AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations

Climate change is anticipated to have dramatic negative effects for SIDS. These in-clude increased air temperatures, reduced fresh water resources, sea level rise, rising water temperatures, ocean acidification, and increased hurricane intensity and storm surges. The IPCC Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2008) states that for SIDS some of the expected effects are that sea level rise will exacerbate storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, threatening vital infrastructure.⁹⁵ In addition, erosion of

89 For more information on vessel registration at the FFA, see <http://www.ffa.int/vessel_registration/howto>

(visited 5 March 2013).

90 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region, Honiara, 9 July 1992, in force 20 May 1993, 32 International Legal Materials (1993) 136.

91 See Aquorau, ‘Illegal Fishing and Fisheries’, supra note 78, at 54.

92 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Honolulu, 5 September 2000, in force 19 June 2004, available at http://www.

wcpfc.int/key-documents/convention-text (visited 5 March 2013).

93 Japan and Korea have not joined the Convention on the basis that they are not parties to the 1995 Strad-dling Stocks Agreement.

94 Emily E. Larocque, ‘The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: Can Tuna Promote Development of Pacific Island Na-tions?’, 4 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal (2003) 83–120 at 85.

95 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2008), available at

<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf> (visited 5 March 2013) at 52. It is worth

beaches and coral bleaching is expected to affect local resources, as will increased invasion of non-native species due to higher temperatures. By mid-century water resources are anticipated to become insufficient to meet local demand during the dry seasons.⁹⁶ Climate change is also expected to have adverse economic, and therefore developmental, effects for SIDS. Although there are few regional studies on the economic impact of climate change, a 2008 study by Bueno et al estimated the costs to the Caribbean of global inaction on climate change at US$22 billion annually by 2050 and US$46 billion annually by 2011 for the region, representing between 10 per cent and 22 per cent of the region’s GDP based on 2004 GDP results.⁹⁷

Anticipated vulnerability to climate change led SIDS to form the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) as a distinct negotiating bloc within the UNFCCC negotia-tions. As scientific concern over climate change mounted, a number of SIDS con-vened a Small State Conference on Sea Level Rise in the Maldives in 1989,⁹⁸ which resulted in the Malé Declaration on Global Warming and Sea Level Rise.⁹⁹ AOSIS was subsequently formed during the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 by 24 states.¹⁰⁰ AOSIS currently has 40 members and four observer states.¹⁰¹

AOSIS operates with no formal budget, charter or secretariat, and works primarily through its member states’ diplomatic missions to the United Nations in New York.¹⁰² Its membership represents approximately one-quarter of developing states.¹⁰³ AOSIS itself is a member of the Group of 77, or G-77 and China,¹⁰⁴ negotiating bloc, but not all of its members are part of that bloc. Some AOSIS members are LDCs, and some are also members of the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance of Latin American

coun-noting that the IPCC predictions in Assessment Report 4 for sea level rise are conservative as they exclude uncertainties in climate carbon-cycle feedbacks and the full effects of future changes in ice sheet flow.

These are expected to be addressed by the IPCC in Assessment Report 5, due to be published between 2013–2014.

96 Ibid. at 52.

97 Ramón Bueno, Cornelia Herzfeld, Elizabeth A. Stanton and Frank Ackerman, The Caribbean and Climate Change: The Costs of Inaction (2008), available at <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Caribbean-full-Eng-lowres.pdf> (visited 5 March 2013) at 2. See also the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean, The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean (2011), available at <http://www.eclac.org/

portofspain/noticias/paginas/0/44160/Final_Caribbean_RECC_Summary_Report%5B1-3%5D.pdf>

(visited 5 August 2013) which provides more recent and sectoral breakdowns of costs. See also Lisa Ben-jamin, ‘Climate Change and Caribbean Small Island States: The State of Play’, 16 The International Journal of Bahamian Studies (2010) 78–91.

98 Although not a formal conference website, materials from the conference are available at <http://www.

islandvulnerability.org/slr1989.html> (visited 5 March 2013).

99 A copy of the declaration is available at <http://www.islandvulnerability.org/slr1989/declaration.pdf>

(visited 28 December 2012).

100 See <http://www.aosis.org>.

101 Taken from <http://www.aosis.org/members> (visited 5 March 2013).

102Ibid.

103 Betzold, ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 11, at 3.

104 The Group of 77 was first formed in 1964, and at its first Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, in Algiers (Algeria) in October 1967, adopted the Charter of Algiers. The G-77 is the largest intergovern-mental negotiating group at the United Nations. For more information, see <http://g77.org/doc/> (vis-ited 5 March 2013).

tries) negotiating bloc. As a result, AOSIS’ membership reflects the diverse nature and interests of SIDS.

AOSIS as a bloc faces distinct disadvantages in the UNFCCC negotiations. Its pri-mary disadvantage is that its member states are in need of drastic emissions cuts by other negotiating parties, but themselves have no substantial emissions to leverage, nor deep pockets to fund technology transfer or adaptation activities. Despite this disadvantage, AOSIS has managed, particularly in the early stages of the UNFCCC negotiations, to secure negotiation ‘wins’ for its member states.¹⁰⁵

In the early stages of the negotiations on climate change, AOSIS’ first Chairman, Robert van Lierop, was appointed to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Commit-tee’s Bureau.¹⁰⁶ This early appointment provided AOSIS with an opportunity to shape the drafting of the UNFCCC. AOSIS was influential in the negotiations by securing most of its 12 objectives in the final Convention, including a preambular reference to the unique problems of SIDS, the inclusion of the precautionary approach in Article 3(3), and the goal of stabilization of GHGs in Article 4(2) of the Conven-tion.¹⁰⁷ AOSIS also employed ‘first mover advantage’ by putting forward the first draft of the Kyoto Protocol in 1994, and the final 1997 Kyoto Protocol was based on this AOSIS draft.¹⁰⁸

Betzold notes that AOSIS achieved these successes by employing a number of nego-tiation strategies, including using a vulnerability discourse, isolating obstructionist parties, and being open to third party assistance.¹⁰⁹ For example, AOSIS has benefit-ed from collaborations with NGOs such as the Foundation for International Envi-ronmental Law and Development, which provide technical expertise and increased manpower. AOSIS’ success has also been attributed to its sense of unity, strong

lead-105 For a fuller summary of the history of AOSIS and of SIDS discourse in international negotiations see Jenny Grote, ‘The Changing Tides of Small Island States Discourse – A Historical Overview of the Ap-pearance of Small Island States in the International Arena’, 43 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (VRU) (2010), available at <http://www.vrue.nomos.de/fileadmin/vrue/doc/Aufsatz_VRUE_10_02.pdf> (vis-ited 5 March 2013).

106 Chasek, ‘Margins of Power’, supra note 13, at 132.

107 For a detailed analysis of the achievement of the AOSIS objectives, see John Ashe, ‘The Role of the Alli-ance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the Negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’, 23 Natural Resources Forum (1999) 209–220. The other objectives included a preambular reference that participation in the negotiations would not prejudice existing rights under international law, a commitment to immediate and significant cuts in GHGs, impact assessments of proposed activities, and reference to the polluter pays principle. See ibid. at 212–215.

108 Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime A guide to Rules, Institu-tions and Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 38. The Kyoto Protocol to the United NaInstitu-tions Framework Convention on Climate Change is currently the only protocol agreed under the Convention, and includes binding targets for some countries, and flexible mechanisms to achieve those targets. Al-though AOSIS put forward the initial draft of the Protocol, the agreed document took several years of negotiation and did not include all of the provisions included in the first draft.

109 Betzold describes process based strategies as including first mover advantage, for example by AOSIS put-ting forward the first draft of the Kyoto Protocol. See Betzold ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 11, at 1, 6, 7 and 8.

ership and an evolving consciousness in the international community of its members’

plight.¹¹⁰ AOSIS has built a substantial amount of expertise among its negotiators, with several assuming leadership positions within the UNFCCC.¹¹¹

AOSIS continues to be a major player in the UNFCCC negotiations, and has built a significant reputation amongst the negotiatiors. Despite this, it has consistently struggled to achieve one of its primary goals (a goal shared by other vulnerable states but not always shared by large developing states): legally binding and significant emissions cuts from large emitting countries. Recently AOSIS has focused on estab-lishing a financial mechanism to help fund its members’ adaption to climate change.

The most recent form of this mechanism is the Green Climate Fund (GCF),¹¹² for-mally agreed in COP16 in 2010, with SIDS securing representation on the GCF Board and transitional committee of the fund.¹¹³ Both the Copenhagen Accord¹¹⁴ and COP16 decisions also include a review of the two degree Celsius goal in 2015,¹¹⁵ including in relation to an alternative 1.5 degree Celsius goal which AOSIS has long argued is necessary. In the 2012 COP18 negotiations, AOSIS was instrumental in the COP decision to establish institutional arrangements, such as an institutional mechanism on loss and damage.¹¹⁶

Despite these successes, there is a general reluctance among many industrialized countries to commit to deep emissions cuts unless all major economies do the same.

This has been exemplified by Canada, Japan and the United States refusing to sign up to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, agreed at COP18 in Doha in 2012. This reluctance leaves AOSIS negotiators in a difficult and often frustrating position. However, a small survey of AOSIS negotiators in 2010–2011 demonstrated that most AOSIS members at that time were satisfied with the per-formance of their negotiating bloc.¹¹⁷ Although the survey did not ask respondents to comment on why they were satisfied with the alliance, this satisfaction may be due to their understanding of the significant resistance by some developed nations and large developing states to agree to binding emission cuts. The G-77 negotiating bloc

110 W. Jackson Davis, ‘The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): the International Conscience’, 2 Asia-Pacific Magazine (May 1996) 17–22 at 18.

111 For example, since 2009, John Ashe from Antigua and Barbuda has been Chairman of the Ad Hoc Work-ing Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), and in 2012 Diane Black Layne, of Antigua and Barbuda (also a representative of the Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS), was selected as Chair of the Standing Committee on Finance under the UNFCCC.

112 See <http://gcfund.net/home.html>.

113 ‘The Cancum Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Coop-erative Action under the Convention’, Decision 1/CP.16 (2011), para’s 103 and 109.

114 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, Decision 2/CP.15, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.

115 This meaning the goal of limiting global temperature rise to no more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels.

116 ‘Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects to climate change to enhance adaptive capacity’, Decision 3/CP.18 (2013), para 9.

117 See Benjamin,’The Role of AOSIS’, supra note 28, at 129–130.

includes states which are members of OPEC, whose interests are almost diametri-cally opposed to those of AOSIS, and so forming strategic alliances with states with-in the G-77 is not always possible. Respondents’ satisfaction may also be attributed to an acknowledgement of the capacity constraints experienced by SIDS. These types of capacity constraints are also felt by SIDS in the negotiating forum of the World Trade Organization.