What is sometimes called a benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting mask for an attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be, instead of an endeavor to free them so that they may seek and find the good of their own choice.
Social efficiency, even social service, are hard and metallic things when severed from an active acknowledgment of the diversity of goods which life may afford to different persons, and from faith in the social utility of encouraging every individual to make his own choice intelligent. (Dewey MW 9: 128)
For Dewey, democracy is a form of social life: social activity through participation. However, he did not consider democratization in a pluralist society as an unproblematic task. His contemplations on how to actually engage in inquiry for educational democracy included questioning how to break down the barriers that make individuals’ experiences inaccessible or incommunicable to each other, thus resulting in the socialization of the mind. This engaged social activity is imperative for democracy, and requires a “cultivated imagination for what men have in common and a rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them” (Dewey, MW 9: 128).
To unfold the moral virtue of this cultivated imagination, Dewey stated that there is not a single method, rule, or theory that could solve any situations regarding moral problems. Rather, whilst moral theories may help to provide a sense of direction on how to act in concrete situations, ethical and moral decisions in effect require situational understanding and a capacity to imagine “possible futures” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 113; p. 127). Dewey (MW 9: 366) describes the traits of moral imagination “[o]pen-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility for developing the
consequences of ideas which are accepted”. Tapping into a situation’s possibilities with an appreciation towards the position of the other evokes deliberation through disrupting action that, according to Dewey, can be considered as “a dramatic rehearsal” of moral imagination (Fesmire, 2015, pp. 132-133). In other words, acknowledging the multiplicity of possibilities for acting in problematic situations requires sound deliberation through moral imagination, rather than following a reductionist view of a single moral etiquette as if there was only one solution available to every situation (Fesmire, 2015; Brinkmann, 2013).
Although it is perhaps needless to say, Dewey was also known for his political activism, and made a point of practicing what he preached. His ideas about participatory social inquiry, along with those of other progressive (pragmatist) theorists, have created the foundations for activist scholarship (Oakes & Rogers, 2006, p. 34). Indeed, many contemporary critical educators prefer to call themselves activists. This draws attention strongly not only towards the conjunction of pedagogical practice and political thought, but also to the production of knowledge as activist scholars through active engagements with and for the progression of social movements (Sudbury & Okazawa-Rey, 2009, p. 3). In other words, activist scholarship entails both practice and research initiatives that cannot be detached from each other. Within this understanding of teacher activism as theory and practice, the only goal for teachers as researchers cannot be to “gain heightened awareness” (Kincheloe, McLaren & Steinberg, 2011, pp. 166-167), but rather to act accordingly, through engaging with political action and through voicing stories that may reveal and unfold injustices within educational and/or research contexts, thus making critical education “doable” instead of maintaining some utopian hope (Apple, 2006, p. 260).
In general, the term activism relates to the production of knowledge, policy, and pedagogical practices through active engagements with, and for, social groups that are marginalized by society. In other words, an activist teacher or scholar thinks that engaging with social justice ‘in thought only’ is not enough – rather, they believe in engaging with reflexive action towards social change, in contexts and communities relevant to education and beyond, thus creating new sites for learning and participation (Montaño, López-Torres, DeLissovoy, Pacheco
& Stillman, 2002). In my own dispositioning, activism refers to the processes of addressing challenging research questions, elaborating methodological considerations, and exercising reflexivity, as well as engaging in personal confrontations with my teaching practice throughout the research project, first at Resonaari and later by making use of my own subsequent experiences as a
teacher educator and in other contexts of music education. In any respect, rather than being a manifestation of resistance or discontentment with the status quo, the role of activism in this research project is seen as a positive construct, allowing for reaching beyond the imaginable, feasible, or normative. Thus, Dewey’s idea of moral imagination is helpful for the definition of activism in this research project as a generative and creative way to promote change through “continual reconstruction of practical moral situations” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 128) in scholarly and educational efforts.
Pragmatist researchers acknowledge that since we only can know through action, our reflexive knowing is “necessitated by breakdowns of, and problems with, our activities” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 164). Indeed, during this research project I have learned that reflective practice is not necessarily about caring for ourselves or the surroundings we research, but a more complex process (see also Osberg, 2010).
Rather, the very suspicion of ourselves (MacIntyre, 1999) generates the reflexive process. Theoretical framing for these reflexive suspicions can be found in a theory of complexity that assumes the “nonlinearity, unpredictability and recursivity” of the dynamics of politics, educational practice, methodology, and theory (Biesta &
Osberg, 2010, p. 2). There is no reason to reduce or dim this complexity; rather, it gives a generative aspect to the regularities and irregularities of educational action and interaction. However, as Osberg (2010) states, complexity theories highlight the problem that “the notion of care does not relieve us of responsibility to ‘take care of the future’” (p. 154). Rather, complexity provides a different approach to this responsibility than viewing it in only instrumental terms. In other words, enacting inclusion processes for educational democratization requires more than inventing new methods for teaching, for example, based on a preconceived notion of what is ‘good’ for the students we consider as marginal or excluded (Osberg, 2010, p. 154; see also Young & Mintz, 2008).
Nussbaum’s human capabilities approach (described in section 2.2) is useful when considering how care may actually restrain people from developing and making use of their capabilities in educational contexts that are filtered through special educational or helping professional lenses. Indeed, as suggested both by Nussbaum and Dewey, we need to be able to use imagination to exercise empathetic projection (see Fesmire, 2015) if we are to make political decisions that affect the lives of vulnerable groups of people over whom we have political control. In educational terms, the human capabilities approach should not be seen to have an instrumental value, but rather an intrinsic value that may help educators to cultivate their moral imagination, generating a view of equal humanity of all
people (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 81). Thus, the educator’s or researcher’s responsibility to promote ethical and political educational action towards inclusion and democracy where people can make use of their capabilities calls for an honest “act in the interests of another [...] over whom we have power” (Osberg, 2010, p. 158), principally aiming at empowerment over care (Morris, 1997). In more practical terms, this may be realized through “critical public dialogue” (Oakes & Rogers, 2006, p. 178), inciting confrontation, uncertainty, and complexity that may (only) be engaged through activism.
Oakes and Rogers (2006) identify challenges concerning educational activism within the US context that indeed resonate and take place within this research project as well. First, when conducting an activist inquiry with, rather than about, people who are assigned to a marginalized category, the aims and means of “participatory social inquiry” often conflict with resources and social capital (pp. 176-177), and furthermore, with the expectations of cognitive capacity, thus fortifying inequality. Said Dewey,
Just as Aristotle rationalized slavery by showing how natural it was for those superior by nature to constitute the ends for others who were only tools, so we, while marvelling perhaps at the callousness of the Greek philosopher, rationalize the inequities of our social order by appealing to innate and unalterable psychological strata in the population. (MW 13: 289)
Second, Oakes and Rogers (2006) claim that professionals and policymakers within education enterprise may be reluctant to expose their field for “public deliberation” of activist communities, caused by the excessive control of legislation and administration within schooling (p. 177). Third, and particularly relevant for the reflexive stance in this research project, especially concerning working with people with disabilities as a non-disabled person, is that creating a more egalitarian democracy and more inclusive contexts for education and research by bringing people with different backgrounds together demands acknowledging that no one can cast away their privilege and the burden that privilege brings along – nevertheless doing the work is a risk worth taking (Oakes & Rogers, 2006, p. 178; see also Lincoln & Cannella, 2007; Ryde, 2009; Nind, 2014).
It is therefore not enough that we read about other people’s stories, or even that we join in interaction with each other; we also need to be able, and willing, to imagine and put our souls into each other’s stories (Nussbaum, 1997). It is my belief that imagination is a significant component of exerting political awareness
and attaining an activist profession, but needs to have a moral dimension to it rather than simply one of addressing empathy and care. Hence, besides showing empathy and engaging in action, activist scholars need to attend to the dismantling of power hierarchies, including identifying their own privileges and ownership within educational sites.
Indeed, striving for educational democracy by acknowledging the ethical and political responsibility it entails for teachers, educators, and academics, is something that cannot be taught to people; rather, education needs to be understood as politics itself (Osberg, 2010). In the logic of complexity, envisioning education as “a place for experimentation with the possibility of the impossible” (Osberg, 2010, p. 164) points in the direction of making more use of imagination. This can be understood as both opening up our narrow world-views (Nussbaum, 1997) through gaining “imaginative access to the stigmatized position” of marginalized people (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 109) and, in terms of Dewey’s moral imagination, as an intentional identification of problems that hamper democratic action (Fesmire, 2015). In sum, the lenses for reflexive process towards an activist stance during this research project have evolved through reconsidering inclusive action through broad ethical questions, unsettling my status quo through reconsiderations of critical pedagogy and activism, and exercising uncertainty and complexity as a teacher and teacher educator, and a researcher.