Forecast disclosure in the Finnish stock market : three essays

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Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies

DISSERTATIONS | JENNI LAININEN | FORECAST DISCLOSURE IN THE FINNISH STOCK MARKET | No 171

JENNI LAININEN

FORECAST DISCLOSURE IN THE FINNISH STOCK MARKET

Three essays

uef.fi

PUBLICATIONS OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN FINLAND Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies

ISBN 978-952-61-2783-5 ISSN 1798-5749

Using a data of listed Finnish firms, this dissertation examines how the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) should be interpreted in the context of forecast

disclosure, and how the composition of the board of directors and risk aversion of executive managers affect forecast disclosure

decisions. The results suggest that Finnish listed companies disclose forecasts actively

and that both the board of directors and executive managers have a material role in

disclosure decisions.

JENNI LAININEN

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STOCK MARKET

THREE ESSAYS

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FORECAST DISCLOSURE IN THE FINNISH STOCK MARKET

THREE ESSAYS

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies

No 171

University of Eastern Finland Kuopio

2018

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Sarjan vastaava toimittaja: Kimmo Katajala Sarjan toimittaja: Helena Hirvonen Myynti: Itä-Suomen yliopiston kirjasto

ISBN: 978-952-61-2783-5 (nid.) ISBN: 978-952-61-2784-2 (PDF)

ISSNL: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5757 (PDF)

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5 University of Eastern Finland, 2018

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland

Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies; 171 ISBN: 978-952-61-2783-5 (print)

ISBN: 978-952-61-2784-2 (PDF) ISSNL: 1798-5749

ISSN: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5757 (PDF)

ABSTRACT

This study examines forecast disclosure in the Finnish stock market. The aim of this study is to (i) examine how the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) should be interpreted in the context of forecast disclosure, (ii) examine what is the effect of board composition to forecast disclosure, and (iii) examine how executive managers and their personal characteristics affect forecast disclosure. These questions are addressed in three separate essays. Forecast disclosure has been studied extensively in the United States since 1970’s. Since the 2000’s, management forecasts have also been increasingly studied in other parts of the world, including Europe. Research has, however, been rather scarce in Finland despite of a regulatory reform of the Finnish Securities Markets Act in 2013 where the obligation to disclose forecasts to the market was removed from the law. This study aims to address this research gap.

The results of the first article to this study suggest that the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) may be interpreted to contain, in some situations, an obligation to issue forward-looking information to the market although the law does not oblige companies to disclose forecasts. The results of the second article suggest that changes in board composition are an efficient way to increase forecast disclosure for the benefit of small shareholders. The results of the third article suggest that risk aversion plays a significant role in corporate voluntary disclosure of forecasts.

Keywords: management forecasts, board composition and forecasts, managers and forecasts, management – economic forecasting, executive board – economic forecasting, disclosure of information

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7 University of Eastern Finland, 2018

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland

Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies; 171 ISBN: 978-952-61-2783-5 (nid.)

ISBN: 978-952-61-2784-2 (PDF) ISSNL: 1798-5749

ISSN: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5757 (PDF)

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämä tutkimus tutkii johdon antamia ennusteita suomalaisilla osakemarkkinoilla.

Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on (i) selvittää miten suomalaista arvopaperimarkkinalakia (14.12.2012/746) tulisi tulkita ennusteiden julkistamisen osalta, (ii) tutkia, miten hallituksen kokoonpano vaikuttaa ennusteiden antamiseen, ja (iii) tutkia mikä on toimivan johdon henkilökohtaisten ominaisuuksien vaikutus johdon ennusteiden julkistami- seen. Näitä tutkimuskysymyksiä käsitellään kolmessa artikkelissa. Ennusteiden julkistamista on tutkittu runsaasti Yhdysvalloissa 1970-luvulta lähtien. 2000-luvun alusta lähtien johdon ennusteita on tutkittu enenevässä määrin myös muualla maailmassa, mukaan lukien Eurooppa. Johdon ennusteita koskevaa tutkimusta ei ole kuitenkaan juurikaan tehty Suomessa huolimatta siitä, että suomalaista arvopaperimarkkinalakia uudistettiin vuonna 2013, ja uudistuksen yhteydessä poistettiin velvollisuus julkistaa tulevaisuutta koskevia arvioita. Tämä tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan tähän tutkimus- tarpeeseen. Väitöskirjan ensimmäisen artikkelin tulosten mukaan arvopaperimarkkinalakia (14.12.2012/746) voitaisiin lain uudistamisesta huolimatta tulkita siten, että tulevaisuutta koskevaa tietoa tulisi julkistaa joissain tilanteissa. Tutkimuksen toisen artikkelin tulosten mukaan hallituksen kokoonpanoa muokkaamalla voidaan paran- taa yhtiön tiedottamista pienten osakkeenomistajien hyväksi. Kolmannen artikkelin tulosten mukaan riskin välttäminen on merkittävässä asemassa kun yhtiö harkitsee ennusteiden julkistamista.

Asiasanat: yritysjohto, johdon ennusteet, hallituskokoonpano ja ennusteet, johto ja ennusteet, arvopaperimarkkinalaki-tulkinta, ennusteet

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9 I wish to thank my supervisors Professor Jyrki Niskanen and Professor Mervi Niska- nen at the University of Eastern Finland for help and comments to this dissertation.

I am also grateful for the official dissertation pre-examiners Professor Markku Vieru and Professor Hannu Ojala.

I want to thank Professor Tor Brunzell (Stockholm University) and Professor Ju- ha-Pekka Kallunki (University of Oulu) for acting as discussants and giving me valuable insights for essays one and two of this dissertation in seminars organized by Hanken. I would also want to thank participants to University of Eastern Finland small group seminar (years 2013–2016), to Hanken’s PhD workshop in corporate governance (August 2015), to Hanken’s National Doctoral Tutorial in Accounting (August 2016) and to Hanken small group seminar (spring 2016) for their comments. I am grateful for the financial support received from Suomen Kulttuurirahasto, Pörssisäätiö, Säästöpankkien Tutkimussäätiö, Suomen arvopaperimarkkinoiden edistämissäätiö, and Helsingin Osakesäästäjät.

I want to give warm thanks to my husband Tuomas for giving me valuable comments and supporting me through the dissertation process. This dissertation would not have been finished without help from Rakel and Merja, who nursed my two children. Thank you. Warm thanks belong also to my two sisters Anni and Sanna for giving me mental support to conduct this dissertation, and also to my father Matti and father-in-law Heikki for support. The warmest thanks should, however, be issued to my two children Eero and Ilmari who have patiently been nursed by grandmothers and grandfathers, my sister and the daycare when I have worked on this dissertation.

Vantaa, April 2018 Jenni Laininen

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ABSTRACT ... 5

TIIVISTELMÄ ... 7

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... 9

1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT ... 13

2 LITERATURE REVIEW ... 15

2.1 The role of board of directors in forecast disclosure ... 15

2.2 The interaction between board of directors and executive managers in disclosure decisions ... 16

2.3 The importance of executive managers’ personal characteristics in forecast disclosure ... 17

3 RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT ... 19

3.1 Finnish regulation of forecast disclosure in listed companies ... 19

3.2 Risks associated with forecast disclosure ... 20

4 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS ... 22

4.1 Essay 1: Forecast disclosure according to the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) ... 22

4.2 Essay 2: Board composition as a way to increase corporate voluntary disclosure in a market with concentrated ownership ... 22

4.3 Essay 3: Risk aversion as a determinant for corporate voluntary disclosure: An examination of managerial characteristics ... 23

5 CONCLUSIONS ... 25

REFERENCES ... 26

ESSAYS... 29

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CEO Chief executive officer.

CFO Chief financial officer.

FFSA Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority.

U.S. The United States of America.

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ENVIRONMENT

Disclosure by an official stock exchange release is the only channel through which investors can obtain reliable information regarding a listed company’s financial position. Disclosure gives existing and potential shareholders information which they need in order to properly judge the opportunities and risks of their investment (Meek et al. 1995, Al-Janadi et al. 2013) and to value the security (Omran and Abdelrazik 2013). Clear and consistent disclosure can also hence reduce the likelihood of unprofit- able investments (Al-Janadi et al. 2013). In essence, disclosure reduces the information asymmetry gap between the company and its shareholders.

Disclosure is classified into mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is that demanded by law or other regulation and companies do not have a choice of whether or not to disclose such information. Voluntary disclosure, on the other hand, originates from the board of director’s desire to inform investors of selected matters. Voluntary disclosure may be defined as “disclosure in excess of requirements [that] represents free choices on the part of company management [---]“

(Meek et al. 1995, p. 555).

This study examines forecast disclosure in the Finnish stock market. Forecasts were, until the end of 2012, a hybrid of regulated and voluntary disclosure in Finland.

Chapter 2 section 5a of the Finnish Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495), which was in force until the end of 2012, required listed companies to disclose assessments “of the likely future development of the company” in each of the company’s interim reports and in financial statement releases. The law did not mention anything about the content and form of the assessments, and apart from certain guidance by the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FFSA), the ultimate decision of what information to disclose and how it was presented was to be made by each company alone. As of 2013, interim forecasts have been completely voluntary in the Finnish stock market.

It has been argued that one of the most important motives for forecast disclosure is cost avoidance. Earlier research in the United States (U.S.) suggests that companies experience costs if they fail to disclose information to the market. Potential litigation following a failure to disclose material information to investors causes costs both to the company, such as damage compensation to investors, and to the managers of the company, including lost reputation and a potential termination of contract (Skinner 1994, Strahan 1998, Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2009). To avoid costs, companies have motives to disclose all material information to the market.

Existing research implies that disclosure decisions are typically made by the board of directors and hence the choice of board members is the most apparent way to affect disclosure (see e.g. Ajinkya et al. 2005, Biondi et al. 2009). However, an increasing amount of literature suggests that executive managers also impact voluntary disclosure decisions. First, executive managers act as information mediators between lower levels of the company, such the financial department, and the board of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). Board members are thus in practice rather dependent on executive managers as information providers. Second, executive managers have cost-based incentives to affect disclosure. According to existing research executive managers are faced with significant reputational costs and a risk of termination of employment if their company faces securities litigation (Niehaus and Roth 1998, Strahan 1998, Cao

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The aim of this study is to (i) examine how the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) should be interpreted in terms of forecast disclosure, (ii) examine what is the effect of board structure to forecast disclosure, and (iii) examine how executive managers and their personal characteristics affect forecast disclosure. To examine the first research question, I use a qualitative method of law interpretation and examination, and to examine questions two and three I employ a unique, hand-collected data of 794 forecast observations and relevant board and executive management data to conduct a quantitative research analysis.

The results of this study suggest the following: It seems that in Finland, which may be described as a rather low litigation environment, forecasts tend to be issued quite regularly, most of the forecasts include references to both revenue and earnings development, and, unlike in the high-litigation risk markets of the United States (Baginski and Hassell 1997, Baginski et al. 2002, Ajinkya et al. 2005) but also in low litigation environments such as New Zealand (Truong and Dunstan 2011), most of the forecasts are qualitative assessments. It is left unclear why disclosed forecasts in Finland differ so much from the ones in low and high litigation risk environments.

The results also suggest that although the wording of the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) does not demand the disclosure of forecasts, forecasts may still have to be disclosed in certain situations under the continuous disclosure obligation of the Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) because forecasts contain information which directly affects securities prices.

The results of the second article suggest that the composition of the board of directors affects the company’s forecast disclosure policy. Boards with an audit committee disclose more forecasts as do boards with members independent of the company and/

or from large shareholders of the company. In addition, boards where the chief executive officer is a member disclose more forecasts and the forecasts tend to be more precise. Finally, boards who meet more often tend to be more frequent disclosers of forecasts.

The results of the third article suggest that the personal attributes and background of executive managers affect forecast disclosure. The common attribute guiding executive managers’ disclosure choices seems to be risk aversion which is reflected in different personal characteristics of the manager in question.

Together the results of articles two and three suggest that both the board of directors and executive managers impact disclosure decisions. The notion is contradictory to the traditional agency theory setting, where the roles of the board of directors and executive management should be separated in the corporate decision-making chain (see e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983) and a monitoring relationship should prevail between them.

Ethics are considered at each stage of the research process as suggested by Kuula (2006). This study does not contain any confidential data. All data used to conduct this study has been publicly disclosed and is hence available for anyone to read and study.

In Chapter 2 I introduce the theory related with corporate governance and disclosure decisions. Chapter 3 describes the research environment, and Chapter 4 gives a summary of the three articles included in this research. Chapter 5 concludes the research.

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15 Existing research on forecast disclosure and a firm’s corporate governance structure may be described with two categories. A traditional stream of literature is focused on the board of directors as the key entity in a firm’s disclosure decision process. However, newer literature also recognises the role of the executive managers in the disclosure process not only as advisors but also as initiators of decisions. An even newer line of literature in the late 2000’s has started to turn its focus on the personal characteristics of executive managers and has suggested that executive managers have personal styles that guide their decisions and hence also affect organisational outcomes. The following chapters discuss these theoretical backgrounds more closely.

2.1 THE ROLE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN FORECAST DISCLOSURE

The importance of a firm’s corporate governance structure to disclosure quality has been widely recognised in the existing research. The agency theory is typically guiding the association between a firm’s corporate governance structure and disclosure.

Because shareholders of a listed company cannot participate in the daily management of company matters they need ways to control for executive managers and to reduce the information asymmetry gap between them and the management (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976 for the agency theory setting). The choice of board members is the most apparent and easy way for shareholders to control management (Ajinkya et al. 2005). A traditional view of disclosure literature suggests that the board of directors is the primary entity in corporate decision making (Ajinkya et al. 2005), and the board of directors is also legally responsible for corporate decisions. Consequently, the focus of corporate governance regulation has been on company boards both in the U.S. (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) and in Europe. As an example, a majority of the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code address issues directly related to board structure.

Investor disclosure can be classified into voluntary and mandatory disclosure.

Voluntary disclosure means disclosure that is not regulated, and the disclosure of such information is at the discretion of the company (Khlif et al. 2017). Mandatory disclosure, on the opposite, means disclosure that is required by law. Existing research on the effects of board structure to investor disclosure is mostly focused on mandatory financial disclosure, but there does exist literature specialised in examining how board structure affects voluntary disclosure and especially the disclosure of forecasts.

Studies by Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and Leung (2004), Ajinkya et al. (2005), Kara- manou and Vafeas (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Beekes and Brown (2006), Mnif (2009), Nalikka (2009), Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan Hussin (2010), and Truong and Dunstan (2011), among others, suggest that board composition affects voluntary disclosure decisions.

The elements of board composition that may specifically affect forecast disclosure can be classified into measures of diversity, measures of expertise and measures of information sharing. Measures of diversity include e.g. the ratio of independent board members, board member age and tenure, board gender diversity, and board

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imply that members have differing opinions. Measures of expertise include features such as the presence of a separate audit committee, special expertise on e.g. legal or financial matters of the board members, and the presence of operative managers on board. Information sharing between board members may be described by the amount of board meetings.

2.2 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVE MANAGERS IN DISCLOSURE

DECISIONS

In the agency theory setting, the board is seen as superior to executive management.

The board of directors “sets the rules of the game for the CEO” (Jensen 1993, 862), and the board of directors decides whether executive managers continue in their position or not (Jensen 1993, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). The agency theory suggests that the primary role of the board of directors is monitoring the executive management.

Hence, the position of executive managers is traditionally seen as subordinate to the board’s, and the relationship between the board of directors and executive management is based on monitoring.

Boards do, however, suffer from severe information constraints. Without the support of executive managers, board members do not have access to all material information relating to company performance (Jensen 1993, Adams and Ferreira 2007).

First, board members rarely have enough time to dedicate to company matters and second, boards often have a lack of special expertise of financial matters (Jensen 1993, Adams and Ferreira 2007). The board of directors needs the assistance of the executive managers to be able to perform its duties. Chief executive officers act as gatekeepers to information given from lower levels of the company to the board of directors and they also often determine the agenda of board meetings (Jensen 1993). Hence, executive managers have a great deal of control over important information and over board decision-making.

Boards cannot effectively perform their duties without collaboration with and support from executive managers, and collaboration between board and management is also crucial for disclosure quality (Cohen et al. 2004). While the agency theory implies that the board’s primary role is that of monitoring, co-operation between management and the board is encouraged by the resource dependence theory which sees the board of directors primarily as a pool of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the stewardship view of management, which suggests that managers act for the benefit of the company and that the board’s primary role is to empower managers (Johnson et al. 1996). Co-operation and monitoring roles of the board need, however, not be substitutes but they can complement each other (Johnson et al. 1996).

Although executive managers are important for boards as information providers, a majority of disclosure research is focused on the role of the board of directors in disclosure decisions (see e.g. Ajinkya et al. 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas 2005, Bédard et al. 2008, Mnif 2009, Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 2010, Truong and Dunstan 2011).

A relatively recent strand of literature has, however, turned its focus on executive managers (see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Nalikka 2009, Bamber et al. 2010, Bro- chet and Welch 2011, and Brochet et al. 2011). The chief financial officer and the head

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17 and reports from the accounting department to the board of directors (Ge et al. 2008, Bamber et al. 2010). The head of legal affairs, due to his/her knowledge, could be asked for advice regarding the legal aspects of disclosure and the general counsel may assist the board of directors to formulate the wording of the disclosed information. Hence, executive managers are an important part of the disclosure decision-making chain and are in practice very likely to affect the end result, the disclosed information.

2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF EXECUTIVE MANAGERS’

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN FORECAST DISCLOSURE

The traditional view of corporate governance is based on the agency theory. The agency theory was initially derived from the dilemma of separated ownership and control of a company (Berle and Means 1932) and refined further by Jensen and Meck- ling (1976). The agency relationship is one where a principal, the shareholders, have engaged another entity, the board of directors, to perform the service of monitoring executive managers to ensure that they act according to the interest of the shareholders, have engaged another entity, the board of directors, to perform the service of monitoring executive management to ensure that the executive managers act according to the interest of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Information asymmetry is central to the agency theory, meaning that shareholders need the board of directors to monitor executive managers because managers know more of the company matters than do the shareholders. Hence, without proper monitoring executive managers may extract additional benefits from the company. Corporate governance is, therefore, traditionally a set of control mechanisms designed to enable efficient monitoring and ratification of executive managers’ decisions (Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008).

Because the agency theory is built on the assumption of management entrench- ment, the agency theory does not recognize that managers with different backgrounds may not act alike. In the agency theory setting a manager can be replaced by any other manager and the end result will still be the same (see Bertrand and Schoar 2003 and Bamber et al. 2010). The agency theory only recognizes two mechanisms to which the manager responds to, which are (i) the firm’s economic environment, and (ii) the firm’s monitoring mechanisms and managers’ contractual incentives (Bamber et al. 2010). The view of the agency theory is similar to the neoclassical view of a firm, whereby it is assumed that managers are perfect substitutes for each other (Ge et al.

2008). In a neoclassical world, replacing a manager with another does not change the outcome, and firms with similar technologies, resources, and product markets are expected to make similar choices regardless of their management team (Bertrand and Schoar 2003).

However, according to Ge et al. (2008) so far “firm-level factors are able to explain only a small fraction of the cross-sectional variation in many financial reporting variables”. Instead of focusing on firm-level factors, the role of individual managers should be examined more in depth. The upper echelons theory (developed in Hambrick and Mason 1984 and Hambrick 2007) recognizes the importance of top executives’ characteristics, including experience, values, and personalities, in corporate decision-making. According to the upper echelons theory managers’ age, education, and tenure,

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have different tolerance levels of ambiguity, which may lead to different disclosure decisions (Bamber et al. 2010). As Huang and Kisgen (2013, 822) put it, “few would ar- gue that Apple would be the same company if someone other than Steve Jobs had been the Chief Executive Officer”. Simply said, managers with a certain background are likely to make different decisions than their colleagues with a different background.

Because managers have different backgrounds which makes them different from each other in terms of knowledge, views and opinion of the world, they are likely to develop individual disclosure styles (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Bamber et al. 2010).

For instance, executive managers who come from the sales function may be more confident to disclose revenue forecasts because they understand the mechanism of the sales cycle in their company or because they are more aggressive and optimistic (see e.g. Ge et al. 2008 for differences in the level of aggression between managers with different backgrounds). Also, managers with a legal background may be more intolerant of risk (Bamber et al. 2010), which may lead them to make different disclosure decisions compared to their colleagues from other functions. Further, female managers may be less confident than their male colleagues (see e.g. Huang and Kisgen 2013) and hence be more conservative in forecasting earnings and revenue. Age and tenure of the manager may also affect the disclosure choices the manager makes because of their link with risk aversion, experience and expertise (see e.g. Vafeas 2003, Ge et al. 2008). Risk intolerance, among other characteristics, is likely to be an important element in forecast disclosure decisions. Risks involved in forecast disclosure are described more in detail in Chapter 3.2.

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3.1 FINNISH REGULATION OF FORECAST DISCLOSURE IN LISTED COMPANIES

The Finnish Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) was enacted at the end of the 1980’s in a world where investments in listed securities were increasing but securities markets law was lacking (Governmental Bill 157/1988). Among other requirements, it was important to establish a disclosure obligation to listed companies to ensure that investors would have sufficient and reliable information on the security and the issuer at all times (Governmental Bill 157/1988).

Initially, the Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) did not contain a specific obligation of forecast disclosure but only a general duty to disclose to the market all information that is likely to have a material effect on the value of the listed security (chapter 2 section 7, see Governmental Bill 157/1988). The general provision is also known as the continuous disclosure requirement. In 1993, once Finland started the negotiations of joining the European Union, an obligation to disclose assessments of the future development of the company was added to the Finnish Securities Markets Act chapter 2 section 5 (law 9.8.1993/740 on amending the Securities Markets Act, Governmental Bill 318/1992). The addition was based on section 2 article 5 of directive 82/121/EEC which required that listed companies should disclose an assessment of their likely future development in semi-annual reports. After the addition, chapter 2 section 5 of the Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) required listed companies to

“give a description of the principal short-term risks and uncertainties relating to the business operations of the issuer as well as an assessment of the likely development of the issuer during the current financial period to the extent that this is possible and present a clarification of the factors forming the basis for the assessment” in each quarterly report. The Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) was further amended in 2006, when the duty to present assessments of the likely development of the company was extended to financial statement releases in chapter 2 section 6a (law 9.2.2007/152 on amending the Securities Markets Act, Governmental Bill 174/2006). However, the Di- rective 2004/109/EC did not contain any more an obligation to issue forecasts. Hence, the Finnish Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) chapter 2 sections 5a and 6a regarding the content of the interim report and of the financial statement release were more demanding than the European Union regulation.

The Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta, FFSA) issued guidelines to help companies determine what information they should include in their assessments of the future. According to section 5.7 of the standard 5.2b on the disclosure obligation issued by the FFSA, the assessment could include (i) a general future outlook which is either a) a description of the general market development or b) an estimate of future developments in the net sales of the company or (ii) a more detailed profit forecast. A more detailed profit forecast is described in the standard as an estimate which directly or indirectly states the probable minimum or maximum level of the issuer’s future results and which allows the approximation of profits or losses for the year (FFSA 5.2b, section 5.7 (52)). The profit forecast can include, among other things, an estimate of the level of the operating profit, profit margin or profit for the

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expressions used should be unambiguous, clear and consistent (FFSA 5.2b, section 5.7 (57) and (59)). However, regardless of the recommendations and guidelines, the FFSA stated that it was at the discretion of the issuer to determine the extent and the areas for which it would provide guidance (FFSA 5.2b, section 5.7 (54)).

In addition to the regular disclosure of future assessments in interim reports, companies were also required to disclose a profit warning under the continuous disclosure requirement in chapter 2 section 7 of the Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) and under the FFSA guidance (FFSA 5.2b, section 5.8) when there were such changes in issuer’s expected profits, financial position or prospects that were likely to materially affect the value of the issuer’s security. The profit warning was to be disclosed regardless of whether a specific forecast was previously disclosed or not (FFSA 5.2b, section 5.8 (68)). Companies are typically reluctant to issue profit warnings because they are likely to cause volatility in share price (Collet 2004, Jackson and Madura 2003, Church and Donker 2010, and Spohr 2014 who uses Finnish data). However, if the company fails to disclose a profit warning on time, the company faces the risk of administrative sanctions, badwill and/or criminal sanctions.

The Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) experienced a larger amendment in 2013. The obligation to disclose assessments of the future had been a requirement in legislation since 1993. In addition, although they were not strictly obliged to it according to the FFSA guidance, Finnish listed companies typically disclosed a forecast in their interim reports and financial statement releases. However, listed companies criticised the disclosure obligation quite extensively because of e.g. an estimated increase in share price volatility and in the returns of securities caused by the disclosure of forecasts (Kauppalehti 14.12.2012 “Jäähyväiset näkymille”; see also Ajinkya and Gift 1984 according to which management is unwilling to disclose forecasts to the public because they believe forecast errors will magnify price volatility which leads to lower price-to-earnings ratio). As an outcome of the criticism, the Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) was amended to correspond to the European Union regulation, meaning, among other things, that the obligation to disclose assessments of the future was abolished as of the beginning of 2013. However, companies can still continue to disclose forecasts if they wish to do so.

3.2 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH FORECAST DISCLOSURE

Under the earlier Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) listed companies could choose quite independently what was said in the disclosed assessments of the future. Com- panies could choose to disclose general market descriptions or specific earnings or revenue estimates (see section 5.7 of the standard 5.2b of the FFSA on the disclosure obligation). The decision of whether to disclose a forecast involves the weighing of at least two types of risks. If a forecast is disclosed, competitors of the company may use the forecast to acquire information on the estimated sales or earnings of the company (see e.g. Bamber et al. 2010, Lu and Tucker 2012). Estimates of future sales and earnings are sensitive information and companies that are not listed would not voluntarily release such information.

However, omitting material information or disclosing wrongful information ex- poses both the company and the managers to a risk of significant costs. In Finland,

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21 public badwill and/or criminal sanctions. In addition, violations of securities regulation have been associated with a decrease in share value in the U.S. (Cao and Narayan- amoorthy 2009, Bhagat et al. 1998). U.S. research also suggests that managers face the risk of reputational damage and termination of contract when the company is faced with a securities lawsuit (Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2009, Strahan 1998).

It is not clear whether an increased risk of sanctions, badwill or other damage de- creases or increases the willingness to disclose forecasts. On one hand, an increased risk may decrease the number of forecasts issued. A study by Johnson et al. (2001) discovered that the number of sales and earnings forecasts increased in the U.S. after the passage of a safe harbour rule which reduced the risk of facing securities litigation based on inaccurate forecasts. The quality of the forecasts stayed unchanged (Johnson et al. 2001). In other words, before the passage of the safe-harbor rule risk-avoiding managers refused to issue forecasts because of fear of litigation based on unrealized estimates (Johnson et al. 2001).

On the other hand, high litigation risk may increase forecast disclosure because sanctions may be based on what has not been disclosed in addition to what has been disclosed. In Finland, the continuous disclosure requirement demands the disclosure of all material information to investors. In the U.S., the Securities Exchange Commis- sion Rule 10b-5 allows for litigation if management has failed to disclose material news to investors. In these cases, increased and more precise voluntary disclosure of information may act as a tool of risk control. When the company discloses a forecast, it can remove the surprise element of the realised earnings or sales and hence avoid getting trapped in a situation which gives basis for investors and/or securities market authorities to start a litigation or other sanction processes towards the company based on omitted information. Supporting this argument Brown et al. (2005) document that a high litigation risk leads to an increase of both good and bad news forecasts and to increased level of detail.

Two elements of managerial characteristics are particularly linked to risk (in)tolerance. Older managers may be more intolerant of risk than younger ones (Peltomäki et al. 2016), and female managers are suggested to be more reluctant to take risk than their male counterparties (Francis et al. 2015). Hence, executive managers’ characteristics and background particularly associated with risk may lead managers to either increase or decrease forecast disclosure, as referred to above in Chapter 2.3.

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22

4.1 ESSAY 1: FORECAST DISCLOSURE ACCORDING TO THE FINNISH SECURITIES MARKETS ACT (14.12.2012/746)

Effective securities markets entail that securities issuers disclose enough material information to the market. Assessments of the future development of the company are one of the most important areas of investor information. With the help of such assessments, investors are able to estimate the value of the security.

The Finnish Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) was replaced with the Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) in 2013. Chapter 2 section 5a of the Securities Markets Act (26.5.1989/495) required that Finnish listed companies should disclose an assessment of the estimated future development of the company in quarterly reports and financial statement releases. The requirement, however, faced criticism after which the law was amended to correspond to the European Union directives as of 2013. In the amendment, among others, the obligation to disclose future estimates was removed and the disclosure of forecasts is now completely voluntary.

It is potentially problematic for investors that the obligation to disclose forecasts was removed from the law. Although abolishing the obligation to issue quarterly forecasts might decrease the administrational costs of listed companies, the avail- ability of material information for the purposes of estimating share value and risks related thereto should also be examined when developing efficient securities markets regulation.

The aim of this article is to examine certain interpretation problems that relate to the new Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) regarding forecast disclosure and to take a stand on whether certain provisions of the new Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) addressing continuous and regular disclosure of information could still entail the mandatory disclosure of material forward-looking information, including forecasts, to investors although the law does not contain a particular provision for forecast disclosure. A comparable critical article on the new Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) and forecast disclosure has not been published in the past.

The article suggests that assessments of the likely future development of the company are important to investors because they contain material information which directly affects the value of the listed security. Hence, assessments might need to be disclosed in some situations according to the continuous disclosure obligation of chapter 6 section 1 of the Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746, before amendment in 29.6.2015). Also, it is unclear whether assessments would also need to be included in financial statement releases as a matter of law.

4.2 ESSAY 2: BOARD COMPOSITION AS A WAY TO INCREASE CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN A MARKET WITH CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

The aim of this study is to examine the effects of board composition to revenue and earnings forecast frequency and their precision in a market where the ownership of

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23 asymmetry gap is supposedly smaller between large shareholders and the board of directors of the company than the one between small shareholders and the board. Fur- ther, according to the results of existing studies, board composition which enhances board diversity, expertise and information sharing might increase transparency in corporate disclosure and hence could be beneficial for small shareholders when the company also has large shareholders. Board member diversity, expertise and information sharing between board members is also generally speaking in line with the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code.

Based on the results of previous research as well as the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code I measure board diversity with board member independence from both the company and from the significant shareholders of the company, board size, board members’ average age and tenure on the board, and board gender diversity. The abovementioned variables measure the amount of different views and opinions of board members. I measure board expertise with whether the CEO has a dual role both as an executive manager and as a board member, whether the board has a separate audit committee and whether the board has members with legal education. CEOs are likely to bring expertise to board because they are involved with company matters on a daily basis. Audit committee, which consists of board members who devote extra time and meetings to the company’s financial matters, is likely to enhance the board’s knowledge of the company’s financial position. Legal knowledge on the board is of importance as well because disclosure is based on regulation and soft law guidance. I measure the sharing of information between board members with board meeting frequency.

I use a hand-collected sample of 794 forecasts disclosed by Finnish listed companies during the years 2006-2013. The findings of a binary regression analysis indicate that board composition is of relevance for disclosure. Boards with a higher percentage of members who are independent of the company or of the significant shareholders of the company disclose more earnings and revenue forecasts than others. Also, boards where the CEO is a member are more likely than others to disclose a forecast and to do it in a numeric form. Boards with a separate audit committee and boards who meet at least once a month are also more likely than others to disclose a forecast.

Together the results suggest that board composition affects forecast disclosure and that especially compositions which are in compliance with the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code and which enhance board independence, expertise and information sharing improve disclosure transparency even when share- holding of the company is concentrated and does not favor transparent disclosure styles. The results of this article are beneficial to investors who may select a board to favour a more transparent disclosure policy.

4.3 ESSAY 3: RISK AVERSION AS A DETERMINANT FOR CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: AN EXAMINATION OF MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Research studying the disclosure of forecasts has traditionally focused on the importance of the board of directors in corporate decision-making. Executive managers are, however, usually involved in the disclosure process as information mediators or

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24

the financial reporting process of the company and is likely to be best aware of the current financial development in the company. The head of legal affairs is an expert of disclosure regulation and is hence likely to be asked to give his/her opinion on the planned disclosure.

Previous literature suggests that managers make unique disclosure decisions that are affected by each manager’s personal attributes which alter their unique taste for risk. Certain demographic characteristics, including the manager’s age and gender, as well as aspects related to the career background of the manager lead to different levels of conservatism and risk aversion which can be seen in corporate disclosure.

To examine whether managerial risk aversion, as reflected in managers’ career track, education, age, tenure and gender, affects forecast disclosure I use a hand-collected sample of 366 observations of the chief executive officer and 144 observations of the head of legal affairs and data on forecast frequency and disclosure. The findings of a binary regression analysis indicate that the risk aversion of the chief financial officer and of the head of legal affairs plays a significant role in forecast disclosure. Executive managers who are more conservative, including women and those with a higher than basic education, disclose less forecasts, while managers with business background and longer tenure in the company are more aggressive in their disclosure styles and disclose more forecasts and the forecasts are more likely numeric.

The results of this study highlight the role of personal taste for risk at the executive manager level and suggest that corporate disclosure decisions are made based on a risk analysis. The results are in line with the existing research.

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25 The aim of this study is to (i) examine how the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) should be interpreted in the context of forecasts, (ii) examine how board composition affects forecast disclosure, and (iii) examine how executive managers and their personal characteristics affect forecast disclosure.

To answer the research questions, I conducted three articles, each of which focuses on answering one of the research questions. The first article suggests that although the Finnish Securities Markets Act (14.12.2012/746) does not oblige companies to disclose forecasts, forecast disclosure might in some situations still be mandatory due to the continuous disclosure requirement which requires companies to disclose all material information to investors. Forecasts are essential to investors because they contain key information regarding the expected development of the revenue and earnings in the company, both of which directly affect the share price.

The results of the second article suggest that in an environment of concentrated ownership, board composition that is in compliance with the Finnish Corporate Gov- ernance Code and which improves independence, expertise and information sharing within the board increases corporate disclosure. The results of the third article suggest that executive managers with diverse backgrounds have different tastes for risk and hence they also have personal disclosure styles.Risk averse managers are more conservative and disclose less forecasts, while less risk averse managers disclose more forecasts and tend to disclose them in a format that leaves less room for interpretation.

As a whole, this dissertation highlights the importance of firm corporate governance structures to corporate disclosure and clarifies especially the role of the board of directors and executive managers in the disclosure decision-making process. It also gives beneficial information for policy makers, companies and shareholders on the disclosure practices of Finnish companies. The results of this study can be used to improve corporate disclosure by a choice of board members and executive managers.

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26

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LIST OF REGULATION AND SOFT LAW

Council Directive 82/121/EEC of 15 February 1982 on information to be published on a regular basis by companies the shares of which have been admitted to official stock-exchange listing.

Council Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC.

Law 9.8.1993/740 on amending the Securities Markets Act.

Law 9.2.2007/152 on amending the Securities Markets Act.

Standard 5.2b of the FFSA regarding the disclosure obligation of a security’s issuer and of the shareholder (Fivan standardi 5.2b Liikkeeseenlaskijan ja osakkeenomistajan tiedonantovelvollisuus). (FFSA 5.2b).

The Securities Markets Act 26.5.1989/495 (Arvopaperimarkkinalaki 26.5.1989/495).

The Securities Markets Act 14.12.2012/746 (Arvopaperimarkkinalaki 14.12.2012/746).

LIST OF GOVERNMENTAL BILLS

Governmental Bill 157/1988 on Securities Markets Act and related regulation (Hallituksen esitys 157/1988 vp Eduskunnalle arvopaperimarkkinalaiksi sekä siihen liittyväksi lainsäädännöksi).

Governmental Bill 318/1992 on amending the Securities Markets Act and certain related regulation (Hallituksen esitys 318/1992 vp Eduskunnalle laeiksi arvopaperimarkkinalain ja eräiden siihen liittyvien lakien muuttamiseksi).

Governmental Bill 174/2006 on amending the Securities Markets Act (Hallituksen esitys 174/2006 vp Eduskunnalle laiksi arvopaperimarkkinalain muuttamisesta).

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29 ESSEE 1

TULEVAISUUDENNÄKYMIEN ANTAMINEN UUDEN ARVOPAPERIMARKKINA

LAIN MUKAAN

Laininen, Jenni (2013): Tulevaisuudennäkymien antaminen uuden arvopaperimarkkinalain mukaan. Defensor Legis 1/2013, 23–48.

Reprinted with kind permission of Defensor Legis / Suomen Asianajajaliitto.

ESSEE 2

BOARD COMPOSITION AS A WAY TO INCREASE CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN A MARKET WITH CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

Laininen, Jenni (2018): Board composition as a way to increase corporate voluntary disclosure in a market with concentrated ownership. Nordic Journal of Business 1/2018.

Reprinted with kind permission of Nordic Journal of Business.

ESSEE 3

RISK AVERSION AS A DETERMINANT FOR CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: AN EXAMINATION OF MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS Laininen, Jenni (2018): Risk aversion as a determinant for corporate voluntary disclosure: An examination of managerial characteristics. Working paper, University of Eastern Finland.

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kinalain mukaan. Defensor Legis 1/2013, 23–48.

Reprinted with kind permission of Defensor Legis / Suomen Asianajajaliitto.

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TULEVAISUUDENNÄKYMIEN ANTAMINEN UUDEN ARVOPAPERIMARKKINALAIN MUKAAN

¹

(Äußerung über Zukunftsaussichten gemäß dem neuen Wertpapiermarktgesetz)

Referee-artikkeli

1 Kiitän asianajaja, OTK, VT, KTM Tuomas Tikkasta arvokkaista kommenteista artikkelia ja uutta arvopaperimarkkina- lainsäädäntöä koskien.

2 Suomen Sijoitusanalyytikot ry (2007), s. 2 (Suomen Sijoitusanalyytikot ry:n lausunto Ratalle asiassa Lausuntopyyntö 13/2007, Dnro 11/121/2007, http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Saantely/Maarayskokoelma/Rahoitussektori/5_Tietojen_jul- kistaminen/Documents/5_1_std1_ja_5_2b_std5_Suomen_Sijoitusanalyytikot.pdf ); Häyrynen – Virtanen (DL 2007), s. 76 (Häyrynen, Janne – Virtanen, Marjatta: Pörssiyhtiön tulevaisuuden ennusteiden merkitys tulosvaroituksen kannalta. Defensor Legis N:o 1/2007); Markkinat 5/2010, s. 5 (Markkinat 5/2010. Finanssivalvonta. http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/

Markkinat/Documents/Markkinat_5_2010.pdf), jonka mukaan osavuosikatsauksessa annetut tulevaisuuden näkymät ovat keskeistä, sijoittajaa kiinnostavaa hintasensitiivistä informaa tiota.

3 AML:n kokonaisuudistus toteutettiin hallituksen esityksellä 32/2012 vp eduskunnalle arvopaperimarkkinoita koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi. Voimassa olevat tilinpäätöstiedotteen ja osavuosikatsauksen sisältöä koskevat lainkohdat ovat vastaavasti AML 7:9 ja 7:11.

1 Johdanto

If a business does well, the stock eventually fol- lows, on yhdeksi maailman menestyneimmistä sijoittajistakin tituleerattu Warren Buffet joskus tokaissut. Sanonnassa on perää – jos arvopaperin liikkeeseenlaskijan talous kukoistaa, näkyy tämä tehokkailla markkinoilla myös arvopaperin arvos- sa. Jotta arvopaperin hinta pystyisi heijastamaan reaaliaikaisesti liikkeeseenlaskijan taloudellista kehitystä, on liikkeeseenlaskijan julkistettava markkinoiden käyttöön määrältään ja laadultaan riittä- västi tietoa. Tämä voidaan taata tehokkaalla arvo- paperimarkkinasääntelyllä.

Yksi tärkeimmistä markkinoille julkistettavan tiedon osa-alueista on liikkeeseenlaskijan tulevaisuuden kehitystä koskevat näkymät.² Tulevaisuu- dennäkymiä hyväksikäyttämällä sijoittajat pystyvät

analysoimaan liikkeeseenlaskijan taloudellisen tilanteen ja samalla sen arvopaperin arvon kehitys- tä tulevaisuudessa. Tällainen analyysi on olennai- nen osa järkevää sijoitustoimintaa.

Uuden arvopaperimarkkinalain (14.12.2012/746) (”AML”) tultua voimaan 1.1.2013 tulevaisuuden- näkymiä koskeva sääntely on muuttunut oleellises- ti. Aiemmin liikkeeseenlaskijan velvollisuudesta arvioida todennäköistä tulevaa kehitystään sää- dettiin edellisessä arvopaperimarkkinalaissa (26.5.1989/495) (”VAML”). Nyttemmin tulevai- suudennäkymien antamisesta säädetään ainoastaan kirjanpitolaissa (30.12.1997/1336) (”KPL”), kun arvopaperimarkkinalain kokonaisuudistuksen myö- tä lain sanamuotoa muutettiin siten, ettei laki enää velvoita arvioimaan tulevaa todennäköistä kehitys- tä tilinpäätöstiedotteen ja osavuosikatsauksen yhtey dessä.³ Nykyisen sääntelyn yleisenä ongel-

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mana on sääntelyn kohtaamattomuus markkinoiden tiedontarpeen kanssa. Edellistä arvopaperimarkkinalakia päädyttiin muuttamaan tulevaisuudennä- kymiä koskevilta osin, koska tulevaisuudennäky- mien esittämisen katsottiin nostavan listauskynnys- tä, lisäävän liikkeeseenlaskijoiden hallinnollisia kuluja ja heikentävän suomalaisten arvopaperimarkkinoiden kilpailukykyä.⁴ Sääntelymuutokses- sa korostuu liikkeeseenlaskijapainotteinen näkö- kulma.⁵ Sääntelyä kriittisesti tarkasteltaessa tulisi kuitenkin painottaa tehokkaiden markkinoiden sääntelylle asettamia vaatimuksia, jotta arvopape- rien tehokas ja oikea hinnanmuodostus olisi mah- dollista.⁶ Arvopaperimarkkinasääntelyn viime kädessä tärkeimpänä tehtävänä on toimia tehokkaiden markkinoiden toiminnan mahdollistavana instituutiona.⁷

Tämän artikkelin tavoitteena on tulkita ja sys- tematisoida suomalaiseen julkisen kaupankäynnin kohteena olevan osakkeen liikkeeseenlaskijaan koh-

distuvaa arvopaperimarkkinasääntelyä tulevaisuu- dennäkymien antamista koskevin osin ja nostaa esiin sääntelyn keskeisiä ongelmia ja erityiskysy- myksiä.⁸ Lisäksi otan de lege lata ja de lege feren- da kantaa siihen, millainen sääntely takaa sijoitta- jan näkökulmasta riittävien ja olennaisten tietojen julkistamisen. Vastaavaa, sääntelyyn kriittisesti ja analyyttisesti suhtautuvaa kirjoitusta ei ole aiemmin julkaistu.

Koska uusi arvopaperimarkkinalaki ei artikkelin julkaisun aikaan ole ehtinyt olla voimassa kuin lyhyen aikaa, ei uutta lakia koskien ole vielä saa- tavissa kattavasti kirjallisuutta.⁹ Myöskään uutta viranomais- tai itsesääntelyä ei ole vielä artikkelin kirjoittamisen aikaan ollut saatavilla.¹⁰ Tukeudun siksi tässä artikkelissa edellisen arvopaperimarkkinalain aikaisiin oikeuslähteisiin siltä osin kuin katson niiden edelleen soveltuvan voimassa olevan arvopaperimarkkinalain tulkintaan.

4 HE 32/2012 vp, s. 52.

5 Katso muun muassa HE 32/2012 vp, s. 75, jonka mukaan suomalaisia liikkeeseenlaskijoita, jotka hankkivat pääomaa arvopaperimarkkinoilta Suomessa, ei tule rasittaa tarpeettoman laajalla tiedonantovelvollisuudella, joka poikkeaa kansainvä- listen pääomamarkkinoiden vaatimuksista.

6 Huolimatta liikkeeseenlaskijapainotteisesta näkökulmasta myös AML:n esitöiden mukaan liikkeeseenlaskijan perustellun arvion saaminen kehityksestä kuluvalla tilikaudella sekä näkymien päivittäminen tilikauden aikana olennaisten muutosten perusteella on sijoittajien edun mukaista, edistää arvopaperin oikeaa ja perusteltua hinnoittelua ja pienentää markkinoiden väärinkäytön riskiä. HE 32/2012 vp, s. 125.

7 Yhden näkemyksen mukaan oikeus voidaan nähdä ennen kaikkea yhteiskunnan toimintaa tukevana instituutiona. Näke- mys on hyväksytty jo 1700-luvulla kehitetyssä vapaan ja tehokkaan markkinatalouden ideaalissa, jonka keskeisen ajatuksen mukaan markkinoita ohjaa näkymätön käsi, jonka ansiosta valtion keskittynyttä hallintoa ei tarvita koordinoimaan tavaroiden ja palvelujen tehokasta tuotantoa. Teorian mukaan yhteiskunnan tehtävänä on ennen kaikkea tarjota markkinoille sen tarvitsemat puitteet ja instituutiot, mukaan lukien rauha, kevyt verotus ja oikeamielinen hallinto ja oikeus. Crowley, George R. – Sobel, Russel S.: ”Adam Smith: managerial insights from the father of economics”. Journal of Management History, Volume: 16 Issue: 4. s. 504–508. (2010), s. 505. Tässä kohtaa on tarpeellista huomauttaa, että oikeustieteen alalta erityisesti regulaatio- teoreettinen näkökulma näkee oikeuden instrumenttina, keinona tiettyjen yhteiskuntapoliittisten tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi.

Katso esim. Määttä, Kalle: Regulaatioteorian perusteita. Teoksessa: Kanniainen, Vesa & Määttä, Kalle (toim.): Näkökulmia oikeustaloustieteeseen 3, s. 21–34. Helsinki 1999, s. 31; Määttä, Kalle: Oikeudellisen sääntelyn tutkimus - lastuja sääntely- teoriasta. Oikeus 2/2002, s. 132–142, s. 132; Määttä, Kalle: Oikeustaloustieteellinen näkökulma kotimaiseen lainvalmisteluun.

Helsinki 2009, s. 17. Lain mieltäminen instituutioksi ei siis ole pelkästään taloustieteellinen keksintö.

8 Käsittelen artikkelissa ainoastaan osakkeen liikkeeseenlaskijoita koskevaa sääntelyä erityisesti siksi, että kaikista julkisen kaupankäynnin kohteena olevista arvopapereista on osake yksi yksinkertaisimpia, tunnetuimpia ja sitä kautta myös sijoittajille tärkeimpiä sijoitusvälineitä.

9 Janne Häyrynen ja Ville Kajala kirjoittavat uudesta arvopaperimarkkinalaista teoksessa ”Uusi arvopaperimarkkinalaki”

(Lakimiesliiton Kustannus), joka ilmestyy arviolta helmikuussa 2013. Teoksen ilmestymisajankohdasta johtuen ei tässä artikkelissa ole pystytty tukeutumaan kyseiseen teokseen.

10 Poikkeuksena Finanssivalvonnan julkaisema Markkinat 4/2012 -tiedote (http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/

Markkinat/Documents/Markkinat_4_2012.pdf) uuden lain soveltamisesta tulevaisuudennäkymien osalta sekä luonnos Finans- sivalvonnan standardiksi 2 (liikkeeseenlaskijan tiedonantovelvollisuus) (http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Saantely/Lausunto- pyynnot/Documents/15_2012_Liite2.pdf), joihin viittaan tässä artikkelissa muiden lähteiden ohella.