Because sustainability implies discussions about the rightness, fairness and justness of procedures that address economic, environmental and social affairs, moral philosophy is at the heart of both this global debate and the idea of more environmentally enlightened and socially responsible marketing. As Crane (2000) argues, the theoretical development of sustainable marketing represents a clear attempt to determine and frame the goals of marketing activities from a moral perspective. Sustainable marketing studies are generally based on the assumption that societal and economic goals cannot be achieved without a healthy natural environment and a just society. If we consider the idea forwarded by Ed-ward Freeman and colleagues (2004, 364–365) that creating economic value is intrinsically connected to creating value for stakeholders, we can argue that sustainable marketing be-gins with the belief that value is necessarily and explicitly a part of doing business and that morality and marketing are not separate. Therefore, maximising shareholder value is not a value-neutral ideology, as it may leverage the prima facie rights of one group – sharehold-ers – to excuse violating the rights of othsharehold-ers (see Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 2004). This idea suggests that sustainable marketing is primarily a moral matter of social conscience whereby firms assume a clear sense of moral responsibility towards the natural environ-ment and society at large (Crane 2000, 144).
The moral basis of this theoretical development, however, is seldom elaborated. The prevailing belief among sustainable marketing scholars is that morality is something singu-lar; that there is only one suitable perspective on morality that applies. Yet, in moral phi-losophy, there are numerous moral perspectives that play a role in shaping the values and
belief systems of the discourses used to frame and articulate the meaning of sustainability (see Ketola 2007; Smith & Duffy 2003). Drawing upon Crane’s (2000, 150) “reconstructionist perspective” of the role of moral values within the marketing–environment literature, moral philosophy denotes a fundamental force guiding how both the environment and society are understood and addressed by individuals and groups within a socio-cultural, economic and political context. Moral values condition not only the way stakeholders define, interpret and approach environmental and social issues but also the discourses they employ when dis-cussing sustainability. Due to the clear connection between meaning, discourse and moral-ity, it seems important to explore the role moral values play in guiding and constraining our thinking regarding our relationship with nature and other members of society. In this way, we will be able to understand how morality contributes to the rationalisation and legitimisa-tion of the dominant discourses shaping the meaning of sustainability in the marketplace.
Accordingly, I suggest that normative ethical theories are suitable for linking the dif-ferent social discourses used to discuss and grasp the social, environmental and economic responsibilities inherent within the global sustainability debate (see Burchell & Cook 2006;
Death 2010; DesJardins 2001; Tennberg 2000). In keeping with Crane and Matten (2007), I use the term “normative” in reference to ethical theories that either propose or prescribe ethically correct ways of acting. The framework introduced in this dissertation is based on four prevalent approaches to normative ethics: ethical egoism, utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. These approaches inform much of the current discussion of sustainabil-ity within the fields of management (Crane & Matten 2007) and marketing (García-Rosell 2009; Robin & Reidenbach 1987). It is worth noting that I use “ethics” and “morality” in-terchangeably throughout this dissertation (Copp 2006, 4). Let us elaborate further on the example discussions regarding the future of a large, old-growth forest in northern Lapland.
This time, I will draw upon four approaches of normative ethics.
Those working for local logging companies and the paper industry might understand sustainability in terms of the overall welfare that use of the forest may bring to a particular community. This line of reasoning, which is rooted in the utilitarian approach to ethics, re-flects the notion that forestry practices in an old-growth forest are justified as long as they produce the greatest balance of benefits (e.g., employment and tax revenues) over costs (e.g., habitat destruction, the violation of indigenous rights) for the greatest number of stakeholders (Robin & Reidenbach 1987; Sidgwick 1981). From this perspective, sustaina-bility is judged in terms of good consequences and the maximisation of overall welfare. The utilitarian viewpoint is too broad for ethical egoism. As a moral doctrine, ethical egoism holds that the sole ethical goal in life is one’s own good, defined as the greatest attainable pleasure (Sidgwick 1981). In the context of the old-growth forest, tourism entrepreneurs and tourists may contribute to the protection of the forest by promoting their self-interest in terms of business objectives and personal well-being, respectively. Their interest in pro-tecting the forest does not mean that these two stakeholder groups have a moral obligation to do so (see Rachels & Rachels 2007). According to ethical egoism, they are acting morally not because they care for the protection of the forest but because they see it as a means for maximising their own interests (see Crane & Matten 2007).
Environmental activists seemingly approach the same situation from a deontological perspective by refusing to accept that the sustainability of the forest can be determined in terms of the economic value and social benefits of logging. For environmental activists, the logging of an old-growth forest is intrinsically wrong and cannot be justified by the benefi-cial consequences these practices yield (see McNaughton & Rawling 2006; Rachels & Ra-chels 2007). This line of thinking embraces the idea that nature has the same moral right to respectful treatment as humans; thus, we have a prima facie duty not to harm it (Brennan
& Lo 2002). Finally, the Sami reindeer herders’ relationship with the forest can be viewed through a virtue ethics perspective. This ethical theory views ethics as an internal practice that can be developed and trained through moral habituation in practical settings under the supervision of virtuous practitioners (Hursthouse 2007; MacIntyre 1998). Through this approach, virtue ethics shifts the analytical focus from acts to the actor’s moral character, which includes virtues such as dignity, industriousness, prudence and equity (Rachels &
Rachels 2007). It can thus be argued that Sami reindeer herders are influenced by their own community in the way they relate to the forest by making it a part of their daily life.
Indeed, in keeping with Alasdair MacIntyre (1998), virtues have a communal origin based in dispositions deemed morally appropriate within the Sami reindeer herder community.
It is not my intention to use normative ethical theories to isolate and explain airtight philosophical positions. Neither do I seek to prescribe what moral sustainable market-ing should be or how moral values should be included within sustainable marketmarket-ing de-cision-making processes. Rather, I view moral philosophy as a means of elucidating the complexities and challenges of sustainability within a marketing context. As the example of the old-growth forest in Lapland shows, moral philosophy can contribute to unveiling the moral reasoning and orientation driving particular ways of representing sustainability within certain discourses. Normative ethical theories, in particular, can be used to analyse different ways of representing sustainability, determine the differences between them and work towards a consensus (see Jones et al. 2005; Stufflebeam 2008).
I argue, as do Crane and Matten (2007, 104), that the pluralistic application of ethical theories contributes to the approach of sustainability from different perspectives. Different ethical perspectives are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. I acknowledge that moral philosophy cannot help the business community develop a universally accepted un-derstanding of sustainability. However, moral philosophy can certainly help firms interpret and communicate to their stakeholders what they think is sustainable about their actions and, more importantly, why this approach is necessary (see Smith & Duffy 2003). In fact, moral philosophy should improve the ability of marketing professionals to understand the beliefs, assumptions and principles that guide and constrain the thought and discussions on sustainability in a market context. Furthermore, as proposed by thinkers such as Alas-dair MacIntyre (1998) and Emmanuel Levinas (1998), moral philosophy can help critically re-evaluate the basic marketing premises and thus make marketing practices more sensi-tive to the principles of sustainability.