Participation Inclusion

This formulation of inclusion emphasizes migrants’ engagement with and participation in society and the removal of obstacles which obfuscate societal interaction. Introducing anti-discrimination legislation to combat labour market exclusion is a cogent example. Inclusion is hereby defined as the “realization of full and equal participation in the economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of life in the [immigrants’] new country”

(Omidvar & Richmond 2003, p.1). Such a participation is envisaged to be both systemic, referring to the macro level of contributing to the maintenance of societal institutions, and social by supporting people’s relational and operative networks (social capital) and feelings of belonging.

In this liberal conception of inclusion, the responsibility to participate is also enjoined on mainstream society. Autochthonous groups are encouraged to join members of minority communities in celebrating their ethnic and religious festivals, but also to “contribute” to society’s diversity in general. Rainer Bauböck (2008) refers to this as celebration multiculturalism.

It is inclusion lite which ignores systemic structural inequalities and privileges while electing to focus instead on maximizing migrants’ access to educational, labour market and social opportunities which have traditionally favoured majority populations. While this interpretation tacitly recognizes that inclusion is primarily a state and societal responsibility, there is a naiveté about what is required in order to achieve inclusion’s egalitarian ideals. This is epitomized in the unreflective comments of some politicians which equate having a job, or a certain language dexterity with a panacea for all manners of social exclusion experienced by migrant residents.

In essence, arguments characterizing a Participation Inclusion outlook can be divided into those which see integration into employment and other state structures as sufficient, notwithstanding society’s structural inequalities, and those that emphasize the self-determination of migrants in negotiating the nature and boundaries of such inclusion efforts, even if this has implications for present power structures. The latter view stresses the importance of democratic citizenship, which presupposes that “inclusion is not only an adequate share of resources but equality of participation in the determination of both individual and collective life chances” (Askonas &

Stewart 2000, p.9). Here, equality is interpreted as “one of (migrant) role sharing in the mainstream of public life” where they become accultured when they are able to assume “more socially visible and valued roles of responsibility in economic and social life” (Martikainen, Valtonen &

Wahlbeck 2012, p.142). Social exclusion in this conception takes place when welfare state measures prove inadequate in ensuring sufficient spheres of migrant participation or in devoting sufficient resources to inclusionary projects. The resulting migrant disenfranchisement exacerbates existing ethnic hierarchies which are then inherited by the second and third generation.

However, the participation discourse as a guarantor of social inclusion suffers from several deficiencies. While the importance of a shared discursive space is a necessary step towards inclusion, it falls short of interrogating the power dynamics at play in the process of migrant participation (Leung 2008). By skirting or downplaying the role of ingrained and pervasive structural inequalities, as well as the privileges these endow upon dominant white groups, participation will remain an interaction among unequal partners and create new arenas of exclusion. Thus, it is possible to be well integrated socially while being poorly integrated at a systemic level (Eriksen 2015). Participation Inclusion does not envisage a fundamental reimagining or reconstitution of society. In recognizing the structural upheaval which would follow in the wake of literally implementing egalitarian understandings of participation where “all is up for grabs” and no one is entitled by birth, length of residence, status or citizenship to more voice or influence, a kind of progressive inclusion has been proposed instead. Here migrants’ inclusion in the host society is achieved through the gradual extension of their rights which, in time, approximate

those of national citizens. Factors taken into consideration in such a bestowment of rights are the duration of migrant residence and citizenship status in the country, as well as migrants’ social and economic ties to the host society (Farahat 2009).

A compelling example of progressive inclusion is encapsulated in the citizenship practices of many Western nations where the attainment of citizenship has been formulated as the prize at the end of the integration road. This prize is contingent upon complying with a number of conditions.

Akin to a “means-testing” of civic integrationism, these conditions revolve around obligatory participation in language and integration courses, citizenship oaths and exams (Guild et.al 2009). Sweden represents an important exception to this rule in that it sees citizenship as a precondition for, instead of an outcome of, inclusion (Borevi 2012). Measuring inclusion based upon the gradual statutory extension of, among others, citizenship rights is problematic for several reasons. In the first instance, it presumes that migrants share our interpretation of such extensions as “inclusive”

instead of perceiving them as parsimonious expansions of the liminal space of “almost belonging”, of “almost” achieving some semblance of equal treatment. Secondly, it exposes a growing rift between the state’s formal acceptance of newcomers and majority society’s everyday acceptance of such people. In nations where there is a clearly defined, dominant group that delineates the borders of belonging according to ethnic and or racial categories, this becomes particularly true. Here, the acquisition of formal rights gives no indication of the extent of practical national belonging granted by the dominant cultural community (Eliassi 2013, p.176).

Questions of cultural descent and myopic definitions of approved cultural practices, especially in times when the dominant community feels threatened, weigh far heavier than state acceptance (Hage 2000).

Ultimately, Participation Inclusion is still largely an inclusion on the terms of dominant society where the rights granted can also be taken away and the levels of migrant participation and self-determination depend largely on the boundaries majorities set for them. While the responsibilities of the host society are far more pronounced in such interpretations, they share the goal of social cohesion with civic integrationism. Normative standards describing good and bad diversity still exist. These are rooted

within a non-negotiable set of core liberal values, enforced adherences to which seek to stave off Überfremdung¹⁰. Inclusion on these terms sanctions democratic political systems to discriminate all those who do not seem to embrace these values. License to discriminate is being granted by the commitment of working “against discrimination” such as by removing certain obstacles to migrant social, political and economic participation.

Social “equality” is only granted to minorities when they are judged to be adapting in ways that align with our definitions of good diversity.