The discussion leading up to the assessment and the actors involved

The discussion about the environmental impacts of the conflict started already during the bombing campaign.

Mostly it went on in local and international media, but there were also diplomatic circles behind the scenes.

Both of these affected the decision by high UN officials to carry out an assessment of the environmental consequences, although it was made rather early on during the spring of 1999.⁴⁵

Environmental problems constituting health risks were the most visible and the most often mentioned issue.

Certainly, these constituted the most prominent part of the media coverage, both in the FRY and internationally. For example, after the strikes on oil refineries in Pančevo and Novi Sad on April 17th, Serbian news agencies started to use the term ‘ecological disaster’,⁴⁶ which was also adopted by several international media. The reports described a dark cloud of smoke hovering over Pančevo for several days.⁴⁷

Stories like these had a key role in raising concerns about irreparable environmental damage, which still lingered after the bombings ceased. In addition, the allegations that the NATO had been using depleted uranium (DU) in its ammunition caused fears that the public might be at risk of a continuous exposure to carcinogenic radiation.⁴⁸ Questions were also raised at a high political level as neighbouring countries Bulgaria and Romania pointed out that the potential pollution was not likely to merely stay within the Serbian borders.⁴⁹

Less attention was given to the direct damage inflicted on the ecosystem and biodiversity or the consequences these would have regarding eventual reconstruction efforts, but these were still present in the discussion. These remarks often made reference to the cross-border effects of environmental problems, emphasising the potentially wide implications that seemingly local events might have.⁵⁰

Although there was a common logic behind the environmental health claims – that the damages of the bombings constituted a threat to the society and to the entire ecosystem potentially – there seem to have been differences with regard to the formulation and focus between the various actors. These distinctions are relevant

45 Interview with Pekka Haavisto 10.12.2014

46 E.g. Anonymous author: Dugo i uporno razaranje jedne zemlje. Vreme Special Edition 7, 24 April 1999, available at http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/vb7/index.html (Last visited 20.2.2014).

47 E.g. Anonymous author: Serbs Warn of Ecological Disaster, to Evacuate Zone. News report, Reuters 19 April 1999, available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=357&newsdate=19-Apr-1999 (Last visited 19.2.2014)

48 E.g. Anonymous author: Depleted Uranium ‘Threatens Balkan Cancer Epidemic’, News report, BBC 30 July 1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/408122.stm (Last visited 20.2.2014); Anonymous author: NATO Uranium Polluting Yugoslavia. News report, Financial Times 22.7.1999, available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/articles/fint220799.html (Last visited 20.2.2014)

49 Haavisto 1999, 91-92.

50 E.g. Toshkov, V.: Yugoslav Officials Say Airstrikes Could Spark Ecological Disaster. The Seattle Times 7 May 1999;

Ostojic, Z.: Primirje ne zaustavlja eko katastrofu. Glas Javnosti 5 June 1999, available at http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/1999/06/05/glavne-vesti.html (Last visited 23.6.2015)

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to understanding the strategic positions of the actors and, in turn, the eventual impact that the claims had on the discussion. They also reveal how the several actors were addressing different audiences.

The most obvious actor with an interest in the discussion was the FRY government, which used the ecological damage to create the image of an ‘ecocide’ so severe that it could be seen as part of an exceptionally cruel type of warfare directed at ordinary citizens.⁵¹ The officials expressed grave concerns especially about the health impacts of the bombings of industrial sites and gave statements to international media suggesting that the ensuing pollution would have dire effects on the population. The culprit for these damages was made very clear. ‘How can they hit a factory that could endanger people's lives by pollution?’, insisted the mayor of Pančevo after the strikes on industrial targets on April 18th, referring to NATO.⁵² Similarly, in his letter to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealing the organisation to intervene and end the bombardments, the FRY Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic claimed industrial targets had released ‘huge quantities of hazardous substances’ and called this ‘yet another example of a crime against humanity caused by NATO aggressors’.⁵³ Later in June, when the peace negotiations were in the final stages, Jovanovic directly accused NATO of

‘ecocide’.⁵⁴ This term was commonly used by local media and many environmental NGOs.⁵⁵

In some cases, such risks were even pointed out before any damage had been inflicted, as a preventive measure seemingly. For example, the authorities took international reporters to a detergent plant in Baric, warning of

‘lethal consequences’ for the citizens of Belgrade as ‘[u]ntold thousands’ would be asphyxiated if the plant was hit and hydrofluoric acid released.⁵⁶ Government representatives also often warned of the potential cross-border effects of the pollution, which could also pose a threat to neighbouring countries or even all of Europe.⁵⁷ This is a clear example of presenting environmental damage as a security threat that could raise alarm among European countries and encourage countries to join in opposition to the NATO campaign. The unusual aspect about this case is that the damage had not yet occurred and was still preventable, giving other countries a real chance to intervene and avert the destruction.

The government also pointed out threats to biodiversity and the ecosystem, although usually as a side note to the human impacts. For example, upon issuing an appeal to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calling for the bombings to cease, the FRY foreign minister Zivadin Jovanovic argued among other things that oil spills into

51 Haavisto 1999, 90.

52 Anonymous author: Focus – Pollution Fears as NATO Pounds Serb Industry. Reuters 19 April 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=342&newsdate=19-Apr-1999 (Last visited 20.5.2015)

53 Anonymous author: Yugoslavia Urges U.N. to Halt Ecological Damage. Reuters 27 April 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=455&newsdate=27-Apr-1999 (Last visited 20.5.2015)

54 BTF: Situation Report No. 8. Balkan Task Force 9 June 1999. Available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/reports/report8/index.html (Last visited 25.5.2015).

55 Haavisto 1999, 90.

56 Toshkov, 7 May 1999.

57 Reuters 27 April 1999.

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the Danube were ‘threatening flora and fauna’ and forest fires in national parks had ‘caused lasting damage to the unique eco-system’.⁵⁸ He went on to emphasise that the damages would be felt ‘not only in Yugoslavia but in southeastern Europe and the entire Mediterranean basin’⁵⁹. The latter argument was echoed by Jagoš Zelenović, FRY Minister of Development, Science and Environmental Protection, in a letter to Klaus Töpfer, stating that ‘[b]esides carrying out genocide, NATO by its aggression is causing ecocide in the environment of FR (Federal Republic of) Yugoslavia and wider, in the whole Balkans and considerable part of Europe’⁶⁰.

Yet in other fora the official sources aimed to reassure the local public and restrain the most acute concern about pollution, pointing out that the ‘fumes caused by the attacks were being monitored closely and, so far, were not causing a danger to the public.’⁶¹ These statements were in contrast to the threat arguments, which suggests that the officials either did not think that the damage was really quite as bad as it was made out to be in the scene of international politics, or that they simply wanted to avoid panic among the public. Both options are likely to be true to some extent. According to Haavisto, a similar pattern continued after the conflict while the environmental assessment was being carried out. The FRY officials tended to hide information and present misleading data, thus considerably complicating the field research.⁶² This implies that for the Milošević regime, the concern about the environmental damage was of secondary importance compared to its instrumental value in extracting sympathy on the international scene. When the bombing campaign ended, it’s likely that any concerns for the environment that had been expressed prior had since become less advantageous and might have, in fact, risen suspicions about pollution impacts among the general public and thus have hindered reconstruction and recovery. In any case, this clearly shows that there were at least two different audiences to whom the FRY officials directed their message: the international community and the domestic population. This differentiation shows how environmental security arguments were used to further specific political interests, and how the formulations and framings changed depending on the target audience and context.

The FRY media closely followed and reflected the official line. The language was harsh, such as the comparisons made to Hiroshima after the atomic bomb that were made by the newspaper Glas Javnosti after a bombing of the chemical plant ‘Milan Blagojević’ on April 8th.⁶³ Similarly, Serbian television claimed the bombings of chemical and fertiliser plants and an oil refinery in Pančevo were a part of a ‘genocidal plan [attempting to] provoke an environmental disaster by targeting an installation containing highly noxious

58 Anonymous author: Yugoslavia urges UN to halt ecological damage. Reuters 27 April 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=455&newsdate=27-Apr-1999 (Last visited 24.6.2015)

59 Reuters 27 April 1999.

60 Anonymous author: Yugoslavia says Nato bombs causing ’ecocide’. Reuters 9 June 1999, available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=159&newsdate=09-Jun-1999 (Last visited 24.6.2015)

61 Anonymous author: Serbian Toxic Fumes Fear. News report, BBC 18 April 1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/322483.stm (Last visited 19.2.2014).

62 Haavisto 1999, 90-91.

63 Šaponjić,, Z.: Lučani kao Hirošima. Glas Javnosti, 26 April 1999.

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substances, which is a precedent in the rules of warfare’⁶⁴. This is in line with the overall style of reporting, which was strongly influenced by the state of war and had a tendency for simplification and aggravated claims.

Moreover, the media in FRY was largely under the control of the Milošević regime, and with the pretext of the war independent outlets were even more at risk of being harassed or shut down.⁶⁵ The majority of the press primarily reflected the official line designed to present a certain picture both to the local public and to the international audience. However, it should be noted that at this time the local media attention was primarily focused on the immediate loss of human lives and other direct damages. The ecological losses, even when they could pose a health threat, were acknowledged rather as side remarks to the greater losses. Overall, the possibility of an ecological disaster was only one of the several stories of destruction reported by the local media – and probably a minor one at that, albeit intensely argued.

In international media, on the other hand, the environmental theme occupied a large part of the war coverage.

Big questions about human losses and destroyed homes took up a major part of the local reporting, but were not necessarily experienced so personally abroad, leaving room for a wider range of topics. The ecological damage could be seen as a broader question that touched all of human kind in a philosophical sense and at least the direct neighbour countries in a concrete way. In addition, even outside FRY the NATO campaign was met with growing opposition, which was inevitably strengthened by claims about ecological destruction.

Obviously, the international media portrayal of the ecological damage does not constitute a uniform or premeditated agenda in the same way as the local media coverage, at least insofar as free and independent media are concerned. Although it has been argued that the media in NATO countries played along with their governments’ narrative about genocide and the necessity of toppling Milošević, it would be misleading to claim that their reporting was controlled.⁶⁶ Therefore, international media coverage constitutes a part of the context, providing a view into the various roles of the different actors participating in the discussion, based on their reactions and arguments. In addition, the coverage of environmental damage drew attention to the problem and increased the potential that it would feature in the political discourse that ensued and by extension inspire concrete actions.

Romania and Bulgaria were relatively vocal actors reinforcing the international discussion from early on. As neighbouring countries, they were potential victims of cross-border pollution and had an interest in demanding preventive action. Since they were not direct parties to the conflict, their arguments could also be considered

64 BBC 18 April 1999.

65 E.g. Brooke, J.: Belgrade Curtails Independent Press. New York Times, 29 March 1999; Bideleux & Jeffries 2007, 260

& 265; Pavlakovic, V.: Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milošević Era and After. In Ramet S.P. &

Pavlakovic, V. (Eds.): Serbia since 1989. Politics and Society under Milošević and After. University of Washington Press, Seattle 2005, 20-21.

66 Blagojevic, M. (2003) War on Kosovo: A Victory for the Media? In Bieber, F., & Daskalovski, Ž. (Eds.).

Understanding the war in Kosovo. Psychology Press, 166-183.

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less influenced by political and propaganda goals and therefore particularly persuasive. Yet the issue was diplomatically challenging in both countries, as they were NATO candidates and offered support to the organisation by allowing the use of their airspace. The most vehement protests against the ecological damage came from opposition forces, who probably also seized the opportunity to weaken the status of the national governments.⁶⁷

In their official statements, on the other hand, the countries struck a balance between concerned and diplomatic tones. For example, the Romanian Ministry of Environment said that it would ‘take at least two years to size up the full impact, especially on the Danube and the Black Sea fauna and flora. We fear there may be long-term effects’⁶⁸, and went on to suggest that acid rains near the Yugoslav border were likely to be ‘the direct consequence of air pollution caused by fires following bombings’⁶⁹. On the other hand, he also remarked that the country did not want to ‘conceal realities’ but instead to ‘issue correct information on the impact of the (Yugoslav) conflict on the environment’.⁷⁰ After the bombings had already ended in June, the Bulgarian government sent a note to the FRY government urging it to ‘to clarify sources and reasons for polluting the Timok river and measures aimed at ending it’⁷¹. Both Bulgaria and Romania were also engaged in monitoring the environmental status and pollution levels during and after the conflict and actively called for further assessment of the ecological consequences.⁷²

Meanwhile, environmental NGOs took the Kosovo case as a part of their campaigning. WWF and Green Cross International, in particular, were active from the beginning, and also announced their willingness to cooperate on the BTF assessment.⁷³ Unlike most other actors, environmental groups focused more on the ecology and natural environment rather than the societal and health impacts. According to Philip Weller of the WWF, even if humanitarian issues were the first in everyone’s mind, ‘only immediate measures to stop the downstream flow of pollution will prevent an ecological catastrophe from following the humanitarian one’.⁷⁴ However, the NGOs also pointed out that some pollutants – like dioxins – would accumulate in the food chain and have long-term effects, also on humans.⁷⁵ They particularly raised topics that they have traditionally been working

67 Haavisto 1999, 91-92.

68 Anonymous author: Romania Blames Acid Rain on NATO Bombing. Reuters 27 May 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=758&newsdate=27-May-1999 (Last visited 24.5.2015)

69 Reuters 27 May 1999.

70 Reuters 27 May 1999.

71 Anonymous author: Bulgaria to ask Yugoslavia about Danube pollution. Reuters 30 June 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=1437&newsdate=30-Jun-1999 (Last visited 24.5.2015)

72 BTF: Situation Report No. 6. Balkan Task Force 27 May 1999. Available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/reports/report6/index.html (Last visited 24.5.2015)

73 BTF: Situation Report No. 1. Balkan Task Force 10 May 1999. Available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/reports/report1/report1.pdf (Last visited 24.5.2015).; Anonymous author: WWF sees environment crisis from Balkan bombing. Reuters 10 May 1999, available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=565&newsdate=10-May-1999 (Last visited 28.6.2015)

74 Reuters 10 May 1999.

75 Reuters 10 May 1999.

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with, for example with Greenpeace pointing out the risk of a nuclear accident as a result of the bombings.⁷⁶ In this sense, they used the Kosovo case in order to further their own political interests.

On the other hand, the Green Cross International aimed to raise discussion about the environmental consequences of war more generally. Writing in the Guardian newspaper, its then president Mikhail Gorbachev argued that ‘a comprehensive analysis of the environmental situation’ should be carried out, and that provisions for environmental damage should be included in the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁷ Likewise, Greenpeace Greece warned about the potential harm to the population in the embattled areas who ‘not only suffer the effects of air pollution but must continue to live in a heavily damaged environment’.⁷⁸ In other words, international NGOs kept the environmental problems on the overall agenda, but at this point were not taking part in the environmental security discourse.

Local NGOs were less vocal in the international scene, but not completely silent. Despite the strong grip of the Milošević regime, civil society organisations in Yugoslavia were able to function, although under pressure.⁷⁹ A focus on the environment may have been perceived as a more neutral topic and therefore less threatening to the government. It is also possible that on the ecological issue NGOs and government agreed, with both emphasising the negative impacts of the bombardments. In some cases, NGOs could be beneficial to the government. Local media reported for example that the organisations ‘Green Limes’ and ‘Gips fulvis’

were active in establishing an international ecological court to study the damage done to the FRY environment.⁸⁰

However, it should not be taken for granted that civil society was always able to openly express its views, particularly if these were in conflict with the official line. Haavisto suggests that there at least was a tension between the two, which came to the fore especially after the NATO campaign had ended. The BTF assessment team were welcomed by environmental NGOs that were active and relatively influential in their local communities and enthusiastic to have the opportunity to share their major concerns.⁸¹ In addition to the conflict damage, though, they were eager to discuss the high levels of existing pollution dating already from the era before the bombings. This was something that municipal officials and other local administration did not

76 Kyriakidou, D.: NATO Bombing Wrecks Balkan Environment – Greenpeace. Reuters 20 May 1999. Available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=680&newsdate=20-May-1999 (Last visited 2.6.2015)

77 Gorbachev, M.: Poison in the Air. Guardian 18 June 1999. Available at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/18/balkans.armstrade (Last visited 2.6.2015)

78 Kyriakidou, 20 May 1999.

79 Papanikolatos, N.: Western Media and the ’Other Serbia’. Human Rights Review 1(2), 2000, 119.

80 Glas Javnosti: Inicijativa nevladinih fondacija "Grin limes" i "Gups fulvis": "Bela knjiga" za međunarodni eko-sud. News report 22 May 1999. Available at http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/1999/05/22/glavne-vesti.html (Last visited 3.6.2015)

81 Lauria, J.: UN team finds contamination at sites of NATO bomb attacks. Boston Globe 8 June 1999. Available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/articles/bg060899.html (Last visited 24.9.2015)

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appreciate, and instead made manoeuvres to hide the more alarming details.⁸² It was in the interest of the administration to present all damage as resulting from the bombardment, whereas the NGOs were simply concerned with bringing to light as many problems as possible that were affecting them, for which they they

appreciate, and instead made manoeuvres to hide the more alarming details.⁸² It was in the interest of the administration to present all damage as resulting from the bombardment, whereas the NGOs were simply concerned with bringing to light as many problems as possible that were affecting them, for which they they

In document International Organisations and the Securitisation of the Environment in Post-Conflict Western Balkans (sivua 81-91)