Conclusion of the discussion – the world is made not found

Rorty argues that in Western culture the notions of science, rationality, objectivity and truth are connected with one another. Science is seen as offering objective and hard truth that corresponds to reality, in other words, the only sort of truth that matters. The rhetoric of Enlightenment painted a picture of the scientist as a sort of a priest who achieves truth by being methodological, logical and objective. While it was useful during its time, the picture is less useful nowadays.²³⁵ In Rorty’s ideal liberal polity, the cultural hero would be a “strong poet” rather than the truth-seeking, objective and logical scientist. Rorty comments that in this sense, it is not a matter for universal theories in science but for ethnographies there would be a general turn towards narratives in scientific inquiries.²³⁶ According to Jacques Bouveresse, Rorty sees scientists, philosophers and poets as part of the same enterprise creating new stories and vocabularies that serve one’s different pragmatic

231 Sartre 1977, 40.

232 Rorty 1998, 53.

233 Rorty 1991, 43, 187-188, 204; Rorty 1998, 54, 55.

234 Dewey 1922, 317.

235 Rorty 1991, 35, 52, 61.

236 Rorty 1989, xvi, 53.

aims – some better, some worse. These all are voices in the discourse of the humanity and none of them has a privileged position in relation to other.²³⁷

Rorty states that since one can never tell which beliefs are true, the truth cannot be the goal of scientific inquiries. Instead, from a pragmatist perspective, the purpose of scientific inquiries ought to be to achieve agreement among people about what to do, that is, how to cope with the world.²³⁸ Donald Davidson concurs with Rorty and argues that people will always be left with fallible beliefs and, although they are able to enhance their knowledge, they can never know for certain which of the beliefs that they hold are true. Moreover, since the truth is neither visible as a target nor recognisable when achieved, it is futile to see the truth as a goal of inquiry.²³⁹ Pragmatist understanding of truth as well-justified beliefs exemplify the current post-modern condition where there is not bedrock and ultimate truths or privileged, accurate representations of the reality. Rorty comments that we should relish the thought that the sciences will always provide a spectacle of fierce competition between alternative theories, paradigms and schools of thought. As Rorty asserts

“The end of human activity is not rest, but rather richer and better human activity.”²⁴⁰

If truth does not have any correspondence with reality or whatever you invent to say, what prevents you from conducting scientific inquiries about remote Aceh conflict from your cosy sofa at home?

Nothing else but the community within which you write. The traditional conventions of scientific inquiries obviously restrict and permit the author in his or her journey. For example, during the 19^th and early 20^th centuries, it was common for anthropologists to write about distant cultures without ever actually visiting the locations. A self-respective anthropologist in the 21^st century would never act in this presumptuous way. Hence, the scientific inquiries are always situated in certain time-space context that restricts and permits the author(s) in one way or another. Therefore, the pragmatic understanding of science does not signify that “anything goes”, as people’s beliefs and theories are subject to the evaluation of their community and the rules and vocabularies of the particular language-game within which they write. Furthermore, from a pragmatist perspective, the evaluation of inquiries ought to begin with the question “[…] what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.”²⁴¹

237 Bouveresse 2001, 130; Käpylä & Mikkola 2005, 100 footnote 173; West 1985, 265; Rorty 1980, 264.

238 Rorty 2001c, 262; Rorty 1999, xxv.

239 Davidson 2001, 67.

240 Rorty 1991, 39.

241 James 2000, 27.

The understanding of language as a tool of coping with the reality is very much at the centre of peace research, where scholars regularly add suggestions and ideas how to resolve conflicts.

However, one should not think that the rest of the inquiry is just some meaningless jargon about the conflict. Obviously, what scholars purport to do is to represent the conflict as accurately as they can. After all, it would practically be impossible or at least sound rather omniscient to give suggestions for resolving the conflict if you would not first introduce the causes of the conflict.

Pragmatism has, also, reflected into different perspectives and policies regarding peace studies and world politics. Perhaps the most well known application is David Mitrany’s functionalism. In peace research, functionalism refers to the idea of peace processes searching for functional solutions that would have positive affect on both participants. In other words, finding a consensus on what to do while, possibly still disagreeing about the reasons for fighting.²⁴²

Language is comprehended in this thesis to encompass a dual purpose regarding scientific inquiries.

On the one hand, in peace research the scholars utilise language to represent the conflict. On the other hand, language is used to change the world; to make visions of the possible better world. The term representation does not reflect something objective and a-personal textual creation. How a certain phenomenon is explained depends on the point of view that the inquirer has chosen as well as on the specific language-game in which he or she participates. The language-game defines the vocabularies and to an extent, also, the perspectives that the scholar presents. To conclude, in scientific inquiries the world is made rather than found. The following chapter argues that scientific inquiries can be understood as narratives, examining how the world is made in these stories.

242 See e.g. Mitrany 1966; Burton 1969, 88-94; Väyrynen 2001, 121-123.