5.1 Evaluative stancetaking as signs of mental states
5.1.2 Indicatives versus conditionals
In the questionnaire data examined in chapter 4, one of the respondents drew special attention to the contrast between the indicative and conditional moods. According to the respondent, the image of the writer as someone who
“knows what she wants” was enhanced by the fact that the writer had used the word halua-n (want-IND.PRS.1SG), which was “stronger” than halua-isi-n (want-COND-PRS.1SG) (käyttää sanaa HALUAN, mikä on vahvempi kuin esim. HALUAISIN [T1/20]). It is, first of all, noteworthy that this particular respondent did not frame the difference in terms of, say, (im)politeness or other kind of (in)appropriateness but merely in terms of the “strength” of the expression of desire. Moreover, we can note that the indicative (n=78) form is, in fact, considerably more frequent in the data than the conditional (n=19). This suggests that a strong expression of one’s desires is considered appropriate for the “promotional” persona in online dating advertisements, at least in actual practice (cf. however, the ideological metadiscourses in chapter 7).
The Finnish conditional marks a variety of non-factive modes, such as intentions, volitions, and predictions (see Kauppinen 1998: 156–167). The conditional mood itself, then, is often an index of desired or predicted states of affairs (cf. 5.1.1). Both in the indicative and in the conditional cases, the predicate haluta (“to want”) explicitly specifies a particular mode of commitment, but the choice of mood locates that commitment event (Ec), or the world in which the speaker is committed to the content, differently. That is, the choice of mood modifies the status of the commitment (see Kockelman 2010: 124). The unmarked IND.PRS.1SG form locates the commitment in a non-specified world but implies that that world is coextensional with the ongoing speech event (Es). The commitment is construable as factive, as located in the actual world of the speech event.85 The conditional mood operator (-isi), however, shifts the commitment event towards a wished-for (or optative) semiotic world or some other merely possible (or afactive) one so that Ec ≠ Es (see Kockelman 2004: 141; 2010: 127; also Kauppinen 1998:
224). The conditional mood seems to signal that the speaker has less control over the realization of the content of the commitment (cf. Kockelman 2010:
134). In that sense, the conditional perhaps brings haluta (“to want”) closer to the meaning of toivoa (“to hope”) that stereotypically denotes a situation in which the person denoted by the grammatical subject is waiting for some desired state of affairs to actualize as a result of or as permitted by relatively external circumstances. In other words, the conditional of haluta (“to want”) distinguishes the speech event (Es) and the commitment event (Ec) from one another as ontologically separate events. Also, it more clearly distinguishes the animator and the principal from each other as separate personae. In a conditional framing, the realization of one’s desire is in a more complex relation to the world of speaking. That is, it more explicitly takes into account and leaves room for aspects of the speech event that the self is dependent on, including social relations (e.g., the participant roles) and others’ stances (e.g., the addressee’s desires) (see also Kauppinen 1998: 218–223).
If the conditional mood brings the meaning of haluta (“to want”) closer to toivoa (“to hope”), then we might argue that the conditional of toivoa (“to hope”) further extends a fictive continuum into a direction in which the self’s desire is construed as more dependent on the external world. It is, first of all, noteworthy that, with the exception of two 3SG forms, all instances of toivoa (“to hope”) in the data, both conditional and indicative forms, are in 1SG
(toivo-n, wish-IND.PRS.1SG; toivo-isi-n, wish-COND-PRS.1SG). Unlike haluta (“to want”), the verb toivoa (“to hope”) is not used to denote others’ stances
85 This is, however, subject to many other layers of interpretation based on the co-text of the CTP and related ontologies. For instance, as was seen in example (4.4), the same metrical pattern in which seven CTPs were embedded was interpreted by some respondents in a “qualitative” way (implying a commitment in a possible world) and by some in a “quantitative” way (implying a commitment in this world). Such differences in genre models and ideologies will be discussed in chapter 7. What this section deals with are some of the very basic distinction between the indicative and conditional forms.
(see chapter 6). As was noted earlier, toivoa (“to hope”) cannot take a direct infinitive complement, in which the process denoted by the infinitive would be controlled by the subject of the matrix clause. However, toivoa (“to hope”) can be complemented by a non-finite clause with independent subject marking (as well as taxis or “relational tense” and the choice of active and passive voice) (see e.g. VISK § 538). When the subject is co-referential with the matrix clause, it is marked in the non-finite clause by a possessive suffix, as in the following example (-ni):
(5.7)
¶Toivoisin löytäväni itselleni kumppanin, joka wish:COND.PRS.1SG find:PTCP.1SG.POSS self:ALL.1SG.POSS companion who
arvostaa itseään, on rohkea ja itsenäinen.
appreciate:IND.PRS.3SG self is brave and independent
(5.7) ¶I would wish to find myself a companion, who appreciates herself, is brave and independent.
In (5.7), the writer is hoping to find a partner with the kinds of characteristics he intensionally specifies, but without presupposing her actual existence.
There is a tone of hoping for external circumstances to allow the desired biographic turning point to take place. (Cf. the strict contrast with e.g. the “I want a man who” example in section 4.2.1.)
Most of the toivoisin (“I would wish”) cases, however, take as their complement a subordinate että (“that”) clause. The issue is then further complicated by the fact that in subordinate complement clauses there is another predicate, whose choice of mood is relatively independent of the choice of mood in the matrix clause. Different mood choices in the matrix and complement clauses, in combination with other semantic and pragmatic factors, yield slightly different nuances. A conditional in the complement clause underlines that the denoted event is a mere possibility and more clearly links it with the intentional and evaluative stance of the matrix clause (see e.g. VISK § 1596; Peltola 2014).
If we now, somewhat simplistically, combine the semantic, morphosyntactic, and pragmatic considerations discussed above (even if they at times diverge), we might arrange the cases in the data on a rough continuum with haluan (“to want”) + INF/NP at the leftmost extreme. The other extreme, then, would consist of cases of toivoa (“to hope”) in the conditional mood complemented by a subordinate clause with a conditional-form predicate (toivoisin että -isi-, “I would wish that + COND”):
haluan haluaisin IND.PRS.1SG COND.PRS.1SG
toivon toivoisin -vAni / että + IND / että + COND IND.PRS.1SG COND.PRS.1SG NFIN / C + IND / C + COND
Among the toivoisin että (“I would wish that”) (n=11) cases in the data, eight complement clauses are in the conditional mood, only three in the indicative.
Interestingly, in all of the cases the subject, or similar subject-like argument (e.g., the animate possessor in example 5.8), is in the second person (2SG
pronoun or inflection). That is, the wished-for process is controlled by the kind of other (“you”) who is, in some sense, maximally presupposed as existing independently of the self’s desires, since that person can be picked out as the addressee.
(5.8) ¶Etsin – – miestä, joka olisi – – rehellinen ja luotettava, keskustelutaitoinen ja urheilullinen.
Toivoisin, että sinulla olisi aikaa parisuhteelle, wish:COND.PRS.1SG C you:ADE[POSS] COP:COND.PRS.3SG time:PTV relationship:ALL
et=kä olisi sitoutumiskammoinen.
NEG:2SG=CONJCOP:NEG.COND.PRS.3SG with_a_fear_of_commitment
(5.8) ¶I’m looking for – – a man who would be – – honest and reliable, conversationally talented and sporty. I would wish that you had time for a relationship and did not fear commitment.
To put it another way, a construction that imposes as little as possible on the person-referent can be addressed to an actual reader without risk of conflict.
In cases like (5.8), then, one might argue, the self’s desire is maximally submitted to others’ recognition and regimentation and reconciled with the limitations of the “real” world. (Cf. also chapter 6.)
A more detailed analysis would probably reveal more intricate patterns and regularities in the division of labor between different structural variants (e.g., when they are used and by whom). The point here, however, was to draw attention to the possibilities and concrete means of modifying the ontological relation between one’s stance and its object as well as the status of one’s commitment in relation to the speech event and its participants. The conclusion is that in online dating advertisements the communication of desire is frequent and unproblematic and it is relatively appropriate for the promotional persona to theorize and to communicate one’s desires even without explicitly concerning oneself with the actualities of the speech event.
The weight is clearly on the leftmost half of the continuum, and examples like
(5.8) are less typical. Strong stances are often expected from others as well.86 As was noted earlier, most instances of toivoa (“to hope”) in the data are in 1SG, whereas haluta (“to want”) can also be used to represent others’ stances (see also chapter 6). Others’ desires, then, are not as readily represented as diminished in degree or as dependent on external circumstances or chance.
In a sense it is logical, since, from the standpoint of the promotional persona, the self is the object of, and already the answer to, an ideal other’s desires (cf.
however 6.3.4).
The question of commitment relates importantly to the management of the relation between “real” and “ideal” worlds in online dating advertisements. In what world is the event of speech located? And in what worlds and under which personae are the participants committed to the contents? For instance, many haluaisin (“I would want to”) cases sketch an
“ideal” world as something separate from the “real” world of the speech event. In some haluan (“I want”) cases, on the other hand, the writer fully inhabits an “ideal” world and a desiring promotional persona in the speech event. The effect was particularly salient in example 4.4, in which the speech event was, for some interpreters, contextualized in a “dramatic” world by the writer’s performance. In other words, the actual world of the interactional event may itself be localized, by degrees, in different semiotic worlds. The writer may be speaking in the ideal world (perhaps with an occasional sotto voce of “reality” as in example 4.4, and see also section 5.2.2), or the writer may paint a picture of an ideal world from the real world.
As a final remark, to link the discussion of CTPs to questions of polarity that will figure prominently in subsequent sections, it should be noted that a clear tendency towards unipolarity can be seen in the CTPs. Negations of haluta (“to not want”) (n=16), pitää (“to not like”) (n=4) and toivoa (“to not hope”) (n=0) are far less frequent than the corresponding affirmative forms and appear in very specific usages as will be seen later. Antonymous verbs like vihata (“to hate”) (n=1) or inhota (“to dislike”) (n=1) are practically absent. The following sections will take up the issues of commitment and polarity from other standpoints, and the cases of negated haluta (“to not want”) and pitää (“to not like”) will be dealt with in section 5.4.