6. CONCLUSION
This study was undertaken as an attempt to understand the role of the local government in the provision of public goods in Russia. The conclusion of findings is presented in this final chapter. To proceed, it is useful to revisit objectives of the study.
There were five objectives of the study. The first objective was to study what powers and competences does the local government have in the areas of education and health. The research revealed that the local
government of Bayandai District has limited decision-making powers and competences in the provision of health and education in the district.
The second objective was to investigate the local budget, i.e. the budget of the Bayandai District with emphasis on revenue formation (local taxes, transfers) and expenditures on education and health care. The analysis of the revenue side of the local budget demonstrated that the local government of Bayandai District is highly dependent from transfers from upper levels of government. The analysis of expenditure side of the local budget showed that educational and health services in the district are provided mostly centrally.
The third objective was to study the local government’s activities in the areas of education and health: how, in what way the local government supports education and health care sectors. The study allows us to conclude that the local government plays limited role in the provision of educational and health services. The local government provides buildings and other infrastructure and organizes different events in the sphere of education.
Regarding the provision of health services, the local government’s role is limited by providing heating and water for hospitals.
The fourth objective was to study how well the local government’s policies and practices respond to local preferences and needs. The study revealed that the local needs and preferences for public goods are not responded fully in the district.
The fifth objective was to study how local residents evaluate and react to the performance of the local government in the areas of education and health. The study found that residents of the district were not satisfied by the quality (and to some extent, quantity) of educational and health services in
the district. On the other hand, residents of the district do not express the willingness to leave the district for more attractive place.
This study made use of three theories: Riker’s theory of federalism, Oates’s theory of federalism and Tiebout model.
Conducted research allows us to conclude that (a) according to Riker’s theory of federalism, Russia is a centralized federation both in education and health care spheres; (b) according to Oates’s theory of federalism, the provision of both education and health care is inefficient in Russia since the existing pattern of the provision of educational and health care services does not take into account local needs and preferences for education and health care; (c) Tiebout model does not work in the case of Russian municipalities because of the low mobility of the population.
Thus, the main conclusions of the study are the next. The provision of public goods (education and health care) in Russia is centralized. The local government plays limited and little role in the provision of educational and health care services. This means that the level of government which is close to citizens and better informed about local needs and preferences plays little role in the provision of public goods. Therefore, citizens’ demand for public goods is not satisfied fully. To change this situation, it is necessary to provide the local government with more competences and decision-making powers in the spheres of the provision of educational and health care services. The local government should be more active, bold and more willing to take initiatives concerning the provision of public goods.
Finishing this thesis, I would like to think about what topics for future studies will be interesting in this research area. I think comparative analysis of local governments’ role in the provision of public goods in Russia and other countries would be very interesting.
References
1. Bardhan P. (2002) “Decentralization of Governance and Development” in The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 16, No.4 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 185-205.
2. Barr. N. (2004) Economics of the welfare state. 4th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
3. Bryman A. (2004) Social research methods. 2d ed. Oxford University press.
4. Coffey A. and Atkinson P. (1996) Making sense of qualitative data:
complementary research strategies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications.
5. Collier S. Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
6. Davoodi, H., Zou, H. (1998) “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study,” Journal of Urban Economics, 43, 244-257.
7. Ebel, R.D. and Yilmaz, S. (2002) On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2809. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute.
8. Fontana A. and Frey J.H. (1994) “Interviewing: the art of science”, in N.K.Denzin and Y.K.Lincoln (eds), Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp.361-76.
9. Glaeser B. (1978) Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA, Sociology Press.
10. Lavrov, A., J. Litwack and D. Sutherland. 2000. “Fiscal Federalist Relations in Russia: A Case for Subnational Autonomy,” OECD:
unpublished paper.
11. Lawrence, Susan. 2000. “China: A City Ruled by Crime,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 30.
12. Libman A. Russian Federalism and Post-Soviet Integration:
Divergence of Development Paths .MPRA Paper No. 12944,
13. Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1996.
“Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success,” World Politics, 48, 1, pp.50-81.
14. Musgrave R. (1959) The theory of public finance: A study in public economy. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill.
15. Haden, Charles. 1999. “Memorandum Opinion and Order”, Civil Action No.2:98-0636, US District Court, Charleston Division, at www.osmre.gov.
16. Hajari, Nisid. 2000. “Fall of an Empire: A high-level smuggling scandal lays bare the corruption that is plaguing the People's Republic,” Time Asia, Vol.155, No.5, 7 February.
17. Henderson, Peter. 1996. “Tatar Oil Firm Bucks Downward Trend,”
Moscow Times, 31 July.
18. The Moscow Times. 1998. “Tatneft to Resume Oil Exports After Recent Cut,” 9 July.
19. Oates W. (1972) Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
20. Qian, Y. & Weingast, B.R. (1997) Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), pp. 83-92.
21. Patton M. (2002) Qualitative research and evaluation methods.3d ed.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
22. Punch K. (2004) Introduction to social research. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publication.
23. Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
24. Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson. 2001."Explaining Leakage of Public Funds." Development Research Group Working Paper, World Bank.
25. Riker W. (1964) Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance.
Boston: Little Brown and Co.
26. Rodrigues-Pose A. and Kroijer A. (2009) “Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe”, LEQS Paper, No.12.
27. Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Gill, N. (2003) The global trend towards devolution and its implications. Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 21 (3): 333-51.
28. Ross C. (2003) “Putin’s federal reforms and the consolidation of federalism in Russia: one step forward, two steps back!” in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36, pp. 29-47.
29. Smoke, P. (2001) Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: A review of current concepts and Practice. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
30. Stiglitz J. (1988) Economics of the public sector. 2d ed. N.Y., Norton&Company.
31. Silverman D. (2004) Doing qualitative research.2d e. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
32. Tanzi, V. (1996) “Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects,” Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995. World Bank, Washington, DC, 295-316.
33. Tiebout C. (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, in The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 64, No. 5 (Oct.1956), p.416-424.
34. Titmuss R. (1970) The Gift Relationship. London, Penguin.
35. Treisman D. and Cai H. (2004) “State Corroding Federalism” in Journal of Public Economics. March 2004, 88, pp. 819-43.
36. Treisman, D., (1996). The politics of intergovernmental transfers in post-Soviet Russia. British Journal of Political Science 26, 299–335.
37. Ward, Ken Jr. 1999a. “DEP hires outside lawyers to defend it in mining case,” Charleston Gazette, April 14.
38. Ward, Ken Jr. 1999b. “City Law Firm Bills DEP Another $62,000,”
Charleston Gazette , June 15.
39. Weingast, B.R. (1995) "The Economic Role of Political Institutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11, pp. 1-31.
40. Welman C., Kruger F., Mitchell B. (2005) Research methodology.3d ed. Oxford University Press.
41. Wetzel, D. and Dunn, J. (2001): Decentralization in the transition economies: Challenges and the road ahead”. PREM Unit Europe and Central Asia. Washington, DC.: World Bank.
42. Woller, G M, and Phillips, K (1998) Fiscal decentralization and LDC economic growth: An empirical investigation. Journal of
Development Studies 34 (4):139-148.
43. Yakovlev E., Zhuravskaya E. (2006) “Lobbying in a Federation”
Mimeo, New Economic School, Moscow.
44. Zhuravskaya E. (2000)“Incentives to provide public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style” in Journal of Public Economics, 76, pp.
337-368.