Musical action and the apprenticeship tradition

Elliott is interested in changing epistemology from “words and other symbols” to that which is manifested in action⁷²⁶. Musical performance becomes then the focus of interest and manifests the fi nal musical understanding. Elliott’s strong emphasis on performance refers to what Schrag calls the ‘apprenticeship tradition’⁷²⁷. In the apprenticeship tradition the main interest is to illustrate how acquisition of practical know-how happens by modelling, demonstration, imitation and application.

According to the apprenticeship tradition, the apprentice fi rst learns the simplest parts of the occupation, then moves on to the more engaging and skilled aspects. When this tradition is applied in education, the basic assumption is, as Bruner describes, that the child does not know how to do x and that the child can learn how to do x by being

725 Bruner 1996, 36.

726 Elliott 1993, 66.

727 Schrag 1992.

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shown⁷²⁸. The imitation model presumes that the child recognizes the given goals, the means to achieve the goals and that he/she wants and tries to achieve the goals, i.e., to do x. The adult and expert demonstrates how to ‘do it right’ leading the novice into the secrets of the guild. The similarities between Elliott’s philosophy of music education and the general principles of musical apprenticeship traditions is found also in their examining even general music education from an axis of novice versus expert. Knieter, for instance, writes that Elliott’s philosophy can be related to the old conservatory tradition⁷²⁹. Regelski criticizes Elliott for placing the emphasis on

“professional standards” and traditions⁷³⁰. On the other hand, Regelski also questions whether we need to fi x the educational perspective in musical performance in the way Elliott does. He, for instance, writes that similarly as “certainly 99% of the devotees of ballet have never themselves taken ballet lessons, let alone have mastered the choreography of a particular repertory”, so can dedicated “music lovers” have no competence as performers⁷³¹.

Although I am not sure if it has been Elliott’s intention to see music exclusively from the angle of novice versus expert performance, there is a reason why this critique is made. According to Elliott, the way we get to know and understand a particular kind of music is by making and taking part in the musical action. From this it follows, according to Elliott, that if we expect concert listeners to understand music through an evaluative attitude of some degree, they need to “possess some degree of competency in musicing themselves”⁷³². Although in Schrag’s classifi cation the apprenticeship tradition is an educational tradition, and in Elliott’s philosophy it is an ultimate view of musical knowledge and understanding, these two share something of their basic rationale: in the apprenticeship system, the practitioner has to be able to perform in the fi eld of study and when mastering the fi eld of study, to be able to explain the rationale behind the performance. For Elliott, this “explaining” is musical thinking-in-action a kind of demonstrative explaining, which does not necessarily result in a verbalized form.

The apprenticeship approach can be criticized for being if not fi xed, at least conservative in its relationship to tradition. At fi rst Elliott seems to avoid this

728 Bruner 1996, 53.

729 Knieter 2000.

730 Regelski 2000a, 72.

731 Ibid., 64.

732 Elliott 1995, 57. The term ‘musicing’ that Elliott introduces is not referring to singing and playing only but also to composing, conducting, improvising and arranging (ibid., 161).

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critique by relating the thinking-in-action kind of behaviour to refl ective-thinking kind of behaviour. This musical refl ection-in-action is basically open to various changes within the tradition. Music making, for Elliott, is thoughtful acting, non-verbal refl ective thinking whilst acting, i.e., knowing-in-action. This kind of practical knowledge, which varies according to the level of quality, is often called procedural knowledge as distinguished from so-called propositional knowledge, or knowing-that kind of knowledge. Instead of verbal propositions, knowledgeable musical acting is guided by practical principles and practical concepts although these concepts can be partly verbally expressed as well. The knowledge needed for a particular kind of music making is practice-specifi c by content.⁷³³ As Elliott summarizes, “musicianship is what music makers know how to do with practice-specifi c musical sound patterns in relation to practice-specifi c musical knowing”⁷³⁴. What Elliott means by refl ection in musical action is therefore more in line with traditions than with trying innovative paths in order to break them.

If ‘knowing how’ was for Reimer only one kind of engagement with the musical object, in Elliott’s theory it is the basis on which he builds his notion of musical knowledge. In general the distinction between ‘know how’ and ‘know that’ is most known from Ryle’s philosophy although the idea of knowledge as maker’s knowledge has come up repeatedly in philosophy⁷³⁵. According to Schrag, educators in particular have been attracted to Ryle’s ‘know how’ because it seems to support a more active learning in classrooms⁷³⁶. Know-how is performative knowledge involving operative acts. Elliott explains that formal or verbal propositional musical knowledge is useful in teaching situations but it is not the practical know-how about music making⁷³⁷. Formal knowledge, like various other kinds of instructions, for example knowledge about music history or music theory, has to be embodied into actions to be productive in music making. The distinctions between the knowing-how and knowing-that or knowing-about type of knowledge should not be understood as a question of bodily motion and conceptual thinking. The procedural nature of musical thinking-in-action is not acquired by a “tandem operation of fi rst considering prescriptions and then

733 Elliott 1995, 53-55.

734 Ibid., 55.

735 See Hintikka 1969, 27-29.

736 Schrag 1992, 283. Schrag writes that ‘activity’-oriented pedagogues stemming from Ryle could defend their position without Cartesian dualism between the mind and body. In Ryle’s framework it was possible to move away from the setting where learning was identifi ed with the passive assimilation of propositions. (ibid., 283).

737 Elliott 1995, 61.

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executing them”, as Ryle has explained⁷³⁸. Intelligence in practice is acquired by refl ecting on different aspects of focused actions and their effectiveness in relation to particular musical goals. Procedural knowledge is thus demonstrated in the success of practical actions validating knowledge. Ryle pointed out that rules are applied and not cited⁷³⁹. A teacher can teach a general aspect (modi operandi) of doing something, but the student needs to do the application⁷⁴⁰. Elliott’s point is that our cognition is not passive when we perform and that performing music focuses our cognition differently than listening without operational acts—the very aspect that according to Reimer makes the performer less prone to have aesthetic experiences. Because Elliott sees the possibilities of education in the aspects that are shared and that can be shared and learned, musical expression is not a subjective inspiration but a result of directed and disciplined effort. As Howard also states, musical expression and music education is a matter of “a ‘hands-on’ constructive affair”⁷⁴¹.

Elliott makes a more complex distinction between the layers of musical knowledge than knowing that and knowing how. For Elliott, as for Dewey and later Polanyi, knowledgeable action is not always explicit but intermingled by tacit and subsidiary elements⁷⁴². Therefore, musicianship is constituted essentially by procedural knowledge but also by four other kinds of knowings. This categorizing is taken from a more recent work, from Bereiter and Scardamalia who have developed their categories of knowledge to cover expertise in any fi eld from physics to music⁷⁴³. These expanded knowledge-categories, besides formal and procedural knowledge are informal knowledge, impressionistic knowledge, and supervisory knowledge.

According to Schrag, “[t]he fi rst two categories [formal and procedural] are basically descendants of the Rylean dichotomy, adopted and given new names”⁷⁴⁴. Informal knowledge, the third category, is intermediate between the two fi rst mentioned.

This kind of knowledge plays a critical role in effective problem solving. Elliott explains that informal musical knowledge provides the musician with a sense of

738 Ryle 1949, 40.

739 Ryle 1971, 215-216.

740 Ibid., 460-464.

741 Howard 1988, 140.

742 Caspary (2000) shows how Dewey’s notion of knowing with habits anticipated the views that were later articulated by Polanyi (ibid. 56). Dewey’s uses terms “practical wisdom”,

“skill”, or “organized ability in action” in order to point out the importance of practical arts in knowledge and understanding.

743 Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993.

744 Schrag 1992, 283.

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how to use musical knowings effectively and the ability to judge actions critically within a practice-specifi c musical situation⁷⁴⁵. Impressionistic musical knowledge is an extension of informal musical knowledge as being the affective side of music making⁷⁴⁶. Schrag relates impressionistic knowledge, to what Broudy called ‘knowing with’⁷⁴⁷, which refers to amorphous background knowledge. It is diffi cult to specify and formulate, but yet it can infl uence the stances we adopt a great deal in confronting our circumstances, the world, and ourselves⁷⁴⁸. This feeling for what matters in musical situations is a cognitive process as cognition is not restricted to verbal thinking and is interdependent of feeling. Impressionistic knowledge or musical intuition is, therefore, knowledgeable, educated feelings for a particular kind of doing, an affective but thought-full awareness of what “counts” in musical situations.

As a background feeling for what matters impressionistic knowledge reminds us of Dewey’s ‘mind’ and habits. Dewey’s habit, as explained in Chapter 2.2.2., does not obstruct intelligent thinking but supports the process.

The last category of knowledge that Elliott fi nds important is supervisory knowledge, which can be called metaknowledge or metacognition. It is a combination of an overarching sense of musical-personal judgment, an understanding of the musical obligations and ethics of a given practice and a particular kind of heuristic imagination.

Heuristic imagination, for its part, refers to the ability to project and hold relevant images in one’s mind before, during, and after one’s musical efforts. Supervisory knowledge occurs during efforts to monitor and coordinate all other forms of musical knowing in the pursuit of artistic musical outcomes.⁷⁴⁹ This self-regulatory knowledge is, for example “[k]nowledge of one’s strengths and weaknesses, of ‘what works for me’ and ‘what I can’t seem to get the hang of’”⁷⁵⁰.

In summary, in Elliott’s theory all the above-mentioned aspects of knowledge become knowledge when one is able to manifest them in musical action. Musical knowledge is thus what Dewey called “accomplished knowledge”⁷⁵¹. Musical knowledge is needed for the musical activity to proceed. It points to the cognitive capacity of an individual, to the individual brain in work such as, for instance, knowing how to sing in the Bulgarian folk style.

745 Elliott 1995, 63.

746 Ibid.64-65.

747 Broudy 1977.

748 Schrag 1992, 283-284.

749 Elliott 1995, 66.

750 Schrag 1992, 284.

751 See Chapter 2.4.1.

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In Dewey’s thinking, however, knowledge that is used in purposive (and refl ective) activity and intelligence as an expression of this use were strictly speaking not the same as the process of knowledge. The process of knowing involves a problematic situation in which meanings change after the goals, that the problematic situation reveals, have been achieved. The question is now: Can inquiry change musical meanings without any manifestation in the student’s own musical performance?

Although interaction in the sense of doing things is important and music as practice cannot be cut away from its operational actions, I think we can see inquiry in music education in a wider sense. The “position” of a certain kind of music, the

“sense” it makes in our experience, and how we anticipate particular kinds of musical experiences in the future can change by other “means”, too. Knowing that kind of knowledge for example is not necessarily only contributing to the performance but can also be instrumental in our very attitude and approach to the musical practice in question. Performance is then seen as part of the larger picture of learning and the goals of education. Rather than treating music as an experience in its wider meaning, and knowledge as an instrument for transforming this experience, Elliott sees music as knowledge that is demonstrated in cognitive goal-directed action. We can therefore ask whether Elliott’s approach with its fi rm focus on performance manifests what Dewey himself pointed out to be the general problem with the representative and cognitive theories of art; that they “isolate one strand in the total experience” taking

“it to be the whole”⁷⁵².

Secondly, and due to the above reasons, for Elliott the process of knowing takes place in the individual brain, conscious cognition and performance disposition. In Dewey’s thinking, change of meaning in experience is not necessarily reduced into the vertical perspective in relation to pre-existing traditions and standards. Change in experience in terms of knowledge and inquiry can be a collective effort in the face of a problematic situation where traditions and standards do not work. Such a collective inquiry is, for instance, Barbanell’s example of the art students’ tour to the New York State Museum where the focus is to critically examine the presentation of cultural minorities and to present suggestions for improvement to museum professionals⁷⁵³. The process is not accomplished by an individual only but is a result of a group work.

752 Dewey 1934, 290.

753 Barbanell 1994, 31.

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Dewey emphasized the importance of action in learning. For him, mind and intelligence means purposeful engagement in a course of action, and the development and training of the mind through education requires an environment, which induces such activity⁷⁵⁴. However, Dewey’s pragmatism is not, as he writes, “glorifi cation of action for its own sake”⁷⁵⁵. Action in pragmatism refers to the ongoing process of facing unforeseeable problems in life. In Elliott’s theory, action in musical life is more like separate ‘actions’ as linear processes. The emphasis on music education being a question of musicianship as procedural knowledge has practical implications that are at some point debatable and that have resulted in the drift between his and Reimer’s approach. I have not questioned the role of musical performance in education, since I think it is and should be central– personal engagement in musical performance is irreplaceable–but rather whether we need to fi x ‘knowledge’ in music education onto thinking-in-action while performing and whether music needs to be equated with knowledge. Despite Dewey’s general use of the occupational approach in schools and his emphasis on doing in agency, his understanding art and music as experience seems to better cover the multitude of positions and ways of engagement one can have in musical events and musical life. Knowledge in general exists in relation to these positions and engagements in the search for musical experiences.

In document Bridging experience, action, and culture in music education (sivua 166-172)