Hermeneutic  windows  (after  Kramer)

Lawrence  Kramer’s  (e.g.  1990,  1995,  1998a,  1998b,  and  2002)  model  for  post-­

structural  and  new-­hermeneutic⁵⁷  music  analysis,  and  especially  his  concept  of   hermeneutic  window.UDPHU±RIIHUSRWHQWPHWKRGVIRU¿QGLQJ locating,   and   interpreting   musical   meanings   –   and   further,   subject-­strategical   layers.  In  Kramer’s  studies,  the  focus  is  on  musical  meaning  as  a  multi-­signi-­

fying   and   multi-­determined   cultural   construction   that   may   be   discussed   and   interpreted   with   cultural   and   critical   theories,   including   psychoanalysis.   Like   psychoanalysis,  musical  hermeneutics  in  general  “seeks  meaning  in  places  where   meaning  is  often  said  not  to  be  found”  (Kramer  1990:  2).  Poststructuralism  (or   GHFRQVWUXFWLRQIRULWVSDUWDI¿UPV³WKDWWKHPHDQLQJRIDWH[WUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ or  cultural  practice  is  multiply  determined  and  exceeds  what  such  things  declare   WKHPVHOYHVWRPHDQ´LELG[LL,W³SURSRVHVWKDWWH[WV¿QGLWGLI¿FXOWWRUHVWULFW what  they  mean  and  that  their  very  effort  to  restrict  meaning  often  propagates   further”  (ibid.).  For  Kramer,  poststructural  music  analysis  equates  with  musical   hermeneutics  (see  esp.  Kramer  1990:  xii;;  Chap.  1;;  2002:  introduction  and  Chap.  

1;;    2003).  

At   the   beginning   of   his  Music   as   Cultural   Practice,   1800–1900,   Kramer   56  Sivuoja-­Gunaratnam’s  narratological  study  and  my  own  subject-­strategical  approach   are  grounded  on  different  semiotical  theories,  but  have  similarities  at  the  music-­analytical   level.  From  the  point  of  view  of  my  study  here,  Sivuoja-­Gunaratnam’s  analyses  of  the   KRUUL¿HGGLVLQWHJUDWLQJPXVLFDOVXEMHFWLQWKHG\VSKRULFQDUUDWLYHRI5DXWDYDDUD¶VCanto   I  (1997:  189–196),  the  narcissistic  subject  in  the  euphoric  narrative  of  Canto  II  (ibid.:  

196–200),  and  the  estranged  subjectivities  in  Arabescata  (ibid.:  200–205)  reveal  power-­

ful,  psychoanalytic  subject  strategies  in  music.  

57  Kramer  often  talks  simply  about  musical  hermeneutics  and  not  new  hermeneutics.  I,   however,  use  the  term  “new  hermeneutics”  because  it  has  become  fairly  well  established   in  postmodern  musicological  discourse.

sums  up  his  poststructural  new-­hermeneutic  music  analysis  as  consisting  of  the   following  basic  premises  (1990:  1):

1.  that  works  of  music  have  discursive  meanings;;

WKDWWKHVHPHDQLQJVDUHGH¿QLWHHQRXJKWRVXSSRUWFULWLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVFRPSD-­

rable  in  depth,  exactness,  and  density  of  connection  to  interpretations  of  literary  texts   and  cultural  practices;;

3.  that  these  meanings  are  not  “extramusical,”  but  on  the  contrary  are  inextricably   bound  up  with  the  formal  processes  and  stylistic  articulations  of  musical  works;;

4.  that  these  meanings  are  produced  as  a  part  of  the  general  circulation  of  regulated   practices   and   valuations   –   part,   in   other   words,   of   the   continuous   production   and   reproduction  of  culture.

According  to  Kramer,  the  hermeneutic  attitude  regards  the  text  as  potentially   secretive  or  a  provocation,  which  must  be  made  to  yield  to  understanding.  This  is   done  by  opening  a  hermeneutic  window,  through  which  the  discourse  of  under-­

standing  can  pass.  (Kramer  1990:  6.)  The  concept  is  meant  to  shed  light  on  “the   illocutionary  forces  of  music”⁵⁸  in  the  dynamic  constellation  of  harmonic,  rhyth-­

mic,  linear,  formal,  and  other  strategies  in  which  musical  meaning  may  be  found,   grasped,  and  interpreted.  Musical  processes  are  viewed  as  expressive  acts,  that   is,  as  performative  dimensions  of  utterance.  (Ibid.:  6–9.)

Kramer  differentiates  three  types  of  hermeneutic  windows  –  partly  overlap-­

ping  each  other  –  to  be  opened  up  in  the  music  under  analysis,  either  as  expres-­

sive  acts  to  be  recognized  as  such  or  as  signposts  to  such  a  recognition:

1.  Textual  inclusions  such  as  texts  set  to  music,  titles,  epigrams,  programs,   notes  to  the  score,  and  expression  markings.  These  inclusions,  just  like   WKHWZRRWKHUW\SHVWRRGRQRWHVWDEOLVKDXWKRUL]HQRU¿[WKHPHDQLQJ

³EXWRQO\LQYLWHWKHLQWHUSUHWHUWR¿QGPHDQLQJLQWKHLQWHUSOD\RIH[SUHV-­

sive  acts”.

2.  Citational   inclusions   such   as   links   to   a   literary   work,   visual   image,   place,  or  historical  moment;;  allusions  to  other  compositions,  texts,  styles,   periods;;  inclusions  and  parodies  of  other  characteristic  styles  not  predom-­

inant  in  the  work  under  analysis.

3.  Structural  tropes  are  procedures  “capable  of  various  practical  realiza-­

tions,  that  also  function  as  a  typical  expressive  act  within  a  certain  cultural   DQGKLVWRULFDOIUDPHZRUN´%HFDXVHVWUXFWXUDOWURSHVDUH³GH¿QHGLQWHUPV of  their  illocutionary  force,  as  units  of  doing  rather  than  units  of  saying”  

–  they  are  to  be  understood  as  performatives.  They  “cut  across  traditional   distinctions  between  form  and  content.  They  can  evolve  from  any  aspect   58   The   expression   “illocutionary”   (contra   “perlocutionary”)   force   derives   from   the   speech-­act  theory  of  J.  L.  Austin.

of  communicative  exchange:  style,  rhetoric,  representation,  and  so  on.”  

(Kramer  1990:  10.)

Structural   tropes   would   include,   for   example,   the   topics,   as   well   as   musi-­

FDOWURSHVDQGRWKHUUKHWRULF¿JXULQJVWKHRUL]HGE\musical  semiotics,  such  as   narrative   modalities   (Tarasti   1994)   or   expressive   meanings   (Hatten   1994).   (In   fact,  topics  may  be  conceived  as  belonging  to  all  three  categories.)  The  struc-­

tural  tropes  are  the  most  implicit  and  powerful  of  the  hermeneutic  windows.  It   is   precisely   the   loose   network   of   structural   tropes   that   forms   an   illocutionary   environment   for   expressive   acts.   (Kramer   1990:   9–10.)   Borrowing   from   J.   L.  

Austin’s   speech-­act   theory,   Kramer   (ibid.)   theorizes   meaning   as  performative   and  illocutionary  act.  The  illocutionary  act  refers  to  the  performance  of  an  act  in   the  saying  of  something,  such  as  issuing  a  command,  asking  a  question,  assuring   or  warning  (the  classic  example  is  the  “I  do”  in  a  marriage  ceremony).⁵⁹  Speech   act  theory  is  important  to  semiotics  for  its  insights  into  rule-­governed  forms  of   behavior,  i.e.,  everyday  cultural  practices  based  on  the  convention-­governed  pro-­

duction  of  signs  in  the  performative  dimension  of  speaking  and  writing,  and  by   extension,  all  forms  of  communication.  In  feminist  theory,  most  notably  in  Judith   Butler’s  (e.g.,  1990)  work,  the  understanding  of  gender  as  produced  in  performa-­

WLYHLVLQÀXHQWLDODQGDGRSWHGZLGHO\&RQWHPSRUDU\UHYLVLRQVVXFKDV%XWOHU¶V of   what   constitutes   a   performative,   view   meaning   in   general   as   performative   (instead  of  staying  with  Austin’s  original  differentiation  into  perlocutionary  and   illocutionary  acts).

To  return  to  Kramer:

6WUXFWXUDOWURSHVRSHUDWHIUHHO\DFURVVWKHHQWLUHFXOWXUDO¿HOG«7KH\PD\RUPD\

not  derive  from  the  explicit  vocabulary  that  a  historical  period  uses  about  itself.  …  In   their  malleability  and  semantic  openness,  structural  tropes  implant  the  hermeneutic   attitude  within  the  object  of  interpretation  itself.  As  latent  hermeneutic  windows  with   DGLYHUVLW\RIFXOWXUDODI¿OLDWLRQVWKH\IRUPVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHERG\ODQJXDJHRIDQ interpretive  community.  (Kramer  1990:  12.)

These  lines  of  Kramer  resonate  with  a  psychoanalytic  understanding  of  cul-­

WXUH$V(OL]DEHWK:ULJKWVXPVXS³Freud  discovered  that  psycho-­

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and  –  we  can  add  –  of  other  signifying  practices,  such  as  musical  sign  systems.  

Psychoanalytic  theory  focuses  on  the  inadequacy  of  the  subject’s  body  and  its   GLI¿FXOWLHV LQ FRQIURQWLQJ WKH VRFLRV\PEROLF ZRUOG DV H[SHULHQFHG IURP WKH subject’s  and  subjectivity’s  point  of  view.  Hence,  unsolvable  meanings,  ambiva-­

lence,  ambiguity,  fantasy,  illusion,  play,  and  the  like  are  frequent  objects  of  study   59  For  John  Searle,  another  speech  act  theorist,  the  illocutionary  act  is  synonymous  with   the  speech  act.

of   psychoanalytic   criticism.   Kramer’s   work   combines   “French”   and   “Anglo-­

American”  criticism  in  a  way  that  melds  psychoanalytic  theory  with  a  rhetoric   RIGHFRQVWUXFWLRQVKRZLQJWKDWPXVLFDOWURSHV¿JXUHVRUJHVWXUHVLQPXVLFDO articulation   may   function   both   as   mechanisms   of   subversion   and   defense   (cf.  

:ULJKW7KHVLJQV\VWHPLVERWKWKHREMHFWRUUHDVRQIRUWKHGHVLUH and  its  consequence  as  well  (cf.  Lacan  1998  [1973]:  149).  

Due   to   the   linguistic   and   cultural   turn   in   humanities,   social   sciences,   and   SV\FKRDQDO\WLFFULWLFLVPDQGUDWKHUWKDQ¿[DWLQJRQWKHSRVVLEOHSV\FKRVH[XDO intersections   or   coincidences   between   the   author   and   the   characters   (usually,   the  protagonist)  of  a  work,  we  can  instead  use  psychoanalysis  to  question  and   GHVFULEHPXVLFRWH[WXDO¿JXUDWLRQVDJDLQVWDEDFNJURXQGRILGHQWLW\SUREOHPDW-­

ics  and  subjectivity  formation.  Here  we  see  a  major  turn  in  psychoanalytic  art   research.  In  the  classic  setting  of  psychoanalytic  criticism,  the  text  (or  worse,   the  author)  is  the  “patient”  (“analysand”)  and  the  reader  the  “analyst”.  But  that   scene  is  reversed,  from  a  poststructuralist,  deconstructionist  perspective:  the  text,   too,  is  the  analyst.  The  reader/listener  is  subjected  to  the  effects  of  the  text,  while   at   the   same   time   analyzing   those   effects,   thus   inhabiting   a   complicated   posi-­

tion  when  acting  as  something  like  a  subject-­critic  (:ULJKW±,Q the  next  chapter,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  “classic”/new-­hermeneutic  dialectic  in   various  forms  of  psychoanalysis,  I  theorize  in  more  detail  certain  elements  and   processes  of  subject(ivity)  in  musical  discourse.

Chapter  5  

Locating  the  subject     (strategy)  in  music

In  Chapter  4,  research  on  musical  subjectivity  was  addressed  as  related  to  post-­

modern  music  analysis  and  musical  semiotics.  In  the  present  chapter,  musical   subjectivity,  subject,  and  subject  strategy  are  discussed  in  poststructural  semi-­

otico-­psychoanalytic   perspective.   Chapter   5.1   outlines   listening   subject   and   musical  subjectivity  as  textual  subjectivity.  The  theorization  is  grounded  on  (1)   the  constructivist  understanding  of  the  interdependent  relation  between  the  sub-­

ject  and  discourse  and  the  related  notion  of  subject  position,  (2)  on  the  psycho-­

analytic  notion  of  LGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGRQWKHQRWLRQRI³WKHplayed  subject”  

and  musical  suture,  based  on  the  application  of  Kaja  Silverman’s  (1983)  psycho-­

DQDO\WLFDOVHPLRWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQVLQ¿OPWKHRU\&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHVKristeva’s   and  Lacan’s  basic  ideas  on  the  constitution  of  subject  and  their  music-­analytical   applicability,  and  the  Freudian  notion  of  the  uncanny  is  presented.  Furthermore,   a  note  on  the  gendered  aspects  follows.  In  Chapter  5.3,  David  Schwarz’s  (1997a)   psychoanalytic   theorization   of   the   listening   subject   is   discussed   and   comple-­

mented  by  Michel  Poizat’s  (1992)  views.  Chapter  5.4  gives  a  summary  of  the   constructed  methodology  of  interpreting  musical  subject  strategies.