Background
The ORFA project
Needs and methods
Methods must always be based on a more or less formal theory that can be used to generate testable hypotheses. Unfortunately, many of the proposed methods lack an underlying theory, which implies that the results obtained may be difficult to interpret. The aim of the work package on needs and methods was to collect existing methods for the assessment of organizational factors and to identify needs for future research on this topic.
Berlin University of Technology, Research Center for Systems Security (FSS) carried out the work package "Needs and Methods". Where possible, project partners contacted competent collaborating experts to gather views on needs and. The partners' comments on the survey application were collected as a basis for further discussion (chapter 5).
Organisational strategies in use
Nuclear power plants typically have a formal organizational structure, with powers and responsibilities described in organizational handbooks. The set of rules and how they are interpreted have a major impact on how the regulator and the nuclear power plants communicate. Although the concept has worldwide support, it is interpreted in several different ways. included in the nuclear legislation of some countries where it has been said that the nuclear power plants are responsible for maintaining a good safety culture.
Most nuclear power plants have been involved in peer reviews in one way or another. Observations from nuclear power plants indicate some difficulties in making workable recommendations based on this approach. Some nuclear power plants have discussed modifying the WANO indicators to include additional indicators. which would be more sensitive to detecting deteriorating performance.
Synopsis of models of organisational factors
- NRC model of organisational factors (A)
- Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission (B)
- OECD/NEA Principal Working Group No. 1, Task 7 (C)
- HSE Health and Safety Management (D)
- Finnish Safety Evaluation Memorandum (E)
- Swedish “Factors to Promote Continuous Improvement Organisations” (F)
- Carl Rollenhagen's model (G)
- ASCOT Indicators of IAEA (H)
- SOL - Safety through Organizational Learning (I)
- CREAM - Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (J)
- TOR -Technic of Operations Review (K)
- TRIPOD (L)
- Ontario Hydro performance assessment report (M)
Each of the twenty dimensions is well defined. For example, the 'ownership' dimension means 'the extent to which factory personnel take personal responsibility for their actions and the consequences of those actions. Behavioral checklists containing key statements about observable events are linked to each of the organizational dimensions. The work of Jacobs and Haber is part of a regulator-initiated research program of the American NRC on the assessment of the organizational performance of nuclear power plants.
As with many other studies in the field of nuclear safety, the definition of the term also applies. Further aspects of the factors and clarifications are provided to provide a complete picture of the organizational factors. Health and safety management assessment is part of the regulator's organizational assessment activities in UK industry.
The theoretical basis of this Finnish approach follows the theoretical thesis of the INSAG safety reports. The assessment of the organizational factors described above is based on the safety culture indicators of the INSAG working group, which can be found in the INSAG-4 safety report, appendix section A 2. The Finnish activity is a response of the regulator on the observed must clarify the INSAG 4 concept of safety culture.
Rollenhagen also discusses some specific assessment methods, which are used in the context of the Swedish nuclear industry. The development of the model is a response to the perceived need to establish a framework, to structure organizational factors and the need for practical models to make them more tangible. The development of the ASCOT methodology of the IAEA was initiated by international appeal to INSAG 4.
SOL is designed for use in teams of employees at nuclear power plants who are trained in the use of the method. These concerns led to OHN management's decision to conduct an independent, integrated performance assessment (IIPA) conducted by the Nuclear Performance Advisory Group (NPAG). The IPAP method (Integrated Performance Assessment Process) from the US NRC, which is described in inspection procedure no.
Towards a generic categorisation of organisational factors
All those characteristics of nuclear power plants related to management and managerial functions, such as monitoring of employees, incentive and reward structures, definition of responsibilities, coordination of work flow, training programs, were collected in this category. The manner in which such functions are carried out will undoubtedly have implications for the internal organizational climate and trust, which are the foundations of staff organizational commitment and safety-related activities. Under this heading are grouped all those organizational arrangements that ensure an appropriate and safe workflow in nuclear power plants.
They include functions such as planning, quality management, feedback on operations, procedures, maintenance management, performance audit and assessment. Specific aspects of the 'task performance' of individual employees in nuclear power plants such as: work practices, violations, job protection, stress management and housekeeping were grouped under this category. Factors that fall into this category consist of tangible and intangible resources that a nuclear power plant organization can draw on to ensure safe and reliable operations.
This last category covers all the technical characteristics of the nuclear power plant's hardware and software such as component quality, design and construction, defense-in-depth, physical working conditions and technical support. It must be accepted from theory, as well as from practical experience, that the seven main categories of organizational factors described above do not function independently of each other in the impact of outcomes of nuclear power plants such as safety and reliability. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the 160 extraneous factors from the 13 models that were analyzed were attributed to generic categories by way of a consensus process among security experts.
We can legitimately discuss the adequacy of the defined seven categories as well as the validity of grouping individual factors within one of the seven groups. Nevertheless, it seems useful to summarize and visualize the potential interrelationships between the seven categories and their impact on nuclear power plant outcomes (eg safety, reliability, competitiveness, profitability) as an eighth category.
Towards a synthesis
An important step towards meeting the overall challenge of improving the theoretical understanding of the methods in use appears to be the expressed need to further develop tools for organizational assessment and process control. This need appears particularly important in three areas: analytical methods to assess organizational performance, proven methods of organizational intervention, and methods to integrate organizational factors into PSA. The improvement of analytical methods for evaluating organizational performance is required by referring to issues such as.
An important problem arises due to the fact that there seems to be no consensus regarding the aspects of organizational factors and their importance for the safe and reliable operation of NPPs. And they are often justified in their claims that a lot of work is being done in this area (some would even say, in their opinion, "enough work"). On the other hand, academics argue that what is being done may not be enough, or is often only being done further.
Furthermore, there appears to be a degree of 'disagreement of opinion' in both camps as to what should be addressed as relevant organizational dimensions. Furthermore, even using the same term can mean different things to different people. Such disagreements are easy to understand in light of the above-mentioned limited theoretical understanding and implicit approach to practical problems.
In conclusion, it makes sense to suggest that educational efforts are needed in the broadest sense of the term. Such efforts will include increased research efforts to further elucidate the various concepts currently referred to as organizational factors and further improve methodological tools to better assess them, as well as renewed efforts to encourage some form of dialogue between practitioners and academics on the issues at hand. National, international and governmental and private initiatives will be most important to the process of promoting such dialogue in the future.
Safety culture in a nuclear facility - reflections on its assessment and promotion (Eidgenössische Kommission für die Sicherheit von Kernanlagen KSA /75 E). STATUS: Development of an HSE Audit Scheme for Loss of Containment Incidents - Part 2: Management and Organizational Factors: A Socio-Technical Accident Cause Model. The organizational factors that were identified on the basis of the 13 investigated models (see Chapter 3) are classified into seven main categories.
The table consists of 3 main columns; Column 1 General categories lists the seven general categories that are the result of the grouping process. Problem addressed: Safety Climate among employees: safety perceptions of employees Industry: Chemical, metal, textile, food production. Database: European company, total staff involved in five countries Comment: Theoretical basis available, partially empirically substantiated The EG&G Idaho Safety Norm Survey (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen & Kaplan, 1993) Problem addressed: Safety norms as expressions of safety culture.
Comment: The instrument can be used in conjunction with the organizational development Safety Culture Scale (Koch, 1993). Problem Addressed: Safety culture (attitudes and norms) in high reliability organizations Industry: Nuclear industry, nuclear aircraft carriers. Commentary: Focusing on safety attitudes relevant to organizational change. Safety Climate and Attitude Questionnaire (Cabrera & Isla, 1996) Problem Addressed: Airport Security.
Database: Approximately 350 employees in airport companies and airport staff Comment: The nature of the methodology is predominantly exploratory. Work Activity and Safety Behavior Questionnaire (Grote & Künzler, 1996) Problem addressed: Evaluation of plant safety and its relationship to safety culture. Industry: chemical industry, transport industry. Comment: The approach includes technical, personal and organizational factors within a socio-technical systems framework, a comprehensive assessment of safety culture in a nuclear reprocessing plant (Lee, 1998).
Problem Addressed: Assessment of Safety Attitudes Related to Self-Reports of Accidents Industry: Nuclear reprocessing industry. Problem Addressed: Assessment of safety attitudes related to self-reports of accidents Industry: Nuclear power industry.
