couples’ strivings for equal marriage rights and the appeal for equal rights in the adoption of children were presented, I argue, as direct threats to traditional patriarchal morality and heteronormative monogamous families. These efforts were marked as threatening to the traditional folkhem, in a manner similar to polygamy – which I interpret here as a disguised reference to the family of the migrant (Muslim) Other. This solidifies the conception that the NATION IS A FAMILY
underpinned by Christian morality and patriarchal heteronormativity.
6.3 JIMMIE ÅKESSON INCARNATING THE COMMON SWEDISH MAN
Keeping in mind the criticism of feminist scholars mentioned previously with regard to the lasting presence of gender inequalities in Swedish politics, the assiduously cultivated image among the mainstream political parties has been one of equal opportunities for ‘politicians’ and ‘female politicians’ alike – in which the general neutral denomination appears to have internalised the idea of masculine hegemony. Men’s natural position as active agents in politics has been further strengthened, according to Wendt, when their role as family fathers has
overlapped that of political leadership. In this regard, men’s professional respectability seems to be fortified by their public performance of fatherhood, regardless of whether this entails a serious commitment to childrearing or not. In comparison to that, motherhood appears to be a political handicap, women being expected to choose between being ‘like–men’, politically active, or retreating into the safety of their domestic enclosure to raise their men’s offspring (Wendt, 2012:
101–110).
Åkesson, as party chair, has repeatedly indicated that the SD has reached political ‘maturity’, thus leaving behind a period of alleged adolescent confusion and turbulence – perhaps with reference to its previous Nazi sympathies – becoming ‘a true challenger party’ (cf. SD–K 68, 2006: 2; SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–
K 81, 2009: 8–9). In turn, the Swedish political establishment has constantly been described as a reunion of ‘old parties’ protecting their privileges (cf. SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–K 78, 2008: 3). It is worth noting that a recurring strategy in Åkesson’s discourse has been to fuse his political presence and that of the SD into a collective totality, through such expressions as ‘we, the SD’ (cf. SD–K 65, 2005:
2; SD–K 70, 2006: 11; SD–K 73, 2007: 12; SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–K 78, 2008: 3).
The SD appears in this context to be identified not only with the figure of the youthful outsider that challenges the pre–existing political hierarchy dominated by ‘those seven in the Riksdagen’, but also with that of an underdog that survives all political vicissitudes against all odds: ‘the old parties have not yet understood that the SD is here to stay. Everything is pointing towards further success in the coming elections.’ (SD–K 75, 2008: 3)
The whole metaphorical cluster structured around the right–conservative man – that Åkesson has attempted to embody – gains conceptual clarity when considering the critique he directed against the SAP leadership, which was depicted in terms of a lenient and mismanaging NURTURANT PARENT. In a sense acknowledging the long–lasting impact that the SAP had on the construction of the folkhem, Göran Persson – the former SAP chair and second longest continuously serving Swedish PM, between 1996 and 2006 – has been described by Åkesson with the term landsfader (father of the country/nation – reminiscent of the founding myths of nation states) (SD–K 75, 2008: 3). In my view, such an appellation recognises Persson’s efforts to re-articulate Swedish national identity through rediscovering the folkhem’s social–democratic values (such as equality, solidarity, and redistribution), emphasising a strengthened work ethic, and praising frugality and economy (Andersson, 2009a: 237; 2010: 56–61)
Åkesson nonetheless reacted negatively to Persson’s efforts to modernise and open up the folkhem to gender equality and multiculturalism, and reassess the welfare system in the context of globalisation processes (Agius, 2007: 591–593;
Andersson, 2009a: 237–240). He has oftentimes criticised Persson for what he considered to be a false image of ‘traditionalism, rusticity and nostalgia for the folkhem’ (SD–K 72, 2007a: 12). Åkesson’s attacks against the SAP have become
more vehement with the election of Mona Sahlin to its helm, in the aftermath of the 2006 Parliamentary elections and the victory of the centre–right quadripartite Alliance, as detailed in the section concerning the presence of women in Swedish politics. I maintain that Åkesson's acceptance of a fatherly presence as the head of the Swedish national family fits within the patriarchal understanding of the
NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster. Such a parental figure becomes nonetheless problematic once the political personalities assigned such a role act counter to the logic of radical right populist ideology – Persson’s preoccupation with reforming the folkhem, and Sahlin’s commitment to gender equality and multiculturalism are the failed image of parenthood, preoccupied with the nurturing of all those inhabiting the folkhem, and not being exclusively concerned with the wellbeing of those narrowly defined as belonging to the Swedish national family.
The leaders of the other parties that crafted the red–green block (the MP and V) in the years preceding the 2010 Parliamentary elections, in turn, have been only seldom mentioned. The MP spokespersons, Maria Wetterstrand and Peter Eriksson, have been most commonly criticised for ideological inconsistency and political opportunism (cf. SD–K 76, 2008: 10; SD–K 78, 2008: 4; SD–K 80, 2009:
4). According to Åkesson, the MP’s two spokespersons were willing to sacrifice their green ideological convictions, and even partake in an alliance with Lars Ohly, the ‘nostalgic communist’ and ‘Stalinist’ leader of the left–wing V for the sake of a promised governmental position if the red–greens would have won. He then commented on the MP’s refusal to cooperate with the SD concluding rhetorically:
‘OK, now we know it! Stalinists are good, but not the friends of Sweden…’ (SD–K 80, 2009: 4). At the same time, the MP and V leaders’ attitude towards a general amnesty of illegal immigrants to Sweden has been dismissed as ‘deeply irresponsible’ (SD–K 78, 2008: 4).
In contrast to that, Åkesson’s masculinity appears to be generally defined in a negative way, through what the leaders of the red–green block apparently failed to be, and as such symbolically positioning the SD in relation to the said coalition of parties according to a masculine versus feminine heteronormative binary. More clearly, the metaphoric cluster defining Åkesson (and in extenso, the SD) embodied masculine traditionalism, underpinned by staunch criticism of multiculturalism and cultural relativism, a longing for ‘social cohesion’
understood in terms of supremacy of Swedish patriarchal norms, and reliance on a strict enforcement of law and order. Put simply, Åkesson’s masculinity embodied a different type of (political) man, representing a steadfast and morally upright masculinity preoccupied with the folkhem’s wellbeing: a heterosexual Swedish man opposing the incarnations of radical right populist demonology – ‘feminists’,
‘advocates of multiculturalism’, ‘environmentalists’, ‘advocates of affirmative action’ (cf. Lakoff, 2002: 170 –173).
The leaders of quadripartite centre–right Alliance have also been heavily criticised by Åkesson for their alleged symbiosis with the mainstream media, and
disconnection from the lives of common Swedes. However, this occurred only on the eve of 2010 Parliamentary elections, when the Alliance was contesting the elections for a second term in government. Furthermore, Åkesson did not pay equal attention to all party leaders; instead, he concentrated his criticism on Olofsson – the C chairperson – and Hägglund – the KD leader – as already discussed in the previous sections. At this point, it is sufficient to underline that Åkesson denied the aforesaid party leaders any political legitimacy, maintaining that Olofsson was ‘lost in the world of fairy tales’, despite her being a deputy prime minister and her proven political ability as the mastermind of the quadripartite Alliance, whilst Hägglund was dismissed for being a liar and political coward, a creation of the mainstream media, and never having the courage to confront Åkesson in a public debate (cf. SD–K 78, 2008: 4; SD–K 84, 2009: 5; SD–K 85, 2010: 5; SD–K 86, 2010b: 6). In turn, Lars Leijonborg and Jan Björklund, the two FP leaders during the analysed timeframe, have not been mentioned once.
Somewhat surprisingly, Fredrik Reinfeldt – the M leader and prime minister from 2006 to 2010, and again for another term after the 2010 Parliamentary elections – has been rarely mentioned directly by Åkesson. Reinfeldt has only been acknowledged in his position as prime minister, condemned for his support of
‘Islamic ritual slaughter’ and for his unflattering description of Swedishness as
‘barbarism’ (SD–K 84, 2009: 14).
The upright and morally conservative masculinity metaphor the SD wishes to embody has been further developed by Åkesson, alleging to the process of
‘purification’ of the SD rank and file, which has been in a sense confirmed by his election to the position of party chair. In his view, while the other parties ‘allow themselves to be represented by fiddlers, violent criminals, and extremists’ he and the SD can ‘beat ourselves on the chest and claim that our sanitation works. We have nothing to be ashamed of. We are better than the others, also in this respect!’
(SD–K 75, 2008: 10). Furthermore, in 2009 Åkesson decried the consolidation of two antagonistic political blocks, and argued that this would hinder new political initiatives leading to an increase of disenfranchised citizens. However, he expressed his confidence that the 2010 Parliamentary elections would officially confirm the SD’s pivotal position in Swedish politics. Making use of this position as kingmakers, continued Åkesson, the SD would finally be able to influence the mainstream political agenda (SD–K 80, 2009: 4).
Time and again, in the examined empirical material, Åkesson invested in himself and his party with the masculine ability to discern and pursue innovative paths, along with such attributes as dynamism and courage to oppose what he argued to be a worsening of the Swedish political climate. The courage to criticise the political establishment, in other words ‘to stand up to evil’ was imbued by Åkesson with the masculine attributes of strength, conceptualised as ‘moral fibre’
or as ‘a backbone to resist evil’ (Lakoff, 2002: 184–185). This involves, I maintain, a reference to embodied physicality, which requires a masculine overcoming of
fear, and resistance to hardships. Such references to masculine steadfastness have further been emphasised by Åkesson’s acknowledged favourite quote. Taken from the film Rocky Balboa, it makes direct reference to masculine resoluteness and commitment to overcome obstacles, while striving for victory: ‘But it ain’t how hard you hit; it’s about how hard you can get hit, and keep moving forward. How much you can take, and keep moving forward. That’s how winning is done.’
(Rocky Balboa, 2006)
Åkesson’s performative of radical right populist masculinity in the Swedish political context does not strictly follow the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor construct. Based on the analysis detailed above, I argue that in Åkesson’s writings the folkhem appears to be under the guardianship of a NURTURANT PARENT whom Åkesson implicitly opposes. However, Åkesson’s continuous emphasis on his and SD’s youthful (masculine) energy indicate a more elaborate relationship between his performative of masculinity and that assigned to his political opponents than the established STRICT FATHER versus NURTURANT PARENT dyad. Rather, the political competition appears to be taking place between unequal opponents – Åkesson and the SD embodying a promising young underdog, whilst the political establishment represents different facets of an aged parental figure that mismanages the folkhem. The typology of masculinity Åkesson performs in the context of Swedish politics seems to be subscribing to a somewhat different conceptual metaphor, for which I suggest the label of CONSERVATIVE SON.