WATER AND FIRE AT THE KYRGYZ-TAJIK BORDER

FIIA

COMMENT

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MAY 2021

8

Kristiina Silvan, Research Fellow, FIIA

WATER AND FIRE AT THE KYRGYZ-TAJIK BORDER

FERGHANA VALLEY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT COULD TAKE A TURN FOR THE WORSE

Te latest clash between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan casts a shadow over the region’s already fragile security situation. Te simmering confict in Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley could potentially escalate into an open armed confict between the two states.

In the heart of Central Asia lies the densely populated Ferghana Valley. Te borders of three post- Soviet states, Kyrgyzstan, Tajik- istan, and Uzbekistan, meander through the valley, which is also home to numerous enclaves. Many of the borders are disputed, which fuels inter-ethnic contestation.

Tensions are high, especially in the spring irrigation season when ac- cess to land and water is essential for making a living.

The latest incident started as a row at the water facility in territo- ry claimed by both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On 28 April 2021, lo- cal civilians from both sides threw stones at each other. The conflict then escalated quickly and some- what unexpectedly: border guards got involved in the fghting rather

than trying to suppress it, and the next day, military from both sides exchanged fre. By the time a cease- fre had taken efect, the number of confirmed casualties had risen to 52 dead and 279 wounded. Since much of the fghting took place on the Kyrgyz side of the border, ma- terial and human – mostly civilian – casualties were heavier there, with observers pointing to Tajikistan as the “winner” in the conflict. On 3 May, troops on both sides were withdrawn.

Against the backdrop of the Ferghana Valley’s history, it is easy to assume that there was nothing new in the confict. Te borders of present-day Kyrgyzstan and Tajik- istan were arbitrarily drawn in the Soviet era. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the administrative

borders were automatically trans- formed into state borders, which sparked criticism on both sides.

Negotiations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been ongoing since 2002, and yet 40% of the 971-km bilateral border remains disputed. Over 150 conflicts have been reported on the bilateral bor- der in the past decade.

Even if conficts in the Ferghana Valley appear to be ethnic, they are rooted in material concerns. Land and water shortages in the region have increased in recent years as a result of population growth and cli- mate change. To pressure the other side, local residents commonly block shared water channels and inter- state roads. Moreover, everyday life is further complicated by rampant corruption and drug trafcking.

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8 MAY 2021

Yet April’s escalation can be better explained by a combination of short-term factors. The legit- imacy of Kyrgyzstan’s recently elected President Sadyr Japarov is based on nationalist and pop- ulist claims. Each of his govern- ment’s border deal plans – such as swapping Tajikistan’s lush Vorukh exclave for a dry strip of land in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken district – has been completely unacceptable to Tajikistan. In early April, Kyr- gyzstan conducted an extensive military exercise at the Tajik bor- der. Tere has been talk of taking a unilateral decision to build a new water reservoir in Kyrgyzstan, which, if it materialized, would be a severe blow to Tajikistan’s water management system.

It seems plausible that the rhet- oric and actions of the Kyrgyz au- thorities caused genuine concern in Tajikistan and prompted its leadership to prepare for a poten- tial border confict. Alternatively, some commentators argue that President Emomali Rakhmon was eager to demonstrate Tajikistan’s military capabilities in a “small victorious war” in order to boost his domestic support.

Although it may appear bila- teral, the confict has broader im- plications. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Rus- sia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Yet both the CSTO and Russia seemed reluctant to mediate. While it is entirely pos- sible that Russia has worked behind the scenes to pressure the two war- ring sides to de-escalate – after all, the prime ministers of both coun- tries happened to be in Kazan, Rus- sia when the confict erupted, and Russian Minister of Foreign Afairs Sergei Lavrov reached out to both Japarov and Rakhmon – there is no telling whether Russia would take the initiative in forging a sustaina- ble border resolution. In any case, the fact that Russia’s two regional allies used weapons against each other points to the limits of Russia’s potential for persuasion.

Despite the quickly negotiated ceasefre, the worst may be yet to come.

The Ferghana Valley can be- come another hotbed for a frozen confict. Tension over water shar- ing will not disappear. In the near future, the political situation will not change radically: in the midst

of an economic recession, neither Tajik nor Kyrgyz leaders seem likely to abandon their nationalist rheto- ric. Moreover, the gap and distrust between ofcials in the capitals and the poverty-stricken local commu- nities implies that even if the lead- ers were to negotiate a mutually ac- ceptable deal, local residents might reject it outright. In fact, Kyrgyz officials were recently forced to reopen negotiations over a border deal sealed with the Uzbeks after the residents of one border com- munity in the Kara-Suu district of Osh Province refused to abide by it.

Given that Tajikistan and Kyr- gyzstan are unable to resolve their border issues on their own and no external actor powerful enough has demonstrated the will and abili- ty to mediate, no ceasefire can be seen as permanent. Although a full- scale inter-state war is unlikely, the latest round of hostilities looks worrying. Considering that the conficting states are located in the immediate vicinity of an unstable Afghanistan that is preparing for US troop withdrawal, the issue deserves much more international attention than it has received thus far.