Top Down or Bottom Up: (How) Does Public Opinion Influence

As implied, existing research has confirmed that public opinion is not volatile, and that it does not lack structure or coherence. However, there is no consensus on how it actually influences foreign policy. This research maintains that the impact of the public mood on a nation’s foreign affairs actually varies; sometimes there is a bottom-up dynamic, while at other times it is the leaders who dominate and actively shape public attitudes. Furthermore, from time to time, public opinion and foreign policy are disconnected due to public disinterest or elite negligence. A number of conditions define the nature of this public opinion-foreign policy linkage. Based on a review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, Morin & Paquin (2018, 174–175), for instance, suggest three broad conditions that increase or reduce the influence of public opinion: a state’s independence vis-à-vis other actors, the visibility of the foreign policy matter at hand and leaders’ belief systems. Their list is not exhaustive. In addition to these variables, threat perceptions, a state’s domestic structure, and electoral threats should also be taken into account.

As to the first condition brought up by Morin and Paquin, evidence is not yet that strong. However, there are good arguments that a state’s domestic structure – political institutions, structure of society and policy networks – is a factor that has an impact on the salience of public opinion in Western democracies. Risse-Kappen (1991), for instance, says that in strong states, which have a predominant role in their

45 Constructivist studies investigating the foreign policy-public opinion nexus are surprisingly scant. One notable exception is James Strong’s (2017) work on the British decision to join the Iraq War in 2003. The basic claim of constructivist public opinion research is that public opinion exists if the society and the elite particularly consider that it exists. The volume’s focus is, however, more on the public legitimacy of a given policy course, not on public opinion formation per se.

domestic structure, the public have more limited access to the policymaking process.

This does not imply that societal demands cannot affect policy outcomes. Moreover, strong leaders have additional persuasive power and, thus, the concentration of political power can downplay the importance of public opinion.

Secondly, some foreign policy questions draw more public attention than others.

Hence, salience matters. In other words, major decisions such as joining international institutions can animate the public, whereas routine and less dramatic decisions might go practically unnoticed by the broader public. Two factors in particular increase public attentiveness. First, the immediacy of the issue at hand and, secondly, the openness of the political decision-making process (see e.g. Knecht &

Weatherford 2006). In other words, major events that draw plenty of media coverage arouse considerable interest. Moreover, a lively elite debate can also spark curiosity in foreign policy issues. Additionally and importantly, salience has two determinants:

issues and countries. Some issues, such as important international events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, capture attention across the globe. However, one must also pay attention to country-specific factors. National intra-elite dissent can, for example, fuel domestic public interest in foreign policy issues. Additionally, a foreign policy question is likely to provoke interest in a country where the effects are palpable or in which the representative government is somehow involved. Thus, the salience of a foreign policy matter is the result of an interplay between issue- and country-specific determinants (Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, 928–931).

Thirdly, it is crucial to take the individual level into account if one wants to understand the public opinion and foreign policy linkage. In other words, the beliefs that policymakers hold about the desirability and necessity of public opinion as an anchor of foreign policy determine how they are influenced by the public mood in their decision-making (see e.g. Foyle 1997; Powlick 1991). Foyle (1997, 145–147), for example, points out that when it comes to considering public opinion in foreign policymaking, there are four kinds of leaders. Delegates believe that it is both desirable and necessary to gain public support for the successful conduct of foreign policy, whereas executors recognize the desirability but think that public support is not necessary. Pragmatists again do not necessarily see public input as desirable but they acknowledge that ignoring it is impossible. Those leaders who are the most lukewarm toward public opinion are guardians, who wittingly disregard public attitudes in directing their nation’s foreign policy.

Besides the aforementioned factors, the potency of public opinion might also depend on existing threat perceptions. Davis (2012, 322–323) argues that “security threats confound the establishment of an opinion-policy nexus, while relaxation of the threat environment allows for a foreign policy that more closely mirrors public opinion”. The logic behind the argument is quite simple. A government’s responsiveness to the wishes of the public is clearly an ideal in established liberal

democracies. In an era of high tensions and risks, such ideals can nonetheless be sacrificed in order to secure very basic national interests such as sovereignty or survival. However, it also seems that during a crisis people tend to “rally around the flag”⁴⁶ and support their leaders. Thus, serious threats can render public opinion homogenous (Cheng & Lee 2017, 17).

What kind of issues do, in fact, determine the dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy? When is the foreign policy-public opinion nexus likely to be top-down, bottom-up, or disconnected? There are no simple or definitive answers, but tentative assertions can be made. Moreover, one should remember that such dynamics are always simplifications and the reality is much less clear-cut. In other words, the dynamics are not completely mutually exclusive, but they can co-exist to some extent.

The top-down dynamic refers to a situation where policymakers clearly drive the policymaking process and where they actively shape public opinion. The reasons for such an attitude can be manifold. First, the top-down mentality most likely prevails in nations where the role of the state is strong and civil society is clearly subservient to political leadership. Moreover, the leaders may also be pragmatists and think that they need public support for the national foreign policy line, and thus they actively seek to shape public attitudes through communication and persuasion (see e.g.

Rothschild & Shafranek 2017). Furthermore, leaders consider that public support can afford official policy additional legitimacy.⁴⁷

The bottom-up model is again most likely dominant under circumstances where leaders think that public support for their policies is both desirable and necessary.⁴⁸ A strong civil society and a de-centralized state also can amplify the dynamic. A relaxed threat environment and the emergence of salient foreign policy cases may further play into the bottom-up pattern. As to the salience of foreign policy questions, visible matters might also gain electoral importance, which affects how elected leaders handle those issues. As Oppermann and Viehrig (2009, 926) put it:

The ability of electorates to shape foreign and security policy decision depends on the credibility of their threat to sanction the government for these decisions. Governments will only have a powerful political

46 Rallying around the flag refers to a phenomenon in which public support of a leader increases during a major foreign policy crisis or other international event. See Mueller 1970.

47 It must be noted that political leadership sometimes fails in its endeavors to change public opinion. See e.g. Paris 2014.

48 However, from the perspective of decision-makers, due to cacophony and various channels, public opinion can be confusing. Opinion polls are useful in this regard, but particularly in media discourse, it is often difficult to recognize which opinions are representative of the majority (Hill 2003, 262).

incentive to devise foreign and security policies that are in line with the public’s preferences if they would otherwise have to expect negative consequences for their prospects of remaining in power.

When the bottom-up model prevails, it acts as a constraint for decision-makers, and they are thus less able to make controversial decisions without a public pushback.

The wider the gap between elite and public preferences, the stronger the constraint (see e.g. Trumbore 1998).

The third model – disconnection – is also a result of multiple factors (see e.g. Doeser 2013). It refers either to the public’s negligence regarding foreign affairs or the leadership’s disregard of public views. Citizens may view most of the foreign policy questions as being low in salience, and more tangible and immediate issues such as social or labor policies can outweigh foreign policy matters. From the perspective of elites, consensus among the leaders on a certain matter can also lead to action irrespective of public disapproval. Furthermore, a state’s leadership can also consist of guardian-like decision-makers who disregard the importance of public attitudes altogether. Lastly, a looming threat can also lead to ignorance of public opinion; a threat perceived as existential might cause the leadership to disregard democratic ideals in order to guard territorial integrity or even the existence of their country.