Logos – the power of inference

We shall now take a look at the first aspect of Aristotelian inventio, logos. The section is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the historical roots of logos, and the second with the meanings associated with logos in the New rhetoric.

In the third part the relation between the concept of logos and the inferential folk-theoretical tendencies of human cognition is explored in some detail. The purpose of this section is to establish a connection between rhetorical argumentation analysis and the relevant folk-theoretical cognitive mechanisms that make given argumentative structures plausible to audiences.

The classical view of logos

In ancient Greece rhetoricians considered themselves the teachers of orthos logos, the way of speaking correctly. The Greek word �logos’ refers to language, discourse, reasoning or to those situations in the world that one might want to reason about.

Later on in the history of the Greek rhetoricians, �logos’ refers to a discursive domain within which propositions may be asserted and discovered. Rhetorical logos might be considered the stepbrother of classical logic, and from the philosophers of ancient Greece there has been continuing discussion concerning the relationship of logic and rhetorical logos.

In particular, the philosophical school of the Sophists theorized that by studying logos one is able to understand possible relations among propositions, which enables one to create completely logical fields of argument. The Sophists conceived of logos as an independent realm of discourse, with vast power to control external reality. In the Sophists’ opinion, the things logically said about external reality were persuasive, even if the discursive realm of logos was not identical to the external reality. Thus, by creating plausible relations between propositions within a discourse, one had the power to make the world what one wanted it to be. The ancient Greeks thought that it is by the power of logos that people are made helpless before the persuasive expertise of the rhetoricians. Indeed, so was the power of persuasion perceived that it was compared with the power of drugs that make the body unable to function. (See Wells 2001, 456-458.)

The Sophists’ claims of power and control through logical manipulation of causal relations utilizing rhetoric were not endorsed by all of their colleagues. Plato, for example, transported the concept of logos to the privacy and safety of philosophical worlds. Plato disconnected logos entirely from the field of rhetoric and left the practice of rhetoric as a storehouse of techniques used to persuade people this way or that, with no connection to the actual truth of matters. In this manner Plato likened logos to logic. Discourse concerning truth is for Plato to be the sovereign territory of philosophers putting logos and logic to good use. In Plato’s opinion, logos was the only part of rhetoric that shared the ability of philosophy to approach the essential domain of certain knowledge. Seen this way, in a scientific or analytic framework rhetoric (minus logos) could exist only as a subject of study, unreflective and devoid of analytic power. (see Gorgias 453C2-4, Wells 2001, 457-458.)

Opposing Plato in this division, Aristotle established the place of logos in rhetoric and through this connection gave a place to rhetoric as a valid, analytically capable discipline. It is apparent in the writings of Aristotle that the Greeks felt great respect for and even fear of the power of the discursive world. But instead of emphasizing the power of discourse over reality through logos like the Sophists or artificially removing logos from rhetoric like Plato, Aristotle aims at stability through holism.

Aristotle sees the threatening powers of persuasive discourse mainly in ethos and pathos, in their power to create appearances and stir the moods of audiences.

What in Aristotle’s theory controls this threat is that he assumes there must be a correspondence between the arguments presented by the orator and the accepted facts and knowledge about the world that the audience possesses. Thus the power of logos is constrained by reality, more so than in the cases of ethos and pathos.

This can be viewed as the first point in history where the discipline’s concepts take the direction of the modern rhetorical views such as the theory of the audience.

(see Yoos 1996, 412; Wells 2001, 458-460.)

In Rhetoric, Aristotle establishes rhetorical studies as a discipline orientated to logos. He redefines logos as being one of the three important “artistic” modes of persuasion, thus creating the ethos-pathos-logos trinity. In Rhetoric, logos is presented as a form of artistic persuasion (separating it explicitly from the method of syllogistic induction and deduction), separate from logic, yet connected to truth or apparent truth. For Aristotle, this connection establishes rhetoric as an analytic discipline that is related to philosophy but distinct from it. The separation is apparent in the status of certainty that the methods of philosophy and rhetoric are capable of attaining:

Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. (Rhetoric, Book 1, 1356b.)

Logos as a rhetorical technique concerns situations where theoretically there might exist concrete, factual proof or even philosophical certainty, but in the given situation of argumentation such certainty cannot be reached. In philosophical argumentative structures and in some debates concerning the external world or the states-of-things as they are, it is possible to reach a form of logical or physical proof so strong that further argument is impossible. In rhetoric, logical proof is artistic in the sense that it has to be invented or artistically produced. In rational

persuasion (logos) the audiences use their rational judgement more than in the cases of ethical or emotional persuasion, but their assessment is still not a form of syllogistic deduction. The utilization of logos does not guarantee the truth, but it guarantees plausibility and probability, an approximation of truth. By logos one cannot approach the certainty of philosophical truths, but one can approach states in the external world that are true, or that at least can be made to seem true for a given audience. Aristotle has a great trust in the abilities of a given audience to assess the basic plausibility of arguments, which guarantees that it is easier to persuade audiences of the things that correspond with the universal understandings of what is true or probable. In a sense, the Aristotelian universal factors are much the same as the universal folk-theoretical properties of the human mind discussed earlier.

In any case, rhetoric for Aristotle deals with issues that must be decided on the basis of probability when it is impossible to reach the safe haven of philosophical, syllogistic certainty. (See Wells 2001, 457-459.)

The rhetorical use of logos does not guarantee that argumentation corresponds with actual states-of-things in reality. For Aristotle, logos becomes false when something that does not belong to an object is predicated to it. False logoi result, for example, when the definition of a circle is attached to the term “triangle”. In a sense, every state-of-things in reality has but one proper logos (meaning the correct statement of the essence of the thing, or “of how the thing is”) but in another sense it can acquire many logoi, meaning the other true descriptions of what it may be.

In other words, any logos is susceptible to rhetorical descriptions, for any logos that expresses what a thing is, may be false. (Modrak 2001, 57-58.)

In short: in different contexts, Aristotle develops a picture of the world, language and human cognitive capabilities that makes the exemplification of universal features by concrete particulars the basis for meaning and knowledge. The concrete substance is a compound of matter and form. Perceptions of the individual prompt (in human beings under favourable conditions) concepts of the compound universal (a generalized notion of the instantiazed form and matter) that is the meaning of the name of the individual’s kind. (Modrak 2001, 204.)

By using the term �logos’ both in a universalizing and particularizing way, Aristotle created a suggestive picture of the connections between cognitive states and the world. The world is shared and intelligible because it is so structured as to be accessible to human minds. The accessibility depends upon the possibility of realizing in perception and thought the same structures as are found in the world.

(Modrak 2001, 261.) It can be said that Aristotle creates a good starting point for connecting the theory of folk-theoretical inferential tendencies of the human mind with the theory of inventio.

When exercising rational appeal, the speaker tries to persuade the audience’s capabilities of reason or their understandings concerning the states-of-things. This means either drawing conclusions from some affirmative or negative statements that are held to be true or making generalizations on basis of some instances.

There seems to be some type of “logic” involved, but it is not a formal one. The argumentative structures used in real-life (or virtual) rhetorical situations are not

“transparent” by definition. So, to analyse argumentative structures the structures must first be brought out into the open. It will be suggested in what follows that a functional formula for achieving this can be reached by adding together the ideas of one of the most original theorists of “New rhetoric”, Stephen Toulmin, and the

concepts adopted from cognitive studies. Next we will look into the use of logos in New rhetoric generally and focus particularly on the theory of Stephen Toulmin.

Logos in the New rhetoric

In classical rhetoric, argumentation was often seen as following the lines of formal logic, yet separate from it. It can be said that in a general sense classical rhetoric still approaches argumentation in a very formal way. It is assumed that strict logical schemas underlie all argumentative structures, and that these schemas can be put into a sort of a “rational reconstruction”. (Daneš 1999, 4.) The relationship of the New rhetoric to logos has not always been so simple.

Although Aristotle emphasized the meaning of ethos and pathos, it has become clearer and clearer in modern studies of persuasion and rhetoric that things other than rationality affect what people come to think of as true. Instead of pure rationality or logic, decision-making seems to follow other rules (Hawkinson 1999, 490). For example, as will be discussed in chapter “Pathos”, emotions seem to have a central role in the process of persuasion (see Breckler 1999, 504).

It may be that this problematic relationship between rhetoric and logic, which becomes most apparent when discussing the topic of logos, has discouraged modern theorists of rhetoric from exploring the concept. Few theorists of New rhetoric dwell on the subject of logos. On one hand, rhetoricians cannot emphasize the logical structure of everyday thought because they want to underline the difference between logic and everyday argumentation. On the other, the logic of causal relations and restrictions is all too apparent, although flexible, in everyday argumentation. In the end, if everyday human thought is not restricted by any formal logic yet neither totally open to any and all arguments, it becomes problematic to state exactly what the restricting principles are.

A good example of the relative difficulty modern theorists of rhetoric seem to have with the concept of logos is provided by Ricca Edmondson. Edmondson (1984) mostly follows Aristotle in her definition of �logos’. First she states that �logos’

represents the “abstract, intellectual structure of the argument itself” (15), and later on, describes �logos’ as follows:

...logos is most concerned with the subject-matter of discussion. Its function is to prove some point – or to appear to prove it, since it cannot be assumed in advance that all arguments are of necessity admissable and correct (19-20).

Edmondson’s definition of logos is quite arbitrary – at least in the sense of establishing a working method for analysing the structures of logos within a given body of argumentation. First Edmondson starts with an Aristotelian definition, but when she extends or unformalizes the concept of logos it becomes somewhat vague.

A more detailed approach to what might be called logos is put forward by Perelman (1958). Perelman does not use the term �logos’, nor does he discuss logos in particular. However, Perelman dedicates a third of his extensive work to the discussion of argumentation about reality, which can be understood as a discussion

about rhetorical logos. The first and central aspect that he examines is the use of the causal link in argumentation:

It is immediately apparent that the causal link must allow argumentation of three types:

a) argumentation tending to attach two given successive events to each other by means of a causal link;

b) argumentation tending to reveal the existence of a cause which could have determined a given event;

c) argumentation tending to show the effect which must result from a given event. (Perelman 1958, 263.)

Perelman goes on establishing a multitude of relations and possible links between everyday thought and argumentation. Despite the extensiveness of his list he says:

“Let us emphasize that we are convinced that the various types of relations we have mentioned do not exhaust the riches of living thought, and that one kind of relation shades into another” (ibid. 263). Although the notions of Perelman are undeniably sharp (as are those of Aristotle when he discusses similar relations), the problem is the relative complexity of the lists of possible links that the theorists of argumentative thought provide. As Perelman states, as comprehensive as one makes a listing of quasi-logical structures, it still is not comprehensive enough. With the tendency of

“relations to shade into one another” this makes listings of argumentative structures quite useless as analytical tools. The same “cumbersomeness” discussed in his theory of argumentative fallacies by Aristotle troubles Perelman when he tries to create a theory of the logic of argumentation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 261-350.) ⁸⁵

The reason for this difficulty in devising a theory of logical argumentation is that, as Perelman says, no amount of logical rules seems enough to cover the argumentative strategies people utilize, yet there always seems to be an underlying logic (e.g. argumentative structures are perceived as argumentative structures because of a logical structure that seems to “argue” something). It is suggested here that the apparent multitude of logical rules used in everyday argumentation comes about because, actually, there are no logical rules of everyday argumentation.

Rather, there are very general cognitive principles that an argument must fulfil to seem logical to a given audience. These general principles can give rise to any number of argumentative structures that seem logical in the sense of everyday thought.

The problem of formal logic, from the point of view of rhetoric, is that it is not an easily applicable method of analysis for cultural materials. The Aristotelian system of logical fallacies of argumentation is more applicable, but still quite cumbersome.

The “cumbersomeness” of the Aristotelian analysis becomes clear when one tries to apply it to the analysis of persuasive text. However, it is important to note that the

85 For further information concerning fallacies of argumentation see, for example, van Eemeren 2001, 295-301; Johnson 1996, 255-258.

“logic” of everyday thought discussed here diverges slightly from the philosophical definition of �logic’. The cognitive mechanisms discussed in this study do not make people “logic machines”, but rather instil structures in everyday thought that create coherence and a certain sense of “logic”. While this is not formal-logical in nature, it would be unjust to say that the everyday, working logic of human beings is totally illogical. This everyday logic includes such modes of thinking as causal reasoning (see, for example, Cheng 1999.), and deductive reasoning (see, for example, Rips 1999).⁸⁶

Formal-logical structures are by nature completely transparent; that is to say, their strict make-up and quasi-mathematical rules make it easy to distinguish between “good” and “bad” logic. Although the principles of rational appeal in rhetoric are much the same as in logic, their relative precision is by necessity much more vague. This certain vagueness extends to the analysis of texts by the method of isolating logical structures and “fallacies of deduction and induction”. It is rather unfruitful to analyse normal speech and argumentative structures using formal logic; the mathematics of syllogistic analysis just betrays the complexities and nuances people use to rationally convince each other in everyday argumentation.

The rhetorical equivalent – tracking rhetorical fallacies in deductive and inductive form of appeal – also seems a bit cumbersome to become an effective tool for argumentation analysis. In order to analyse the logos of an argumentative structure, the argument should be presented in a quasi-logical form and then subjected to a thorough examination including all the possible exceptions normal language has to offer compared to formal logic. And these exceptions are numerous.

So, it can be argued that the field Aristotle named rhetorical logos has been somewhat dominated by philosophers and logicians who have devoted their attention to study the relations between language and reality, and, more recently, by cognitive psychologists and anthropologists who have studied the ways the human mind categorizes and interprets reality. Perhaps the hesitancy of rhetoricians to step in the ring where the questions of “reality”, “states-of-things” or “logic” are fought out is due to the feeling that this is an area having more to do with logic than rhetoric. Consequently, when it comes to defining �logos’, the border between rhetoric and logic has been disputed since the days of Aristotle. Here again, an understanding of the mental mechanisms that make the surrounding reality accessible to us might be helpful. The mechanisms may provide at least one missing piece between logic, persuasiveness, states-of-things and everyday thought. The basic mental mechanisms, in this case folk-theoretical thought, are responsible for the shared basis that makes us accept one line of argumentation as plausible and others as not credible.

In everyday interactions, people seem to infer on the basis of the interrelations between the propositions at hand, with no recourse to a complex and formal mental logic. This everyday use of “spontaneous” logic might be called something along the lines of von Wright’s “practical” or “instrumental” logic. (von Wright 2004 (1971), 96-118; see also Johnson-Laird 1983.) Even in questions dealing with the actual states-of-things in the world, the rational truth of matters is usually not the most forceful or powerful persuading factor. The most significant factor in the success of

86 It is suggested in this study that the folk theories discussed earlier form a basis for the coherent

“logic-like” structure of everyday thought. For further reading on rationality see for example Evans, Over and Manktelow 1993; Mayer 1992; Manktelow and Over 1993. For an account of causality, causal explanation and formal-logical structures see von Wright 2004 (1971), 34-82.

any given argumentation is the amount of socio-cultural relevance people can find in the arguments from their own points of view (see Aldo di Luzio 1998.) In Norman Maier’s view, rhetorical devices are always situated in both the social context and

any given argumentation is the amount of socio-cultural relevance people can find in the arguments from their own points of view (see Aldo di Luzio 1998.) In Norman Maier’s view, rhetorical devices are always situated in both the social context and