Climate Uncertainty in International Relations

Political climate is dictated both discursively, through the interactions of multiple actors, and physically by circumstances outside direct human control (for example in geopolitics).

At the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, discussions were

dominated by politics that related more to the existing economic and political relations of

the attending states than to the physical threats and challenges of climate change. But while political and discursive details are argued, the material consequences of climate change are uncertainly looming up around us. If the earth’s climate is to become increasingly

uncertain, with the rippling effects of these changes on biological and human systems even more uncertain, then the stages and circumstances of international relations are also likely to shift and change, possibly destabilizing old relationships or forcing the evolution of new systems and structures of relations.

Climate change is a complex and far-reaching phenomena. Its atmospheric mechanisms, shifts in weather patterns and extremes, and effects on living organisms, species

distributions and ecosystems clearly fall within the environmental sector. But its causes, and the strongest arguments blocking action to curtail it, are largely economic, driven by a world economy dependent on oil, industrialized production and global trade of goods.

Because its causes and effects span so many sectors and scales, in many cases, “we are eroding capacities to respond to change, at the same time as we are accelerating the speed and magnitude of change” (O’Brien 2006, 3). So-called “environmental issues” such as climate change actually “interact with social, economic, technological, political, and institutional dynamics and create new challenges for human security” (O’Brien 2006, 3).

Although most debate around climate change has treated it as an environmental rather than a security issue (O’Brien 2006, 1), there are signs of change, as more actors on all levels recognize that “our increasingly unstable climate is no longer seen as primarily an

environmental or economic issue” (Parry 2007, 20). Human security is experienced on the individual level, and encompasses a broader spectrum of potential referents and threats than traditional international security. Because of its potential for destabilization, and because it does span multiple sectors and scales, climate change is an interesting potential referent for an expanded concept of security.

Concepts such as human security can act to broaden the security agenda, and some in IR have argued for an expansion of what can be securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). A broader understanding of security can draw much needed attention to the importance and urgency of an issue, indicating that it “warrants a policy response commensurate in effort if not in kind with war” (Barnett 2003, 14). There are signs this is already occurring: in April 2007, the UN Security Council debated climate change, marking its recognition as a core

international security issue (Parry 2007, 21). The traditional referent of security is the state,

where the primary concern is violent conflict and the military is the accepted response (Barnett 2003, 8). In this context, the analysis of climate change in relation to security becomes how it will impact state sovereignty and legitimacy by affecting its ability to respond to external forces (such as extreme weather events), causing large scale migrations of environmental refugees, and/or exaggerating existing inequalities that under some circumstances can lead to violent conflict (Barnett 2003). There is a danger that

securitizing climate change will turn it into “a military rather than a foreign policy problem and a sovereignty rather than global commons problem” (Barnett 2003, 14). This is a valid concern, as militaries are major greenhouse gas emitters, and military spending takes money and attention away from environmental and social goals more directly relevant to human security (Barnett 2003, 13). In light of these types of pitfalls, a counter-argument to securitization (in essence an extreme form of politicization in which one issue is moved to the top of and beyond the regular agenda entirely) is that it is more preferable to move beyond securitization altogether (Buzanet al. 1998).

Still, the threats of climate change to human security are compelling. Questions of poverty, inequality and social justice are key elements of human security, and the impacts of climate change will be felt unequally throughout the social sector. The distribution of impact is likely to vary both geographically and socio-economically, exacerbating existing inequalities, with the greater burden resting on the poorer people, as was seen in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (O’Brien 2006, 2). Thus, responding to the impacts of climate change will be closely entwined with the fight against poverty (Parry 2007, 20). This is especially relevant to my current discussion because in the North, as in other parts of the world, poverty is found to a disproportionate degree in indigenous communities (AHDR 2004). Shifting the framing of climate change from environmental issue to human security can also help move the debate beyond scientific uncertainty:

“Using scientific uncertainty as a reason for inaction is simply no longer a credible excuse”

(O’Brien 2006, 2). Despite the reality of uncertainty and the importance of humility,

science does already possess a great deal of important and highly relevant knowledge about the world. Putting it into practice in an integrated way that supports rather than trumps other ways of knowing is what is needed now. At the same time, Barnett (2003, 15) concludes that a grounding in science, such as that produced and reviewed by the IPCC, is necessary to avoid appropriation by conventional military security.

As can be seen especially clearly in the environmental sector, where so many (interrelated) issues compete for attention, focusing on one issue has the potential to cause more overall harm than good; narrowing the focus to one symptom, be it water pollution or species loss or desertification, misses the underlying causes and thus fails to reach real solutions. In fact, even issues that seem straightforward, such as military threats, usually have underlying causes that cross into other sectors, and thus securitization can be argued to exacerbate rather than help most problems, not only environmental ones. However, I think a unique argument can be made for securitizing climate change, if it is viewed holistically and critically as climate uncertainty, as traditional knowledges or new materialism view it.

Recognizing the agency of the nonhuman world and the importance of intra-actions forces us to view our relationships and interactions with each other and the world as uncertain and constantly co-created. Securitizing climate change in this way can be seen as a radical suggestion, in that it could act to draw attention to where we most need to look: the roots of things.

In its sheer scope and magnitude, encompassing most human, biological and physical systems on the planet in some way, climate change can be almost overwhelming in its unity. Looking at climate change through the lens of security, however, can also help integrate multiple scales, linking “local (human security), national (national security) and global (international security) levels of environmental change and response” (Barnett 2003, 14) as well as integrating projects of mitigation and adaptation. On one hand, an issue that brings to the forefront the interconnectedness of the global bio-geo-physical system seems to call for globalized solutions. Attempts at global solutions can be seen in international arenas such as the Kyoto and Bali meetings, and organizations such as the IPCC. However, uncertainty about the resilience of existing systems and the possible destabilizing effects of climate uncertainty can also easily support an argument for devolution of power, as smaller systems are quicker to adapt to change. Most change ultimately must originate from the roots up, at the human and local level. Yet, insofar as human security is necessary for lasting national security, and traditionally it is threats to national security that are the greatest concern and focus of international security, the divide between these three levels may be somewhat artificial. I think that the most effective and lasting solutions will come through synergy of multiple scales, with global agreements and strategies partially

directing and partially directed by human-driven local and regional action. This calls for an

alternative concept of security that does not privilege security at any one level over the others.

The most crucial element to any approach is a humility rooted in a thorough understanding and acknowledgment of the uncertainty that currently, and likely always will, underlie our knowledge and predictions about climate change and its effects. Without this, any political strategy is bound to fail when something unexpected (inevitably) happens. Furthermore, I believe that understanding uncertainty can help foster tolerance and cooperation, even at the state-level of security and international relations. If no one believes they are absolutely right, the perspectives of other sides are better heard and more easily accommodated.