Learning as the cultural process of adopting, applying and producing

Cultural artifacts as carriers of generalized human operations

According to activity theory the specifi cally human form of learning is based on cultural artifacts, and its origin is in man’s productive activity. According to Ily-enkov (1977, p. 265), thinking, or ”ideal”, is an aspect of man’s labor activity and exists whenever an object of nature is transformed into an object of labor activity and then into a product of labor. In this process the external thing involved in the labor process is fi rst sublated in the subjective form of the activity and represented by a word. This is followed by the reverse sequence in which the verbally expressed idea is transformed into a deed, and through action into the form of an external, sensuously perceived thing an object. Thinking emerges in this cyclic movement along the route thing-deed-word-deed-thing. Man’s productive interaction with external bodies and their transformation fi rst into objects of activity and then into artifacts is itself mediated through cultural artifacts, signs and tools.

According to Vygotsky, human individuals do not react to the environment or to other people directly (or merely instinctively) but through forms of behavior that are mediated through cultural artifacts that carry culturally developed gen-eralizations. Human consciousness thus lies not inside individuals’ heads as a product of biological development, but in the interaction between the individual and the cultural artifacts created by the labor of mankind. Culturally developed artifacts link individual and cultural learning. Higher psychological functions de-velop fi rst in practical social activities and only later become internalized as inner psychological processes of individuals (Vygotsky, 1978).

Vygotsky conceptualizes the meaning of signs, such as words as generalized refl ections of reality, in short generalizations that people use in their life activities.

Tools could also be understood as culturally developed generalizations.

The ordinary tool is a societal operation fi xed in an object, the way in which it is used. The tool is necessarily linked to an object under specifi c conditions (and not against the ”back ground” of indifferent things). It generalizes and abstracts the characteristics of the object. It is the material, sensibly perceivable form of the fi rst real human generalization and its carrier – not indifferent to that which it car ries, yet directly not coincident with it. (Leontyev, 1933, p. V) The development of human cognition and activity could thus be investigated as the development of forms of cultural mediation and mediating generalizations (Le-ontyev, 1933, p. III). The generalizations reifi ed in tools or representations do not carry the generalization from one context or person to another in themselves, but they mediate a generalized operation. ”To appropriate a tool or a meaning means to appropriate an operation” (ibid., 1933, p. V), in other words, to learn to use a tool is to learn to carry out the operation the tool has been created to mediate.

While tools are directed at material objects of nature, words and other signs are directed toward other people as mediators of social cooperation. They entail generalizations concerning recurrent aspects of situations in human practices to which human beings need to direct other peoples’ attention. Once developed in social praxis, however, signs may later also become tools for the self-regulation of an individual’s behavior, and make creative refl ection and self-consciousness pos-sible. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 54–55)

The tools and signs are in human activity connected to each other. There is a functional similarity between tools and concepts, that is, generalizations attached to and mediated through words and other signs. These two types of generaliza-tions are complementary and there is no sharp distinction between them. The co-operative use of physical tools is often not possible without a corresponding set of concepts carried by words and other signs. (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII) On the one hand, communication between people presupposes generalizations:

without them it would be impossible. On the other hand, generalizations develop in communication: they are thus products of societal practices and can develop only within them (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII).

The dialectical connection between representation and the process of generalizing

According to Leont’ev, an adequate characterization of the structure of a general-ization is reached by showing the process that leads to it. The difference between general izations is understood as the differences in the contents being generalized

and in the process of generalizing. Different factual contents require different pro-cesses, and one and the same content can be understood, generalized, and refl ected in dif ferent ways (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII).

Representations, whether internal or external, and the process of generaliza-tion form a dialectical unity.

The representation and its corresponding process [of generalizing, JP] do not exist apart from each other. But it cannot be concluded that they are one and the same, just appearing differently, now as moment now as process. They are different and opposed things. (Leontyev, 1933, p. IV)

The relationship between a generalized representation and the pro cess of general-ization is dynamic. Their ”coincidence” merely appears as a moment; they can fi nd themselves in open contradiction with one another. The existing representation detaches itself from the process and becomes inert, resisting change. The process in which a generalized refl ection develops is unthinkable without the generalized refl ection on which it is based, however.

(…) every refl ection of reality in the human con sciousness (and every refl ec-tion is generalized refl ecec-tion and cannot be otherwise) and the pro cess in which it develops and presents itself form a dialectical unity (that is, one is unthink-able without the other), they form an opposition, are identical processes – pass into one an other. Fundamental in this unity is the process that always links generalization with the general ized reality (and the subject with reality). (ibid., 1933, p. IV)

Vygotsky and his colleagues defi ned the object of research on knowledge and learning in a radically new way. Their studies showed that the opposition between process and generalization was more important than the Cartesian opposition between internal and external processes that had traditionally been regarded as fundamental.

The actual opposition is the opposition between re presentation and process, whether internal or ex ternal, and defi nitely not the opposition between con-sciousness (as internal) and object world (as external). (…) The opposition be-tween material-external and ideal-internal began to reveal itself as histori cal, as a secondary formation, and thus as an opposition that could not serve as a point of depar ture. It must be understood and exposed as just an historical formation, that is, as not absolute. (ibid., 1933, pp. IV–V)

Considering the opposition between process and representation to be primary does not deny the existence of a difference between the material-external or ideal-internal processes of generalizing and generalization: it rather postulates their co-existence and interaction.

The process of generalizing presupposes variation in the material about which a generalization is made. Marton (2000) pointed out that variation, not repetition, is the ”mother of learning”. Only variation makes it possible for the subject to discern what is essential and what is irrelevant from the point of view of reaching an objec-tive. There is, however, a dialectical relationship between repetition and variation.

If something varies, that something must be repeated. At the same time, that which is repeated can never be exactly the same if seen from the learner’s point of view. Another way of looking at the relationship between variation and rep-etition (in the sense of the exact same event taking place again and again) is seeing the latter as the limiting special case of the former. There is an unlimited number of ways in which repetitions of the same text (or whatever) may differ from each other. One, and only one, of these is the case when they do not differ at all. And this case in fact does not occur in the context of learning. (Marton, 2000, pp.14–15 )

Marton maintains that to be able to do something is to be able to see or experience something. In order to do that, a person has to discern certain critical aspects of the object. We can see or experience specifi c features in the object only when there is contrast and variety within sameness. Variation within sameness is the basis of all generalization. Following Marton’s idea, we could say that there are four basic elements in the process of generalizing: 1) an existing generalization that defi nes what is being repeated, in other words what the unit is within which it becomes possible to observe and analyze variation; 2) there is variation within this unit of attention; 3) there is a method of processing the variation in order to reach further generalizations, and further, 4) there is a way of remembering or preserving the reached generalization. According to Leont’ev, all these four elements can exist both as internal mental structures and as objectifi ed in artifacts.

The tripartite structure and logic of mediated action provides a quasi-experi-mental setting of variation in sameness, as some of the elements may vary while others remain the same. When the same person uses the same tool and there is variation in the object, he/she learns about the properties of the objects. When the same person uses different tools on the same object he/she can learn about the properties of the tools. When the same person repeats actions using the same tool for modifying the same object, but varies his or her attention and method of using the tool, he or she may learn to reach the goal more effectively with the tool.

According to Leont’ev, tools and signs do not mediate actions: they only medi-ate the operations needed to carry them out. Operations are the means of goal-oriented actions. Thus the culturally developed generalizations fi xed in artifacts do not completely determine individuals’ actions, but rather facilitate certain kinds of actions and restrict the scope of possible goals. Individuals use generalized types of operations in various combinations to carry out actions.

Furthermore, operations can be formed consciously from actions, or they can develop unconsciously as responses to the requirements set by the specifi c condi-tions of performing an action. The operacondi-tions that stem from conscious accondi-tions are the results of a process of psychological automatization, and it is just in this automated form that they become included in actions as readily available mod-ules. Leont’ev (1978, p. 66) illustrates the nature of the transformation of action into operation using the example of driving a car.

Initially every operation, such as shifting gears, is formed as an action subor-dinated specifi cally to this goal and has its own conscious ”orientation basis”.

Subsequently this action is included in another action, for example, changing the speed of the car. Now shifting gears becomes one of the methods for attaining the goal, the operation that effects the change in speed, and shifting gears now ceases to be accomplished as a specifi c goal-oriented process: Its goal is not isolated.

For the consciousness of the driver, shifting gears in normal circumstances is as if it did not exist. He does something else: He moves the car from a place, climbs steep grades, drives the car fast, stops at a given place, etc. Actually this opera-tion of shifting gears may, as is known, be removed entirely from the activity of the driver and be carried out automatically. Generally, the fate of the operation sooner or later becomes the function of the machine. (Leont’ev, 1978, p. 66) Operations that develop spontaneously as ways of adapting an action to the objec-tive conditions in a situation, or through simple imitation are largely unconscious.

The individual cannot control them or the conditions to which they respond con-sciously without special effort. These operations may be brought into conscious control only if they become objects of special actions and are specially recognized.

A child does not need grammatical knowledge in order to learn his/her native language. In order to control the practically adapted knowledge consciously, how-ever, he or she has to make the forms of grammar into the object of goal-directed actions of inquiry (ibid., p. 165).

On the other hand, operations that are formed as results of conscious actions are easier for the actor to change and more fl exible than those that evolve spon-taneously and unconsciously. The latter are inadequately controlled, rigid and in-fl exible while the former can be transformed from automated operations to con-scious actions and back (ibid., p. 166).

Every action, even the ”reaching of point N,” is always accomplished in a cer-tain objective situation. Thus actions are determined not only by their goals, but also by the conditions of achieving the goal. The conditions ”formulate” the spe-cifi c and particular operations (how, by what means) through which the action is accomplished. (ibid., p. 64). Because objectives and conditions vary somewhat independently of the available signs and tools the generalizations objectifi ed in them do not always coincide with them. The tensions between the changing objec-tives and conditions and the available signs and tools create needs to change and develop existing artifacts and the generalizations embedded in them.

Two origins of generalizing

Davydov maintains that generalizing processes emerged in human history from two different sources and orientations. On the one hand, peoples’ elementary ra-tional orientation toward objects and means of labor brought the conceptions that established the immediate properties of objects. These were translated through lan-guage into abstract generalities, no longer closely connected to the objects and means of production.

This was an orientation toward the settled and canonized methods of produc-tion with relatively stable tools requiring ”training”, the acquisiproduc-tion of ”skills”.

This type of orientation towards the presently external being became the basis for the empirical thinking of the mass of the toiling performers of social and labor operations. (Davydov, 1990, p. 244)

On the other hand, human beings developed an ability to plan production, and to create designs for new tools and the techniques for making and using them.

Another kind of practical action emerged that was taken in order to delineate the universal properties of things. These generalizing processes apparently developed through a different route.

It can be presumed that the sensory-practical action retained its external, ob-ject related form, but for cognitive purposes in the role of ”fi tting”, ”testing”

or ”trying out”. This engendered specifi c sensory-object actions of a compre-hending nature, which reproduced a certain form of the movement of things.

For example, operations (…) can solve problems in evaluating the suitability of raw material or of a by-product by a preliminary testing, a practical ”try-ing out” of it. Operations of this kind, which are subordinate to the cognitive purpose, whose result is the knowledge obtained through them, are genuine thought in its external, practical form. (ibid., pp. 263–264)

The nature of recurrent methods of production activity was idealized in the kind of thinking that prevailed out in the external form of trying out and testing. Davy-dov called this form of generalizing sensory-object experimentation. It was a men-tal activity that was gradually converted into ”internal activity”, into work done by man ”for himself ”.

Humans’ rational orientation toward the objects and tools of production, and habituation in the form of practice on the one hand and the ability to plan duction and to experiment on the other were the essential early processes that pro-duced the fi rst generalizations, the fi rst forms of human thinking in history. They made it possible for people to sustain, change, and develop their labor activity.

We might presume that the operations used in this different kind of thinking were objectifi ed in different types of artifacts, which further made possible differ-ent types of practical and intellectual actions and also differdiffer-ent forms and levels of learning. Marx Wartofsky (1979, p. 201) characterizes the artifacts directly used in production, e.g., tools, models of social organization, and bodily skills in the use of tools, as primary. The symbolic communication of such skills in the production, reproduction and use of artifacts is a characteristic mode of human activity. This ability to represent an action by symbolic means generates a distinctive class of secondary artifacts, representation of practices in textbooks, designs, directives and prescriptions. Representations of practices make it possible for the practitioners to take an overall view of the activity, to refl ect on it and to collect and save their experiences as material for the further development of the work. While primary artifacts mediate the operations needed in directly productive actions, representa-tions mediate those needed in planning these acrepresenta-tions, coordinating and teaching them as well as refl ecting on them.

According to Wartofsky, there are also tertiary artifacts that do not have a direct representational function, but serve the free construction in the imagination of tools, rules and operations that are different from those adopted for the praxis.

Such ”possible worlds” may refl ect the limits of the actual praxis and help to create alternatives for conceivable changes in the model itself. Tertiary artifacts serve as tools for refl ecting on, evaluating and developing the secondary artifacts.

Yrjö Engeström (1987) connected Gregory Bateson’s theory of the three levels of learning with Wartofsky’s different types of artifacts. On Bateson’s fi rst level of learning the learner learns a behavior within a situation in which the goal and the means for reaching it are given and the appropriate reaction is learned through habituation. On the second level the goal is given and the learner learns by trial and error or experimentation to select an appropriate tool. In other words, he or she learns the context and rules of the fi rst level. This may take place largely as tacit socialization, or more in the form of conscious strategizing. A worker learns by trial and error, or by experimenting, to select appropriate work instruments, to use

certain kinds of problem-solving methods as a team member and to understand his/her own position as a worker in a factory. Representations of the practice are important tools for the more advanced forms of second-level learning involving problem solving and experimentation.

If the underlying logic of action reveals continuously unstable or contradic-tory action, the third level of learning is needed, according to Bateson. In this case, the uncertainty and instability become so pressing that people engage in a major effort to make sense of it all. The essence of this level of learning is thus in identi-fying the right problems to solve. The learner learns not only to solve problems of a certain kind, but also to transform the context so that the problems appear and become manageable in a radically new light. This historically new level of learning emerges when individuals are repeatedly exposed to double-bind situations in the

If the underlying logic of action reveals continuously unstable or contradic-tory action, the third level of learning is needed, according to Bateson. In this case, the uncertainty and instability become so pressing that people engage in a major effort to make sense of it all. The essence of this level of learning is thus in identi-fying the right problems to solve. The learner learns not only to solve problems of a certain kind, but also to transform the context so that the problems appear and become manageable in a radically new light. This historically new level of learning emerges when individuals are repeatedly exposed to double-bind situations in the