This study has been focused on the dynamic movement, or “heavy traffi c” that goes on between our conscious thought and bodily experiences. It seems to me that the nature of this movement itself is still vaguely understood, and that we have not even begun to appreciate the richness of meanings that are being generated through it.
As I have mentioned earlier, dancers may have a special ability to distinguish and give meaning to bodily sensations. Also, meanings related to the body bear special signifi cance for dancers, since the body is their “whole life”. Thus, dancers know through their bodies and about their bodies. They seem to be able to access the prerefl ective realm quite easily, and generate rich meanings and varied mental refl ections based on their bodily experiences. Moreover, often these refl ections are poetic and metaphoric in nature, and are related to existential questions and complex issues related to oneself, others and the world.14
According to Klemola (2005, 10) by practicing conscious movement it is possible to learn to understand ourselves and our place in the world, and to comprehend the ethical and aesthetical dimensions of human existence. Based on this study, I am willing to think likewise, and encourage dancers and non-dancers to take on this kind of personal journey. In other words, this means leaving our natural, everyday attitude and taking on a phenomenological attitude towards our experiences (Parviainen 2006, 46–53; Thompson 2007, 20). In the near future,
I will examine the relationship between phenomenological attitude, introspection and mindfulness.15
I also think that understanding that it is possible to “increase the traffi c”
between prerefl ective and refl ective consciousness bears considerable pedagogical implications. Listening to the body and deriving meanings from bodily experiences can support young dance students’ self-understanding and personal growth as dancers, artists and human beings. Sharing one’s own refl ections with others can widen the intersubjective horizon within a dance community, and develop a more caring and compassionate attitude towards one’s fellow dancers.
Having access to meanings based on bodily, prerefl ective experiences is not, and needs not to be, only the privilege of dancers. Everyone can learn to “mind” their bodies. I want to emphasize, however, that attending to prerefl ective experiences changes them, and as they become conscious mental refl ections, they are no longer prerefl ective. On the other hand, I believe that our prerefl ective consciousness is so vast that there is probably never the danger of “emptying” it and our life becoming entirely refl ective. New experiences arrive at our prerefl ective consciousness constantly. Strengthening the connection between these modes of consciousness is a matter of fi nding more complexity and clarity at the same time; and this, to me, is one way towards a meaningful life.
Endnotes:
1 See Soili Hämäläinen’s article on bodily knowledge in this publication.
2 I am thankful to Dr. Carol-Lynne Moore for pointing this notion of “What dancers know” out to me.
3 I explored the notion of body memories in my previous study (Anttila 2004). While this study was largely based on Damasio’s (1999) views on body memories, i.e., on the role of the body in the development of consciousness and the autobiographical self, I also acknowledged that he did not invent the notion of body memories, or the body as a site of memories. According to Reiners (2001, 241), the roots of a memory technique based on bodily memories are deep in French culture. For example Margalit (2002), Casey (1987) and Merleau-Ponty (1995/1962), among others have brought up the idea of body memories when referring to the process of remembering. There is a wide body of literature concerning the historical and cultural body that I cannot address within the scope of this current study.
4 The proprioceptive system is associated with a more familiar term, the kinaesthetic sense, that is, the sense of movement, muscle tension, position etc. Another related “lay” term is the sense of balance, or the vestibular system, which is located in the inner ear, and can be seen as separate from the proprioceptive system. In addition, some authors distinguish interoceptors from these systems. They transmit information from organs, glands, blood vessels and nerves. (Cohen 1993, 115).
5 During the course of this research project, I have become increasingly interested in Eastern philosophy, especially Vedantic philosophy and Buddhism, as well as in meditation that can be conceived of as the
practice or study of philosophy. The idea of consciousness in these philosophies diff ers greatly from Western conceptions. In the West, humanistic or transcendental psychology is interested in studying the spiritual aspect of human existence, as well as alternative states of consciousness, for example, cosmic and pure consciousness (Rauhala 2005b, 81-86). Recently, the scientifi c study of consciousness has been extended to the study of, for example, the state of pure consciousness that can be reached through meditation (Shear & Jevning 1999).
6 It may be helpful to distinguish a notion of “natural intelligence” from the idea of bodily consciousness.
Natural intelligence refers to “cellular consciousness,” the complex system of our cellular life that consists of the intricate activity of transformation and interaction with other cells and the environment regulated and monitored by each individual cell (Aposhyan 1999, 150–154). While it is common to consider our cellular life as autonomous and unconscious, there are approaches to body psychotherapy and somatic practice that are based on attending to our cellular life, or, for example, on a certain organ (Cohen 1993, 28–31). These approaches are based on the relationship between our organic, physiological processes and our emotional and mental processes. While this relationship is certainly related to the question studied in this present study, space here does not allow for a comprehensive exploration of this issue.
7 Rauhala (2005a, 32) uses the Finnish words “tietoinen” (conscious) and “tiedostamaton” (unconscious) as subcategories within the main sphere of consciousness. Unconscious, thus, belongs to the sphere of consciousness. It can be accessed and brought to a conscious level. Unconscious is then, “possibly conscious”.
8 Cognitive unconscious is not equivalent to prerefl ective experience (or possibly conscious); it also refers to cognitive processes that we cannot become aware of. We cannot derive meanings from such processes. I wonder whether the cognitive unconscious could be conceived as “tajuton”, using Rauhala’s terminology. This analogy would level our cognitive processes and organic processes in terms of our ability to become aware of them. Maybe we could even conceive cognitive unconscious as organic. It does take place in the brain and in the nervous system, and thus, in the material body.
9 According to Depraz (1999, 99), “. . . the epochè corresponds to a gesture of suspension with regard to the habitual course of one’s thoughts, brought about by an interruption of their continuous fl owing.” See also Parviainen (2006, 46–50) or Thonpson (2007, 17–22) for clear descriptions of phenomenological reduction.
10 According to Pfeifer & Bongard (2007, 128–129) “the embodied turn” has revolutionized the study of artifi cial intelligence. Whereas cognitive science was formerly based on the premise that the brain controls the body, this notion has been recently been re-evaluated: the body controls the brain just as much as the brain controls the body. The body and the brain mutually determine each other’s behaviour.
This is because the neural system that receives and transmits information from the organism and from the environment is itself embodied, that is, is situated within the body.
11 I have taken the liberty to adapt the term introspection here, and modify the method according to current theoretical and philosophical understanding. I am aware of some limitations that were considered problematic at the time when introspection was introduced. Also, some scholars, like Varela and Lakoff & Johnson demand that fi rst-person methodologies, like phenomenological refl ection and introspection need to be supported by “third-person” approaches. Recent technological advances in neuroscience and biology are being increasingly employed in the study of consciousness. The current trend in consciousness studies is multidisciplinary. See Thompson (2007) for a comprehensive and recent account of this matter.
12 Translated by me from an original account that was written in Finnish. This article includes several accounts originally written in Finnish. All translations are mine, but they have been verifi ed by other readers/researchers. Original accounts are not included because of limitations of space.
13 The instructions were the following: “The main principle is that any bodily activity, like walking, swimming, stretching, dancing etc. can be the focus of introspection. Bodily activity supports focusing the attention to the body. It is possible to practice introspection without bodily activity, but it is more diffi cult. During the activity, focus your attention on your bodily events and sensations. Try to record these as closely as possible, so that you can return to them afterwards, that is, recollect them. At the same time, pay attention to your stream of consciousness, where your thoughts and attention turn to, how your bodily events are refl ected in your mind. After you have fi nished the activity, write down your observations immediately. During the writing process, the fl ow of consciousness continues and generates new contents. Let this happen freely and write down everything that you can easily and eff ortlessly. However, try to stay focused on the previous activity and mental refl ections that evolve from it. The length of bodily activity and writing do not matter.”
14 See Kirsi Heimonen’s article on dancing and writing in this publication.
15 Mindfulness is a method developed in the US by Jon Kabat-Zinn (2005). This method is based on Buddhist tradition, but it has been adapted to suit the needs of people who live in the contemporary Western world.
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