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2.1 Theoretical perspectives to emotions

2.1.2 Regulatory focus theory and emotions Basic premises of regulatory focus theory

Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998) is a social psychological theory of self-regulation (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). Self-self-regulation refers to the cognitive, affective,

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and behavioural processes that allow for people to guide their goal-directed activities under different circumstances (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Karoly, 1993). Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two general strategies that people employ in goal attainment:

promotion focus and prevention focus (Dholakia et al., 2006; Gino & Margolis, 2011;

Higgins, 1997). These regulatory foci connect to emotion-elicitation in that the positive and negative emotional responses to attaining and falling short of attaining a goal should be qualitatively distinct, depending on whether the goal is conceived through a promotion- or prevention-focused strategy of goal attainment (Higgins, 1997; 2002).

Promotion focus relates to the orientation towards pursuing hopes, aspirations, and desires, and to attaining positive outcomes (Higgins, 2002; Pham & Avnet, 2004). Needs that relate to growth and development are salient in promotion-focused strategies of goal attainment (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 1997; 2002). On the other hand, prevention focus relates to the orientation of attending to obligations and responsibilities, and to maintaining desirable states of affairs by avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997; Pham & Avnet, 2004). In prevention-focused strategies of goal attainment, security-related needs are salient (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 1997; 2002).

Whether a person is attuned to promotion or prevention focus in goal attainment depends on dispositional and situational factors. On the one hand, for some individuals, promotion-focused strategies are chronically more accessible than prevention-promotion-focused strategies, and vice versa (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Pham & Avnet, 2004). This implies that individuals can have a general tendency to view particular tasks or forms of consumption as the means to prevent negative outcomes, or to advance positive outcomes. On the other hand, the framing of particular situations, and situational primes can enhance the activation of either promotion or prevention focus (Higgins, 1997; 2002; Pham & Avnet, 2004; 2009). For instance, a task-specific framing that directs attention either towards making progress or towards avoiding mistakes as a criterion of performance is likely to enhance the activation of promotion and prevention foci, respectively (Higgins et al., 1997; Pham & Avnet, 2004).

Furthermore, either a promotion- or prevention-focused strategy of goal attainment can be adopted, depending on whether the pursued goal relates more to needs of growth and development, or of security and responsibilities (Chernev, 2004; Chitturi et al., 2007).

The nature of emotions elicited under promotion and prevention foci

Regulatory focus theory maintains that under promotion focus, the qualitative nature of emotions that are induced by the attainment and the failure to attain a positive outcome range between cheerful and dejection-related emotions (Brockner & Higgins, 2001;

Higgins, 1997; Higgins et al., 1997). On the other hand, under prevention focus, the emotions induced by the success and the failure to prevent a negative outcome are expected to range between quiescent and agitated (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 1997;

Higgins et al., 1997).

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For instance, if a person is more heavily promotion- than prevention-focused in a gambling context, a gained win is expected to be perceived predominantly as the attainment of a positive outcome. Consequently, under promotion focus the win should induce cheerful emotional responses, such as excitement, elation, or delight (Chitturi et al., 2007; Higgins, 2002; Higgins et al., 1997). Conversely, under promotion focus a gambling loss is expected to be seen primarily as a failure to attain a positive outcome, and the loss should induce dejection-related emotions such as disappointment, discontent, or sadness (Chitturi et al., 2007; Higgins et al., 1997; Higgins, 2002).

If the person playing the game is more strongly prevention-focused than promotion-focused, a win is more likely to be perceived as the avoidance of a negative outcome.

Consequently, under prevention focus the win should induce quiescence-related emotions such as relief, relaxation, or pride for preventing a negative outcome (Chitturi et al., 2007;

Higgins et al., 2001; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007). On the other hand, under prevention focus a gambling loss should be perceived as the failure to prevent a negative outcome, and the loss should induce agitated emotions such as anxiety, anger, fear, or guilt (Brockner &

Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 2002; Higgins et al., 1997). Figure 2 presents an illustration of the affective dimensions that regulatory focus theory postulates, and how they relate to goal attainment under promotion and prevention foci.

Figure 2 An illustration of the affective dimensions postulated in regulatory focus theory and their association with goal attainment under promotion and prevention foci.

Agitation

(e.g. anxiety, anger, fear, guilt)

Quiescence

(e.g. relief, calmness, relaxation)

Low arousal High arousal

Dejection

(e.g. disappointment, discontent, sadness)

Cheerfulness

(e.g. cheerfulness, elation, delight)

Negative valence Positive valence

Gain

Loss Non-loss

Non-gain

Promotion focus Prevention focus

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The perspective of regulatory focus theory to emotion-elicitation has elements of a dimensional approach to emotions (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell, 2003; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The essence of dimensional theories of affect is that they postulate a limited number of qualitative dimensions that characterize the nature of felt affective states at a particular point in time (Johnson & Stewart, 2005; Watson

& Spence, 2007). In regulatory focus theory, the nature of emotional responses is tied to goal pursuit, and defined as a combination of the dimensions of valence and arousal (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). On the dimension of valence, an emotional response to goal attainment and loss is expected to induce emotional responses of positive and negative valence, respectively (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Johnson & Stewart, 2005; Richins, 1997;

Russell, 2003). Furthermore, the emotional response to goal attainment or loss can range on the dimension of arousal between very calm and passive affective states, and highly activated and alert states (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Johnson & Stewart, 2005; Richins, 1997; Russell, 2003). Thus, the non-loss of a prevention goal induces quiescent positive emotions of low arousal, and the gain of a promotion goal induces cheerful positive emotions of high arousal. In contrast, the loss of a prevention goal induces agitated negative emotions of high arousal, and the non-gain of a promotion goal induces dejection-related negative emotions of low arousal.

As regulatory focus theory and its premises about emotion-elicitation are closely associated with goal attainment, it is applicable for understanding the emotions that arise in consumption-contexts and in relation to products and attributes that serve different types of goals for consumers, for example (Chernev, 2004; Chitturi et al., 2007; Louro et al., 2005).

While regulatory focus theory ties the nature of emotional responses to goal attainment, an even more detailed account of the factors that influence the specific nature of emotional responses is provided by appraisal theories of emotions. Furthermore, appraisal theories of emotions also provide insights into the behavioural implications of discrete emotions. In this study, the appraisal approach provides an essential background for interpreting the antecedents, and the motivational properties of discrete emotions in food choice contexts.

The following section discusses appraisal theories of emotions and their propositions about the elicitation and the implications of discrete emotions.

2.1.3 Appraisal theories of emotions