Rinnakkaistallenteet Luonnontieteiden ja metsätieteiden tiedekunta
2018
How are forest owners' objectives and
social networks related to successful conservation?
Vainio, Annukka
Elsevier BV
Tieteelliset aikakauslehtiartikkelit
© Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.06.009
https://erepo.uef.fi/handle/123456789/6756
Downloaded from University of Eastern Finland's eRepository
Author accepted manuscript (AAM) version
How are forest owners’ objectives and social networks related to successful conservation?
Annukka Vainio1*, Riikka Paloniemi2, Teppo Hujala1,3
1 Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Bioeconomy and Environment, Latokartanonkaari 9, FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland
2 Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Environmental Policy Center, P.O. Box 140; FIN- 00251 Helsinki, Finland
3 University of Eastern Finland (UEF), School of Forest Sciences, P.O. Box 111, FI-80101 JOENSUU, Finland
* Corresponding author: annukka.vainio@luke.fi
Abstract
In sustainable rural development, national and international policies are interpreted and implemented through local networks and involvement of local actors with various
backgrounds, needs and objectives. We explored how forest owners’ land management and biodiversity conservation objectives, as well as social capital embedded in their social
networks were related to success in nature conservation, i.e., voluntary conservation contracts made as a part of the Forest Biodiversity Program for Southern Finland. The survey data of forest owners (N=509) were analyzed with multivariate generalized linear modeling. The networks involving forestry actors exhibited highest levels of trust, information seeking and perceived similarity of goals. The act of making a conservation agreement, as well as the type of conservation agreement made, was associated with the endorsement of biodiversity
objectives and the three dimensions of social capital analyzed in the study. More specifically, owners who had made a conservation agreement perceived environmental and forestry actors’ goals as similar to theirs, trusted in them most often, and sought information from them more frequently than owners who did not have any contract. Moreover, the owners with a fixed-term contract expressed goal similarity, trust, and information seeking behavior towards forestry actors more frequently than owners with a permanent contract, who in turn expressed the above ties more frequently towards environmental actors. These results increase the understanding of the role and importance of forest owners’ diverse social
networks in voluntary nature conservation agreements. The findings encourage the utilization of these networks more systematically and dynamically while implementing rural,
environmental and forest policies in order to increase their societal impact in local contexts.
Keywords: biodiversity conservation; contracting; forest owners; social networks; social capital
Highlights
- Local networks and trust between local actors are important in rural development - We analyzed forest owners’ social capital, conservation objectives and contracting - Conservation agreements and social networks were related
- Forest owners with fixed-term agreements were more attached to forestry actors - Forest owners with permanent contracts were more attached to environmental actors
1. Introduction
Voluntary biodiversity conservation on private lands is based on cooperation between landowners, forestry and environmental experts and authorities, and other actors. Forest conservation programs worldwide increasingly face a dilemma between effectiveness and social acceptance (Clements et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2012). While the principles of environmental justice (e.g., Agyeman et al., 2003) require equal opportunities for all beneficiaries to enjoy public environmental benefits and take part in environmental decision-making, voluntary conservation programs (Paloniemi et al., 2015; Rauschmayer et al., 2009) rest on private landowners’ acceptance and thus are in principle highly sensitive to landowners’ objectives and motivations. To balance the views of landowners and wider beneficiaries, an intensive communication and information delivery approach has become an integral part of conservation programs (e.g., Salomaa et al., 2016; Young et al., 2013), recently complemented with the spatial prioritization and targeted marketing of conservation contracts (Nielsen et al., 2017; Paloniemi et al., 2018). Current knowledge about landowners’
social networks (Borg et al., 2015; Korhonen et al., 2013) and most influential information channels (Butler et al., 2007; Häggqvist et al., 2014), would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of landowners’ communication partners and their messages.
The Forest Biodiversity Program for Southern Finland METSO (later Biodiversity Program) is a rather thoroughly studied example of voluntary conservation Programs, (see e.g., Borg et al., 2015; Paloniemi and Tikka, 2008; Paloniemi and Varho, 2009; Paloniemi et al., 2018; Primmer et al., 2013). Biodiversity Program is based on the idea of using voluntary instruments where contract-making is based on trust, which typically evolves through good experiences of successful exchange of information (Hiedanpää and Borgström, 2014; Hujala and Tikkanen, 2008; Ostrom, 2000). For example, perceived differences between individuals often reduce trust but in these situations social interaction can help because it leads to the development of knowledge-based trust that, in turn, builds a broader, generalizable trust (Stolle et al., 2008). Individuals have a tendency to attend to information from the sources that they trust (Arbuckle et al., 2013) and therefore disseminating information to landowners about biodiversity conservation is more effective when it is done through social networks as compared to mass media or direct communication channels (Brook et al., 2003). At the same time, landowners’ social networks, as well as their information search behaviors may vary, and therefore an effective information provision should use multiple information channels (e.g., Korhonen et al., 2013).
Forest owners’ forest management objectives are related to their conservation motivations. However, the link between the two is not simple: for example, active wood producers may selectively favor conservation agreements on sites where a timber sale is not a profitable option, and the most environmentally-minded owners may not want to join any official conservation Program because of their intrinsic motivation to safeguard nature values on their own land instead of responding to some external financial incentives (Primmer et al., 2014). However, a share of owners may still find joining Biodiversity Program appealing, if it can be marketed and adapted to fit into their overall bundle of forest management (and ownership) objectives (Kline et al., 2000; Majumdar et al., 2008).
Forest owners’ biodiversity conservation objectives are diverse and often linked with forest management objectives, and the perception of property rights (Paloniemi and Tikka, 2008). Forest owners’ relationship with environmental conservation is often emotional (Lähdesmäki and Matilainen, 2014), let the origin be in intergenerational family ownership history (Törnqvist, 1995), strong environmental protection values (Cross et al., 2011), dissatisfactory experiences with authorities (Hujala and Tikkanen, 2008), or influences through lobby organizations or other mass media (Ferranto et al., 2012). Emotions are socially constructed in social interaction where emotions are ceased, strengthened, and redirected, and these processes influence the success of voluntary conservation. Therefore several branches of research have advised policies towards communication strategies that make use of owners’ own social networks (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Knoot and Rickenbach, 2011; Korhonen et al., 2013; Lind-Riehl et al., 2015).
Forest owners’ perceptions of the quality of interaction with the forestry and environmental authorities, i.e. customer service, play an essential role in forest owners’
experiences of voluntary conservation in Biodiversity Program (e.g., Korhonen et al., 2013).
However, the characteristics of Biodiversity Program, as well, have an influence on how conservation communication is received (Mayer and Tikka, 2006). Acknowledging the role of emotions in land-related decisions (Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2016), an interesting aspect that shapes conservation communication is the type of the contract: permanent versus fixed- term. On one hand, while a permanent contract evidently is more secure from ecological perspective, it appears as an irrevocable and contradicting act for landowners who might have competing objectives or a motivation to pass decision power to their inheritors (Broch and Vedel, 2012). On the other hand, when looking Biodiversity Program participation from the innovation theory perspective (Rogers, 2003), while a fixed-term contract appears to be questionable in meeting long-term ecological objectives, it encourages late adopters of
conservation innovation to make some kind of agreement instead of staying out of the Program (Korhonen et al., 2013).
In the Finnish case, permanent and fixed-term contracts do not only differ in the length but also in the governance: in the Biodiversity Program fixed-term contracts are made based on Forest Act (1093/1996) with forestry authorities, and permanent contracts based on Nature Conservation Act (1096/1996) with environmental authorities. An owner’s perception of these actors and their agendas has been found to shape the opportunities of successful conservation contracting (Salomaa et al., 2016). In addition to the authorities with whom the final contracts are signed, forest owners also cooperate with other actors regarding voluntary conservation contracts: local and regional non-governmental organizations and networks for forestry and nature conservation, companies promoting sustainable forestry, and official cooperation networks created to promote the Biodiversity Program (Borg and Paloniemi, 2012).
Forest owners seek information about land management practices through their formal and informal social networks, and owners’ social networks have been shown to influence their forest management practices (Knoot and Rickenbach, 2011). Social networks are one example of social capital. Social capital has been defined as comprising of the social networks characterized by trust and reciprocity, which facilitate the coordination of actions and thus increase efficiency in society (Adger, 2001; Lehtonen, 2004; Putnam et al., 1993;
Stone and Hughes, 2002). Borg et al. (2015) outlined trust, knowledge exchange and similarity of goals as the key dimensions of social capital in the context of biodiversity collaboration. Trust has been found to facilitate cooperation and it has been regarded as an important prerequisite for cooperation (Putnam, 1995). Moreover, trust is associated with values: individuals are more likely to trust the views of those information providers whose values they perceive as similar (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Vainio et al., 2017). In the context of biodiversity collaboration in Finland, trust has been found to build especially among like-minded actors (Borg et al., 2015). Therefore it is possible that forest management and biodiversity objectives may guide with whom forest owners want to negotiate
conservation contracts: forest owners may prefer those actors whose objectives they perceive as similar to their own. However, Borg et al. (2015) found that ties of trust in networks were based on past experiences of working together. Therefore it is possible that the perceived similarity of objectives only in part explains how forest owners build their networks, and the conservation contracts they may eventually make.
In this study we explored how forest owners’ land management and biodiversity conservation objectives, as well as their social networks were related to success in nature conservation, i.e., the conservation contracts made. The analysis was structured around three main research questions. First, we explored how forest owners’ social networks differed in terms of trust, information seeking and perceived similarity of goals. Second, we explored how conservation contracts were associated with forest owners’ forest management objectives and biodiversity objectives. Third, we explored how these three dimensions of social capital were associated with the conservation contracts made. We discuss the results from the perspective of strengthening social capital in local rural settings as a means to safeguard a balanced implementation and effectiveness of forest conservation Programs.
2. Material and methods 2.1. Participants
We analyzed a survey collected in four regions that are important in private forest ownership in Finland: Rekijokilaakso-Hyyppärä, Pirkanmaa, Southern Ostrobothnia, and Northern Karelia. Different sampling strategies were used based on the number of forest owners in the region: in some regions, a total sample of owners was contacted whereas in other regions a random sample was contacted (Table 1). Moreover, in order to ensure a sufficient number of owners with a conservation contract, a total sample of owners with conservation contracts in the Northern Karelia region was contacted.The landowners replied to a postal questionnaire exploring various aspects of biodiversity conservation on a landscape level (described in more detail in Paloniemi et al., 2018).
The total sample size was 509. The mean age in the sample was 63.7 years (SD=12.2) and 22.7% of the respondents were female. Most common educational level in the sample was a vocational degree (25.3%) followed by comprehensive school degree (23.8%) and a college/polytechnic degree (19.4%). In terms of age and gender, the sample is quite representative of the Finnish forest owners: in a survey of 6,318 Finnish forest owners in 2009, the respondents were about 60.6 years old and about 25% were females (Hänninen et al., 2011). The sample is slightly more highly educated than the average owners in the survey of Hänninen et al. where about a half of owners had only a comprehensive school degree. Of the respondents, 108 owners had made fixed-term conservation contracts, 98 had permanent contracts (of which 21 also had fixed-term contracts) and 303 owners did not have any contract. About 3% of forest owners in Finland have a conservation contract (Natural
Resources Institute Finland 2015; 2017) so the owners with conservation contracts were overrepresented in the final sample (Table 1).
Table 1. The sampling method of the study.
Region (total N of forest owners in the area)
Sampling method N of sent
questionnaires
N of returned questionnaires (response rate %) Rekijokilaakso-
Hyyppärä (N=679)
A total sample: every forest owner in the area 679 112 (16%)
Pirkanmaa (N=8,952) A random sample of the members of two selected forest management associations (excluding forest holdings smaller than 4 ha).
296 64 (21%)
Southern Ostrobothnia (N=3,701)
A random sample of members of two selected forest management associations (excluding forest holdings smaller than 4 ha).
206 32 (16%)
Northern Karelia (N=27,031)
A random sample in the region
A total sample of owners with conservation contracts:
a) all owners who have a private conservation area contract
b) all owners who have a forest environmental management contract signed in 2004-2013
(excluding forest holdings smaller than 2 ha).
420 599 267
332
[the region total:
1019]
103 (25%) 195 (33%)
86 (32%)
109 (33%)
[298 (29%)]
Questionnaires returned without an identification 3
Total: 2,200 509 (23%)
2.2. Materials
The survey gathered information about forest owners’ conservation efforts, forest management and conservation objectives, as well as their views about different actors relevant to conservation. There were about 21.9 percent of missing values in these variables, which common in surveys of forest owners. In order to maximize the use of information in the analysis, missing values were replaced with the EM method (expectation-maximization;
Dempster et al., 1977; IBM, 2017), where observed values are used to calculate parameters, which are then used to calculate the missing values.
In evaluating forest owners’ relations to actors we followed Borg et al. (2015), focusing on three aspects of social capital: similarity of goals, trust and information seeking.
In practice, the participants were requested to evaluate eleven actors on these following three dimensions using a 5-point scale (“never”−“always”) (a full description of the instrument in Appendix):
Similarity of views about conservation goals: how often the respondents perceived to share their views with the actors about the conservation goals.
Trust in actors: how often the respondents experienced trust in the actors in conservation issues.
Seeking information: how often the respondents sought information about conservation efforts from the actors.
In order to group the actors, the responses to questions evaluating the three dimensions of social capital were analyzed with an exploratory factor analysis using
maximum likelihood method and Varimax rotation (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007, 607–675), which resulted in three factors with eigenvalue greater than 1: the factors were named as
“local actors”, “environmental actors” and “forestry actors”. Nine subscales (mean scores) were constructed as follows:
Local actors (N=6): local entrepreneurs, local residents, local hunting associations, local forestry companies, other forest owners, and Regional Council (“trust” subscale: α=.89,
“seeking information” subscale: α=.87, “similarity of goals” subscale: α=.90).
Environmental actors (N=4): Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (regional nature conservation authority), environmental associations, local nature tourism enterprises (“trust” subscale: α=.70, “seeking information” subscale:
α=.67, “similarity of goals” subscale α=.72).
Forestry actors (N=2): Forest Center (regional forestry authority), Forest Management Association (forest owners’ service and lobby organization) (“trust” subscale: α=.72,
“seeking information” subscale: α=.67, “similarity of goals” subscale: α=.72).
Forest management objectives were measured as follows. The respondents were requested to rate 10 objectives using a 5-point scale (“not at all important” – “extremely important”): timber production, maximization of economic profit, safeguarding biodiversity, maintaining or improving landscape values, game keeping and hunting opportunities,
gathering berries and mushrooms, recreational values, energy wood production, maintenance of carbon storage and carbon sinks, and safeguarding the availability of clean water.
Biodiversity conservation objectives were measured as follows. The respondents were requested to indicate, on a 5-point scale (“not at all important” – “extremely important”)1, how important they perceived 11 issues associated with safeguarding biodiversity: “I make sure that nature values of the site important to me are protected”, “I conserve the site in its natural state”, “I conform to the expectations of other people”, “I improve everyman
recreational possibilities”, “I conserve the site to future generations”, “I maintain the right to decide about my own forest”, “I profit economically from conservation”, “I protect nature in order to get currently unknown benefits in future”, “Human duty is to protect nature”, “All species are needed in a biologically diverse nature”, and “A fixed-term conservation contract is not binding to future owners”.
Conservation contracts made. The respondents were asked if they have made any contract to conserve forest, and if yes, to indicate the type of contract they had made. For the purpose of further analysis, these responses were grouped into “no contract” (N=303), “fixed- term contract” (N=108) and “permanent contract” (N=98). Twenty-one owners had both fixed-term and permanent contracts. For the purposes of the analysis these owners were coded under the “permanent contract” category, because permanent contracts are more combining and more commitment is needed from the landowners.
Respondents’ gender, age, and the level of education were included in the analysis as background information.
1 The respondents were asked to select 1-3 most important objectives and assign the value ”5” to them, then select 1-3 least important objectives and assign the value ”1” to them, and after that rate the rest of the objectives using the values “2-4”.
3. Results
First, we explored the degree of trust, information seeking and perceived similarity of goals in local, environmental and forestry networks. On average, the levels of trust, information seeking and similarity of goals were low or moderate (Table 2). The networks involving forestry actors exhibited highest levels of trust, information seeking and perceived similarity of goals in conservation issues.
Table 2. Trust, information seeking and perceived similarity of goals in local, environmental and forestry networks (means and standard deviations).
Local actors Environmental actors
Forestry actors
Mean1 SD Mean1 SD Mean1 SD
Trust 2.26 .78 2.42 .83 3.39 1.00
Seeking information 1.82 .74 1.85 .82 2.91 1.20
Similarity of goals 2.35 .77 2.38 .80 3.25 .97
1 range 1 (“never”) – 5 (“always”)
The associations between the three dimensions of social capital, forest owners’
objectives and conservation contracts were analyzed with the multivariate generalized linear modeling (GLM), planned contrast approach (e.g., Bors, 2018, 412–466) using SPSS
software, version 25. Two sets of Helmert contrasts were made. The first set of contrasts compared the forest owners who had no conservation contract and the forest owners who had at least one conservation contract (fixed-term and permanent contracts were grouped
together). The second set compared the owners who had made a fixed-term contract and the owners who had made a permanent contract.
Table 3a. Landowners’ forest management objectives and biodiversity objectives. The comparisons of owners without a conservation contract vs. with a contract, and owners with a fixed-term vs. permanent contract (Helmert contrasts).
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, ns = not significant
No contract (NC) (N=303)
Contract (C) (N=206) Helmert contrast 1:
NC vs. C
Helmert contrast 2:
FC vs. PC
Main effect for group (df=2, 538) Fixed-term (FC)
(N=108)
Permanent (PC) (N=98)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD P value P value F
Forest management objectives:
Timber production 4.44 1.04 4.43 1.00 4.33 1.21 ns ns .57
Economic profit 3.34 1.41 3.59 1.30 3.38 1.49 ns ns 1.18
Biodiversity 3.65 1.07 4.02 .96 4.14 .85 NC < C *** ns 11.43***
Landscape 3.33 1.11 3.49 1.09 3.74 1.13 NC < C ** ns 5.24*
Gamekeeping and hunting opportunities 2.91 1.31 2.81 1.27 2.78 1.31 ns ns .84
Gathering berries and mushrooms 3.46 1.15 3.53 1.10 3.55 1.16 ns ns .24
Recreational values 3.42 1.19 3.50 1.26 3.72 1.06 ns ns 2.35
Energy wood production 3.17 1.20 3.00 1.09 2.84 1.19 NC > C * ns 3.26*
Maintenance of carbon storage and sinks 2.81 1.25 2.80 1.27 3.09 1.32 ns ns 1.92
Clean water 3.34 1.28 3.42 1.22 3.26 1.24 ns ns .47
Biodiversity objectives:
I make sure that nature values of the site important to me are protected
3.74 1.20 3.89 1.10 4.33 .92 NC < C *** FC < PC ** 9.50***
I conserve the site in its natural state 3.16 1.28 3.71 1.29 4.31 .79 NC < C *** FC < PC *** 35.54***
I conform to the expectations of others 1.67 .94 1.71 1.01 1.71 1.08 ns ns .22
I improve everyman recreational possibilities 2.35 1.14 2.34 1.12 2.45 1.11 ns ns .25
I conserve the site to future generations 3.99 1.06 3.85 1.07 4.22 1.03 ns FC < PC * 3.38*
I maintain autonomy to decide about my forest 4.45 .91 4.22 1.06 3.66 1.35 NC > C *** FC > PC *** 23.41***
I profit economically from conservation 2.84 1.34 3.68 1.20 3.50 1.31 NC < C *** ns 20.27***
I protect nature in order to get currently unknown benefits in future
2.97 1.19 3.06 1.16 3.01 1.28 ns ns .09
Human duty is to protect nature 4.17 .99 4.06 1.00 4.14 1.00 ns ns .71
In biologically diverse nature all species are needed 3.82 1.12 3.96 .93 4.00 1.07 ns ns 1.16
Fixed-term contracts do not oblige future owners 2.82 1.31 3.45 1.45 2.32 1.32 ns FC > PC *** 18.33***
Table 3b. Dimensions of social capital (similarity of goals, trust and seeking information), gender, age group and level of education. The comparisons of owners without any conservation contract vs. owners with a contract, and owners with a fixed-term vs. permanent contract (Helmert contrasts).
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, ns = not significant
No contract (NC) (N=335)
Contract (C) (N=206) Helmert contrast 1:
NC vs. C
Helmert contrast 2:
FC vs. PC
Main effect for group (df=2, 538) Fixed-term (FC)
(N=108)
Permanent (PC) (N=98)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD P value P value F
Similarity of goals: Local actors 2.41 .76 2.28 .67 2.28 .78 ns ns 1.88
Environmental actors 2.27 .75 2.42 .72 2.73 .85 NC < C *** FC < PC ** 13.79***
Forestry actors 3.10 .93 3.61 .83 3.41 .98 NC < C *** ns 14.24***
Trust: Local actors 2.35 .75 2.14 .68 2.19 .83 NC > C * ns 3.86*
Environmental actors 2.33 .79 2.42 .74 2.77 .86 NC < C *** FC < PC ** 11.90***
Forestry actors 3.26 .97 3.69 .86 3.50 1.01 NC < C *** ns 9.10***
Seeking information: Local actors 1.81 .72 1.89 .73 1.80 .68 ns ns .70
Environmental actors 1.67 .72 1.99 .78 2.32 .86 NC < C *** FC < PC ** 30.20***
Forestry actors 2.67 1.16 3.51 .94 3.07 1.15 NC < C *** FC > PC ** 24.08***
Background: per cent per cent per cent
Gender male 74.8 76.2 74.5 ns ns .02
Age group Less than 40 years 5.1 2.1 6.8 ns ns 1.25
40-59 years 27.9 32.3 31.8 ns ns .49
60 years or more 66.9 65.6 61.4 ns ns .55
Level of education Comprehensive school 31.2 19.2 22.0 NC > C * ns 2.56
Gymnasium 3.9 3.8 3.3 ns ns .01
Vocational school 27.0 35.6 25.3 ns ns 1.65
College degree 23.9 17.3 20.9 ns ns 1.65
University degree 14.0 24.0 28.6 NC < C *** ns 6.34**
3.1. Forest management objectives
The comparison of the forest management objectives between the owner groups revealed three statistically significant results (Table 3a). The owners who had a conservation contract considered biodiversity and landscape objectives as more important than the owners who did not have any contract. Energy wood production, in contrast, was more important to the owners who did not have any contract, than to the owners with a conservation contract.
3.2. Biodiversity objectives
We found more differences in forest owners’ biodiversity objectives than in their forest management objectives (Table 3a). Four statistically significant differences between the owners with a conservation contract and the owners without any contract were identified.
Protecting nature values that are important to the owner, conserving nature in its natural state, as well as benefiting economically from conservation were more important objectives to the owners who had some kind of a contract than were to the owners who did not have a conservation contract. Maintaining the autonomy to decide about one’s own forest, in turn, was more important to the owners who did not have any conservation contract than it was to the owners who had some kind of a contract.
Moreover, five differences between the owners with a fixed-term and the owners with a permanent contract were identified. Protecting nature values that are important to the owner, conserving nature in its natural state, and conserving the site to future generations were more important to the owners with a permanent contract than to the owners who had made a fixed-term contract. Not burdening future generations with conservation obligations and maintaining the autonomy to decide about one’s own forest were more important to the owners who had made a fixed-term contract than to the owners who had made a permanent contract.
3.3. Social capital
Local actors. Only one difference between the groups of forest owners was found: the owners who did not have any conservation contract experienced trust in local actors more frequently than did the owners who had some kind of conservation contract (Table 3b).
Environmental actors.The owners who had some kind of a conservation contract perceived their goals as similar to environmental actors, trusted in them, and sought
information about conservation from them more frequently than did the owners who did not have any contract. The owners who had a permanent conservation contract perceived their
goals as similar to the environmental actors, trusted in them, and sought information about conservation from them even more frequently than did the owners who had a fixed-term contract.
Forestry actors. The owners who had a conservation contract perceived their goals as similar to forestry actors, trusted in them, and sought information about conservation from them more frequently than did the owners who did not have any contract. The owners with a fixed-term contract sought information from forestry actors in conservation issues more frequently than did the owners who had a permanent conservation contract.
Background variables. Only one statistically significant finding was found: the owners who did not have any contract were more likely to have a comprehensive school degree and less likely to have a university degree than the owners who had a conservation contract.
4. Discussion
In this study we explored how forest owners’ land management and biodiversity conservation objects, as well as the dimensions of social capital operationalized following the
conceptualization by Borg et al. (2015) were related to the conservation contracts made. We found that forest owners’ objectives related to biodiversity may partly explain why some owners decide to make conservation agreements, and moreover, whether they make permanent or fixed-term agreements.The importance of conserving nature was a more important objective to those owners who had made permanent contracts than to those who had made fixed-term contracts. The importance of not obliging future owners with a conservation contract was a more important objective to owners who had made fixed-term contracts, suggesting that these owners were more likely to perceive the conserved site as a potential burden to future generations and that the owners who had made a permanent contract perceived the conserved site as a gift to future generations. This observation highlights the complexity of intergenerational considerations in conservation decisions and resonates with the results by Markowski-Lindsay et al. (2016) regarding conservation bequest motives among landowners. Overall, differences in the objectives between the groups were small, and most objectives were similar across groups.
We found that forest owners’ social capital in their social networks, alongside
landowners’ biodiversity objectives, characterizes those owners who have made conservation agreements. Owners who had made a conservation agreement perceived environmental and forestry actors’ goals as similar to theirs, trusted in them most often, and sought information
from them more than owners who did not have any contract. In addition, we found that the specific actor networks to which social capital was associated were related to the type of conservation agreements that the owners had made. The owners who had made a fixed-term contract sought information from forestry actors more often than the owners who had made a permanent contract. Instead, the owners who had made a permanent contract perceived environmental actors’ goals as similar to theirs, trusted in them, and sought information from them more often than the owners with a fixed-term contract. Finally, the owners who had not made any contracts experienced trust in local actors more often than the owners who had made some kind of a conservation contract. Networks with environmental authorities were associated with permanent conservation contracts and networks with forestry authorities were associated with fixed-term contracts, which reflects the current institutional arrangement in Finland, wherefixed-term conservation contracts are made with forestry authorities and permanent contracts are made with environmental authorities.
The dimensions of social capital within social networks were correlated and the findings between the owner groups were conceptually consistent and meaningful. These findings support the notion that individuals more likely trust those information providers whose values they perceive as similar (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Vainio et al., 2017).
Furthermore, the association pattern of information seeking behavior with particular actors provides evidence on the relevance of recognition of and positive experiences with the actors to create and maintain trust. This observation is in congruence with the findings of Hujala and Tikkanen (2008) as well as Borg et al. (2015) highlighting the role of authority and service experiences in directing landowners’ communication behavior. However, the present results, based on exploring the three dimensions of social capital, add a nuanced understanding of social networks. More specifically, these results suggest that experts and authorities could benefit from engaging in (informal) root-level communication with landowners to build trust and enhance social capital that would help implementing conservation programs in rural settings. Further, forest owners reported relatively low levels of trust, information seeking and similarity of goals, in particular with local and environmental actors, which suggest that there is a potential to increase social capital in these networks.
This study analyzed data collected with a survey and therefore we could not test causal associations between forest owners’ objectives, social networks and conservation behavior. Objectives may affect social networks that, in turn, may affect behavior, but
opposite causal associations are also possible. Moreover, the sample of forest owners was not fully representative all forest owners in Finland so we cannot (and did even not intend to)
draw detailed conclusions about social capital as such in forest owners’ networks related to biodiversity conservation. The grouping of actors was based on exploratory factor analysis. It is also possible to group actors in other ways. However, we believe that the chosen
classification has an underlying social psychological explanation: local actors were perceived by respondents as more close than forestry or environmental actors.
In this paper we interpreted the results using the social capital framework. We focused on some aspects of social capital, and there are other important aspects of social capital that we did not consider, such as shared norms, or the quality of social networks (OECD, 2001).
Moreover, the diffusion of innovation framework (e.g., Rogers, 2003; Korhonen et al., 2013) could be used more systematically as an interpretation lens to identify reasonable ways to increase attractiveness for Biodiversity Program participation.
Even with their limitations these results suggest that forest owners are likely to seek information about biodiversity conservation from actors whose conservation views they perceive as being similar to theirs and whom owners perceive as trustworthy. The notion that forest owners prefer to seek information about conservation from their social networks is particularly important in the implementation of voluntary conservation policies. For example, Korhonen et al. (2011) found that while negotiating voluntary conservation agreements in Biodiversity Program several owners were offered only one agreement type (either fixed- term or permanent), and the offer was dependent on the organization with whom the forest owner was dealing with. Thus, it is possible that forest owners’ existing networks remarkably influence the type of agreement they are initially suggested to make. In other words, the actor with whom the forest owner happens to deal with may have an important role in determining what kind of agreement the owner will eventually make without learning to know genuine alternatives between which to choose. It is possible that it is easier for forest owners to join some networks than others (Borg et al., 2015). These actors and networks, which are easier to access, are a promising starting point for a number of (by no means self-evident)
conservation agreements. The present results give reason to assume high level of trust in these easy-access networks, but opening opportunities for more balanced information flows and conservation contracting choices, it is recommended to join the forestry and
environmental networks with cross-network ties and multi-actor events with landowners. In addition, it is possible that skilled individuals, who can build a dialogical space, and
consequently trust, are successful in making agreements and encourage further steps as well.
Social contacts with different kinds of actors are challenging in terms of building trust, but it is important for integrating the diversity of knowledge that is necessary for
successful biodiversity management. Previous research focusing especially on the perspective of organizations and authorities suggests that the similarity of goals is not an important determinant of network ties in biodiversity conservation (Borg et al., 2015). In our study that explored the social networks from forest owners’ perspective, only the objectives directly related to biodiversity conservation and the type of conservation contract were related to the actual contracts made. In other words, the importance of biodiversity conservation appears to unite forest owners to other actors and appears to facilitate cooperation irrespective of other objectives that the actors may pursue. Moreover, no gender differences were found in the three dimensions of social capital. However, a previous study found that forest owners’
biodiversity objectives were associated with voluntary conservation among men but not among women, suggesting that gender may affect owners’ possibilities to pursue biodiversity objectives through their social networks (Vainio and Paloniemi, 2013).
It has been already noted that private forest owners often remain outsiders in networks involved in biodiversity conservation (Borg and Paloniemi, 2012; Borg et al., 2015;
Paloniemi and Tikka, 2008; Syrjänen et al., 2007). The results of this study are in line with previous research emphasizing the need to develop inclusive processes that support
cooperation in networks, where forest owners can find new roles for themselves and take action they prefer. Because social interaction builds trust, these activities do not have to be directly related to biodiversity conservation. As Putnam (1995) has argued, trust facilitates cooperation and is therefore essential for cooperation. Thus, beginning cooperation through a network where trust already exists, even with smaller efforts, such as a temporary contract, may be a beneficial way forward.
5. Conclusions
In order to encourage sustainable rural development, national and international policies should be implemented in a voluntary and socially acceptable, but also in an effective manner in local contexts. Only seldom policy implementation processes have achieved these
interlinked objectives, which are not easy to reach simultaneously. In this study we explored the achievement of voluntary biodiversity policies by exploring interlinkages of forest owners’ experiences of permanent and fixed-term conservation agreements with their land management and biodiversity conservation objectives and the theory-driven and
operationalized dimensions of social capital embedded in owners’ social networks.
We found that making a permanent or fixed-term conservation agreement was
associated with the endorsement of biodiversity objectives and the three dimensions of social
capital, namely perceiving environmental and forestry actors’ goals similar to one’s own, trusting these actors, and searching information from them. The owners with temporary conservation contract perceived forestry actors’ goals as similar to theirs, trusted in them, and sought information from them more frequently than owners with a permanent contract, while those with a permanent contract attached these similar dimensions of social capital to
environmental actors. These results reflect the institutional settings occurring in current national Biodiversity Program, in which temporary contracts are made with forestry authorities and permanent contracts with environmental authorities. More generally, these results give evidence on the relevance of both landowners’ passive perceptions of and active connections with her social network actors as determinants of trust and thus prerequisites of successful conservation contracting.
These results increase the understanding of the role and importance of forest owners’
diverse social networks in voluntary nature conservation agreements as well as of various dimensions of social capital, and a need to encourage them to develop. The finding encourages making use of these networks more systematically and dynamically while implementing rural, environmental and forest policies in order to increase their societal impact in local contexts.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [grant number 311 340]. We thank Anna Salomaa, Sari Pynnönen, Eeva Primmer, and ELY-centre
Varsinais-Suomi, and Forest Centre North Karelia Office for participating in data collection.
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Supplementary material
Perceptions of different actors in the conservation contract process:
Information seeking, trust and perceived similarity of views
Please note that the measure has three subscales: information seeking, trust and perceived similarity of views.
The instruction given to respondents:
What kind of role do the following actors have in the conservation contract process? Please evaluate how often you seek information from the following actors, how often you trust in them in conservation issues, and how often you share similar views about the conservation goals with them.
- Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment - Forest Center
- Forest Management Association - other forest owners
- environmental associations - Regional Council
- local hunting associations - local nature tourism enterprises - local entrepreneurs
- local forestry companies - local residents
Response scales:
- Seek information: 5 = always – 1 = never
- Trust in them in conservation: 5 = always – 1 = never
- Share similar views about the conservation goals: 5 = always – 1 = never
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