Postmodernity
Postmodernity has been a fashionable concept in academic writing during recent years.
Its popularity has, however, rather added to than reduced the confusion around it.
There exists little agreement over what is meant by it either among those who employ it or among those who would like to dismiss it altogether. Basically, there are three intertwined senses of the word ‘postmodern’ (and similar ones of ‘modern’): (1) postmodernity as an era, (2) postmodern philosophies as attempts to grasp the peculiarities of that era, and (3) postmodernism, that is, responses to and expressions of the first two in the aesthetic realm (architecture, literature, visual arts etc.). What is understood by these three different categories is then a point of further debate. It is important to keep in mind that there does not exist any postmodern school or orthodox postmodern theory but a host of different writers. Therein lies the confusion about the term: for some people postmodernity refers only to Jean-Jacques Lyotard, who first brought the concept to public knowledge (see 1979; cf. Jameson 1991, 60–61), whereas others also add Jean Baudrillard and maybe a few others to the list. Recently, it has become more and more common to use it as an umbrella term to put together writers such as Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Cixous, Spivak, and de Man. This latter view is also the one I have adopted in this thesis: for me the concept
‘postmodern’ functions as a loose label for the various critical theories of the past few decades.
In this context, my emphasis is on the first two senses of the word: first of all, I use the concept of postmodernity as a shorthand for our contemporary late-modern (Western) world. Fully aware of the fuzziness of the concepts of ‘modern’ and
‘postmodern’, I still find the notion of postmodernity a useful theoretical concept that can be used to designate a particular cultural context. I tend to agree with Fredric Jameson’s view that however many contradictory and conflicted meanings the notion of postmodernity has acquired, it is so essentially part of contemporary discourse that it is hardly possible not to use it (1991, xxii). This, I think, is true of recent translation theories as well. But since the word ‘postmodern’ has acquired so many different meanings, some of them significantly more coloured and more limited than in my usage, I find it important to devote some time and space to clarifying how I perceive postmodernity. My basic tenet is that there are in our contemporary world certain peculiar and distinctive traits which can be called ‘postmodern’. If modernity can be epitomised by faith in progress, growth and improvement, postmodernity can be characterised as an era of lost hopes and ambivalent feelings: technological progress has turned out to be a mixed blessing, causing as many problems as it has solved;
economic growth has been achieved in some already affluent countries only by the exploitation of others; societal improvements have not solved social problems, and
extended projects like the welfare state have been eroded; and education and self-improvement are no longer seen as guarantees for success in life. In many ways, we currently live in ‘a runaway world’ (Giddens 1990, 151; see also Bauman 1993; Beck 1995).
This disillusionment has been called a variety of names, such as high or radicalised modernity (Anthony Giddens), reflexive modernity (Ulrich Beck), late capitalism (Fredric Jameson) or, most commonly, postmodernity. All these names imply not a disruptive shift with modernity but a changed mode of thinking.
Postmodernity has been defined as modernity becoming aware of itself (Bauman 1993;
see also Giddens 1990; Jameson 1991). In other words, modernity turns into postmodernity when it starts to contemplate and reflect on its own aims and results.
Or, conversely, postmodernity can be seen as a critique of modernity, or the state in which modernity begins to self-erode. Either way, postmodernity is still closely tied to modernity or even internal to it: it is not a departure into new directions, but it highlights the impasses reached in modern paths. It shows us the limits of modernity (cf. Drucilla Cornell’s renaming of deconstruction as ‘the philosophy of the limit’). To what extent postmodernity entails an irreversible shift away from modernity, or to what extent it is merely a temporary crisis, remains to be seen. But at the moment, the project of modernity is in many ways in serious trouble: ‘we are left with questions where once there appeared to be answers’ (Giddens 1990, 49).
A linear view on theoretical paradigms presupposes a clear-cut division of predecessors and successors and necessitates an answer to the question whether or not the shift from modernity to postmodernity has taken place. A less linear approach allows for the ambivalence: ‘Perhaps we live in a postmodern age, perhaps not’
(Bauman 1997, 79). Perhaps we are all Blendlinge (see Chapter 4.2. below), one foot resting securely on the edifice of modernity, the other already feeling the foothold trembling. The relation between modernity and postmodernity is less a clear-cut chronological succession than an unsteady coexistence. For example, the European Union is a modern project par excellence, aiming at centrally controlled differences and cohesion among the Member States, but at the same time it promotes postmodern tendencies by diminishing the role of another modern project, the nation-state.
Philosophers associated with postmodern views have become notorious for extremist statements (often quoted as celebrating ‘the end of history’ or ‘the death of the author’, or claiming that ‘there is no truth’ or that ‘there is nothing outside the text’; cf. Chapter 2.2. below), as well as for their often cryptic or even apocalyptic style of writing (see, e.g., Lehman 1991, 103–113 et passim.). It is therefore not surprising that they have not won unanimous support (although some commentators consider the new style of writing to be the best and most entertaining input of writers like Derrida; see Rorty 1993). It is also quite typical, among their friends and enemies alike, to take their claims at face value, without any attempt at historicising or contextualising them.6 The lack of any historical perspective is, by now, a severe problem. Many of the theorists have had an academic career of thirty years or more, and in addition to differences of opinion between those grouped under the heading of postmodern theories, any serious scholarly attempt at analysing them would have to try and take into account the different phases and changes in the texts of any one philosopher over the years. However, texts dating from different periods and different
writers are often mingled together so that all differences are blurred. Within translation studies we should be especially alert to this problem since the discipline has been slow to participate in the discussion of postmodernity, and the ‘new’ ideas have only found their way into translation theory in the 1990s – sometimes more than twenty years after their first publication.
Postmodern theories are naturally not exempt from the important academic process of critique and self-correction. But it is deplorable that critiques of postmodern theories are often characterised by deliberate simplifications and exaggerations, and little attention is paid to the fact that we are not dealing with a unified movement.
Postmodern positions are depicted as either ridiculous and unacademic nonsense or as a form of juvenile cynicism only suited for angry young men dressed in black (see, e.g., Searle 1993; Airaksinen 1997). This caricature is then easy to dismiss. The resulting arguments against this self-created ‘postmodernism’ are sometimes wild enough to be amusing. For example, Airaksinen argues that supporters of the Greens cannot enjoy postmodern art, and vice versa: if you support postmodern theories you cannot truly care for ecological and environmental issues7 (1997, 129). The mock image of postmodern attitudes and postmodern theories, centred around the alleged amorality and laissez-faire attitude, distorts discussions of postmodern positions.
Instead of an exchange of pertinent arguments, they often become quasi-religious battles where everyone is called upon to take sides.
All this has made ‘postmodern’ a notorious label, and as a result, there is a tendency even among the proponents of postmodern positions to try and disentangle their favourite writers from its spell. A culmination of sorts may be Barry Smart’s conclusion that none of the philosophers he has discussed as major figures of postmodern theory (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard and Vattimo) may in fact be appropriately designated ‘postmodern’ (1999, 61). The issue of whether Derrida should be listed among the postmoderns or not has been controversial. Whereas critical commentators tend to see him as a descendant of the postmodern line starting from Nietzsche, many of his epigones have attempted to salvage him from the declining reputation of postmodern theories by claiming that he is not one of the bad guys. For example, Cristopher Norris (1990) and Drucilla Cornell (1992) give lengthy explanations as to why Jacques Derrida cannot be considered a postmodern theorist.
Admittedly, Derrida himself does not use the word ‘postmodern’. But in my vocabulary postmodern theories include a variety of critical approaches, and among them deconstruction is one of the more moderate responses to the postmodern condition (cf. Arrojo’s view of deconstruction as the strictest and most ruthless reading strategy among postmodern theories in 1998b).
The critique or even hostility towards postmodern philosophies can partially be explained by the extremism and ambivalence which tend to leave postmodern philosophers vulnerable to criticism. It is often easy to continue their line of argument ad absurdum, creating a ridiculous image of the whole theoretical framework (see, for instance, the extension of Derrida’s notion of différance to the act of walking in Tallis 1988, 216). However, I suspect the hostility may also occasionally be a projection of an unwillingness to accept some features of today’s world (Tallis’s critique, for instance, is motivated by his wish to raise the status of realistic fiction within literary circles). Accusing postmodern theories of introducing attitudes and tendencies that
can, in fact, be interpreted as corollaries of modernity, some critics seem to be blaming the mirror for the image they are not happy with (on modern morality see Smart 1999).
A good case in point is the often expressed claim that postmodern theories reject the possibility of any reality outside the play of textuality (see also Chapter 5.4. below).
The simplistic counterargument, then, is to knock on a nearby table and question whether it exists or not. The debate is, in my view, rather pointless. It would be absurd to argue that physical objects do not exist. But it would be equally futile to argue that our understanding of the world is in no way linked to representations and interpretations. The real point is located elsewhere: our world is becoming ever more mediated and textual/digital, and instead of authentic experiences we are often confronted with virtuality, hyper reality or ‘simulacra’. One could argue that the most extended metaphor of postmodernity is the shopping mall. Instead of city streets and piazzas (urbanisation being one of modernity’s major projects), the shopping mall offers an artificial, simulated city, climatised and sterilised from the unwanted aspects of real cities (cf. the new TV wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans). It also epitomises the overall conversion of people from citizens to consumers, as well as the exclusion of those with not enough spending power.
To gain understanding of this shopping mall world, and of the ethical challenge it poses, I have found it useful to resort to theories that try to grasp its particularities and build on them. This, in other words, relates to the second sense of ‘postmodern’, postmodern theories and philosophical approaches. From among the various approaches I have selected two theorists: Jacques Derrida and Zygmunt Bauman. I have chosen to emphasise deconstruction because among postmodern theories it is the one most closely connected with translation theory (see Chapter 3.2. below). The main focus is thus on Derrida and deconstruction. Bauman, then, is extremely useful as a point of reference, his analyses of the postmodern condition functioning like a mirror on which to reflect the various approaches. Significantly, the two writers complement each other fruitfully and offer a rich array of viewpoints on the issues of ethics and translation.