Lisa Benjamin 1
4 Survey of AOSIS negotiators
4.6 Capacity constraints
Sixty per cent of responders stated that their inability to attend all of the intersessional meetings affected their negotiating capacity ‘a lot’, and 66.7 per cent felt that their in-ability to attend all of the COP meetings affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’. The view of respondents was that funding issues also had a large capacity constraining effect, with 66.7 per cent of responders stating this affected their negotiating capacity ‘a lot’.
The major capacity constraint felt by responders was a lack of numbers of participants to attend various meetings (79.9 per cent). Other capacity constraints included:
• lack of awareness/training on technical/scientific issues (40 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’);
• lack of local/regional data (30 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’);
• lack of historical knowledge of the UNFCCC process/documents (20 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’);
• integration/exchange of personnel/experience at the international/local level (51.7 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’); and
• lack of access/relationships with other negotiating blocs/countries (30 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’).67
67 Other capacity issues offered by responders were lack of good knowledge of English, lack of good negotiation skills, changing political agendas locally, lack of documentation (especially in French), lack of continuity of personnel at negotiations or change of focus on agenda items for personnel, space and time for negotiation, lack of technical expertise, logistics of accommodation to negotiation venue and visa issues.
Only 10 per cent of responders felt ‘well prepared’ for intersessional and/or COP negotiations, and the majority, 79.3 per cent of responders, felt they were ‘adequate-ly prepared’, whilst 10.3 per cent felt that they were ‘not well prepared’.68
5 Conclusion
The capacity constraints felt by AOSIS negotiators are not unexpected. Developing countries, and especially small countries, often face capacity difficulties in multilat-eral negotiations such as the UNFCCC negotiations. These constraints often include small delegations, limited staff and human capacity to attend the vast number of often simultaneous meetings, and the reliance on other countries or NGOs to rep-resent their interests.69 As Chasek points out, many Caribbean countries have been forced to downsize their New York missions at the United Nations, leaving a smaller pool of potential negotiators.70 When negotiators are changed, it presents issues of continuity of representation and historical knowledge, which in turn may affect personal relationships with other negotiating blocs which may have been devel-oped.71
68 This latter percentage may be a function of the high number of responders (23.3 per cent) for whom COP16 was either their first COP or who had only been involved in negotiations for one year.
69 See Pamela Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Expe-rience of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin’, 10 Review of European Community and International Environ-mental Law (2001) 168–176 at 168–169.
70 Ibid. at 170.
71 Ibid.
Despite these pressures, it is interesting to note that most of the AOSIS negotiators who responded were satisfied with the performance of their negotiating bloc. AOSIS has consistently demonstrated a remarkable ability to make progress in the negotia-tions despite the small size and relative powerlessness of its member states. This is no minor feat, for as a negotiating bloc, AOSIS has its internal tensions and has not been successful on all fronts. It appears, however, that despite constraints on its members, a combination of factors, including the early decision to pool resources, strong leadership, and the use of a variety of negotiation strategies, has benefited AOSIS as a negotiation bloc, and enabled it to not only actively participate in and influence the UNFCCC negotiations, but also to satisfy its various constituent mem-bers as well. AOSIS’ management of its memmem-bers’ interests and its successful nego-tiating strategies can, therefore, serve as a demonstrative model as to how negonego-tiating blocs can be effective for small states that may traditionally be marginalized in mul-tilateral negotiations.72 Mrema and Ramakrishna state that ‘[f]or smaller delega-tions, [such] coalitions ensure and guarantee that their interests and priorities are considered; since, within such coalitions, delegations are able to gain trust and re-spect and thus gain support for their ideas’.73
The performance of AOSIS confirms the view held in international law that multi-lateral negotiations conducted within international organizations have been advanta-geous for weaker states by enabling them to have a ‘greater impact on the initiation of multilateral conferences and the forming of MLTs [multilateral treaties]’.74 Blum notes that the use of coalitions in multilateral negotiations can afford weaker states more cost-effective participation, because they can share both efforts and resources which they would have to bear alone in bilateral negotiations.75
The near future, however, does not look bright for the coalition within UNFCCC negotiations. Despite limited success at the latest COP16/CMP6, the effects of the acrimonious nature of the negotiations in Copenhagen linger on.76 It was recently announced that the UN Secretary-General is to end his ‘hands on’ involvement with the international climate change regime in order to focus on broader issues of
sustain-72 Note Sewell’s and Zartman’s approach: ‘Power is the fundamental consideration in negotiations, underly-ing other basic values such as well-beunderly-ing, interests, and even existence…’ in John W. Sewell and I. William Zartman, ‘Global Negotiations: Path to the Future or Dead-End Street?’, 6 Third World Quarterly (1984) 374–410 at 383. Also see Kotzian, who argues that, depending on which frame is adopted in negotiations, appeals to norms and reasoning will have an impact when the arguing frame is utilized. Peter Kotzian
‘Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: On the Application of the Frame-Selection Mod-el and Its Implications’, 28 International Political Science Review (2007) 79–99 at 93.
73 See Mrema and Ramakrishna, ‘The Importance of Alliances, Groups and Partnerships’, supra note 44, at
74 Gabriella Blum, ‘Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law’, 49 Harvard 190.
International Law Journal (2008) 323–379 at 341.
75 Ibid. at 341. However, note Blum’s assertion at 342 that multilateral negotiations are not always more beneficial to weaker states, and in some instances bilateral negotiations can be beneficial.
76 In fact, Navroz Dubash referred to the Copenhagen negotiations as ending in ‘almost [a] complete col-lapse’. Navroz K. Dubash, ‘Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust’, 44 Economic and Political Weekly (2009) 8–11 at 8.
able development at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 2012.77 The UN Assist-ant Secretary-General Robert Orr explained that ‘[i]t is very evident that there will not be a single grand deal at any point in the near future’.78 This development may signal a de-emphasis on the UNFCCC multilateral process for the next few years.
Considering the urgency of the issue of climate change for SIDS, it may mean that AOSIS must allocate already overstretched resources to its sustainable development agenda, and push the issue of climate change through not only UNFCCC negotia-tions but the Rio+20 forum as well.
77 The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (or Rio +20) will be held in Rio de Janeiro from 4–6 June 2012, twenty years after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-ment which was held in Rio de Janeiro from 3–14 June 1992. The Rio +20 Conference has adopted two themes: (a) a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; and (b) the institutional framework for sustainable development. For more information see <http://www.earth-summit2012.org>.
78 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Ban Ki-moon ends hands-on involvement in climate change talks’, Guardian of 27 January 2011, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jan/27/ban-ki-moon-un-cli-mate-change-talks?INTCMP=SRCH> (visited 28 June 2011).