Building the SCO - Constructing the Role of a Great Power : China s Peripheral Relations, Terri

1. INTRODUCTION

3.2.1. Building the SCO

As described above, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was established officially in summer of 2001. Its predecessor, the Shanghai Five Forum, had been operational for five years, but did not have an official status. Thus, when Hu Jintao

assumed the chairmanship⁴⁸ of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002–

March 2003, the SCO was still in very much under construction. Hu’s weakness as a leader, discussed in the introduction of this study, is obvious in his first official speech at the summits of the SCO: in Moscow Hu (2003) both acknowledges his predecessor Jiang Zemin for his work in establishing the SCO, and refers to the new Chinese regime as “new collective leadership” [Ɨđä̞Ć̏P].

The role of China in the aftermath of the CCP 16^th Party Congress – in the context of SCO and Central Asia – was according to Hu (2003) to promote the

“democratisation of international relations” [Ë̇kɈǙ], and the “diversity of human civilizations” [3ɆƔƠșáǆœ], as well as advocating a “just and rational new international political and economic order” [iǐ²ȊșË̇ƏǠɖǩƗȰĲ].

Probably in the light of the recent (spring 2003) invasion of Iraq, Hu (ibid.) reminded his audience that China upholds “lasting peace and security” [Ÿ ½Ĭ ôg] that would be realised through “equal participation in international affairs”

[±ËĬɁ¢Ë̇*]. While military action could bring a “temporary victory”

[Ɵșɯ], it could not provide a “lasting security” [Ÿ șôg], the naturally more attractive outcome.

This, according to Hu (2003), was in fact the purpose of the SCO: as the

“crystallisation” [ɗƨ] of “good-neighbourly relations,” [Ȣ˯¥ékɈ] and in advocating the “new security concept” [^ƗÖôgʏ] and “the new regional model of regional dialogue and cooperation” [×Ąʤ½²RǋĽ] in the post-Cold War world, the organisation could prevent the escalation of disagreements in Central Asia into full-scale conflicts such as the war in Iraq. The problems brewing outside the region were not to be allowed to come and disturb the uneasy peace in Central Asia. In fact, another aspect of the SCO acknowledged by Hu (2003) was the international environment of the organisation: the establishment of the organisation had “caused widespread concern in the international community” [Ë̇ȫHșİǣ

48 The transfer of power after the CCP 16th Party Congress took several steps in the party congress in November 2002 and in the National People’s Congress in March 2003. It was not until September 2004, however, until Jiang Zemin relinquished his position as the chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, giving Hu all the positions considered to belong to the leader of the CCP.

kǥ], a reference to the fears related to the idea of the ‘NATO of the East,’ as discussed above. From the Chinese point of view these concerns were unfounded:

the members of the SCO, while not liberal democracies, respected state sovereignty and thus were much less prone to attack other countries than the US was, which had in recent years invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq.

This view of the impact of US military actions in Eurasia is shared by Professor Xu Tao (2003: 7), who sees them as a challenge to the development of the SCO. Together with the negative security implications of the US military presence, the framing of the SCO as the Asian NATO shows the threat of the nascent cooperation, being confused with the “old-fashioned, Cold War era concepts of international relations.” Thus, the SCO needed to be strengthened considerably (ibid: 13; 8–9). In fact, these early years of the SCO are marked with the natural push to construct the existing framework of cooperation into a tangible organisation capable of doing the bidding of its members. In 2003 it was not yet such an organisation, and the remainder of Hu’s (2003) speech was reserved for a call to speed up the construction of the SCO. To help in this, China was willing to provide the premises for the recently established secretariat in Beijing for free.

Of the other problems of the SCO, such as the territorial disputes in Central Asia as well as the ‘Three Evils’ of terrorism, separatism and fundamentalism, Hu spoke only little. In fact, throughout the time frame of this study, Hu never refers to the border negotiations that, nevertheless, take place continuously until 2011.

The Three Evils were mentioned in the context of security cooperation, and according to Hu (2003) the “Three Forces” [ɫ] had to be eradicated in order to preserve the peace and stability in the region. The best way for this would be to cut the financing of these ‘forces’ by focusing on the prevention of drug trafficking.

Thus, in this speech, Hu Jintao linked the political opposition in China and Central Asia to terrorism and the trade on narcotics.

Hu Jintao’s speech in the Tashkent summit bears strong resemblance to the one in Moscow in 2003. In his Tashkent summit speech Hu (2004) returned to the original idea of the SCO: its purpose was to “ensure lasting peace and common development of the member states” [ȨZşºËșŸ ½Ĭ½j³¨Ē]. Thus, the

expanding and deepening of economic, cultural, and security cooperation was necessary in the “new period of development” [Ɨș¨ĒƟƲ]. References to this, together with repeated references to the “trend of the times” [Ɵ=ǵǨ] (Hu 2004;

2006; 2008b; 2010; 2011) and the complex and volatile [ßƸá«] international situation in the world (Hu 2004; 2006; 2012a) are, on top of the regular patterns of his speeches, constantly present in Hu’s speeches. Combined with his references to the challenges and threats towards the SCO, the speeches paint a very bleak vision of Central Asia and the world in the early 2000s. In this world, the cooperation between China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics shines like the crystallisation of their good relations. Moreover, as times passes, China’s role in this cooperation becomes even more important.

In Hu’s (2004) Tashkent speech, anti-terrorism was more prominently present than before: terrorism must be opposed with “no double standards” [ɱƉ

¦˳Ǆx].⁴⁹ The “Three Forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism were targeted, but, and most likely with reference to Uyghurs, according to Hu (2004) terrorism “must not be equated with specific ethnic and religious affiliations” [ɱ Ĉŕő!ǾøșǙƚ½öƑɩɈɁ³ˇƼ]. In line with the common Chinese views on national unity, Uyghurs were not the problem of Xinjiang, but rather the separatists among them. Unfortunately, as I have described elsewhere (Naarajärvi 2012b), China’s campaigns against Uyghur separatism has hit all of the residents of Xinjiang hard, not only separatists and terrorists.

Hu further (2004) pledged to provide the other members of the organisation with preferential buyers’ credit worth of USD 900 million. While a good sum of money, preferential buyers’ credit mainly enables the purchase of goods and services from the creditor, in this case China, thus linking the economies of Central Asia with China more tightly. China’s self-interest is thus clearly visible, and there are no other signs in the speech of China portraying itself as anything more than one of the six members of the SCO. While the appointment of a senior Chinese

49 With these “double standards” Hu Jintao referred most likely to the U.S., which e.g. the later editorial by Feng Yujun (2005) in People’s Daily criticised for pushing for democratization and

“colour revolutions” in Central Asia in the shadow of anti-terrorism.

diplomat, Zhang Deguang, as the first secretary-general of the SCO in the new premises of the organisation were signs of China’s primus inter pares position, in the speeches and subsequent role statements by Hu this was not yet present.

The fourth year of the SCO, 2005, brought new challenges to the nascent organisation. Political instability following parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the ‘Tulip Revolution’ that ousted president Akayev, forcing him in exile in Russia in late March, thus marking the first regime change in Central Asia since the early 1990s. For an organisation like the SCO, and especially before the maturation of the cooperation, abrupt regime changes can be troublesome. Of the SCO member states only China and Russia have more or less clear and controlled systems of power transfer, and in neither of those countries has power transfer in the 2000s meant regime change: in China, power is transferred to a successor inside the Communist Party, and in Russia Vladimir Putin has found a way to stay in power by alternating between the posts of president and prime minister. Thus, when Hu Jintao mentioned stability in his SCO summit speeches, it is not unreasonable to see the term to include regime stability as well.

Less than two months later, in mid-May, more trouble was brewing in the Uzbekistani side of Fergana Valley, a known hotspot for insurgent activity only few years before. In the events that the Uzbek government calls Islamist riot, and many others peaceful protests, hundreds of people gathered in the central square of Andijan were attacked by Uzbek security forces (OSCE 2005). While the nature of both the demonstrations and the subsequent violence is unclear, the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators led to a noticeable cooling of the relations between Uzbekistan and many western countries, and e.g. the European Union established sanctions on Uzbekistan for the next several years (Castle 2009).

The 2005 summit of the SCO, which met in Astana, had a clear stance on the events: the unrest in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were domestic affairs that should not be meddled with. According to Hu (2005a), “certain issues” [0*Ř] that had recently taken place in Central Asia had caused widespread concern among the international community. This he saw as a sign of Central Asia’s “increasingly prominent role in the international arena” [ÐË̇ɶ¯ŪǳȡƜȚ˳ʍșʒɷ].

For China, there was no reason for concern: the countries of Central Asia were

“masters of their own affairs” and had the right to choose “the development path”

in accordance “with their national conditions” as well as the ability to “run things according to their own wisdom” (ibid.). In fact, for China this meant an opportunity to show how it practises what it preaches: the policy of non-interference and the democratization of international relations.

However, the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan put pressure on the SCO and resulted in some changes in Hu’s rhetoric: while the earlier ideas of the

“Shanghai spirit” and respect for diverse civilizations were still there, the SCO had entered a “new situation” with “new tasks and challenges” [^ƗŃƗCƗź Ţ]. Moreover, the future of the SCO now depended on its ability to put “the consensus into action and realise the plans” [Ůjʡʅ ŮɿÌ«şȇú] (Hu 2005a). These views are echoed in the article by Xu Tao, who frames the outside world even more as a threat. According to Xu (2005b: 21), the Central Asian countries varied in their means to develop their nations and “resist” [^ŲŊ] the

“impact” [chongji, t}, also “attack” or “punch”] of globalisation.

SCO’s response to this outside pressure came in the form of a declaration by the heads of states of the organisation. Since the late 2001, the United States had been using the airbases of Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan to support the ongoing war efforts in Afghanistan. Now the members of the SCO demanded the end of this use:

Considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation consider it necessary, that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states (Xinhua 2006).⁵⁰

While the US-led coalition was indeed making progress in Afghanistan, the reason to call for the end of the use of these bases was clearly elsewhere. Western support

50 However, the US troops stayed at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan until 2014.

for the first ‘Colour Revolution’ in Central Asia, and the widespread condemnation of the violence in Andijan were in stark contrast with the general views within the SCO and China. Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, visited China only two weeks after the Andijan violence, and on the eve of his visit the issue was raised at the regular press conference at the Chinese Foreign Ministry. At this event Kong Quan, ministry spokesperson, stated that Uzbekistan was not to blame for the violence in Andijan:

As to what has happened recently in Uzbekistan, it is the internal affairs of the country in essence. We have all along firmly supported the efforts of the Uzbek Government to fight the three forces of terrorists, separatists and extremists. We also support Uzbekistan's efforts, together with those of other countries in Central Asia, to safeguard the peace and stability in the region, and their commitment to regional development and prosperity (FMPRC 2005).

By 2005, the SCO had finished its initial structure-building: the secretariat was working in Beijing, headed by a senior Chinese diplomat. Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure was established in Tashkent. The pattern of annual summits between the heads of states of the member countries was functioning: even the Acting President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan was present in Astana, showing the continuous support of his country to the SCO. As Hasan H. Karrar (2009: 157–158) has argued, from 2005 onwards the SCO was “fully functioning,” since it had achieved the status of an observer in the United Nations, signed Memorandums of Understanding with ASEAN, and had accepted new countries as observers to the SCO summits.

In this context, the western responses to the ‘issues’ in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan drove a wedge between the West and the members of the SCO. By criticising state-sponsored violence in Andijan, western countries were guilty of interfering in the internal affairs of a member of the SCO. In the same vein, the critical reports by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe of the Kyrgyzstan elections preceding the ‘Tulip Revolution’ (OSCE 2005) could be interpreted as a breach of Kyrgyz sovereignty. Reacting to this kind of pressure was precisely what the SCO was built for, and as described in chapter 1, in accordance

with China’s long-standing foreign policy doctrine of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The SCO was thus doing in practise what China had been preaching for already 50 years. The pledge of Hu Jintao (2005a) to train 1500 specialists from other SCO member states in China, together with the more favourable terms on the loans pledged a year before, can be seen as rewards for the organisation for a job well done.

As 2005 was a turning point for the SCO as an organisation, so it was one for China, too. The Chinese expectations regarding the SCO started to grow significantly, and as discussed in the following section, so were expectations regarding some of the components of China’s national role conception as well. Until 2005, China had still been strongly attached to its identity as a developing country, and its push for a multilateral world order and the democratization of international relations lacked impetus. China’s cultural heritage and domestic opinion had had only a little impact on the NRC of China towards Central Asia. As for the material aspects of China’s NRC, China was clearly more developed and more capable than the Central Asian members of the SCO, but apart from being a financial lender, China was not portraying itself in a role much different from the other members. In fact, it was the opportunities – that is the external events outside of China – that had the biggest influence on how China saw the SCO and its own role in it. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, defined by Hu Jintao above as “changes in the international environment,” as well as the pressure towards Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after the violence Hu described as “events,” were the variables that called for a new approach towards multilateral cooperation in Central Asia.

In document Constructing the Role of a Great Power : China s Peripheral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Role Change, 2002 2012 (sivua 98-105)