A RTICLE III. G ENERATIONS , SOCIAL HOMOGAMY AND STRATIFICATION IN F INLAND , 1700–1910

The paper (III) investigates social homogamy in the western and the southern parts of Finland between the years 1700 and 1910. It measures social homogamy based on the social origin of spouses, in other words, based on their parents’ social status. The 10Gen database has been reconstructed using population registers starting from the early 18^th century. The individuals were divided into upper, freeholder, tenant and labour classes.

We observed strong social homogamy in Finland, as approximately 72% of spouses had the same social origin in 1700–1860 and 59% in 1861–1910. The strength of social homogamy was largely due to the persistence of farming as an occupation, with farmers comprising the largest social group and having homogamy rates of 84% in 1700–1860 and 74% in 1861–1910. On the other hand, social homogamy was much weaker in other classes: while 42% of tenants married homogamously in 1700–1860, only 38% did so in 1861–1910, while the corresponding percentages for those in the labour class were just 15% and 24%, respectively. It is possible that the small class size of the upper classes forced them to contract more heterogamous marriages, since the percentages were as low as 30% in 1700–1810 and 29% in 1861–1910.

In the agrarian world, owning land was crucial for the livelihood of the family, which placed pressures on familial marriage strategies. We identified long-run patterns that highlight the significance of and identity derived from owning land. However, the previous four-class classification does not account for the contrast between landowners and the landless. Thus, we characterised

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homogamy also as a twofold classification: landowners (upper classes and farmers) and landless (tenants and labourers). When using this twofold type classification system, homogamy rates were as high as 76% in 1700–1860 and 69% in 1861–1910. During the years 1700–1860, homogamy was as high as 69% for grooms with an upper class origin, whereas it was 85% for those with an origin as farmers. On the other hand, 49% of grooms with origins as tenants married a woman from the landless group in 1700–1860, while the corresponding percentage was 54% for grooms from in the labour class. When comparing the twofold homogamy percentages with the latter period of 1861–1910 (upper class 73%, farmer 75%, tenants 56% and labour 62%), we find that homogamous marriages strengthened among those in the upper, tenant and labour classes, whereas marriages among those with a background as farmers became more heterogamous during the research period.

Marriage patterns were quite strict in agrarian Finland, and they remained relatively stagnant during the research period. These findings support the arguments presented in the previous studies that a great social divide existed between landowners and the landless. Although the regressions and odds ratios presented in the research support these previous findings, some evidence also suggests that prevailing marriage patterns began to weaken slightly during the latter half of the 19^th century.

However, the initial effects of modernisation and industrialisation were modest with respect to marriage patterns. Lastly, homogamy was quite strong among those in the freeholder class compared with those in other classes.

Marriage patterns are influenced by interactive forces: individual preferences (i.e. love), family interests (marriage strategies), group pressure (local power and social norms), and structural restrictions (size and division of the marriage markets). To a certain degree, these four forces are intertwined and are difficult to separate from each other. However, we found that the odds for heterogamous marriages increased when there was a larger age difference between spouses, when one spouse remarried, when one spouse was an illegitimate child or in cases involving a single mother.

In addition, especially the first marriages of those in the labour class increased the odds for heterogamous marriages. The findings suggest that the asset of being young mattered, and it gave more possibilities for young spouses from the labour classes to climb up the social ladder as well as a widow/widower from a higher social group to marry someone from a lower social group. Moreover, it is clear that being an illegitimate child or single mother was quite stigmatising.

The evidence suggests that industrialisation and urbanisation gradually began weakening the prevailing traditions. The odds for heterogamous marriages were considerably higher when living in more urbanised or industrialised regions. Also, people who migrated entered into more heterogamous marriages. Moreover, the findings indicate that heterogamous marriages occurred more frequently

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among people living in regions with weaker future prospects (poor relief recipients, Finnish-speaking population and those emigrating).

Arguably, the family institution was, and still is, perhaps the most important social institution in an individual’s life. Marrying was and is one of the most important events in a person’s life-course and can either enforce or severely hamper the social and material capital of families. Our model explained roughly 57 to 80 per cent of the marriage patterns, which indicates the relatively strong influence of family interests, social norms and structural restrictions over individual preferences (i.e.

love). These findings also signify that spouses have tended to prefer partners from a similar background throughout history.

6.4. Article IV. The Land of Opportunity? Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Finland, c. 1700–2000

This paper (IV) investigates intergenerational occupational mobility in Finland between 1700 and 2000. We investigated the intergenerational persistence of ‘class’ by investigating how parents’

occupation predicts the occupation of their sons. To reconstruct family linkages, we utilised population registers (1700–2000) as well as modern census data (1950–2000).

Social mobility was relatively mild in 18^th-century Finland since farmers’ sons retained their parents’ social status due to strong possibilities to obtain land of their own to cultivate (Figure 3). At the time, Finland primarily had a peasant economy where other social classes only played a minor role in social stratification. During the research period, the absolute rate of social mobility increased considerably since the share of farmers, a quite immobile population, diminished. On the other hand, the relative mobility metric (Altham statistic) shows that intergenerational persistence first declined during the early 19^th century, whereas it peaked during the late 19^th century. We argue that the gradually expanding population produced a scarcity of farmland, which caused increasing downward social mobility from the farmer class in the 19^th century. At first, this development increased social mobility, but the pattern reversed course with the formation of a larger social underclass. During the 19^th century, the empirical evidence suggests that the social divide expanded between the two extremes of the social hierarchy spectrum (white collar versus labour classes).

In contrast, social mobility increased during the first three quarters of the 20^th century along with modernisation and equalisation. Remarkably, educational reforms that began in the 1920s but accelerated after WWII and into the 1970s increased the possibilities for the descendants of those from the labour, crofter and farmer classes to pursue white-collar occupations. This equalisation process halted or even reversed course in the last quarter of the 20^th century. However, worsening

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equal opportunities occurred between parents and sons, whereas not in links between parents and daughters. The observation that boys with a labour class origin have diminishing possibilities to ascend the social ladder is in line with the growing gaps in educational attainment and PISA scores between genders.

The Nordic cases (Finland and Norway) show highly similar social mobility patterns during the 19^th and the 20^th centuries, whereas access to equal opportunities weakened during the same period in the US and UK. Despite the fact that intergenerational occupational mobility is still relatively rigid, we could argue that the Nordic countries are today much closer to the land of opportunity.

Figure 3. The development of social mobility in Finland, c. 1700–2000 (Altham statistic, parent-son).

Sources: see text.

Notes: for further details about A) Finnish classes and B) international classes, see article IV: Table 1, columns 4 and 5. Year refers to a son’s birth year before 1950, whereas it refers to the year when the occupations were captured in the periods 1950–75 and 1975–2000. Ideally, the same definition for year should be used; however, adequately capturing the precise year of the occupations requires extensive data handling.

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28

-1799 1800-1849 1850-1879 1880-1899 1900-1929 1930-1960 1950-1975 1975-2000

A. Finnish classes B. International classes

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↑ LESS OPPORTUNITIES

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