The interview provided relevant insight on the operational level but somewhat vague on the overall supply chain management strategy. The discussion focused mainly on a single retail store in large concern. On the local scale, the focus on finding alternative sources of supply had proven to be effective in combating product shortages in the first stages of the pandemic and could be described as a “textbook” method for increasing resilience through sourcing flexibility. The company had increased resilience through two of the improvement methods detailed by Stevenson and Spring (2009) by firstly creating flexibility by utilizing near-sourcing and second, creating more flexible relationships with its local supplier base. The reactiveness of these regional purchasing approaches had ensured supply on some of the more difficult product categories. Multi-sourcing is one of the most effective ways of increasing resilience (Pettit et al., 2013, 49). The sub-optimal economies-of-scale in multi-sourcing detailed by McMaster et al. (2020) was a non-issue when the most significant risk source was not meeting demand in crucial product categories. The IT systems and tools for especially order cycle and stock management provided by the concern had been an asset in combating the disruptions with anticipative capability. Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) described that visibility as a resilience factor has strong links in information flows in inventory and demand levels; these were at use throughout. The central organization's redundant capacity had aided in ensuring continuity (Polyvioy et al., 2019).
The supply chain distance, specifically in the purchases coming through the central warehouse, had been an issue where the SM had little influence over combating demand volatility in centrally purchased products solely on the parent organization's responsibility.
The absorptive resilience capacity of the company was in a good state. Readiness can be enforced by a robust concern that provided control, coherence, and connectedness with solid logistics, processes, and information technology (Ponomarov & Holocomb 2009; Honeycomb et al. 2015). Slight downsides for especially absorptive resilience stem from the centralized purchasing and lack of complementary products. Coherence enabled by the local flexibility greatly influenced adaptive capacity. Even though the concern is large, the agility brought on by the relative autonomy and quick supplier relationship forming leaves the adaptive capacity at a good state locally. Still, connectedness on a grander scale might suffer due to the large organizational structure.
The recovery phase was not significantly discussed as there had not been a significant recovery period as operations had remained relatively normal. The most substantial resilience capacity and defense for disruptions of the company came from its proactive, or “readiness”
capabilities (49% of capability in readiness) (see figure 7). The figure displays the spread of the resilience factors (sorted by color) and sub-factors (dots along the axis). The percentages signify the total share of the capacity and approach combination. The proactive resilience was balanced between the three approaches with a slight bias towards coherence stemming from the company’s internal communication with other units and the central organization in the concern. The adaptive or responsive capacity was equally spread among the different approaches. In practice, control measures were enabled by the solid central organization along with agility stemming from the disperses decision making baked into the business model. The capacity to recover was relatively unsubstantiated, with only slight indications through alternate sales and distribution channels. However, it would be safe to assume that the recovery capability would be comparatively good due to the large size and strong market position in the highly centralized domestic retail sector.
Figure 8 Resilience Capacity Distribution of Company A
Compromises between risk exposure and costs were discussed locally, but the more significant decision had been made in the central organization. The emphasis is, however, on lessening the risk exposure by investing in redundant resources. Scholten and Schilder (2015) describe redundancy as a logical trade-off between cost and risk exposure and based on the interview, the bias is towards redundancy. When discussing vulnerabilities (see table 8), the highlighted were somewhat predictable and in line with the overall notion of supply and supplier reliability issues. Resource limitations were deemed to be the most critical source of vulnerability during the pandemic. Prevalent sub-factors were limitations in supplier, production, and distribution capacity. Product availability with centrally purchased products was a significant issue. Most supply difficulty stems from turbulence caused by the pandemic, while more surprisingly, the competition had been more prevalent and fiercer during and after the pandemic. The highlighted vital capabilities (see table 9) are mostly centered around reactive capacity. The ability to have a better stock situation during the pandemic's difficult phases undoubtedly helped gain an edge over the competition.
The SM’s assessment that the most critical resilience sources were agility and flexibility through local suppliers' utilization should generally be agreed upon and in line with combating the apparent operational vulnerabilities. The focus on local flexibility and agility undoubtedly has a link in mitigating almost all the highlighted vulnerabilities. The model of a central organization with a web of entrepreneurs proved to be a source of stability and resilience for the whole concern.
Table 7 Company A Vulnerabilities
A Vulnerability Ranks Score Weighted score
Resource Limits 6 11
Table 8 Company A Resilience Capability Factors
A Capability Ranks Score Weighted score
Redundancy 6 12
Flexibility (in Sourcing) 6 11
Agility (Flexibility in Order Fulfillment) 5 9
Collaboration 5 8