Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomenality

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Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta Filosofiska studier från Helsingfors universitet

Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki Publishers:

Theoretical Philosophy Philosophy (in Swedish) Social and Moral Philosophy P.O. Box 24 (Unioninkatu 40 A) 00014 University of Helsinki Finland

Editors:

Panu Raatikainen Tuija Takala Bernt Österman

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Fredrik Westerlund

HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM

OF PHENOMENALITY

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ISBN 978-952-10-9912-0 (paperback) ISBN 978-952-10-9913-7 (PDF) ISSN 1458-8331 (series)

Helsinki 2014 Unigrafia

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Abstract

This PhD thesis is an extended critical investigation of Martin Heidegger’s influential account of the problem of phenomenality, i.e., of how things show up as meaningful phenomena in our experience. As such, it is also a study of his effort to develop and probe the question of phenomenology, i.e., what it means to see, understand, and articulate such phenomena. The aim of the thesis is both historical and systematic. On the one hand, it offers a unified interpretation of how Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of phenomenality unfolds during the main stages of his philosophical development, from the early Freiburg lecture courses 1919-1923, over the Marburg years and the publication of Being and Time in 1927, up to his later thinking stretching from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s. It is argued that the problem of phenomenality constitutes one of the core problems that Heidegger is concerned with from beginning to end, and that focusing on this problem allows us to shed new light on the philosophical logic and motives behind the main changes that his thinking undergoes along the way.

On the other hand, the thesis examines both the philosophical power and the problems and ambiguities of Heidegger’s consecutive attempts to account for the structure and dynamics of phenomenality. In particular, it critically interrogates Heidegger's basic idea that our experience of meaningful phenomena is determined by our prior understanding of the historical contexts of meaning in which we always already live. A central argument of the thesis is that Heidegger’s conception of the historical structure of phenomenality raises the decisive question of how to distinguish between historical prejudice and primordial understanding, and that Heidegger’s inability to answer this question in Being and Time generates a deep ambiguity between his program of historical-destructive thinking and his employment of a Husserlian intuition-based phenomenological method in his concrete investigation. Moreover, it is argued that Heidegger’s later thinking of the clearing/event of being is centrally motivated by the effort to answer precisely this question by showing how a historical world can arise and give itself as a binding destiny. Ultimately, however, the thesis suggests – elaborating on the criticisms previously presented by, e.g., Ernst Tugendhat and Emmanuel Levinas – that Heidegger’s radical historicization of phenomenality makes him unable to account either for the truth of our understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of other persons.

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Acknowledgements

The road leading up to the completion of my doctoral thesis has been long and winding. It has been a road of hard work, constant dialogue, and self- examination – a road on which I have come to think about many of the problems of life and philosophy in a new manner. Some of the thoughts that have evolved during these years I have now tried to articulate in my thesis; some point towards the future. Although genuine thinking is always thinking and seeing for oneself, it is at the same time true that our thinking becomes what it becomes – and achieves whatever independence and insight it achieves – only in and through discussions with others.

During the years of working on my thesis, many people and institutions have, in different ways, helped me in my work and in my thinking.

My doctoral studies have been conducted at the Swedish-speaking philosophy unit at the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki. I want to begin by thanking Professor Jan von Plato for his support and assistance, especially during the final phases of the project.

I want to express my greatest gratitude to the supervisor of my thesis, Dr. Thomas Wallgren. During these years Thomas has been a constant source of encouragement and inspiration. He has nurtured a truly philosophical spirit by always boldly insisting on the need to face and interrogate the meaning and moral roots of the philosophical problems that seem to address us – and not take refuge in the norms governing our notions of academic decorum and excellence. I have learned a lot from his sharp comments – always oriented towards the matters themselves – on many different versions of the manuscript, as well as from our innumerable philosophical discussions. I hope that my thesis to some extent realizes Thomas’ spirit of radical and open-minded questioning.

I am very grateful to Professor Sara Heinämaa who has function as a kind of co-supervisor during different stages of the work. On the long and challenging road to my thesis, Sara’s persistent encouragement and help have been of great importance. Her belief in the philosophical potential of my project, her thorough knowledge of phenomenology, her valuable

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comments on my thesis, as well as her generous readiness to lend a helping hand, have been vital for my ability to finish the thesis. I am also thankful to Professor Hans Ruin who served as my external supervisor during the early and middle stages of the work. An acclaimed expert on Heidegger, Hans played a key role in helping me orient myself in Heidegger’s thinking and in the vast secondary literature. Although we often differed in our views on how to read Heidegger, the encounter with Hans’ strong reading was very valuable, and forced me to think through and deepen my own approach in important respects.

I am very thankful to my pre-examiners, Professor Steven Crowell and Professor Günter Figal, for accepting the task of reading my dissertation.

Both statements were thorough, perceptive, and open-minded to a quite exceptional degree. Reading them at the end of the journey was an instructive and philosophically stimulating experience.

My special thanks go to Dr. Martina Reuter and Dr. Bernt Österman, who were my teachers at the beginning of my philosophy studies, and who have since become my colleagues and friends. Aside from being a great philosophical discussion partner, Martina has been unwavering in her support and helpfulness during these years. One can wonder whether I would have been able to pull this off without her help. My continuous philosophical dialogue with Bernt over the years – touching on a myriad of themes – has been a source of pleasure and insight. In the final stage of my work on the dissertation, he read through and offered valuable comments on the entire manuscript, something for which I am extremely grateful.

My friendship and dialogue with Dr. Joel Backström and Dr. Hannes Nykänen has been decisive for the development of my thinking in the last years. Our discussions have been countless, often fierce, very often close to the matters themselves. Without doubt, Joels’s and Hannes’ exemplary courage, openness, and insistence on bringing philosophy back to the problems facing us in our ethical-existential relations to each other – and to ourselves – has taught me to see more clearly what philosophy is all about.

The most important academic context for my work on my thesis is undoubtedly to be found in the phenomenological research seminar arranged and conducted by Professor Sara Heinämaa. The seminar, gathering a great group of researchers and students, has been a vital place

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for exchange and discussion centering on phenomenological philosophy. I have enjoyed and benefited from the discussions at the seminar, and manytimes I have received valuable comments on chapters and papers that I have presented there. The members of the seminar include Dr. Jussi Backman, Dr. Saara Hacklin, Marko Gylén, Dr. Mirja Hartimo, Dr. Martta Heikkilä, Juha Hotanen, Dr. Tua Korhonen, Dr. Virpi Lehtinen, Anniina Leiviskä, Dr. Susanna Lindberg, Dr. Timo Miettinen, Dr. Irina Poleschuk, Simo Pulkkinen, Dr. Erika Ruonakoski, Dr. Joona Taipale, Risto Tiihonen, and Hermanni Yli-Tepsa. I especially want to mention five of my colleagues and friends belonging to this circle of phenomenologists. I want to thank Dr. Jussi Backman for years of dialogue on Heidegger and for his valuable comments on a section of the thesis written in the very final phase. I want to thank Dr. Mirja Hartimo for her generous support and aid, and for all our philosophical discussions. I want to thank Dr.

Virpi Lehtinen for her support and encouragement along the way, and for all our inspiring philosophical lunches. I am grateful to Simo Pulkkinen for his thorough and very helpful comments on some of the sections dealing with Heidegger’s relationship to Husserl. Finally, I want to thank Dr. Timo Miettinen for his kind help and advice in the process of getting the thesis ready for print.

I would like to thank Professor Merete Mazzarella – who was my teacher at the Department of Nordic Literature during my early years at the university – for her encouragement and friendship along the way.

From Merete I have not only learnt a lot about what it means to read, write and think about literature. Insisting on the importance of not getting stuck in the academic norms of writing and thinking, she also from early on instilled in me a crucial sense of freedom in choosing my discourse and words according to the discussion and the problems at issue. I am very thankful to Dr. Nora Hämäläinen, whom I have known for many years, for our friendship and for all our rewarding philosophical discussions. A special thanks goes to Jim Jakobsson for his discerning and helpful comments on some sections of the thesis, and for smooth cooperation in psychoanalyzing The Big Lebowski.

On my philosophical journey I have benefited greatly from my discussions and exchanges with Professor Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Dr. Christian Erbacher, Dr. Niklas Forsberg, Dr. Anssi Korhonen, Professor Lars Hertzberg, Dr. Nina Honkela, Jonas Lillqvist, Dr. Jan-Ivar

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Lindén, Dr. Pauliina Remes, Dr. Mika Perälä, Dr. Friederike Rese, Dr.

Hugo Strandberg, Dr. Morten Sørensen Thaning, Niklas Toivakainen, and Dr. Charlotta Weigelt.

During the years of work on my thesis, the friendship of Christian and Pamela Brandt has been of decisive importance. Their unflinching belief in the philosophical path I have chosen – in the face of whatever difficulties encountered along the way – has been a source of encouragement and inspiration. Besides, I have learnt immensely about life and philosophy from our innumerable and intense discussions over the years, covering all possible – and impossible – subjects.

Without the love and support of my parents, Jan and Kristina Westerlund, this thesis could not have been written at all.

Finally, my greatest thanks – beyond measure in a way that demonstrates the absurdity of expressing thanks for relationships of love and friendship – goes to my wife, Tatjana Brandt. No one has taught me more than her about life, love, and thinking.

This thesis could not have been written without the financial support from The University of Helsinki, Nylands nation, Koneen säätiö, Oskar Öflunds stiftelse, Otto A. Malms donationsfond, and the research community “Subjectivity, Historicity, Communality” at the University of Helsinki.

Fredrik Westerlund Helsinki, May 2014

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Introduction

Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomenality

For about a century it seems that the question of phenomenality – of givenness – has haunted philosophy as a central problem. What does it mean that something shows itself or gives itself as a meaningful phenomenon in our experience? What does it mean to see, understand and give expression to such phenomena? Can our direct intuitive experience of the phenomenally given serve as a ground and measure for our understanding? Or is this experience essentially determined by the historical contexts of meaning – languages, concepts, norms, values, practices, vocabularies – in which we live, in such a way that our critical understanding of these contexts cannot ground itself on any phenomenological description of the experientially given, but will need to take the form of another kind of conceptual, hermeneutical or deconstructive analysis?

At the beginning of the 20^th century Edmund Husserl launched his immense attempt at transforming philosophy into a rigorous phenomenological science. In order for philosophy not to collapse into empty and prejudiced theoretical speculation on the basis of received concepts and theories, Husserl argued, it must concentrate on strictly seeing and describing what is concretely given in our experience. At the same time, Husserl widened the notion of experiential givenness to include not only sense perceptions or empirical data but everything that may show itself as identifiable unities of meaning for our consciousness.

Phenomenology is born and lives on the promise that phenomenal givenness may serve as an ultimate ground for our understanding of meaningful reality.

But is this possible?

The fact is that since the middle of the last century philosophy has centrally been characterized by the tendency to dismiss the very idea of direct phenomenal givenness – the “myth of the given,” as Wilfrid Sellars called it.¹ The variations of the critique of the given are of course multiple:

1 Cf. Sellars 1956.

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on the continental side we have, e.g., the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, the structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss, the post structuralist and deconstructivist thought of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan, and the critical theory of Theodore Adorno and Jürgen Habermas;

on the analytical side we have, e.g., the Neo-Kantianism-cum-Hegelianism of Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell and Robert Brandom, the everyday language philosophy of John Austin, the holistic naturalism of Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson, the thinking of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein and much of the philosophy that it has inspired, the philosophy of science developed by Thomas Kuhn, and the Neo- Pragmatism of Richard Rorty. Notwithstanding the immense differences between these philosophers, one of the vital effects of their combined efforts has been to establish one of the leading paradigms of thought pervading contemporary philosophy: the general and more or less vague idea that our experiential access to reality is essentially mediated by the historical contexts of meaning – languages, concepts, norms – in which we live, and which determine in advance what we may see and identify as meaningful phenomena. Whereas this paradigm largely dominates the field of continental philosophy it has never achieved a governing role in the analytic tradition, where it lives in a tense relation to the fundamental inclination towards naturalist thought. In so far as the above paradigm currently tends to link our philosophical thinking and imagination in a habitual and unquestioned manner, granting to our basic concepts and distinctions – conceptual, empirical, meaning, object, context, tradition, historicity, value, norm, groundless, incommensurability, horizon, otherness, etc. – what appears to be their ready understandability and weight, I suggest calling it the metaphysics of historical meaning.²

Martin Heidegger stands at the very center of the historical development sketched above. As Heidegger emerges as an autonomous philosopher in the beginning of the 1920s, he adopts Husserl’s basic phenomenological demand to return to the experientially given while at the same time critically pursuing the question concerning the nature of phenomenal givenness. In contrast to Husserl, who according to

2 In the epilogue of the thesis I will outline my view of the ”metaphysics of historical meaning” in a little more detail.

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Heidegger had largely built on the model of theoretical observation, he insists that our primary access to meaningful reality lies in our pre- theoretical experience of the world. In the course of laying bare the rootedness of this experience in the historical contexts of meaning into which we always already find ourselves thrown, Heidegger gradually moves away from the intuition-based phenomenology of Husserl towards a radicalized hermeneutical reflection on how our contexts of meaning arise and concern us as a finite and groundless historical destiny. Hence, while Heidegger takes his starting point in Husserl’s phenomenology, he – through a long critical reflection on that phenomenology – eventually becomes the philosopher who more than anyone else contributes to establishing the dominance of the metaphysics of historical meaning in the continental tradition.

This thesis is a study of Heidegger’s struggle to come to terms with the question of phenomenality, i.e. what it means for something to show or give itself as a meaningful phenomenon; as such, it is also a study of his effort to critically develop and probe the question of phenomenology, i.e. of what it means to see, understand, and articulate such phenomena. However, to the extent that Heidegger’s struggle with these questions constitutes one of the exemplary trajectories instituting our present situation, I also hope that my study will help to open up and illuminate some of the philosophical problems, ambiguities and blindnesses marking our present.

The Heidegger Discussion

By now the scholarly literature on Heidegger has already grown into an enormous mass encompassing hundreds of books and thousands of articles – and it is still rapidly growing.

This discursive situation – whose closest contemporary counterpart is to be found in the research on Wittgenstein – certainly brings with it some obvious advantages. We are now in possession of a large amount of careful historical research covering most parts of Heidegger’s production and including detailed studies of the key philosophers and traditions influencing or providing background for his thought. However, there are also grounds for interpreting the discursive situation as the symptom of a philosophical crisis, a crisis which the situation is itself contributing to. On the one hand, the greater part of the literature on Heidegger is primarily

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philological in character, exhibiting little or no independent and systematic philosophical work. On the other hand, the circumstance that Heidegger’s thought constitutes a paradigm for our own thinking makes it possible to feel that in charting the internal conceptual networks of Heidegger’s texts one is indeed trailing the highest perimeters of our contemporary horizon of understanding. Yet this is a delusion – for the simple reason that a philological interpretation of a philosophical text, however philosophically powerful that text might be, can never of itself effect a genuine philosophical understanding. Hence, to the extent that we go on tracing the conceptual connections of Heidegger’s thinking, repeating his criticisms of philosophical positions that we strictly speaking do not take seriously anymore, all the while believing that we are engaged in philosophy proper, his work has started to function as an invisible wall for our thinking. The sheer mass of literature supports this state of affairs by making it virtually impossible to confront the basic thoughts of Heidegger in a systematic fashion without failing the academic demand to anchor the interpretation in the relevant literature and the elaborate picture of Heidegger’s thought that it sustains.

Let me try to specify the distinction between philological and philosophical interpretations a little. By philological – or historical – interpretations I do not only denote interpretations that deliberately or unambiguously realize a philological purpose. I mean all interpretations that essentially move – trace, connect, map concepts and ideas – within the conceptual horizon of the interpreted text and possible intertexts, without critically probing and accounting for the philosophical force of these concepts. By philosophical – or systematic, or problem-oriented – interpretations I mean all interpretations that explicate a text through providing some kind of independent articulation of what the text shows or fails to show. One reason why this distinction has tended to grow dim in the current discussion may be found in the sharp and widely recognized critique that Heidegger himself levels against any attempt to draw a simple distinction between historical and systematic investigations. Heidegger’s central argument is that every systematic investigation is always already guided by some historical pre-understanding of the matter in question;

hence, it becomes an integral part of the systematic task to engage in a critical reflection on the historical conditions determining the focus of our questioning. But the reverse is also the case, as Heidegger himself was well

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aware: in order for an interpretation to bring the sense of a text to life and to bring it to view in its philosophical claim on us, it must itself be able to confront and give voice to that claim.³ Given that the sense of a philosophical text ultimately resides in its capacity to teach us something about ourselves and the world, our understanding and interpretation of such a text must essentially involve an understanding of what the text teaches us about these matters: to understand the text means understanding what the text tells us about the world such as we are now – with and independently of the text – able to see and understand it. If the interpretation does not do this, it is philosophically empty. This, however, does not in any way rule out the possibility that philological interpretations may have a great value and function of their own, providing crucial guidance for philosophical interpretations.

In so far as our research on Heidegger is still motivated by a genuine philosophical will to learn I believe it is imperative that we elevate the philosophical capacity to independently open up and articulate the matters themselves as our highest criterion for judging the secondary literature on Heidegger. Such a systematically oriented interpretation may of course take many shapes: it may expand, rearticulate, critically delimit or deconstruct Heidegger’s concepts and analyses; it may apply Heideggerian figures of thought to new questions and situations; or it may use Heidegger’s thinking as a critical starting point for philosophical inquiries in quite other directions. Of course, there is a risk that such a program might be exploited as an apology for producing texts that renounce serious interpretation and translate Heidegger into a strawman for the interpreter’s own purposes. But this is a risk I think we have to take today;

otherwise, we hazard a greater danger: that Heidegger’s work is transformed into a prison and a sanctuary instead of being freed up, critically delimited and overcome – in short, teach us what it can teach us – as the powerful, finite and deeply problematic work that it is.

Previous Literature

To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first extended study focusing on what I suggest is Heidegger’s life-long effort to come to terms

3 Cf. SZ, pp. 150-153; GA 62, pp. 354-348.

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with the problem of phenomenality, examining how this effort to explore the structure and dynamics of phenomenality motivates the development of his thinking in general and his critical transformation of phenomenology in particular.

However, there are certainly a host of works potentially relevant for a study of the problem of phenomenality – and phenomenology – in Heidegger. To begin with, there are numerous books and articles focusing on the fate of phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking, including more or less indirect accounts of the theme of phenomenality, and many of these will be referred to or discussed in the course of my thesis.⁴ Besides, since the problem of phenomenality – as I will argue – constitutes a fundamental problem in Heidegger’s thought, which is linked to almost all other central concepts in his philosophical corpus, every general interpretation of his philosophy, whether or not it has phenomenality/

phenomenology as its explicit theme, will eo ipso involve an interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenality.

In my thesis I am mainly going to stake out my own interpretation in relation to what I believe are the two philosophically most powerful interpretations of what constitutes the systematic heart of Heidegger’s thinking and, by implication, the sense of phenomenality/phenomenology in his thought. On the one hand, we have the transcendental phenomenological interpretation defended by, e.g., Steven Crowell, Daniel Dahlstrom, Søren Overgaard, Burt Hopkins and Dermot Moran.⁵ This interpretation basically reads Heidegger’s philosophy as a critical yet fundamentally faithful elaboration of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which is conceived of as providing the key to rigorous philosophizing. Even though Heidegger criticizes Husserl for having neglected the pre- theoretical and historically conditioned nature of our experience the systematic promise of his own philosophy lies precisely in a hermeneutically sharpened intuitive reflection on the basic – necessary and universal – structures characterizing our primary experience of the

4 The major works in this field include Tugendhat 1970; Gethmann 1974; von Herrmann 1981; 1990; 2000; Stapleton 1983; Held 1988; Hopkins 1993; Marion 1998;

Crowell 2001; Dahlstrom 2001; Overgaard 2004; Figal 2009, pp. 43-54; Rese [ed.]

2010; Figal & Gander [eds.] 2013.

5 For some of the central texts defending this interpretation, see Gethmann 1974;

Hopkins 1993; Crowell 2001; 2003; Dahlstrom 2001; Overgaard 2004; Moran 2007;

Zahavi 2003b.

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meaningful world. On the other hand, we have the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation defended by, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Guignon, Françoise Dastur, Günter Figal, John Sallis, John van Buren, David Farrell Krell, and Hans Ruin.⁶ This interpretation explicates and hails Heidegger as one of the most severe critics of the idea, still held by Husserl, that our reflective seeing of intuitively given structures of meaning could serve as a measure for our understanding. According to this interpretation, Heidegger provides a groundbreaking analysis of the radical historicity of all experience of meaning: it is only on account of our thrownness into groundless and finite historical contexts of meaning that we are able to experience objects as meaningful. Hence, philosophy cannot hope to ground itself on any direct experience of the phenomenally given, but needs to take the form of a critical explication of its own historical predicament. There have been two basic ways of developing this line of interpretation, which cannot always be kept strictly apart. The hermeneutic interpretation – represented by e.g. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Francoise Dastur, and Günter Figal – tends to highlight our fundamental rootedness in our own finite tradition and inquires into the possibilities of remaining faithful to that tradition while at the same time critically reflecting upon it and opening ourselves up to other people and histories. The deconstructive interpretation – represented by e.g. John Sallis, David Farrell Krell and Hans Ruin – tends to stress the primary task of tracing and answering to the groundless differential logic at the basis of every possible formation of meaning.

It is no surprise that the two systematic visions outlined above tend to favor different sorts of descriptions of the role of phenomenology in the history of Heidegger’s thought. From the point of view of the transcendental phenomenological interpretation, Heidegger’s early thinking from the early 1920s up to Being and Time naturally emerges as the philosophical summit of his path of thought. The general picture is this: In

6 For some of the central texts defending this interpretation, see Gadamer 1986; 1987, pp. 175-430; 1990; Guignon 1983; Bernasconi 1984; Sallis 1978; 1990; Figal 1992;

2010; van Buren 1990; 1994; Krell 1986; 1992; Theodore Kisiel 1993; Ruin 1994;

Dastur 1999; Sheehan 1998; 2001. In addition to the works listed so far, which basically affirm Heidegger’s hermeneutic-deconstructivist thinking, there are also works that explicate Heidegger as a representative of a hermeneutic-deconstructivist approach but are more or less critical of this approach. Cf., e.g., Tugendhat 1970;

1984; Apel 1973; 1989; Lafont 2000.

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the early twenties Heidegger develops his hermeneutical phenomenology as a critical elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology. Even though Heidegger emphasizes the historical conditions of thinking and focuses his attention on the temporal and projective structure of our pre-theoretical experience of the world, he nevertheless essentially remains faithful to Husserl’s method of phenomenological reflection. Consequently, the turn that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the middle of the 1930s is viewed as a transition from the hermeneutical phenomenology of Being and Time towards a historical thinking, which, although in practice containing important pieces of rigorous phenomenological description, is more prone to give rise to speculation and metaphysical construction. From the point of view of the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation the story is almost the reverse: Heidegger’s exploration of his main theme – the opening up of groundless, finite being – is bound to appear as a more continuous journey from his groping and ambivalent phenomenological origins towards a historical thinking which is able to answer more consistently to its own finitude and historicity. Moreover, John van Buren has recently brought forth a tripartite narrative, which views Heidegger’s early Freiburg-lectures – with their strong emphasis on the elusive, theoretically ungraspable event-character of our primary experience of the world – as a promising beginning, which gets lost in the more traditional, transcendental phenomenological project of fundamental ontology of Being and Time, and which is then rehabilitated and radicalized in Heidegger’s later thinking.⁷

As will become clear I think that both of the above interpretations are able to capture and illuminate basic aspects of Heidegger’s thinking and of its development. This is because they correspond to and explicate, each in its own way, two of Heidegger’s basic philosophical convictions: on the one hand, his phenomenological conviction that the experientially given constitutes the measure of our understanding; on the other hand, his radical historicization of phenomenal givenness. However, I also believe that both interpretations suffer from a one-sidedness that cannot be easily overcome since it is connected with problems in both their exegetical and their philosophical force. Indeed, none of the interpretations is able to see clearly how throughout his life Heidegger is struggling with the problem

7 Cf. van Buren 1994. Cf. Kisiel 1993, pp. 3, 16.

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of phenomenality in the tension between his basic convictions, and why it is so difficult – philosophically – for him to give up either of them.

In their readings of Heidegger’s philosophical journey both the transcendental phenomenological and the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation tend to set out from a given idea of the systematical core of Heidegger’s thought, from the point of view of which Heidegger’s relation to phenomenology appears as a temporary – more or less central and promising – commitment to a basically Husserlian stance, which from the middle of the 1930s gives way to another kind of historical reflection on the destinal event of being. This way of writing the history of phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking has deep roots and goes back to William J. Richardson’s pioneering book from 1963: Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. Richardson originally intended to use the formula

“From Phenomenology to thought” but changed the “from” to “through”

on Heidegger’s own suggestion.⁸ Nevertheless, Richardson portrays Heidegger’s philosophical development as a trajectory which starts from a phenomenology of the human being and develops into a thinking of the primary event of being itself. More recently Theodore Kisiel has called the years 1919-1927 Heidegger’s “phenomenological decade,”⁹ a description later echoed by, e.g., Dermot Moran, Steven Crowell and Edgar C.

Boedeker Jr.¹⁰ Still, in reproducing this story of Heidegger’s development – which is not in itself incorrect – the commentators systematically tend to overlook the extent to which Heidegger himself from beginning to end was engaged in a continuous battle to think and articulate the problem of phenomenality, and, by implication, the problem of phenomenology, as an issue which never ceased to challenge his previous strategies to come to terms with it.

Moreover, this neglect is liable to go hand in hand with a neglect for the philosophical challenge that the problem of phenomenality/phenomenology itself poses. Hence, in pursuing the transcendental phenomenological interpretation one will be apt to downplay the force with which Heidegger’s explication of the historical as-

8 Heidegger’s comments on the title are found in a letter that he sent to Richardson in April 1962, and which was published as the “Preface” of Richardson’s book. Cf.

Richardson 1963, pp. ix-xxiii; GA 11, pp. 145-152.

9 Kisiel 1993, p. 59.

10 Moran 2000, p. 194; Crowell 2001, pp. 115, 225; Boedeker 2005, p. 156.

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structure of understanding from the early 1920s onwards upsets the very possibility of using intuitive reflection on the structures of experience as the central means for any such explication. Or else, in following the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation, one will be inclined to disregard the deep difficulties arising from any serious attempt to dispense with intuitive experience as an irreducible measure for our understanding of the meaningful world. To Heidegger, however, the critical questions issuing from his pursuit of the historicity of thought always remained awake and pressing: Granted that all our phenomenal experience is determined by our factical historical understanding, what is it that allows us to uphold the critical difference between historical prejudice and originary understanding? What is it that guides and measures our understanding of the matters themselves? How can the finite historical contexts of meaning in which we live address us as a binding destiny, if, that is to say, they can do it all? In the course of the thesis, the above interpretational tendencies will be specified according to how individual commentators interpret the different periods and aspects of Heidegger’s thinking.

The interpretations above are of course not the only distinct systematic approaches to Heidegger’s thought available. An interpretation which especially deserves mentioning is the one developed by Hubert L.

Dreyfus in his seminal work Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I from 1991. Having his main background in pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein Dreyfus reads Heidegger as primarily concerned with emphasizing and expounding the primacy of our practical pre-theoretical ability to handle and cope with things in our social-historical context, so that this coping functions as the background condition for all theoretical knowledge and understanding. Although ultimately quite limited as an explication of Heidegger’s philosophical project, Dreyfus’s interpretation certainly contains many important analyses and insights, and it has also given rise to a vital tradition of Heidegger research. In addition to this, Heidegger has also been read in terms of many other philosophical frameworks, e.g., as a pragmatist, as a Sartrean existentialist, and as a Kantian transcendentalist. However, as I see it, the basic problem of all these strategies of interpretation is that even if they may provide limited clarifications and insights into Heidegger they remain too blind to the basic concerns of his thinking, taking their cue

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from some particular aspect of his thought which cannot account for the main thrust of his philosophical project.

Objective

The overall objective of this thesis is to provide a unified and critical explication of Heidegger’s continuous effort to understand and articulate the problem of phenomenality during his path of thinking.

As mentioned above, the secondary literature has been characterized by a basic tendency to portray Heidegger’s relationship to phenomenology in terms of a temporary commitment to a basically Husserlian stance during his early years which then, in the mid 1930s, gives way to a more historical mode of thinking. In my study, I shift the focus from the theme of phenomenology to the theme of phenomenality. And I do this for particular reasons. What I hope to show is that the question concerning the nature and structure of phenomenal self-showing indeed constitutes one of the core problems that Heidegger’s thinking revolves around from his earliest Freiburg lecture courses of the early 1920s up to his last writings from the early 1970s – i.e. even in the long period of Heidegger’s later thinking during which he largely refrains from employing the word

“phenomenology” as an appropriate term for his own thinking. The thesis aims to demonstrate that the problem of phenomenality plays a very basic role as a problem which constantly motivates Heidegger and moves his thinking forward, not only regulating his effort to critically develop and eventually abandon the phenomenological method of inquiry, but also informing his central analyses of the pre-theoretical experience, the historical structure of understanding, the ontological difference, the clearing/event of being, etc. By thus focusing on the problem of phenomenality I also think it is possible to shed new light on some of the central aspects of Heidegger’s philosophical development, for example: on what I believe is the shift that Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg phenomenology of factical life undergoes in 1921 when in Aristotle he discovers the historical as-structure of understanding; on the ambivalences in his conception of phenomenality/phenomenology that underlie his abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology launched in Being and Time; and on the so called “turn” of Heidegger’s thinking in the mid 1930s, which I interpret as a turn in his interrogation of phenomenality

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towards the question concerning the dynamics which let a binding historical world shine forth and prevail.

The historical explication carried out in the thesis is not primarily a conceptual history. I have no ambition to chart Heidegger’s use of the words phenomenon, phenomenology, givenness and so forth in any exhaustive manner. Although I will certainly be paying close attention to the rhetoric of phenomenality in Heidegger’s work, it will essentially serve as so many indications of the philosophical problems that Heidegger is dealing with and articulating in terms of his whole central conceptuality.

As concerns the historical sources of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenality, I will deal in more detail only with Husserl’s phenomenology. In addition to providing a short exposition of Husserl’s general phenomenological program as the starting point of Heidegger’s thinking, the thesis also examines the basic critical confrontations with Husserl that Heidegger undertakes during his Denkweg. Although I cannot hope to do anything like full justice to Husserl’s massive and complex philosophical work, I nevertheless try, with some independence, to indicate the force and limits of Heidegger’s criticisms. By contrast, the other central sources informing Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality – e.g., Aristotle, Dilthey, Hölderlin, the Pre-Socratics – are only mentioned briefly, and they will only figure in the roles that Heidegger accords to them in his own interpretations.

In and beyond explicating the history of Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of phenomenality the thesis also has a critical-systematic ambition. To begin with, it attempts to articulate the philosophical content of Heidegger’s thought in a jargon-free manner, and account for the force of his thinking in relation to various other philosophical standpoints.

Moreover, my thesis continually pursues a kind of internal critique of Heidegger, exposing the inner problems and ambiguities that motivate and drive his thinking of phenomenality forward. Finally, towards the end of the thesis – in the last chapter and in the epilogue – I also make an attempt to interrogate more independently what I believe are some of the basic problems and unclarities arising resulting from Heidegger’s radical historicization of phenomenality, and to suggest a provisional positive vision of how these problems could be better understood.

In this thesis I will provide no extended treatment of the difficult and inflammatory question of Heidegger’s relationship to National Socialism –

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although I will briefly touch upon the issue in the third part of the thesis.

There are two main reasons for my decision: first, it is not possible within the framework of the present study to open up the systematic space – constituted by the relations between philosophy, ethics, politics, and psychology – in which it would be possible to raise sharp questions and present nuanced arguments about Heidegger, philosophy, and Nazism;

second, it is not possible to take into account the massive scholarly controversies about this question.¹¹ However, there should be no doubt about the importance of this question for our efforts to understand and assess Heidegger’s life as well as his thinking.

The basic facts of the story are today in plain view:¹² Heidegger enthusiastically embraced National Socialism, which he viewed as a counterforce against the destructive and leveling tendencies of modernity and as a possible beginning of the ontological revolution that his own thinking was aiming at. As rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933- 1934, he supervised the enactment of the Nazi university reform, including the implementation of the Führer principle and the application of the Nazi laws of racial cleansing to the student body of the university. He secretly denounced colleagues and students, and he undeniably had a leaning towards Anti-Semitism (although he never endorsed the biological racism of the Nazi regime). Although, following the debacle of the rectorate, he began to lose faith in the philosophical capacity of the official ideology and politics of National Socialism – which he gradually began to

11 For some of the basic works dealing with Heidegger’s relationship to politics and Nazism see, e.g., Krockow 1958; Schwann 1965; Farias 1989; Sheehan 1988; Ott 1992;

Gethmann-Siefert & Pöggeler [eds.] 1988; Derrida 1989; Pöggeler 1990; Altweg [ed.]

1988; Sheehan 1988a; Zimmermann 1990; Wolin 1990; Brainard [ed.] 1991; Rockmore

& Margolis [eds.] 1992; Sluga 1993; de Beistegyi 1998; Bambach 2003.

12 The most comprehensive and reliable biographical accounts of Heidegger’s life and politics available today are Ott 1992 and Safranski 1997. My remarks on Heidegger’s relationship to National Socialism in this thesis were written before the publication in February 2014 of Heidegger’s “Black notebooks” (schwarze Hefte) from the years 1931- 1941 (cf. GA 94, GA 95, GA 96). The notebooks contain a lot of new and troubling material, exhibiting the depth, duration and ambivalence of Heidegger’s Nazi engagement and, above all, demonstrating the extent of his Anti-Semitism and its connection to his account of the history of being. Nevertheless, my impression is that the notebooks do not significantly alter the basic picture of Heidegger’s relationship to National Socialism which my remarks build on, and which has already for some time been discernable in its central features – for those who have been willing to see.

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interpret critically as a manifestation of the nihilistic subjectivist-technical metaphysics to which he first thought it would be an antidote – for many years he continued to express support for Hitler and the Nazi party, and to uphold his belief in the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism according to his idealized vision of the forfeited potential of the movement.¹³ He remained a member of the NSDAP until the end of the war, and never showed any remorse, never apologized for his actions, never seriously acknowledged and confronted the moral catastrophe of Nazism in his later thinking, and never published a single word on the Holocaust. Although he refers to the death camps in two unpublished lectures and in a least one letter, these minimal mentions are either extremely unsatisfactory or terribly reductive.¹⁴

It is clear, I think, that Heidegger’s engagement in National Socialism and his later failure to respond to it are connected with some of his central – and most problematic – philosophical convictions, and it remains an important responsibility to investigate the nature and depth of this connection. However, this does not in any way remove the philosophical task of explicating the sense of Heidegger’s thinking, and critically interrogating its truth and untruth as well as its moral problems independently of the role it played in his relationship to Nazism.

Structure

The thesis proceeds chronologically. It is divided into three main parts successively investigating what I suggest are the three main phases in Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of phenomenality. These parts are then followed by an epilogue in which I offer a critical discussion of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference at the root of his

13 GA 40, p. 208: “innere Wahrheit und Größe.” To facilitate the reading, quotations in German have been moved from the main text to the footnotes. In translating Heidegger, Husserl and others I have followed the strategy of consulting the available English translations, sometimes using them as such, sometimes modifying them.

However, I will only refer to the original German texts in the footnotes and will not seperately mention if my translation deviates from the published translation. The English translations are listed in the bibliography.

14 Cf. GA 17, p. 27; GA 17, p. 56. Heidegger’s letter to Herbert Marcuse – in which he compares the Holocaust to the Soviet Union’s treatment of Germans in Eastern Europe – is cited, e.g., in Farias 1989, p. 285, and in Sheehan 1988a.

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conception of phenomenality, and provisionally sketch an alternative account of the problems at stake here.

Part One focuses on Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg lectures 1919-1921, in which he critically elaborates Husserl’s phenomenology into an

“originary science” (Urwissenschaft) of factical life.¹⁵ It analyses Heidegger’s decisive notion that what is primarily given is what we encounter in our pre-theoretical experience of a significant world. It is argued that while Heidegger accentuates the temporality and historical familiarity of the pre- theoretical experience, he still understands his “originary science” as basically Husserlian phenomenology reflectively describing the fundamental structures of factical life. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s emphasis on the primacy of our pre-theoretical experience in its temporality eventually gives rise to acute problems and ambivalences both in his conception of phenomenology as intuition-based reflection, as well as in his effort to account for the role of philosophy in pre-theoretical life.

Part Two focuses on the period commencing with Heidegger’s groundbreaking confrontation with Aristotle in 1921 and culminating with the publication of Being and Time in 1927. Whereas the earliest Freiburg lectures had only provided a rudimentary analysis of the historical nature of phenomenality, Heidegger now, by way of an explication of Aristotle, elaborates his paradigmatic analysis of the structure of phenomenal understanding in terms of what he will call the “ontological difference”:¹⁶ it is only on the basis of our prior understanding of the historical contexts of meaning/being we live in that we can experience particular beings as meaningful phenomena. This analysis in turn motivates Heidegger’s idea that philosophy cannot transpire as intuition-based phenomenology anymore but needs to take the form of a hermeneutic-destructive reflection on the historical origins of our understanding. However, the project of fundamental ontology launched in Being and Time is still beset with deep ambivalences, which – it is argued – stem from Heidegger’s inability to account for how historical meanings can address us as something originary and binding, and be distinguished from mere prejudices. Firstly, this lacuna in Heidegger’s vision of a historical thinking prompts him – contrary to his belief in the historical structure of phenomenality and his program of historical destruction – to have

15 GA 56/57, p. 12.

16 GA 24, pp. 22, 102.

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recourse to a Husserlian method of phenomenological reflection in concrete investigations. As a result, the radical historicity of understanding is investigated as a universal and ahistorical structure of the human being, Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger’s failure to depict the binding power of historical meaning undercuts his analysis of authenticity – i.e., of Dasein’s transparent choice of its historical possibilities – in a way that ultimately gives rise to an uncontrolled vacillation between collectivism and subjectivism.

Part Three focuses on Heidegger’s later philosophy. It commences with the years 1928-1933 after the publication of Being and Time in which Heidegger gradually abandons the project of fundamental ontology. It then analyses the so-called “turn” that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the mid 1930s as a turn in his questioning of phenomenality, and traces how the problem of phenomenality is developed in his later writings. I argue that Heidegger’s later thinking of the clearing/event of being is centrally motivated by the effort to show how a historical world can shine forth and prevail as a groundless but binding destiny. Along the way I explicate Heidegger’s conception of the phenomenal dynamics that make a world shine forth as binding, as well as his rearticulation of phenomenology in terms of a historical mode of thinking whose rigor lies in its capacity to attend and answer to the hidden origin of our received understanding of being. In the last chapter I undertake a critical delimitation of the clarificatory force of Heidegger’s late historical thinking of phenomenality, with the aim of distinguishing what it wants to but cannot account for in contrast to what it actually can account for. Here I suggest – elaborating on criticisms previously presented by, e.g., Ernst Tugendhat, Cristina Lafont, and Emmanuel Levinas – that Heidegger’s radical anchoring of phenomenality in our prior understanding of historical meaning ultimately makes him unable to account either for the truth of our understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of the human beings we encounter.

The thesis ends with an epilogue in which I sketch a critique of the ontological difference, which, I argue, is not only the foundation stone of Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality but which is also at the basis of the metaphysics of historical meaning dominating large parts of contemporary philosophy. The critique starts out from a late commentary that Heidegger wrote on Cézanne in 1974, in which Heidegger suggests an “overcoming

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of the ontological difference between being and beings.”¹⁷ Following Heidegger’s suggestion I here attempt to open up and develop, in a provisional fashion, the central question that Heidegger’s self-criticism gives rise to: How should we understand the relationship between our factical understanding of the historical meaning-contexts in which we live and our direct experience of beings? Ultimately, I suggest that we need to conceive of our openness towards the particular beings we experience both as our source of truth and as our source of ethical-existential significance.

17 Heidegger’s original German text is found in Figal [ed.] 2007a, p. 342:

“Überwindung der ontologischen Differenz zwischen Sein und Seiendem.”

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Part One: A Phenomenology of

Factical Life

1.1 Introduction

Martin Heidegger’s breakthrough as an independent philosopher takes place a few months after the end of World War One. In the lecture course

“The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,”¹⁸ delivered at the University of Freiburg in the extraordinary war emergency semester (Kriegsnotsemester) in the beginning of 1919, Heidegger launches the idea that phenomenology, in order to realize its true philosophical potential, needs to develop into an “originary science” (Urwissenschaft) of life:¹⁹ a science that leaves the traditional philosophical effort to find theoretical foundations for our naive everyday experience behind, and takes on the task of explicating and salvaging our factical pre-theoretical experience as our primary and irreducible access to meaningful reality.

It seems no exaggeration to highlight “The Idea of Philosophy” as the decisive opening of Heidegger’s philosophical authorship.²⁰ In his pre-war writings – including his PhD thesis from 1913 and his Habilitationsschrift from 1915 – Heidegger still basically appears as a capable yet unexceptional philosopher on the contemporary academic scene taking his main philosophical cues from Husserlian phenomenology and neo- Kantianism. Had this been all he wrote he would today at most be remembered as a typical figure of the philosophical debate of that time. In

“The Idea of Philosophy,” by contrast, Heidegger for the first time emerges as a distinct and autonomous philosophical voice provisionally opening up many of the basic philosophical questions and motifs that will henceforth guide his thinking. This marks the beginning of a period of lecture courses in which he develops the idea of phenomenology as an originary science.

18 “Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschuungsproblem,” in GA 56/57 (henceforth referred to as “The Idea of Philosophy” in the main text).

19 GA 56/57, p. 12.

20 For an account of the pioneering role of this lecture course in Heidegger’s philosophical authorship, see Kisiel 1993, pp. 15-20; Kisiel 1992.

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However, Heidegger’s way into phenomenology starts earlier than the war emergency semester of 1919. It is clear that already in his student years from 1909 to 1915 Heidegger became electrified by Husserl’s phenomenological impulse without as yet being able to achieve an independent philosophical opening. Let me give a brief overview of the phenomenological motifs entering his thinking during these years, before I turn the attention to his early Freiburg lectures.²¹

In one of his first philosophical publications, “Recent Research in Logic”²² from 1912, Heidegger endorses Husserl’s and the neo-Kantians’

critique of psychologism on account of Lotze’s well-known distinction between the psychological act, which “is” (ist), and the logical sense, which

“holds” (gilt).²³ According to Heidegger, it is a crucial task for philosophy, so far not fully realized, to bring to light “the realm of validity (Geltung)” in its “pure own essentiality” as something distinct both from “the sensorially being” and from “the suprasensorially metaphysical.”²⁴ In regard to the question how this realm of sense should be investigated, he introduces a distinctly Husserlian outlook. Although the “validity-value”

(Geltungswert) of logical sense cannot be founded on psychology, he maintains that the logical is “embedded in the psychic.”²⁵ For an investigation of the psychic to be logically relevant, however, it must take the form of a “phenomenology of consciousness” focusing on “the significances, the sense of the acts.”²⁶ Finally, he insists, with Husserl, that our knowledge of the realm of logical sense must ultimately be grounded on

21 Cf. Heidegger’s late autobiographical sketch “My Way into Phenomenology” (Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie) from 1963, GA 14, pp. 81-86, for a depiction of his early efforts to read and come to terms with Husserl’s Logical Investigations. For more detailed treatments of Heidegger’s pre-war philosophical writings, see Crowell 2001, pp. 76- 111; van Buren 1994a, pp. 51-129; Sheehan 1981; 1988; Denker 2004. See also Kisiel 1993, pp. 25-38.

22 “Neue Forschungen über Logik,” in GA 1.

23GA 1, p. 22.

24 GA 1, p. 24: “Dieses Reich des Geltenden muß jetzt seinem Umfang nach prinzipiell gegenüber dem Sinnlich-Seienden ebenso wie gegenüber dem Übersinnlich- Metaphysischen in seiner reinen eigenen Wesenhaftigkeit herausgehoben werden.”

25 GA 1, pp. 29ff.

26 GA 1, p. 30: “Die Untersuchung geht auf die Bedeutungen, den Sinn der Akte und wird so zur Bedeutungslehre, zur Phänomenologie des Bewußtseins.”

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“insight into the objective states of affair.”²⁷ What is needed is, in short, an intuitive phenomenological investigation of the categorial sense- structures of intentional consciousness along Husserlian lines. In his 1913 dissertation, The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism: Critical and Positive Contributions to Logic,²⁸ Heidegger echoes the same phenomenological motifs in his extended critical investigation of some of the key figures of contemporary psychologism (Wilhelm Wundt, Heinrich Maier, Franz Brentano, Anton Marty, Theodor Lipps). He repeats his notions of the irreducibility of sense and the need to exhibit it phenomenologically while at the same time sharpening the question concerning the ontological sense of this domain of sense: “What is the sense of sense? [...] Perhaps we stand here at something ultimate and irreducible, concerning which a further elucidation is ruled out, and every further question necessarily falters.”²⁹ Up to this point one could say that Heidegger moves within the horizon of Husserl’s phenomenology as a promising philosophical possibility without, however, as yet being able to engage it in an independent questioning of the philosophical matters themselves.

Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift, The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus³⁰ from 1915 exhibits a somewhat bolder effort to push phenomenology in new independent directions of questioning. The main part of the work is devoted to an investigation of the scholastic treatise De modi significandi – a work that was actually written by Duns Scotus’s pupil Thomas von Erfurt in the 13^th century, but which at the time of Heidegger’s habilitation was commonly ascribed to Scotus himself. Here Heidegger for the first time displays his extraordinary talent for historical explication by reading Erfurt’s treatise as an essentially phenomenological analysis of how different logical senses are given in correlation with particular intentional acts of judgment and expression. However, although the main work proceeds within Husserl’s phenomenological framework it is clear that Heidegger wants more than a translation of the scholastic grammatica speculativa into a Husserlian vocabulary. In a footnote to the introduction he highlights Husserl’s decisive importance for the

27 GA 1, p. 39: “Einsicht in den objektiven Sachverhalt.”

28 Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik, in GA 1.

29 GA 1, p. 171. “Was ist der Sinn des Sinnes? [...] Vielleicht stehen wir hier bei einem Letzten, Unreduzierbaren, darüber eine weiter Aufhellung ausgeschlossen ist, und jede weitere Frage notwendig ins Stocken gerät.”

30 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, in GA 1.