Foucault (1992) reminds us ‘there are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on look-ing and reflectlook-ing at all’ (p. 8). In order to engage myself to an ongolook-ing conversation with myself about what I have been experiencing as I am experiencing (Katila and Meriläinen, 2013), I have employed the four dimensions of reflexivity (picture 3).
Although Hibbert et al. (2010) note that this matrix is an oversim-plification of the complex processes of reflexivity, it can be employed in explaining how reflexive writing becomes part of the empirical data and supports working with theory. In this case, repetition produced reflexive texts which stayed within the accepted boundaries of thought for addressing the changing nature of HE. Extension produced reflex-ive texts, which manifested the concerns and ethical struggles related to self-production. The disruptive mode of reflexivity produced texts, which questioned the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true.
Picture 3 Dimensions of reflexivity
Earlier manuscript versions and the discussions I have had with my the-sis supervisors reveal my inability to challenge my assumptions of HE.
I was merely producing something that others have produced during for the past twenty years, and caught myself employing repetition as a mode of reflexivity. As I proceeded with my analysis, following versions and discussions revealed how I became ‘locked into a theoretical per-spective through recursive processes that simply reinforce the current set of understandings that they employ’ (Hibbert et al., 2010) and vigorously sustained my sense of self. This is understandable, because at that time my headwork was dominated by the structural influences of the merger.
I tortured my thesis supervisors with a polemic narrative related to the political ramification of the Finnish HE sector and its implications on an institutional – and on an individual – level without realising that I am trying to resist particular modes of subjection. Yet my internal reflexive conversations with myself and the external reflexive conversa-tions with my supervisors helped me to open to new insights and
chal-lenges. The astonishments and breakdowns in my own understanding made me realise that my patterns of sense-making were not adequate.
Furthermore, the conversations with my supervisors in which they asked disruptive questions related to my research, helped me to think with theory anew. Most of these discussions aroused feelings of confusion, frustration, disorientation and plain ignorance, because I could not answer some of their most difficult questions such as ‘Why cannot strategy mean autonomy?’ and ‘Why ethical subjectivity?’ These
‘offstage’ conversations (Hibbert et al., 2010) with my supervisors were important to me, because they sustained my reflexivity despite their oc-casional disruptiveness. Hibbert et al. point out that the value of such emotions is that they are both indicators and outputs of reflexivity.
Yet, the risk of disruptive reflexivity is ‘a spiral of doubt […] as deeper and deeper foundational notions can be opened to radical critique – and abandoned’ (Hibbert et al. 2010: 55). At its worst, pursuing an auto-ethnography may result not only in a self-emptied researcher but also in a self-emptied practitioner. The worst part of it is that after one start to problematise one’s own thinking, one has to let go of the idea of knowing oneself and others. This can be an unsettling process, because it fractures ‘tacit assumptions that are enacted in our practices and ways of talking’ and writing, resulting in, at its worst, an endless process of doubt in one’s research. To break such a process, the fourth mode of reflexivity, i.e. participation, is needed.
Hibbert et al. speak of ‘the disrupted, confused and self-emptied researcher’ who seeks participation with a more static ‘partner’. With this, they refer to participation in which the researcher completes the reflexive circle though engaging in ‘conversation with a classic (or in some way charismatic) text rather than a person’ (p. 18). For me such charismatic texts were provided by Rosalyn Diprose (2002) and Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre (1997). These texts gave a meaning to the awkwardness that was inscribed in me throughout this research project.
Without familiarising myself with Diprose’s work on ethics and St. Pierre’s thoughts on ethical practice of post-foundational inquiry, I would still be entangled in the reflexive circle feeling frustrated and uncomfortable due to the flow of feelings and embodiment (Ashcraft,
2017: 24). Diprose’s work provided an access to ethics as a felt sense, as embodied experiences whereas St. Pierre’s work provided me analytical tools to address these experiences empirically. Accordingly, I agree with Sorsa (2012), that the contribution of actual research work is realised through reflexive theoretical thinking. Pointing out reflexivity is also a way to increase the plausibility of the research, because it is practiced not only in relation to the empirical material but also in relation to one-self (ibid.). The reflexive vignettes I have chosen are my conversations with myself (ad se convertere), because they entail existential impulses through which I have turned in upon myself (eis heauton epistrephein) and have created a reflexive relation with myself (Foucault, 2000).
Employing reflexivity has also helped me to question the knowledge production of studies related to the changing nature of HE. Leaning on this knowledge production without practicing reflexivity, one might risk reproducing as much about one’s ‘historical and political context as about the subject-matter under study’ (Hook, 2001: 22). To hold on to this knowledge would have been dangerous, because it might have resulted to a personal confession (Ashcraft, 2017) through reproducing the agony caused by the disturbing discourses in and around structural development. According to the extant literature, these discourses are seen as oppressive and violating the traditional values embraced in HE. I was proceeding in this direction with full speed ahead in order to prove that despite my managerial position, I am a diligent researcher who is able to criticise the regime of structural development. However, allowing myself to be sensitive to and annoyed by the awkwardness of ‘particular encoun-ters among particular people with particular agendas in particular histor-ical moments’ (Kondo, 1990: 307) eventually helped me to understand how affect prompts self-production through the technologies of the self.