Givenness and content

With Siegel‘s definition, Crane presents a connection between content and the given: ―To my ear, ‗what is conveyed‘ sounds rather close to ‗what is given‘. So if we adopt Siegel‘s definition of ‗content‘, we can also say that the content of an experience is what is given to the

177 Siegel, 2010.

subject in that experience.‖¹⁷⁸ This ‗given‘ or ‗content‘ need not be a mythical Given, nor is it necessarily a nonconceptual given. It seems that one could even consider contents in standard conceptualism as something ‗conveyed to the subject‘, even if one were to understand concepts as something one brings to experience. McDowell‘s earlier view would then also be a valid view about content in Siegel‘s terms. Whereas in McDowell‘s earlier view ‗what is conveyed‘ was something conceptual and representational, in his revised view, ‗what is conveyed‘ is something intuitional. It seems that intuitions, conveyed or given in experience, are not quite representational, nor are they just one‘s perceived surroundings as would be the case with ‗mere sensibility‘. As for those who reject the idea that perceptual experience has any content at all, what they truly are rejecting is representational content, which on Siegel‘s account of content is not presupposed. In this way, when Siegel‘s definition is adopted, content in the broad sense can be distinguished from representational content.

According to Crane, the dominant view about the nature of perceptual contents is the propositional content view, which he calls standard intentionalism. He claims, however, that there is a tension in standard intentionalism between two kinds of views about propositions:

On the one hand, Russellian views emphasise the ‗object-involving‘ and ‗direct‘ nature of experiences. On the other hand, Fregean views emphasise the ‗aspectual‘ nature of experiences by presenting perceived properties as perceived under some mode of presentation, or through how a concept represents them. While the Russellian view relates the experiencing subject to the perceived objects and properties¹⁷⁹, the Fregean view relates the subject to representations of these objects. And here the tension in standard intentionalism becomes apparent: If the views relate the subject to different types of entities, and hence neither view strictly excludes the other, which one of the views should we consider as the correct view about content, and on what grounds? After all, it is somewhat uncontroversial that both of the proposed relations exist, at least in normal veridical perception.

178 Crane, 2013, 233.

179 Perhaps by pure reference or by an externalist relation (see chapter 6.4).

One possible response to this tension is to adopt a pluralistic view about perceptual content, such as the one proposed by David Chalmers. Chalmers proposes that experiences can have multiple contents with different corresponding ‗perceptual‘ relations. These contents could also include other kinds of contents besides Russellian and Fregean contents.¹⁸⁰ According to Crane, Chalmers‘s proposal is based on the idea that the pluralistic view can serve to highlight different aspects of perceptual states, much in the same way de dicto and de re distinctions can serve to highlight different aspects of some other mental states, such as desires. Chalmers‘

view is plausible, according to Crane, but only if it is understood as a claim about the information that experience delivers or what can be derived from it. In that sense it is plausible to say that perception of the planet Venus shining in the sky can convey to one also that Hesperus or Phosphorus is shining in the sky or that something is shining in the sky, and so forth. However, if Chalmers‘ proposal is understood as a view about the phenomenology, about what it is like to have an experience, it makes considerably less sense. ―When having a visual experience of the planet Venus in the evening, it does not seem as if many distinct (and possibly incompatible) contents are being conveyed to me.‖¹⁸¹

In Crane‘s view, inability to explain phenomenology is a serious flaw in a view about perceptual content. For Crane, the connection between content and phenomenology is more than what is determined with the commonly-held constraint that perceptual content ―must be adequate to its phenomenology.‖¹⁸² While a constraint like this is present in the views of John McDowell, Jeff Speaks and Christopher Peacocke, among many others, what Crane proposes is that phenomenology should a part of content itself:

Given how Siegel originally introduced the word ‗content‘, it seems like an understatement to say that phenomenal adequacy is simply another ‗constraint‘ on content. Content, remember, is what is conveyed to a subject in an experience, and an

180 For more, see e.g. Chalmers, 2006.

181 Crane, 2013, 237.

182 Siegel, 2010.

experience is a conscious state or event. Surely part of what is conveyed is how things are consciously?¹⁸³

But could phenomenology be a part of content that is propositional? According to Crane, propositional content and phenomenology may have in common the idea that what is given has a certain form, but the propositional ‗that things are thus and so‘ necessarily abstracts from the real presence of what is perceived. It is by abstracting from this ‗real presence‘ that propositions can outlive the experience and become the contents of judgement. The phenomenal given should thus be distinguished from propositional content. ―The reason for this is the plausibility of content pluralism, plus the implausibility of saying that multiple representational contents are given to the subject.‖¹⁸⁴ Crane‘s point appears to be that in order for propositional content to be plausible as content of experiences, it would have to be pluralistic content, and pluralistic content could not be what is phenomenally given.¹⁸⁵