As already discussed in the first chapter, there were significant differences in the way the New Left operated in Finland and Sweden.525 This is particularly true of the gender debates when the matter was adopted by the New Left. In Sweden, leftist perspectives challenged the frames of reference previously used by liberal gender activists in a way that was not seen in the Finnish gender debate. This was part of the wider New Left tendency to question the role of technocratic
519 Holli 1988, 326.
520 Mickwitz 2008b, 51, see also Liite 4, 277-279 on the same volume.
521 TiS 9/66, Leo Ågren, ”Sexualliv i Finland”.
522 Zenit 2/67, Margaretha Mickwitz, ”Könsroller i Finland”, 107-108.
523 Holli 1988, 329-330; Holli 1990, 83-84; Jallinoja 1983, 180.
524 “Det är hög tid att vi i detta land slutar upp med att tro att reformismen.” TiS 6/66, Gudrun Ekeflo, ”Könsrollsdebatten: Vad vi måste angripa är hela
samhällstrukturen”.
525 Suominen 1997, 161; Östberg 2002, 61-62, 102-104; Wiklund 2006, 181; Jørgensen 2011, 56.
expertise that so far had been such an instrumental part in establishing the Swedish welfare state.526 In its least dogmatic form, the gender argumentation of the Swedish New Left can be seen as a more politically conscious and pessimistic version of the liberal discourse. It strongly emphasised the negative psychological effects of consumption – the gendered practices of commercial enterprises making women the primary targets of greedy salesmen who were using “neuroticising” psychological tricks. For the Swedish New Left press, these examples of commercial exploitation showed that the worrying developments of American capitalism were also present in Sweden.527 These psychological arguments leaned strongly on the Marxist theory of alienation that was undergoing a renaissance among Sixties’ New Left groups,528 but the Swedish New Left’s criticism of consumerism took the form of drawing attention to its concrete manifestations in setting beauty standards for women: sexist swimwear;529 cosmetic surgery;530 corsets that caused “complexes”;531 and beauty products with absurd profit margins.532 These examples show not only the pessimism and elitism of Nordic radicalists when it came to mass consumerism, but also their opposition to the commercial objectification of women.533 The salesperson was often depicted as the villain in these stories, causing neuroses and spreading the American obsession with beauty and consumerism to Sweden's youth. With its emphasis on cultural matters, however, Finnish New Left activists did not break away from the liberal tradition in such a pronounced manner. New Left papers were mostly disseminating reformist texts written by Yhdistys 9 and its activists, while transnational New Left theories outlining the psychological effects of consumerism were almost non-existent.
In the context of gender activism, Swedish New Left activists challenged the meaning and content of the central concept – radical. Although they admitted that previous liberal gender criticism had a point, they claimed it had been compromised because of its petit-bourgeois attitudes. Thus, it was radical only as an attitude that pushed for comprehensive reforms, but not as a political identity.
Sometimes the texts would undermine the supposed ‘radicalism’ of these liberal activists by juxtaposing their professed individuality with their proposals to reform welfare-state policies.534 The Swedish New Left also questioned the effectiveness of liberal gender activism by pointing out that reformism had not managed to change attitudes. Liberal discourse had expected a swift change in
526 Andersson 2006, 46-47.
527 TiS 5/65, Holger Brinkenbo, ”Med bysten som statussymbol”, 15; TiS 15/67, Gunnel Granlid, ”Kvinnorna – den längsta revolutionen”, 4; Clarté 2/68, Marianne
Petterson, ”Socialistisk syn på kvinnofrågan”, 49-52.
528 Wiklund 2006, 175; Gilcher-Holtey 2001, 15; Horn 2007, 154.
529 TiS 12/65, Lisbeth Ullman, ”Mormor på stranden – och här är jag”, 18-19.
530 TiS 5/65, Holger Brinkenbo, ”Med bysten som statussymbol”, 15.
531 TiS 51-52/67, Gunnel Granlid, ”Vi behöver en kroppsstrumpa!”, 5.
532 Clarté 2/68, Marianne Petterson, ”Socialistisk syn på kvinnofrågan”, 49-52.
533 Evans 2009, 344; Jørgensen 2011, 55.
534 TiS 32/65, Sven Wernström, ”Det där med sex”, 23; Clarté 4/65, Dick U.
Vestbro, ”Könsroller”, 28; TiS 6/65, Arthur Ekström, ”Statliga bordeller – motion om motion”, 15.
moral codes, without fully understanding the complex nature of implementing such widespread reforms.535 Liberal freedom of choice was therefore just a form of opportunism and “faux-radicalism” that impeded truly radical actions.536 Despite obvious political disagreements, criticism of liberal gender discourses had to be somewhat delicate, so as to not marginalise the issue itself. Gender roles were so important, however, that it should not to be left to the liberals who, the Swedish New Left press argued, were only capable of inadequately reforming existing society.537 The New Left saw this half-baked reformism as a form of conservatism, as the supportive reforms they proposed only perpetuated women’s “double role” and current responsibilities.538 Furthermore, liberals had not paid sufficient attention to gender roles in the home, and their key role in the whole issue.539 Even if attaining more personal liberties for individuals had been successful, this progress was meaningless until it could be extended to the whole of Swedish society.540
Focus on reforms guided by social scientists had been one of the leading arguments of liberal gender radicalism in both Nordic contexts. It had both de-politicised the issue and limited the debate to only those who knew the sociological terminology. This was not compatible with the Swedish New Left’s aspirations for a new politically conscious grass-roots movement that would expand from the bottom up. In their eyes, liberal radicals, scientific experts, and social engineers were essentially serving the objectives of the “bourgeois classes”
with their elitist literacy. Their expertise, they argued, could also be governed by financial motives, and the results of their studies dictated by social prejudices.
Swedish New left papers maintained that liberal reformists had not understood the dominance of mass media as a form of social and political control. According to this logic, media was purposefully used by the upper classes to influence the attitudes and values of lower classes. Portrayals of sexuality in the media therefore needed to be made explicitly political by emphasising their social and class aspects.541 While the New Left is often approached as a decidedly intellectual movement, there were some in the Swedish New Left press who argued that the liberal notion of social discourse as a progressive force was nothing but academic mumbo jumbo – debate for its own sake was worthless,
535 Clarté 4/65, Dick U. Vestbro, ”Könsroller”, 28.
536 TiS 13/68, Björn Häggqvist, ”Om nyfikens gränser”, 11 (a Review of Vilgot Sjömans movie Jag är nyfiken); Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller
könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75; TiS 5/68, Gunnel Granlid och Göran Palm, ”Kvinnan, klassen, samhället”, 17-18; TiS 12/67, Nina Yunkers, ”Mera kärlek åt vänster!”, 3.
537 Zenit 2/67, Carin Mannheimer, ”Klass och kön”, 105-106.
538 Clarté 4/65, Dick U. Vestbro, ”Könsroller”, 28; Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75.
539 Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75; TiS 32/65, Sven Wernström, ”Det där med sex”, 23.
540 TiS 13/67, Nina Yunkers, ”Har inte hemmafruarna mål i mun?”, 13.
541 TiS 13/68, Björn Häggqvist, ”Om nyfikens gränser”, 11; Zenit 3/68, Dick Urban Vestbro, ”Könskamp och klasskamp” (A review of Göran Palm’s Indoktrineringen i Sverige, 1968), 74-76.; TiS 5/68, Gunnel Granlid och Göran Palm, ”Kvinnan, klassen, samhället”, 17-18.
unless it resulted in concrete political action.542 Criticising literary works and citing “intellectuals” was simply not enough if you wanted to actually improve the position of Swedish women; the debate would end up being just “l’art pour l’art”.543 A proper analysis of social power structures first required a clear awareness of how those structures have affected all of us already from an early age.544 Despite welfare reforms, the New Left papers argued, Sweden was not a classless society.545 By focusing on sexuality and individualism, liberal radicalists had actually avoided important economic questions.546 By focusing instead on the intersections of class and cultural factors like education, social capital, and media representations, the Swedish New Left wanted to emphasise the complexity of gender roles in a way that clearly challenged liberal positivist belief that social values could be changed quickly.
Gender arguments of the New Left were usually more practical than those of the liberal radicals who had introduced it.547 The New Left objective was to understand the reasons behind gendered low-income jobs, to draft a concrete plan for achieving equality, raise political consciousness of those most affected by material shortcomings, and to press for policies such as equal pay laws and single-income tax models.548 Focusing on the “bourgeois mythology” of marriage was not enough to reveal the real shortcomings of gendered social practices in Swedish society.549 This effectively introduced an intersectional understanding to the gender debate; while the concept was not featured in Sixties’ discussions, by including factors such as ethnicity, age, and disability to the gender analysis, the Swedish New Left was essentially highlighting the rhizomatic and complex nature of gendered practices and policies.550 These factors seemed to provide a more nuanced understanding of the effects of gender roles, as they took account of socioeconomic aspects, such as the professional status, age, and social class of women.551 The effects of these intersectional factors were described, for instance, in a series of articles in the New Left weekly, Tidsignal, on the daily routines of working-class women. These cases showed how working-class women had a
542 TiS 21/68, Gunnel Granlid, ”Så här tycker de i dag”, 4-5; TiS 6/66, Gudrun Ekeflo, ”Könsrollsdebatten: Vad vi måste angripa är hela samhällstrukturen”.
543 TiS 18/67, Nina Yunkers, ”Kinnorna – den längsta resignationen”, 13; TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”; TiS 6/66, Gudrun
Ekeflo, ”Könsrollsdebatten: Vad vi måste angripa är hela samhällstrukturen”.
544 TiS 5/68, Gunnel Granlid och Göran Palm, ”Kvinnan, klassen, samhället”, 17-18;
Wiklund 2006,173-177.
545 TiS 21/68, Gunnel Granlid, ”Så här tycker de i dag”, 4-5.
546 TiS 15/67, Gunnel Granlid, ”Kvinnorna – den längsta revolutionen”, 4.
547 Zenit 3/68, Dick Urban Vestbro, ”Könskamp och klasskamp”, 74-76.
548 TiS 21/68, Gunnel Granlid, ”Så här tycker de i dag”, 4-5; TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”; Clarté 2/68, Marianne Petterson, ”Socialistisk syn på kvinnofrågan”, 49-52; TiS 35/68, Georg
Palmér, ”Svensk industri idag: stora löneklyftor och kinnodiskriminering”, 12-13.
549 TiS 15/67, Gunnel Granlid, ”Kvinnorna – den längsta revolutionen”, 4.
550 TiS 21/68, Gunnel Granlid, ”Så här tycker de i dag”, 4-5; TiS 33/69, Jörn
Svensson, ”Kritik vid ett jubileum”, 4-5. The concept of intersectionality was not used in argumentation at this time.
551 Zenit 2/67, Rita Liljerstöm, ”Teorier om könsrollsinlärning”, 37-43.
rather rudimentary understanding of the “intellectual” gender debate.552 The Swedish New Left press therefore did not just ignore intellectual debates on the issue; it actively dismissed the relevance of such discussions, emphasising instead an anti-elitist form of grass-roots activism.
As well as distinguishing themselves from their liberal activist contemporaries, the Swedish New Left were distancing themselves from the deficiencies and political compromises of the traditional Left and labour movement (hence ‘New’). The idea was to clear space for a new political movement while still being able to borrow influences and build on top of existing political traditions.553 Like nearly all other 1960s New Left movements, the Swedish New Left endeavoured to distance themselves from the USSR and emphasised their democratic take on socialism.554 At the same time they wanted to highlight the “reactionary“ policies prevalent in the Swedish Social Democrats and labour movement; their “treachery” of the gender issues and women’s movement were also an essential feature of the argument. According to the Swedish New Left, labour movement leaders had succumbed to “bourgeois temptations” and simply raised their own standard of living and social status.555 In order to overcome the ideological stagnation of the labour movement, its fundamental tenets needed to be reasserted.556 The lack of ideological purity among ruling leftist politicians was highlighted by instances where labour organisations had failed to meet their own equality standards.557 The Swedish New Left focus on the labour movement might be explained by the fact that both these leftist movements had similar goals – especially regarding industrial democracy (a prominent discourse in Sixties’ Sweden).558 For many in the Swedish New Left, labour unions were a prime example of the way traditional leftist organisations had given up on the goal of comprehensive social change and settled instead for mundane issues and conservative policies that simply raised wages and increased the benefits of its own members.
Because of the self-declared internationality of the Swedish New Left, transnational examples were also important in their gender debate. Closely resembling the way Finnish radicals had used Swedish liberal examples to highlight shortcomings in their own political context, some in the Swedish New
552 See, e.g., TiS 28/66, Gunnel Granlid, “Debatten och vi/-Oavlönad familjemedlem kallas jag visst…”, 6-7; TiS 28/66, Gunnel Granlid, “Debatten och vi/En ganska vanlig 18-åring”.
553 Östberg 2002, 67; Wiklund 2006, 166.
554 Jørgensen 2011. This side was also present in the gender debate, see e.g., Zenit 2/67, Eva Adolffson, ”Patriakrat i Sovjet?”, 108.
555 Zenit 2/67, Rita Liljerstöm, ”Teorier om könsrollsinlärning”, 37-43; TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”; TiS 36/66, Gunnel Granlid, ”Vad menar Arne Geijer?”; Zenit 3/68, Dick Urban Vestbro, ”Könskamp och klasskamp”, 74-76;
TiS 35/68, Barbro Backenberger, ”Kvinnan och jämlikheten”, 11; Östberg 2002, 75-76.
556 TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”; Wiklund 2006, 169.
557 TiS 14/66, Sven Landin, ”Även fackföreningar betalar ”kvinnolöner”; TiS
24/66, ”Hon fick inte bli ombudsman i FCO”, 7-9; TiS 36/66, Gunnel Granlid, ”Vad menar Arne Geijer?”; Östberg 2002, 51.
558 Östberg 2002, 114; Wiklund 2006, 164, 172-173.
Left used these examples to primarily strengthen a domestic argument or political position. Tidsignal looked up to the French MDF (“Mouvement Democratique Feminin”), as their actions seemed to show the inseparable connection not only between gender and wider political and ideological questions, but also with the very definitions of democracy and justice. The members of MDF had openly acknowledged the stagnation of state socialism and existing leftist organisations, and demanded policies that would raise women’s political consciousness and practical political skills. They had also initiated pragmatic models, such as female-only membership, which systematically supported these ambitions.559 The French protests of 1968 impressed many in Sweden. Their example showed how a movement could gain revolutionary momentum outside conventional political organisations.560 Similar transnational support was found elsewhere. Hannah Gavron’s The Captive Wife, despite its distinctly British origins, was used as an example directly applicable to the Swedish context. Gavron’s argument was that the concept of individual freedom of choice was hollow if class differences were not fully taken into account – different classes had asymmetrical opportunities to exercise their free choice, and that asymmetry was also present in Swedish society though liberal activists conveniently ignored this. Juliet Mitchell’s psychoanalytical theories were also often cited, as they provided a solid socialist alternative to existing liberal theories of gender relations.561 Yet, in spite of distancing themselves from the individualism of early Sixties’ liberal gender activists, the Swedish New Left owed many of its perspectives on the gender issue to patterns that had been initiated by liberal activists.
As well as contesting the processes of socialisation, the Swedish New Left also challenged the role of the family as the foundation for all social organisation.
Family-based policies did not match the “realities” of modern, industrial post-war societies; in fact, they were seen as reinforcing some of the most reactionary concepts still existing in society562 – the “nuclear” family was the epitome of such concepts. It nevertheless seemed to be the most resilient one, even when
“primitive” conceptions of womanhood were abolished, as many of the traditions were part and parcel of the family structure.563 As a “consumer group”, the family effectively neutralised every attempt at political activism by the working classes.564 But the New Left argument against the family was not just anti-capitalist, it also highlighted the “disharmony” caused by the modern family’s isolation. This isolation could have an impact on children’s upbringing by giving them “emotional neuroses”. The economic reasoning behind family structures should therefore be abolished, not merely reformed, as these
559 TiS 21/68, ”Frankrikes nya suffragetter arbetar för socialismen”, 4.
560 Jørgensen 2011, 56.
561 Zenit 2/67, Carin Mannheimer, ”Klass och kön”, 105-106; TiS 15/67, Gunnel Granlid, ”Kvinnorna – den längsta revolutionen”, 4.
562 TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”.
563 Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75
564 TiS 6/66, Gudrun Ekeflo, ”Könsrollsdebatten: Vad vi måste angripa är hela samhällstrukturen”.
entrenched traditions were also supported by the major political parties.565 The Swedish New Left clearly analysed the way in which mental and economic structures had become intertwined to produce the conservative attitudes present in Swedish society.
However, radical activists were not just criticising existing social conditions in the 1960s. They also had proposals for renewing key cultural practices in a highly practical manner. In more moderate versions, the Swedish New Left proposed collective daycare policies that would ease the counterproductive influences of traditional family values. Through collective action, which encouraged a more sociable upbringing, these policies would provide contacts and activities for children that were otherwise not readily available via the traditional nuclear family setup.566 Taken one step further, collective childcare was also envisioned as a way to include otherwise isolated adult family members too. Meanwhile, collective housing would effectively redistribute domestic labour and thus automatically increase equality between the sexes.567 Completely transforming the practical living conditions would force a necessary change in the ultimate problem – the power structure of families. Transnational examples were cited here, such as the Israeli system of collective housing; Kibbutzes were described in several Swedish New Left publication issues as tangible proof of their effectiveness as a model assuring intra-family equality.568 Such comprehensive and far-reaching conclusions were nowhere to be seen in Finnish radical debates; even leftist women’s organisations were still concentrating on relatively non-radical issues, such as kindergartens.569
While considerable differences can be found between Nordic radical papers and their framing of gender-related themes, these differences were relatively small when compared to the way similar issues were debated in the West German radical press. On a general level, Sweden was often cited when evaluating the impact of sexual liberation on a society.570 In practice, the progressive reputation of Sweden meant that educational books were sometimes translated from Swedish to German.571 But in the radical sphere, the example of
“Swedish Sin” and Sweden’s reputation as a sexually liberal, and perhaps even indecent culture were far more significant than any reformist educational policies and texts.
As Dagmar Herzog and other scholars of the West German radical movement and its gender relations have noted, the way in which the West German radical press used sensationalised, scantily-clad women as a part of its public communications is striking. Konkret, the most widely circulated German New Left paper was no exception in this; rather, it can be seen as one of the most
565 Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75; TiS 33/69, Jörn Svensson, ”Kritik vid ett jubileum”, 4-5.
566 Konkret 7-8/67, Gunnar Bengtson, ”Familjedebatt eller könsrollpolitik?”, 67-75.
567 TiS 4/66, Irene Matthis, ”Aretarrörelsens svek mot kvinnan”.
568 TiS 5/66, Dick Urban Vestbro, ”Hur ska vi bo utan familjer?”; TiS 24/66, ”Hon fick inte bli ombudsman i FCO”, 7-9.
569 Katainen 1994, 343-348.
570 Eder 2014, 107.
571 Sauerteig 2009, 130.
influential public channels that helped set off this sensationalist and misogynist trend. While the voyeuristic imagery was sometimes seen as part political protest, even the German radicals involved have later acknowledged that the images were mainly used to boost sales. In this respect, they did not differ that much from the way Springer press tabloids also used the female figure to sell products. However, these images would not have fitted Nordic New Left papers in any shape or form, as they were counterintuitive to the political position of Nordic activists, who had been specifically fighting against just these kinds of
influential public channels that helped set off this sensationalist and misogynist trend. While the voyeuristic imagery was sometimes seen as part political protest, even the German radicals involved have later acknowledged that the images were mainly used to boost sales. In this respect, they did not differ that much from the way Springer press tabloids also used the female figure to sell products. However, these images would not have fitted Nordic New Left papers in any shape or form, as they were counterintuitive to the political position of Nordic activists, who had been specifically fighting against just these kinds of