Opponents of meritocratic admission systems often call for affirmative action, otherwise known as positive discrimination as way of equalising opportunities for students from disadvantaged origins who are not only under-represented in HE, but who do not stand the chance of entering HE if meritocracy—purely defined by test scores and school-leaving examination results—were to be strictly adhered to in the selection of students.
Son Hing et al.(2002) for instance, claim that insofar as target-group members are discriminated against, “the current system of assessing merit is not equitable” (p.494).
These biases which tend to favour the dominant groups stem from three issues; (a) the criteria chosen to measure merit, (b) the tests used to assess merit, and (c) the subjective evaluation of the performance of another (ibid; Clayton & Tangri, 1989; Eberhardt &
Fiske, 1994; Fraser & Kick, 2000).
A number of scholars have attempted a definition of affirmative action:
Affirmative action can be defined as attempts to make progress toward substantive, rather than merely formal, equality of opportunity for those groups, such as women or racial minorities, which are currently under- represented in significant positions in society, by explicitly taking into account the defining characteristics — sex or race — which have been the basis for discrimination. (Mullen, 1988 cited in Crosby, 1994:15)
Generally speaking, an organisation is said to have taken an affirmative action when it
“goes out of its way (i.e., takes action) to assure (i.e., to affirm) that its practices operate without disadvantaging either sex or any ethnic group” (Crosby, 1994:15, Crosby et al., 2006).
A closer inspection of the afore-mentioned definitions, in my estimation, reveals a somewhat narrow treatment of the subject. The roots of discrimination which are supposed to engender the application of affirmative action have been limited to gender and race. As far as the concept applies to education in general and HE in particular, other salient aspects of discrimination such as SES, disability and age (non-traditional, mature students entering or re-entering HE) need attention.
31 Weisskopf (2007) rather takes a more microscopic view of the concept and stretches the sources of discrimination which warrant affirmative action beyond gender and race. He regards it as “the provision of some amount of preference in processes of selection to desirable positions in a society to members of groups that are under-represented in those positions” (p.1). Whatever form the affirmative action takes— either by allocation of quotas for such groups in different competitions or by way of some preferential treatment— Weisskopf’s opinion is that regardless of the form, affirmative action will always result in shoring up the numbers for the under-represented group(s) to a desirable position. Others view affirmative action not just as a corrective measure seeking reparations for the underprivileged in society, but as a ‘punitive’ one seeking to weaken the sway of the current elite on the national pie:
Affirmative action (AA) consists of a set of anti-discrimination measures intended to provide access to preferred positions in a society for members of groups that would otherwise be excluded or under-represented. It provides a mechanism to address contemporary exclusion, particularly a mechanism to desegregate elites. AA can be utilized to change the demography of elite position holders, making those positions more representative of the ethnic/racial/caste/gender composition of the society as a whole. (Darity et al., 2011:238)
Affirmative action as a concept has often been used in education and employment circles to guide recruitment policies (Weisskopf, 2007; Crosby et al., 2006). Its distinguishing feature from equality of opportunity is it being a more proactive way of dealing with discrimination; in that it gives regard and consideration to target-groups at the decision-making stage of the allocation process than the latter which is reactive, in the sense that it takes for granted that the playing field is already level, and assumes that the world is already fair (Crosby, 1994; Son Hing et al., 2002; Smith-Winkleman & Crosby, 1994).
The implementation of affirmative action in HE admission is often fraught with tensions and ambiguities since it tends to ‘favour’ some applicants (the minority and under-represented), a phenomenon referred to as “reverse discrimination” or “positive discrimination” (Fraser, 1995; Morley & Lugg, 2009; Weisskopf, 2007). To illustrate, although Article 17 (2) of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana states that “a person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status”, it in the same vein, empowers Parliament to enact laws “reasonably necessary… for the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational imbalance in the Ghanaian society;”
32 (Article 17[4a]). Consequently, the University of Ghana Act, 2010 (Act 806) while cautioning against discrimination which it defines as treating persons similarly situated differently, also empowers the UG to adopt affirmative action policies:
Without limiting the power of the University to adopt affirmative action policies from time to time, the University, an organ or a body of the University, a principal officer, staff, agent or servant of the University shall not discriminate against a person on the basis of that person’s religion, political affiliation, gender, ethnic origin, disability, race, colour or social or economic status to determine whether that person is to be…admitted as a student of the University, (UG, 2012:21)
Crosby (1994) justifies the use of affirmative action in three respects: necessity, efficiency and effectiveness, and admits that the very grounds for the justification of affirmative action have been advanced by critics who regard it as unnecessary, ineffective and unfair.
Reflecting on the situation in America, he posits that persistent gender and racial injustice coupled with the fact that the victims of injustice are often not better placed to recognise and correct injustices meted out to them, necessitate the use of affirmative action. He concedes that “no one policy can solve all ills, but affirmative action is needed to lessen bias…” (p.24). Effectiveness, Crosby (1994) opines, is not only hard to define but difficult to measure asserting that an effective affirmative action policy is one that achieves the desired results “without causing troubling side-effects” (p.27); and that, the advances that have been made by the people in the ‘protected-classes’ should be a pointer to the effectiveness or otherwise of the policy.
Moses (2010) grounds his support for affirmative action in HE on morality: “we ought to support and argue for affirmative action policy because it is the right thing to do.
Children’s birth circumstances, that is, whether they are born into a wealthy family or an upper caste family, a White family or a Black family should not dictate their opportunities” (p. 25).
Critics of affirmative action regard the policy as one that privileges some people at the expense of others and for that matter qualifies as ‘reverse discrimination’ (D’Souza, 1991;
Glaser, 1988). “A policy of affirmative action that seeks to correct past inequities in the access to educational opportunities for one group…may imply that individuals of greater merit (but from another group) are excluded, creating unfair processes” (World Bank, 2006: 20). A rebuttal, however, views the policy as one that justifiably sacrifices a portion of individual rights in the interest of social justice, arguing that “including such a factor [target-group membership] does not unbalance an equitable state, but rather restores
33 balance by adjusting for the positive weighing of majority group membership that is ingrained within the system” (Clayton & Tangri, 1989: 181). In almost all systems, the heart of fairness has been to “treat same the same”, that is to say, the same procedures must apply to all. But as far affirmative action goes, a more sophisticated understanding of sameness is vital (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Crosby & Blanchard, 1989). Crosby (1994) therefore uses the allegory of athletics to drive home this point:
In a fair system, every runner has an equal chance of winning the race. To equalize chances, all runners must have the same number of meters to run. In a straight track, the finish line is pulled straight across the lines, at a 90° angle to them. In an oval track, however, the finish line must slant to compensate for the fact that the inside track has fewer meters than the outside track. Treating every runner on the oval track fairly requires that "an adjustment" be made to the finish line —so that it is placed at a 60° or 70° angle and not at a 90° angle. A very simple-minded person would see the slanted finish line of the oval track as giving advantage to the runner on the outside track, but a more sophisticated thinker would understand that the slant in the line simply compensates for unequal conditions of running. (p.29, emphasis mine)
The main thrust of Crosby’s analogy, then, is that equal treatment does not mean identical treatment.
On the contrary, Fraser (1995) argues persuasively that although affirmative action is aimed at addressing injustice in distribution, the phenomenon cannot be fully remedied with affirmative action because the deep structures in society that generate the disadvantage are left undamaged; thus, the affirmative action approach ends up creating injustices of recognition rendering it self-contradictory or as some put it, “a medicine that harms its patients” (Crosby et al.,2006:593). To avoid this double whammy, Fraser (1995) rather prescribes “transformative remedies” which will reduce social inequality without “creating stigmatized classes of vulnerable people perceived as beneficiaries of special largesse”, and have the twin effect of addressing distribution and recognition (p.85). The author identifies two deficiencies inherent in the use of affirmative action—
class differentiation and stigmatisation of the disadvantaged— which adds the “insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation” (p.86), which she believes can be addressed with the transformative approach, which has the strength of blurring the class differences, promoting solidarity and helping with the problem of misrecognition.
Weisskopf (2007) presents a very interesting line of reasoning similar to that of Fraser (1995) in regard to the effectiveness of affirmative action to right the wrongs done to the underprivileged using the instrument of HE. As far as HE admissions are concerned, Weisskopf’s (2007) opinion is that positive discrimination (affirmative action) policies
34 target students who have already gone through secondary education successfully; and on that score, the policy can do little to correct educational inequality which finds its best expression at the pre-university or tertiary level. He proffers a solution similar to Fraser’s (1995) transformative remedy—investing heavily in the pre-university levels of education including pre-school— to level the slanted playing field for all in society. He entreats HEIs to use affirmative action to integrate disadvantaged students into the higher echelons of society by placing them in programmes that will lead to respected occupations and decision-making positions which had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the privileged classes in society. Such an upward social mobility, according to Weisskopf (2007), will lend more credence to the legitimacy of the political system and fortify the democratic institutions, while motivating youths from disadvantaged backgrounds.
The need to shift the emphasis on affirmative action away from the confines of HE unto the lower rungs of the educational ladder where inequality is best manifest, equally resonates with Moses (2010):
Affirmative action is indeed important; it needs to be a part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at social change toward meaningful educational access, opportunity, and equity, along with a host of other social policies and programs including universal preschool and primary school, bilingual education, and democratic educational reforms to improve primary and secondary education. (p. 24)
Despite the obvious benefits of an affirmative action policy, its blanket application is often discounted since it has the potential to give undue advantage to undeserving segments of the society (Darity et al., 2011; Weisskopf, 2007; Crosby,1994) leading to the phenomenon of “arbitrary favouritism” (Weisskopf, 2007:2). The following criteria have therefore been suggested to guide the implementation of affirmative action policies in higher education:
a. The eligible community should be that which is very under-represented in the most sought-after positions in society for whom an integration will make a big difference.
b. The eligible group must have suffered major discrimination in the hands of the conventional society such as negative attitude by virtue of its identity.
c. The candidate group must be that with a “strong sense of common identity” to ensure that the benefits derived from such a policy would have a trickle-down
35 effect on those in the lower rungs of the group, while raising the aspirations of the younger ones.
d. The qualifications of the beneficiaries as determined by their past performance should not be far below that of the non-beneficiaries (ibid.:3,4).
Obviously, criterion (d) above introduces some element of meritocracy into affirmative action policies which suggests that affirmative action in its purest form may be difficult to implement; having regard to the fact there may be more applicants deserving to be considered under the policy than available places, and the only logical approach to dealing with the problem will be to select the beneficiaries of affirmative action under some merit.
Some scholars also argue against implementing affirmative action on the basis of class (socio-economic status such as wealth and income) rather than group basis (race, ethnicity and gender). Their argument is that since one of the principal goals of affirmative action is to desegregate and alter the make of the upper echelons of society; “substituting class-based for group-based, affirmative action can compound the marginalization of a subaltern group by screening out of consideration the more class-advantaged members of the group, who are the ones most likely to qualify for elite positions” (Darity et al., 2011: 264). But this position is equally not without problems. How do you deal with people in the marginalised groups with high socio-economic status who would otherwise have been offered admission without affirmative action? Plus, group-based affirmative action exposes the beneficiary group to undue threats, stigmatisation and polarisation of society, which would have, arguably, been muted were a class-based approach adopted since people from low socio-economic status transcend the groups.
Despite the flaws accompanying the implementation of affirmative action policies in HE systems, the evidence available suggest that the policy is gaining currency and its appeal is becoming ‘global’. Countries like Brazil, India, France, United States and South representing five different continents, have affirmative action policies in HE, albeit shaped by their unique national, socio-cultural and political contexts. Moses (2010:35) identifies four prominent rationales that have emerged in the implementation of affirmative action in these countries: remediation (compensation for discrimination of the past), practicality (ensuring the full participation of the
36 disadvantaged in society with the expectations that the gains will trickle down to generations after them), diversity (improving diversity on campuses and altering the composition of office-holders in society), and social justice (highlighting affirmative action as a key mechanism in the search for greater justice and equity). These four rationales can further be put into two broad categories— instrumental and moral (Drupper, 2004). As the terms suggest, instrumental rationales are employed to achieve specific goals and can thus be regarded, merely, as means to an end. The practicality and diversity rationales belong to this category. The moral type however
“appeal to deeper beliefs about what is right and good and how people ought to be treated” (Moses, 2010: 36). While remediation is often invoked to justify affirmative action in HE in India and South Africa for obvious reasons, the same rationale seems to have lost its steam, over time, in the United States where the practicality and diversity rationales are more welcoming to the courts and the public—a testament to the fact that a rationale that may be readily accepted today would lose its bite in future. Moses (2010) therefore recommends de-emphasising backward-looking moral rationales seeking retribution, in favour of the instrumental and forward-looking approach; noting that while countries have different histories, the social justice rationale ought to be the primary justification for affirmative action in HE which should be supplemented with the other rationales for public agreement when necessary. “The social justice rationale is the heart of the policy. It explains, on a more profound level, why a society ought to act affirmatively to admit under-represented students to higher education in greater numbers” (p.25). The author, however, cautions against using affirmative action in HE as if it were ‘an open sesame’ to divorce all the inequalities in society:
In the end affirmative action policies are not THE way to get to social justice; they are one policy tool that nations may have to get to a place where social inequalities are mitigated and students of all races, ethnicities, and classes have meaningful access to and opportunities for higher education. Any justification that claims that affirmative action is synonymous with social justice is placing too much power with this one policy. (ibid: 24, emphasis not mine)
The arguments so far point to affirmative action in HE being a necessary evil. Privileging a disadvantaged student may result in the loss of opportunity for a ‘better qualified’
advantaged applicant in the stiff competition for HE seats, which may be deemed as unfair, and an affront to individual right and justice (see World Bank, 2006). Be that as it may, it has become a ready-made and a central policy plank at both the institutional and
37 system levels, for the equalisation of HE opportunities. Its inherent weaknesses render it a cosmetic, window-dressing policy tool which deals with symptoms rather than the root causes of exclusion in HE.