Decentralisation and t��e election of Commune Councils

The origin of decentralisation in Cambodia can be traced to 1992 and the Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE), a joint initiative between the government, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to implement reconstruction

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projects at the local level (Rusten et al. 2004). CARERE II, implemented between 1996 and 2000, marked the beginning of the Seila programme, a joint initiative by seven ministries, and received support from donors forming the Seila Task Force Secretariat.² The second phase of Seila lasted five years and ended in 2005.³ Seila’s goal is to contribute to poverty alleviation through good governance and the estab-lishment of a decentralized and deconcentrated system (RGC 2000). Seila covers all 20 provinces of the country and has shown that decentralisation is possible by pro-viding a role for the commune in local development (Biddulph 2000, Turner 2002, CDRI 2003). Critics of the Seila programme have argued that Seila depends heavily on donors funding and attracts skilled personnel with salary supplements (Turner 2002), the logic of its planning processes is too complicated and has led to a situation where a decentralised programme has been implemented in a centralised manner (Biddulph 1997, SIDA 1998, SIDA 2000), it has created a parallel structure to pro-vincial and district line agencies (Informant), and has a tendency to prioritise rural infrastructure projects over sectors such as education or health.

With regard to community participation, Seila has contributed, since 1991, to the introduction and institutionalisation of Village Development Committees (VDCs) as the “foundation of the rural development structure and autonomous committee[s]

that work to ensure coordination and communication between the village, civil so-ciety and government institutions” (MRD 1999: 4). However, according to a study by German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Ministry of Rural De-velopment, among the approximately 8.000 VDCs that have been established, only those that receive external funding through Seila or NGO projects seem to be active (Hor Chan Rotha 2004).

Though Seila has been the basis for the design of the general decentralisation re-form that were marked by the elections of Commune Councils/Sangkats (Commune Councils) in February 2002, its aim of ‘establishing a decentralized and deconcen-trated system’ was only partially successful. Reverting to the definitions by Manor (1999) presented in section 2.2, Seila has achieved administrative deconcentration, but has produced only a limited transfer of political power and decision making au-thority to lower level authorities.

The Commune Councils election successfully marked the beginning of decen-tralisation reforms that, despite limited initial donor support, the Cambodian

gov-2 Seila is a Khmer name which means ‘foundation stone’ and evokes the concept of local efforts as the ‘foundation’ of all national development (RGC 2000). In addition to a Government contribution of 2,2ml USD, the donors supporting Seila during this phase were: UN, SIDA, Netherlands (total 60 ml USD). Support to local funds came from IFAD, UNCDF and World Bank. UNOPS executed the CARERE II programme (Rusten et al. 2004)

3 Seila received donors’ funding in two ways: a basked fund through the Partnership for Local Governance (PLG) comprising UNDP, DFID, SIDA (total 37ml USD), and additional donors’

support for specific programmes and/projects by GTZ, DANIDA, UNICEF, WFP, IFAD, The World Bank, and AusAID (Rusten et al. 2004).

Decentralisation reforms in Cambodia and characteristics of Khmer communities 79

ernment has been determined to pursue. The reforms have three main objectives which recall the definition of political decentralisation by Rondinelli presented in section 2.2 (NCSC 2005):

• Promote democracy, good governance and equity of life;

• Give ordinary people greater opportunities to determine their future;

• Encourage greater and sustainable development, especially the delivery of basic ser-vices.

The election of the Commune Councils followed the passage of the two main pieces of legislation that form the present legal framework for decentralisation: the Law for the Election of Commune Councils (RGC 2001a) and the Law on Administration and Management of Commune Councils (LAMC) (RGC 2001). The election law has introduced a proportional system whereby votes are given to parties and not to indi-vidual candidates. In the 1.621 Commune Councils/Sangkats of the country, 11.261 councillors were elected, 951 (or 8,5 per cent) of whom were women (UNDP 2002).

The CPP has won the 61,2 per cent of all the seats, followed by FUNCINPEC with 21,9 per cent and Sam Rainsy Party with 16,7 per cent. Other parties received the remaining 0,2 per cent (ibid.). As noted by Turner (2002), the proportional system means that more than one party can be represented in the same commune.

The LAMC (RGC 2001) states that the Commune Council must be formed by between five to eleven members depending on the population (Figure 4.2). The Com-mune Chief (the first name of the most popular list) has two deputies (from the list of the next most successful party/ies). The Commune Clerk, who is an appointed staff of the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for administrative (or agency) functions such as civil and election registration. The Commune Council can establish sub-committees composed by councillors and villagers to advise and assist the commune (RGC 2001: Chapter 3, Article 27). One sub-committee is mandatory: the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC), which is comprised of the commune chief, and two representatives (a man and a woman) from each village in the commune (RGC 2002a). The primary responsibility of the PBC is to “assist the Commune/Sangkat chief in the preparation of the Commune/Sangkat development plan, investment program and annual budget” (ibid: Chapter 2, Article 9).

The Commune Councils’ role and functions are stated in rather general terms in the law and include: maintain public security and order; arrange for the provision of necessary public services and ensure the proper implementation of the services;

promote and encourage the comfort and contentment of residents; promote social and economic development and upgrade the living standards of residents; protect and conserve the environment, natural resources, national culture and heritage; rec-oncile differences of opinion and encourage mutual understanding and tolerance be-tween residents; undertake general affairs to meet the needs of residents (RGC 2001:

Chapter 4, Article 43). The LAMC is also not clear in its description of the mecha-nisms that could enable greater consultations and participation by villagers in local development and local governance, besides mentioning the mandatory selection (not election) of village chiefs (mephum) by the Commune Councils (RGC 2001: Chapter 3, Article 30). It further states that the village chief “shall represent all residents of the village and act as a main link between the village and Commune/Sangkat Council”

and that he/she should “participate in meetings of various commune committees to share views on matters relating to the village; … regularly consult with residents of his/her village” (RGC 2002: Chapter 2, Article 23 and 24). These are important articles, for they describe the need to establish two clear links: a horizontal bridge between village chief and villagers on matters of village development, and a vertical link with the Commune Council.

Citizen consultation is described in sub-decree N. 022 (RGC 2002) which pre-scribes that: “A Commune/Sangkat Council shall actively promote and facilitate the process of democracy in the Commune/Sangkat by developing mechanisms to con-sult with Commune/Sangkat residents and community organisations” (Chapter 1, Article 12). It fails, however, to explain how this should take place. The main spaces for citizens’ participation described in the LAMC are the annual Commune Invest-ment Planning process and the monthly Commune Council meeting where “every Commune/Sangkat resident can attend … but cannot vote” (RGC 2002: Chapter 3, Article 30).

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