Core concepts of activity theory

As mentioned above, one origin of activity theory can be traced to the works of Russian psychologist L. S. Vygotsky, whose studies centered on the concept of human consciousness (Engeström 1987, p. 58; Roth and Lee 2007). In his works, Vygotsky focused especially on the significance of mediation, meaning that while one can observe a direct connection between stimulus and response, in many cases, there is also a second-order stimulus (for example, language) that acts as a mediator between the stimulus and response (Engeström 1987, p. 58). In activity theory, these mediators are considered culturally constituted, which then interlinks the activity with the culture and history of the activity. The mediators can be either technical (tools) or psychological instruments (signs). (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003)

The Vygotskyan approach of studying the cultural mediation of actions is often referred to as the first generation of activity theory (Engeström, 2001). It introduced three fundamental characteristics that have been inherited by later approaches. These characteristics are as follows: first, an activity is defined by its objective; second, activities are mediated by artifacts; and third, activities are socially constituted within a culture (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003).

Vygotsky’s work was then further developed by his student and colleague A. N.

Leont’ev, who expanded the Vygotskian individual perspective to collective activity (Allen et al. 2011). He both introduced the concept of collective activity and divided human activity into a three-level hierarchy: activity, action, and operation (see Figure 9). This division demonstrates how individual operations can create actions, which, when analyzed as collective, form activities. Owing to the significance of the introduction of the collective activity, the approach introduced by Leont’ev is referred to as the second generation of activity theory (Engeström, 2001).

Figure 9. The dynamic relationship among levels of human activity (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003).

In Leont’ev’s hierarchy of human activity, an activity is a constituent of actions carried out by the participants of the activity (Engeström 1987, p. 144). The participants of the activity share a motive, which drives their individual actions to contribute to the activity (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003). This motive is not necessarily given conscious attention, but it is critical for the actions creating the activity to take the activity in the desired direction (Engeström 1987, p. 144). While activities are guided by shared motives, their constituents (i.e., actions) are organized toward a conscious goal (Nyvang 2006). Actions are typically performed by individuals who, through these actions, contribute to the collective activity (Häkkinen and Korpela 2007). The actions are then carried out by means of the operations. These operations are the concrete ways in which individuals execute the actions. While activities are guided by motives and actions by goals, operations are guided but also limited by conditions, i.e., the factors enabling or limiting the individual’s ability to achieve the goal of the activity. (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003; Mursu et al. 2007)

To demonstrate this division between the different levels of the hierarchy of human activity, Leont’ev used the example of a group of hunters. The hunters can have different tasks related to the hunt: some frighten a herd of animals; some kill the game. These are actions guided by a variety of goals. Only by analyzing these actions as constituents of a shared activity does the bigger picture and underlying motivation to stay alive appear. (Leont’ev, 1978, pp. 62–63, cited in Sannino 2011) The hierarchy emphasizes that actions can only be understood within the collective activity they construct (Korpela et al. 2000). Consequently, Leont’ev provided an approach to distinguishing short-lived and goal-directed actions from more durable and object-oriented activities (Engeström 2000).

When these different levels are analyzed, it is important to acknowledge that they are not fixed. Instead, actions can become operations through automatization, whereas operations can become actions through conceptualization. While activities evolve, transformation at different levels can also occur. (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003) Furthermore, the context of the analysis can influence the way different levels are interpreted. An activity in one context can be interpreted as an operation in another.

(Engeström 1987, p. 144)

The second generation of activity theory was then further developed by Engeström (1987) to the third generation of activity theory. The main addition to the Leontevian model was the realization that a shared motive was not necessarily enough to coordinate the activity (Korpela et al. 2000). Therefore, Engeström introduced the concepts of rules and division of labor (Engeström 1987, p. 190).

Additionally, Engeström (1987) pointed out that activities do not occur in a vacuum

but should comprise part of a larger network of activities that influence and are influenced by their connective activities (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003). This dissertation relies on the third generation of activity theory.

The third generation of activity theory can be summarized in terms of its five core principles. These are as follows: (1) Activities are artifact-mediated and object-oriented systems that create networks through their connection to other activities.

(2) The activity system is always part of a community. For this reason, there are always multiple points of view, which can be a source of trouble but also create the potential for innovation. (3) Activity systems build upon historicity, i.e., all the factors in the activity system have their history, and this should be acknowledged when activities are analyzed. (4) Contradictions play a central role in activity systems and can be recognized as the source of the evolution of these systems. (5) While activity systems can have long development cycles, it is also possible for these systems to go through extensive transformations in situations where the object and motive of the activity are reconceptualized. (Engeström 2001)

The third generation of activity theory is typically presented via Engeström’s structure of human activity (Engeström 1987, p. 78). This is depicted in Figure 10.

Figure 10. The structure of human activity (Engeström 1987, p. 78).

The triangle of human activity is a combination of Vygotsky’s presentation of the subject, object, and mediator (the upper triangle) and Leont’ev’s addition of community as part of the model (middle triangle). The role of community in the activity is then clarified with the subject and community mediators, i.e., the tools and

the community, along with object mediators, i.e., the division of labor. (Engeström 1987, p. 78)

In the structure of human activity, the key factor is the object of the activity. This object is sometimes also referred to as the motive, and it is the separator that distinguishes different activities from one another. (Kuutti 1995) This object can be tangible or intangible, like an idea that is expected to result in an outcome that is the motive for the existence of the activity (Engeström 2000). While the process of transforming the object into the outcome is the core motivator for the existence of the activity, the object and the motivation for it can transform over time and should not be considered static (Kuutti 1995). Instead, the motive and the desired outcome can evolve while the subject continuously reinterprets the object and adjusts it during the activity (Crawford and Hasan 2006).

In activity theory, the object is in a dialectic relationship with the subject of the activity (individual or group of people). In this relationship, the subject utilizes tools in order to work on the object and achieve the desired outcome (Nehemia-Maletzky, Iyamu, Shaanika et al. 2018). Tools or instruments are the mediators between the subject and object (Miettinen 2009). These include both technical and psychological tools (Engeström 1987, p. 66), including constructs such as technologies and processes (Nehemia-Maletzky, Iyamu, Shaanika et al. 2018). The tools enable the manipulation and transformation of the objective to achieve the outcome. While they can be seen as enablers of the activity, they can also limit it. (Kuutti 1995) Like the activity itself, the tools also have a history and the ability to evolve (Crawford and Hasan 2006).

As activities are constructs of the actions of individuals, the structure of human activity also acknowledges the community as a critical part of the structure (Engeström 1987, p. 78). Here, community refers to the environment in which the activity occurs and the people who understand the objective of the activity (Kuutti 1995). In an organizational context and within work activities, the motive that unites the community often comes from the organizational objectives, which then define the community (Mursu et al. 2007). This does not mean that everyone engaged in the activity is conscious of the collective motive but that through their participation in the production of the outcome, they are part of the activity (Korpela, Mursu, and Soriyan 2002).

The role of community in the realization of the outcome is mediated via rules and division of labor (Crawford and Hasan 2006). While the tools mediate the relationship between the subject and object, the rules mediate the relationship between the subject and community. These rules include both explicit and implicit

norms, conventions, and social relations in the community. (Kuutti 1995) The division of labor then mediates the relationship between the community and the objective of the activity (Nehemia-Maletzky, Iyamu, Shaanika et al. 2018). It deduces the way individuals participate in the activity even if the community is not fully conscious of the objectives of the activity (Engeström 1987, p. 66).