Regime Proposals

This section presents a general theorization about two of the proposals outlined before. Let us remember that one proposal is a binding regime that focuses on one arms category (SALW) and the other proposal is the inclusion of this previous binding regime into a broader security regime with the application of cooperation and development policies, in social and economic areas, directly with the arms recipients (in this case who are mostly in Africa and in the Middle East).

Considering the current Common Position and other EU policies on arms control, part of the formation process and the framework of a future regime already exist. Even if the formation stages can be considered as complete, with the inclusion of the principles and norms of the Common Position, the proposals presented should consider further adaptations to diminish the presence and trade of military means among the participants.

The negotiation stage would make a clear difference and innovation from previous arms control agreements. If the recipient countries were full participants of the regime, then the regulations would not be applied to arms suppliers and recipients only. Instead, recipients would have to fulfil regulations regarding the use and destination of the armament.

In the next table, the features and differences between the actual policy and the proposals presented are compared; this information is according to all the approaches presented within regime theory.

Arms Control

The binding regulation of specific armament and the comprehensive security regime start from the contractarian perspective, where participants recognize common problems and interests.

The promotional issues stay the same in the three instruments. The comprehensive regime combines coordination policies including social and economic measures to change behaviour and practices; it creates a cognitive process to modify dynamics applying a binding control on arms transfers with generative characteristics. The comprehensive regime must be a negotiated type, where the interests of all actors are considered to reach a strong consensus;

spontaneous and imposed regime varieties are out of question. Its main innovation is the inclusion of international monitoring and the appearance of new practices of cooperation; the comprehensive regime proposal can begin with specific regulation to SALW, but its final aim is to implement a wider control over many categories of conventional arms as the actual Common Position. It is clear that the regulations are related directly to the criteria used and the actions taken when transferring armament.

EU

The comprehensive regime may have procedural characteristics in the sense that dispositions to control such transfers can be adapted according to the reactions of the states and the problems presented during its operation. The generative regime features are relevant to this proposal since it involves the creation of new social practices. In this case, the situation goes with the adoption of the EU policies on arms control by other states, as the internalization of norms and principles may share values and interests.

The degree of formalization has a stricter character with the inclusion of a biding status and the possibility to implement international norms. As previous dispositions contemplated in the Code of Conduct have not been followed, it is required high disposition and coherence in what is trying to be regulated, certainly because of the broad scope and the exceptionally high regulations that they include. The proposals have specific functions in the regulation of arms exporters and monitoring the behaviour of the recipients when receiving armament. The compliance functions remain close to the binding dispositions accorded in previous stages;

mechanisms of monitoring need to be independent of the government influence to keep effectiveness in optimal degree.

The operationalization of the comprehensive regime can also include the creation of an international organization, with the inclusion of NGOs, to control the application of the norms, and to review the behaviour of the participants. This regime could achieve in long-term, a governmental dimension if an institutionalization process takes part and laws and reliable institutions come into action. For example, this happened with the IAEA and the Non-proliferation regime. The substantive components of the regime would lie in the articles of the Common Position where the rights and rules of the Member States are specified; the implementation component must be accorded with mechanisms to fulfil the rules. From the constitutive perspective, the Common Position has the capacity to influence their behaviour and interests; however, the regulatory character is a new feature in the actual Common Position, therefore, its enforcement is yet to be assessed.

Effectiveness, compliance, and enforcement are deeply related to the proper operation of the regime. The lack of an authority that ensures compliance has been the weakness of international regimes, especially regarding regulatory regimes. In this case, the EU appears as the authority in charge that generates a collective choice of applying binding regulations on arms transfers. Modest aims at the beginning are more likely to consolidate a practice that can

be improved upon in successive steps. The non-compliance threat is diminished because of a higher authority that would have the means to control. This kind of security regime does not involve the weakening of the security of any participant; it tries to regulate a public-private economic activity with political implications.