Knowledge exists between individuals

Pöyhönen (2004, 32) strongly criticises data-information-knowledge-continuum which is mentioned in the beginning of chapter 2.1. Pöyhönen argues that the continuum served the knowledge management research community well in 1990’s, when it was used to create an identity for knowledge management as a branch of management science, but it has two important problems.

1 In this study concept maps are drawn as text graphs. Text graphs are special kind of concept maps that can be used in domains where accuracy and well-defined meaning are important. This sort of accuracy is often needed whenever a detailed understanding of some complex structural constructions or causal interactions is required. A text graph can be automatically translated to a set of natural language sentences that people can naturally attach a meaning. Text graph notations are drawn with text graph editing tool TGE created by Esko Nuutila and Seppo Törmä. (Nuutila & Törmä 2004).

Firstly Pöyhönen (2004, 32) points out that knowledge is defined in rela-tion to its significance for the knowledgeable individual. No explicit refer-ence is made to the context in which knowledgeable individual is situated, and neither to the groups, communities and organisations in which the knowledge is supposed to be used. According to Pöyhönen, the typical conception of knowledge deriving from these characterisations is individu-alistic to the extreme.

Second problem with the continuum is that it suggests that any piece of

‘actionable information’ is just as ‘good’ as the next piece of ‘actionable information’. So there is no means for assessing the relative value of something once that something has been categorised as ‘knowledge’.

Pöyhönen asks several questions, like is rumour just as much knowledge as scientific research, and she argues that he continuum is oversimplified.

(Pöyhönen 2004, 32 - 33.)

What Pöyhönen (2004, 33) is striving for, is a reference of knowledge to the world outside of the knowing subject, so that the viability of a cognition can be assessed. She points out that the term knowledge should be de-fined based on the views of humanistic and social scientific studies which do not follow the objectivistic epistemology. According to these views, knowledge is not objective or subjective, but something that is constructed in the social practices of actors embedded in a particular social context.

Pöyhönen proposes that the most fruitful approach to knowledge in the context of organisational research is to frame it as inter-subjective. She quotes J-C Spender who argues that “knowledge is less about truth and reason and more about the practice of intervening knowledgeable and purposefully in the world” (Spender 1996a, 64). Pöyhönen points out that to intervene in the world one has to be able to communicate with others and to understand the particular context of activity. In this sense, knowl-edge exists essentially between and not within individuals. (Pöyhönen 2004, 33 - 34.)

The nature of knowledge is seen in two ways in the studies on knowledge in organisations. The first views knowledge as an object and the second views knowledge in terms of knowing activity. When knowledge is seen as an object, it is assumed that knowledge is something that can be relatively easily identified, located, moved and traded. The second view argues that knowledge cannot be separated from practice and it should be seen as a collective social practice enacted in a particular context. The latter one should be called knowing or knowledgeable activity. (Pöyhönen 2004, 34 - 35.)

Pöyhönen (2004, 35) argues that connection between ‘object’ and ‘activity’

can be traced back to different ways of understanding Polanyi’s distinc-tions between tacit and explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is portrayed as an object that can be easily moved around and fit into different con-texts. Tacit knowledge on the other hand, is embedded in the organisation and therefore more safe from imitation. Pöyhönen (2004, 36) refers to ‘ac-tivity-based’ interpretation of Polanyi’s work and points out that there is always a tacit component in knowledge. Purely explicit knowledge is actu-ally data [or information], useless in itself without the tacit dimension.

In this study knowledge is seen more in terms of knowing, an activity. It also relates to competence. Gherardi and Nicolini (2003, 206) define knowledge as a competence to act, and as such knowledge is primarily tacit, as well as deeply rooted in individual and collective identity.

Spender (1996a; 1996b) has created a typology of knowledge in organisa-tions (see Table 1). Main dimensions of the two-by-two matrix are: explicit vs. implicit (tacit) and individual vs. social. Conscious knowledge consists of facts, concepts, and frameworks that individual can store in memory and retrieve more or less at will. Automatic knowledge includes percep-tions, mental models, and values etc. which are unconscious and difficult or impossible to access consciously. Objectified knowledge represents the shared base of codified knowledge. Collective knowledge consists of the

knowledge that is embedded in the forms of social and organisational practice, residing in the tacit experiences of the collective.

Table 1. The different types of knowledge in organisations (Spender 1996a).

Individual Social

Explicit Conscious Objectified

Implicit Automatic Collective

In this study the main focus is on objectified knowledge. In many times it has clearly visible connections to conscious knowledge or vice versa. Ob-jectified knowledge has also practical connections with collective knowl-edge. (Spender 1996a.)

3 SYSTEMIC WAY OF SEEING AN ORGANISATION