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Holistic and Integrated: Co-Benefits

4. Chapter 4: Article 6.8 Case Example: Supply Side Regulation

4.3 Why Implement Supply Side Policy Under Article 6.8

4.3.5 Holistic and Integrated: Co-Benefits

There have been limited comprehensive reviews on the co-benefits of different climate change policies, though this has been increasing in recent years.557 Despite this, throughout the international community there has been a push to integrate solutions to global problems, most prominently through the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.558 Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement is no exception. Article 6.8 does not merely promote action towards the implementation of NDCs but is also clearly aimed at holistic and integrated

552 Ibid.

553 BP 2020, n.p.

554 Ibid.

555 Green and Denniss 2018, p. 73, 82.

556 SEI et al. 2019, p. 52.

557 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 293-294.

558 UNEP, Global Environment Outlook 6, 2019, p. 7.

approaches which offer co-benefits relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication. As with many elements discussed in this chapter, the specific benefits offered by supply side policy implemented under Article 6.8 will vary depending on the nature of a specific project. The technical paper produced for the UNFCCC discussions on NMAs, for example, linked NMAs to many possible co-benefits, including addressing poverty, adaptation, job creation and sustainable and economic development.559 Co-benefits also play an important role in being able to raise public and national support for climate measures due to multiple positive objectives.560

Synergies exist here as well, with similar perspectives towards climate change action raised in supply side articles. The Production Gap Report, for example, explicitly notes that the outcomes sought from supply side regulation extends beyond climate change action to matters such as biodiversity protection, eco-tourism and ecosystem maintenance.561 Likewise, a report from UNEP and the International Resource Panel supports a “multi-beneficial approach” to policy decisions involving natural resources, including fossil fuels.562 The link between social, cultural and economic matters, and climate change has been plainly stated in many previous forums. For example, Gupta el. note that national policies targeting poverty, energy, land use, trade and pollution will have an impact on climate change.563 Likewise, the threat of climate change exists outside of the environmental sphere and looms over other crucial elements of society, including clean water, food production, access to energy, good health and having safe, stable places to live.564 The link between fossil fuels and poverty is particularly complex, as the resources are seen as a critical resource for development.565 However, researchers have found with very high confidence that climate change worsens poverty, especially among already vulnerable

559 FCCC/TP/2014/10, p. 17.

560 FCCC/TP/2014/10, p. 17; Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 303-304.

561 SEI et al. 2019, p. 44.

562 UNEP and International Resource Panel 2019, p. 33.

563 Gupta et al. 2007, p. 765.

564 Ivanova 2017, p. 22.

565 Lazarus and van Asselt 2018, p. 8–9; Kartha 2018, p. 117.

populations.566 Furthermore, it has been found that higher increases in global average temperature will prevent nations from being able to reduce poverty.567

On the flipside, addressing the threat of climate change provides real opportunity for building resilient, low-carbon societies and simultaneously addressing other concerns, such as biodiversity and health concerns.568 While taking meaningful action on climate change will always involve some trade-offs, it does not preclude sustainable development and poverty eradication. For example, Rogelj et al. held that through ambitious and just climate change policies, poverty alleviation and large-scale public benefits can be achieved while also remaining within a 1.5ºC pathway.569 In addition, co-benefits may accumulate and reinforce each other.570 Health co-benefits is one example which could be obtained through supply side policies. One such benefit could be the reduction of harmful emissions which cause air pollution and respiratory problems.571 The effect of air quality is one of the most studied health issues associated with fossil fuels.572 There are different estimates on the lives that could be saved as a result of improving air quality, but it is clear that it could reduce millions of premature deaths.573 Supply side regulation could improve air quality by promoting measures to prohibit and wind-down coal production, particularly in developing countries.574 The overall impact of this improvement would also depend on how energy needs were met, after supply side policies were implemented.575 For example, research on the United Kingdom held that the least beneficial outcomes for health based on air quality arose in models where biomass was predominately relied upon following a phase out of fossil fuels.576

566 Roy et al. 2018, p. 451.

567 Ibid, p. 450.

568 Ivanova 2017, p. 22.

569 Rogelj et al. 2018, p. 96.

570 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 295.

571 Metz 2010, p. 71.

572 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 295-296.

573 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 295-296; Rogelj et al. 2018, p. 96.

574 Roy et al. 2018, p. 461; Metz 2010, p. 89–90.

575 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 296-297.

576 Ibid, p. 296-297.

The ability to contribute to the protection of biodiversity also highlights how NMAs and supply side regulation can be holistic and integrated, in accordance with Article 6.8.

Globally, biodiversity is declining, with climate change one of the identified drivers of this loss.577 In relation to marine ecosystems, for example, higher temperatures are causing retreating ice cover and greater absorption of solar rays by the ocean.578 This, in turn, is resulting in warmer and more acidic waters. On land, climate change has disrupted precipitation cycles, resulting in fast changing ecosystems.579 Consequently, limiting fossil fuel supply and addressing climate change will already have positive impacts on biodiversity, as it will give battered ecosystems a chance to adapt. In addition, there are more direct linkages between upstream fossil fuel activities and biodiversity. A recent report by UNEP and the International Resource Panel, for example, noted that achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention to Combat Desertification, are all connected to use of natural resources, including fossil fuels.580 Extracting and processing natural resources has, according to the report, caused over 90% of biodiversity loss across the globe.581 While fossil fuels are not the sole driver of biodiversity, it is clear that upstream activities, in particular, can have direct and devastating effects on local ecosystems, in addition to the deleterious, long-term effects of climate change.582 Among the direct impacts are destruction and fragmentation of habitat and damaging levels of noise and pollution.583 Indirect impacts include increased human traffic into biodiverse areas and potential introduction of new pathogens and invasive species.584 In addition, human expansion into new areas may also result in damaging activities such as illegal hunting.585 This scenario has played out tragically in South America, particularly Suriname and Bolivia, with jaguar poaching increasing following the arrival of foreign workers involved in mining and logging.586

577 UNEP, Global Environment Outlook 6, 2019, p. 46-48.

578 Ibid, p. 46.

579 Ibid, p. 46-47.

580 UNEP and International Resource Panel 2019, p. 12.

581 Ibid, p. 7.

582 SEI et al. 2019, p. 54.

583 Harfoot et al. 2018, p. 2; Butt et al. 2013, p. 425.

584 Ibid.

585 Ibid.

586 Bale 2018, n.p.; Bale 2017, n.p.

The impacts of fossil fuel extraction is especially concerning due to evidence of a high convergence between fossil fuel reserves and biodiverse rich areas, both on land and in the water.587 This convergence also existed in areas where there is existing infrastructure for oil, gas and coal extraction.588 A study on the relationship between biodiversity and blocks marked for future exploration found a slightly lower level of convergence, with the Latin America and Caribbean countries noted as an exception.589 A separate paper, however, highlighted that “top-ranking carbon stock sites do not necessarily coincide with high biodiversity”.590 While some fossil fuel regions may thus fall outside of biodiverse rich areas, it is clear that well-designed policies could be used to target fossil fuel supply as well as biodiversity protection. Examples of how to address multiple environmental issues in a connected manner include a policy which both protects carbon sinks and avoids deforestation and another which links payment for land sector sequestration with the enhancement of biodiversity.591 This approach may also have cost-benefits, as entities may be more willing to pay for policies which achieve multiple outcomes.592

Upholding human rights, including the rights of indigenous communities, is another area in which possible co-benefits can be obtained through NMAs and supply side policies focusing on fossil fuels. These benefits could include reassertion of indigenous values, acknowledgments of sovereignty and the broader recognition of the “non-carbon” values of land.593 Due to the associated environmental damage and pollution, fossil fuel extraction often occurs away from urban areas, in “fossil fuel sacrifice zones”.594 Indigenous territories may be particularly at risk of falling within these zones, due to power and bargaining inequalities. Klein provides the example of pipeline construction historically facing less resistance in indigenous territories when compared to “less compromised populations” who

587 Butt et al. 2013; Harfoot et al. 2018, p. 2.

588 Harfoot et al. 2018, p. 2. One exception to this finding is noted in the study, namely that licensed contract blocks had the same level of species richness compared to the rest of land surfaces.

589 Harfoot et al. 2018, p. 3-5.

590 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 301.

591 UNEP and International Resource Panel 2019, p. 31.

592 Karlsson et al. 2020, p. 301.

593 Le Billon and Kristoffersen 2019, p. 15.

594 Klein 2019, p. 156–157

have more means to resist and protest.595 In many places, environmental defenders and people who protest fossil fuel and other major developments face a very real threat of assassination.596 In 2015, environmental assassinations resulted in more than 3 deaths per week, around 40% of which were estimated to be indigenous.597 These statistics highlight the inequality and grave cost paid in the defence of the environmental, particularly by indigenous communities.598

One example on how to address these matters through fossil fuel supply policy is provided by Muttitt et al., who suggests winding up production in areas where local populations, such as indigenous communities, are facing rights violations.599 On a cautionary note, poorly executed climate projects can run the risk of negatively impacting on the rights of indigenous communities. Parr, for example, outlines a carbon dioxide sink reforestation project in the Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda conducted by Face Absorbing Carbon Dioxide Emissions and the Uganda Wildlife Authority.600 Mount Elgon National Park had been home to an indigenous community, the Benet People, since 1967.601 According to Parr, the project resulted in the brutal eviction of the Benet People, which was carried out with extreme violence.602 Such examples emphasise the crucial importance of compassion, balanced and well-designed policies. Environmental assassinations and other human rights violations are not the only violence to arise from fossil fuel production. Many international disputes, particularly in the Middle East, can be related at least in part to the control of fossil fuel reserves.603 Accordingly, supply side policies could seek to wind-up fossil fuel production in a just and controlled manner, hopefully reducing the risk of violence.604

595 Ibid, p. 315–319.

596 Ibid, p. 156–157

597 Klein 2019, p. 204.

598 SEI et al. 2019, p. 54.

599 Muttitt et al. 2016, p. 7.

600 Parr 2013, p. 31-33.

601 Ibid.

602 Parr 2013, p. 31-33.

603 Klein 2019, p. 160–168.

604 Ibid, p. 160–168, 178–182, 199–206.