The concept of moral universe has been addressed in numerous ways by different researchers, both directly and often implicitly. What is fundamental to them all is the idea that one’s moral universe delineates to whom we apply moral rules to; in other words, who we are morally obligated to. This varies dramatically between cultures, groups, and individuals, based on an assortment of different reasons.
2.5.1 Schwartz’s moral universe
Schwartz’s (in press) contributions to the topic have been isolated because his revised value survey is being used in this study to operationalize participants’ moral universes.
Therefore, the particular way in which he understands the concept, and universalism more specifically, is directly relevant. Universalism is a complex construct on the self-transcendence side of the value spectrum. Helkama (2012) affirms that universalism (along with benevolence and conformity) has been found to be a primary moral value.
Schwartz (1992) defines universalism as “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature” (p. 12, emphasis his). However, there are indications that universalism does not necessarily apply to “all people and for nature” for everyone who holds it as a value.
It is a person’s moral inclusiveness, specifically, which determines the extent to which universalism genuinely applies to all. Schwartz (2007) identifies moral inclusiveness as an individual’s perception of “the breadth of the community to which people apply moral values and rules of fairness” (p. 711). Schwartz (2007) acknowledges that there is considerable variation in moral inclusiveness between people, within and among
different cultures, partly dependent on how highly each culture socializes its citizens in moral inclusiveness. Broadly, wealthier countries (including Finland) tend to apply universalism to outgroups, whereas poorer countries cannot necessarily afford that luxury (Helkama, 2009). Schwartz distinguishes between those who truly hold
universalism values and those who hold universalism values that are indistinguishable from benevolence values, in order to determine moral inclusiveness. His premise is that
“the meaning of any construct finds expression in the pattern of its semantic or functional associations with other constructs” (p. 714). By that reasoning, to put it simply, he assumes that as long as a person’s universalism values are more highly
correlated with each other and less highly correlated with benevolence values, they are discrete, and the moral inclusiveness of universalism is expected to be high – or at least, not simply applying to one’s circle of close others. (Schwartz, 2007.)
However, as seen in Figures 1 and 2, there is a vast realm of potential moral universes beyond one’s circle of close others, and to consolidate all of these possibilities into one group and suggest they are all similarly morally inclusive seems unduly crude.9
Schwartz et al. (in press) has recently refined the value model, splitting universalism into three groups, concern (equality and protection for others), nature (conservation of the environment), and tolerance (accepting those who are different). This will allow a person’s moral universe to be more readily teased apart, particularly whether it includes the natural world within it or not (see Figure 5 in section 4.2 for the new model).
2.5.2 The animal-human hierarchy
The moral universe has also been touched upon by other social psychologists. Brandt and Reyna (2011) posit a social cognitive chain of being (SCCB), which is an extension of previous work done by Haidt (see e.g., Haidt & Algoe, 2004). The SCCB in essence suggests that, although we do not necessarily articulate it in this way (particularly within science), we still use a modified form of Aristotle’s scala naturae (chain of being), which represented all things, living and otherwise, as part of a hierarchical progression of existence. Aristotle’s chain focused upon human and NH animals, plants, and
minerals, but it was soon taken up as a moral hierarchy, which included demons, angels, devil(s), and god(s). The specifics of the hierarchy are relative culturally, temporally, and idiosyncratically, but it being a progression from the most evil at the bottom to the most good at the top enduringly persists (see Figure 3). (Brandt & Reyna, 2011.)
Brandt and Reyna (2011) argue that, although perhaps not explicitly acknowledged, it is still used nonetheless as a cognitive tool for ordering our moral universe. “Social targets that are considered less moral (on the bottom half of the SCCB) would be perceived as
9 In Schwartz (2007) the indicated disparities in moral inclusion using country differences (such as attitudes toward immigrants) is based only on European data, which renders some of his broader claims unconvincing. This is particularly so since the more problematic of the purportedly high universalism countries were eliminated (Schwartz, 2007). (For example, South Korea; see Lim, 2010, for some of South Korea’s problems with immigrants, among other issues.)
more animal-like and, in extreme cases, even akin to demons and devils. Conversely, social targets that are considered especially moral (on the top half of the SCCB) would be perceived as more saintlike and, in some extreme cases, even akin to God… Thus, we are proposing that the perception of humanity, animality, and divinity have a bidirectional and mutually reinforcing relationship with the moral hierarchy of the SCCB” (Brandt & Reyna, 2011, p. 430). They go on to say that, clearly, the perception
of people as more or less human influences how they are treated. They also note that these positions are not fixed, and are subject to changes in status and development over time. It is also at least somewhat culturally dependent;
that is, the sense of a moral hierarchy is consistent across most cultures, but who populates the levels varies, both by culture and by person. To use the example of
immigrants, depending on the scope of one’s moral universe, they may be included in any category from saints to demons, although they would typically fall somewhere between humans (in general) and nonhuman animals (Brandt & Reyna, 2011.)
The animal-human divide and how people relate to it can be explained by the pairing of this broad concept of SCCB with Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner’s (2000) theory of the sacred-value protection model. They have posited that, beyond solely the intuitive scientist (assessing causality) and intuitive economist (appraising utility) functionalist frameworks discussed by social psychologists, there is quite likely a third dimension, that of intuitive moralist-theologian (protecting sacred
values). They find that intuitive economists are unwilling to compare trade-offs when the subject is taboo or considered morally corrosive (e.g., attaching a monetary value to one’s children), in the same way that intuitive scientists will not use base rates that conflict with moral ideologies (e.g., those that portray women as inferior in a gender-egalitarian culture). This also applies to “heretical
Figure 3. The social cognitive chain of being, showing the
counterfactuals,” which are what-if statements that provide an alternate possibility for something that is viewed as sacred by a particular group (e.g., reflecting on how Jesus’
life would have been different had Joseph left Mary when she got pregnant). The responses to any of these trespasses is moral outrage against the offenders and against those who do not punish the offenders, and/or moral cleansing of oneself, for having been peripherally party to such a transgression. This is both a theoretical precept, and based upon five experiments. (Tetlock et al., 2000.)
In that vein, animal-human continuity would also be seen as a heretical counterfactual to the Judeo-Christian premise that humans (or at least men) were created in the image of God, and NH animals are lesser beings that were created for human use. Moral outrage is often directed at those who do not conform to social norms emphasizing the animal-human divide or hierarchy, such as researchers being derided for espousing notions of animal-human continuity (see e.g., de Waal, 2006, 2009) to animal rights activists or vegetarians being belittled and scorned (see e.g., Einwohner, 2002). Moral cleansing can involve, at its most basic, an activity that volubly reaffirms one’s commitment to the
“right” side, so in this case, it could be something as straightforward as immediately going out and eating a huge steak, or buying a new leather jacket. Both scientific (e.g., evidence of animal-human similarity) and utilitarian (e.g., eliminating human starvation if we all switched to a plant-based diet) conceptions can be dismissed in order to protect the sacred values of human exceptionalism and our dominion over the natural world.
Moscovici (2010) makes a similar point: “The real prejudice focuses on the human/not human, culture/nature and domesticated/wild dichotomy. When we free ourselves from a moral authority that applies only to humans, we feel that we are justified in freely using naked, violent force against others” (p.10).
These factors constrain a person’s moral universe and make it difficult to broaden it to include NH animals. However, Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and Hodson (in press) recently examined whether that very broadening, or extension of moral concern for animals could have “‘spillover’ effects for the expansion of moral concern more generally” (p. 2). They found that linking NH animals to humans did in fact lead to an extension of moral concern more generally. It increased people’s concern for NH animals’ welfare, a concern that also extended to ostracized human groups.
Our moral universe is determined largely by our society, and the basic principles and tenets of that society. This includes, rather significantly in Western cultures, the tenets of science. Thus, the role of NH animals in science, as well as in culture, is crucial and needs to be examined at least in brief, to clarify some of the issues involved in
conducting research involving them. First, the birth and progression of the animal-human divide will be examined, followed by the intersection of attitudes toward NH animals and humans, both historically and empirically. Next, NH animals in science and finally, the effect that culture has on our social representations, will be discussed.