This paper has considered scenarios of Russia’s future from a number of perspectives.
Specifically, we have noted that a number of possible drivers can be seen at work in influencing the future development of Russia: economic development, energy, the international environment, Russian identity, regional development, demography, and politics. Which drivers are seen as most important is a matter of judgement but there is a
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tendency for whichever topic is most current to be seen as the key driver for the future. In order to produce more rigorous models, more systematic investigation of key drivers could be carried out. One approach would be based on Russian history: what have been the key drivers and variables in the past? Alternatively it might be possible to look at more recent developments in Russia and comparable countries, notably the other BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, South Africa). Do their experiences point towards possible futures for Russia? Of course each of these drivers plays some part, and scenarios might be enriched by more systematic cross-referencing of different variables between each of them.
This paper has also explored a range of scenarios written about Russia over the past decade or so. All of these scenarios were written before the current Ukraine crisis, and even those which did place an important emphasis on international relations did not foresee such a major crisis in Russia’s international position. For the most part, the scenarios view the international position in terms of economic relations, or as a consequence of internal political development. The possibility that an international crisis would severely impact political and economic developments does not seem to have been taken account of. Even scenarios developed by experts on Ukraine did not anticipate the forcible annexation of Crimea and subsequent military conflict. A few analysts – for example, in a special panel at the Aleksanteri Conference 2014 – are beginning to develop scenarios for Russia from 2014 onwards, starting to draw on events in Ukraine. However, it is too early for a full scenario development process to have been undertaken and published which takes a considered view of these events. In August 2014, Nikolai Petrov, one of the editors of Russia in 2020 and Russia 2025, considered these previous scenario accounts in the light of the events of 2014. His conclusion was that in each of the potential futures which had earlier been developed, a clear, usually hard line (жесткий), choice had been made. He expressed this as follows, with the variant adopted written in italics:
• liberal economic and political reforms – mobilization model, the ‘besieged fortress’
• empire, internal and external – Russian national state
• hybrid regime – authoritarian regime
• élite – nomenklatura
• soft power – hard power
• West – China Source: Nikolai Petrov, Pro et Contra, May-August 2014
In considering where these choices might lead Russia in the future, Petrov talks about the serious tensions in Russia’s elite which sharp confrontation with the West may bring about, particularly arguing that the ‘middle-level’ of the élite are less confrontational than the top few leaders. However, Petrov stopped short of doing what a number of analysts are beginning to do, both publically and privately, in considering scenarios of the future for Russia, namely considering an outcome which has been almost entirely excluded from
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scenarios of Russia’s future written since the end of the Cold War – military conflict between Russia and NATO.
In considering scenarios of Russia’s future, much attention has been given to the importance of inputs (key drivers). We have also noted, however, that even anticipating the development of a key driver (for example, economic growth), does not mean that the outcome of this anticipated development can be safely predicted. If a key driver behaves in a predictable manner, this still leaves a number of scenarios possible in terms of the outcome of that behaviour. As noted earlier, many scenarios see the decline of the Russian economy (related to the collapse of oil prices) as the starting point for a more modern and democratic Russia. It is possible though that the same behaviour of the key driver, economic decline, might lead to increased xenophobia, nationalism, and authoritarianism.
What is more, as always with anticipating the future, we can complicate matters still further. Even when the behaviour of a key driver (economic decline) is anticipated, and the most anticipated outcome (modernisation and democratisation) occurs, scenario choices remain with regard to the strength of that outcome. In this example, would modernisation and democratisation be of the gradual, ‘in twenty years time’ type familiar from the rhetoric of the Medvedev years? Or would it be a more rapid, society-mobilising process? And if the latter, would it be led from the élite, or from the people?
Figure Three. An output focus on scenario development.
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In the final figure of this paper, Figure Three, we focus on outputs rather than inputs. For specific areas of activity we provide an illustrative set of potential outcomes. In the final column of Figure Three, we show how even each potential outcome can play out along a variety of routes and with variable force. The purpose of Figure Three is twofold. First, it demonstrates the complexity of causal relationships between inputs and outputs. Second, it provides an illustrative map of potential futures for Russia.
Further future scenarios will need to factor in the consequences of the Ukraine crisis – growing nationalism, economic impacts not so much from short-term sanctions but from the possible long-term distancing of Russia from the West, and the failure to draw Ukraine into the Eurasian Union. Although each of the sets of future scenarios differs from each other, and especially sees different drivers as important, nonetheless they tend to present a similar range of scenarios. One of the most common scenarios is continuation of the current state of affairs, an authoritarian political system and raw materials based economy which will stagnate and which may lead to the disaffection of society. The possibility of a thorough reform programme carried out by a powerful leader is generally seen as one of the more positive likely scenarios. Reports differ as to the possibility of such a direction being accompanied by, or leading to, a more democratic, open society.
Most agree that tackling corruption is an important precondition for a healthy economy as well as a thriving political system. Reading the scenarios, Russia also faces a range of options in international relations which are linked to political developments. A more liberal regime is likely to be more pro-western, while deepening authoritarianism is more likely to focus on Russia’s position as a regional great power. Economic prospects are linked to these developments, although approaches vary as to whether politics determines the direction of the economy or the other way around. As well as political and international factors, a key factor for the economy will be whether energy prices will remain high enough to encourage Russia to eschew major reform and continue to rely on raw materials, or to modernize and diversify in other directions.
As both Oxenstierna and Bacon have pointed out, scenario writing does provide some valuable insights. The picture of Russia that emerges is a multiple-choice picture. One can find, what one wants to find. Given that most reports give equal weight to a range of scenarios, it is difficult to conclude from these whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about Russia’s future. However, from the point of view of the purpose of scenarios, we ought not to take any particular one as a likely forecast. As noted at the beginning of this paper, scenarios create narratives of the future which often appear remarkably detailed. However, the purpose of such detail is not to predict, but to anticipate what future paths, in broad terms, lie ahead, so that each one might be considered as possible.