Conceptions of "us" and "them" : the attitude of Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students towards the "other"

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Conceptions of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

The Attitude of Greek Cypriot and Turkish

Cypriot University Students towards the ‘Other’

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Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies No 82

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ANDRI NEOPHYTOU

Conceptions of

‘Us’ and ‘Them’

The Attitude of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot University Students towards the ‘Other’

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies

No 82 Itä-Suomen yliopisto

Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja kauppatieteiden tiedekunta Joensuu

2014

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Juvenes Print, Suomen yliopistopaino Oy Tampere 2014

Editor in-chief: Prof. Kimmo Katajala Editor: MA Eija Fabritius

Sales: University of Eastern Finland Library ISBN (bind): 987-952-61-1435-4(nid.)

ISSN (bind): 1798-5749 ISSN-L: 1798-5749 ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-1436-1

ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757

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Neophytou, Andri

Conceptions of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: The Attitude of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot University Students towards the ‘Other’, [in English] 189 p.

University of Eastern Finland

Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies, 2014 Publications of the University of Eastern Finland,

Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies, no 82 ISBN (nid): 978-952-61-1435-4

ISSN (nid.): 1798-5749 ISSN-L: 1798-5749

ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-1436-1 ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757 Dissertation

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to provide an insight into how Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students construct perceptions of ‘us and them’, their attitudes towards the ‘Other’ and how they consider their in-group in comparison to their out-group. The methodology applied here is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods including questionnaires and document analysis.

The purpose of using qualitative research was to interpret, clarify and validate important issues that emerged from the quantitative research.

Some of the main hypotheses were that ‘proximity with the “Other”’, ‘contact with other cultures’, and ‘sense of nationalism’ are possible data indicators which are correlated with attitudes towards the ‘Other’. The results of this study confirmed the above hypotheses. Meaningful contact of Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students with the ‘Other’ and with other cultures is connected to their more positive attitude towards the ‘Other’. Furthermore, students’ stronger ‘sense of nationalism’, which has the strongest correlation with their attitudes towards the ‘Other’, seems to be connected to their more negative attitude towards the

‘Other’. Another hypothesis was that students would have very negative attitudes towards the ‘Other’, however, this was not confirmed by the results of this research. Despite the fact that students have constructed an ‘us and them’ reality, the research did not show extremely negative attitudes towards the ‘Other’.

Additionally, the results showed that Greek Cypriots have a rather negative attitude, whereas Turkish Cypriots have a rather positive attitude towards the

‘Other’, which is connected to their ‘contact with other cultures’, ‘proximity with the ‘Other’, and ‘sense of nationalism’. The research revealed statistically significant differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriot students in terms of ‘contact with other cultures’, ‘proximity with the “Other”’, and ‘sense of nationalism’, something that is partly consistent with the socio-cultural and political situation in Cyprus at the time of the research.

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As the results show, in both cases, students saw their in-group in a more positive way compared to their out-group. Greek Cypriots considered their cultural group in a rather positive way and their out-group in a negative way. Turkish Cypriots characterised their in-group in a very positive way and their out-group in a rather neutral way. However, students’ stronger identification with their in- group did not correlate with stronger inter-group conflict. Furthermore, both Greek and Turkish Cypriot students were eager to participate in bi-communal events, albeit with low participation levels.

Keywords: Attitude, nationalism, culture, ‘Other’, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish- Cypriot, University students

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Neophytou, Andri

Käsityksiä ‘meistä’ ja ‘heistä’: Kyproksenkreikkalaisten ja kyproksenturkkilaisten yliopisto-opiskelijoiden suhtautuminen ‘Toista’ kohtaan 189 s.

Itä-Suomen yliopisto

Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja kauppatieteiden tiedekunta, 2014 Publications of the University of Eastern Finland,

Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies, no 82 ISBN (nid): 978-952-61-1435-4

ISSN (nid.): 1798-5749 ISSN-L: 1798-5749

ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-1436-1 ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757

Väitöskirja

ABSTRAkTI

Tässä tutkimuksessayselvitettiin, miten kyproksenkreikkalaiset ja -turkkilaiset yliopisto-opiskelijat muodostavat käsityksiä ”meistä ja heistä” sekä tarkasteltiin heidän asenteitaan ”toista” kohtaan ja sitä, mitä he ajattelevat omasta ryhmäs- tään verrattuna toiseen kulttuuriseen ryhmään. Tutkimuksessa käytettiin sekä kvalitatiivisia että kvantitatiivisia menetelmiä, kuten lomakekyselyjä ja doku- menttianalyysia. Kvalitatiivisen otteen avulla oli tarkoitus tulkita, selventää ja todentaa tärkeitä aiheita, joita kvantitatiivisesta tutkimuksesta nousi.

Tärkeimpiä hypoteeseja oli, että ”toisen” läheisyys, kontaktit toisiin kulttuu- reihin ja kansallistunne ovat mahdollisia aineistoindikaattoreita, jotka korrelo- vat ”toiseen” kohdistuvan asenteen kanssa. Tutkimuksen tulokset vahvistivat tämän oletuksen. Kyproksenkreikkalaisten ja -turkkilaisten yliopisto-opiskelijoiden merkitykselliset kontaktit ”toisen” ja toisten kulttuurien kanssa ovat yhtey- dessä heidän myönteisempään asenteeseensa ”toista” kohtaan. Lisäksi opiskelijoiden vahvempi kansallistunne, joka korreloi vahvasti ”toiseen” asennoitumisen kanssa, näyttää olevan yhteydessä heidän kielteisempään suhtaut-miseensa ”toiseen”. Toinen hypoteesi oli, että opiskelijoiden asenteet ”toista” kohtaan olisivat hyvin kielteisiä, mutta tätä tutkimuksen tulokset eivät vahvistaneet. Vaikka opiskelijat ovat luoneet ”me ja he” -todellisuuden, tutkimuksessa ei tullut esiin äärimmäisen kielteisiä asenteita ”toista” kohtaan. Tulokset osoittivat lisäksi, että kyproksenkreikkalaisilla on melko kielteinen asenne, kun taas kyproksenturk- kilaisilla on melko myönteinen asenne ”toista” kohtaan, mikä liittyy heidän kon- taktiinsa toisten kulttuurien kanssa, ”toisen” läheisyyteen ja kansallistunteeseen.

Tutkimuksessa tuli esiin tilastollisesti merkittäviä eroja kyproksenkreikkalaisten ja -turkkilaisten välillä liittyen kontaktiin toisten kulttuurien kanssa, ”toisen” lä- heisyyteen sekä kansallistunteeseen. Tämä vastaa osin Kyproksella tutkimuk- senteon aikaan vallinnutta sosiokulttunrista ja poliittista tilannetta.

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Tutkimustulokset osoittavat molempien ryhmien kohdalla, että opiskelijat suhtautuivat omaan ryhmäänsä myönteisemmin kuin toiseen ryhmään. Kypro- senkreikkalaiset suhtautuivat omaan kulttuuriseen ryhmäänsä melko myön- tei-sesti ja toiseen ryhmään hyvin kielteisesti. Kyproksenturkkilaiset luonneh- tivat omaa ryhmäänsä hyvin myönteisesti ja toista ryhmää melko neutraalisti.

Opiskelijoiden vahvempi identifioituminen omaan ryhmäänsä ei kuitenkaan ilmennyt vahvempana ryhmien välisenä konfliktina. Lisäksi sekä kyproksenkreikkalaiset että -turkkilaiset opiskelijat olivat innokkaita osallistumaan yhtei- siin tapahtumiin, vaikka osallistuminen oli vähäistä.

Avainsanat: asenne, nationalismi, kulttuuri, ”toinen”, kyproksenkreikkalainen, kyproksenturkkilainen, yliopisto-opiskelijat

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor M’hammed Sabour, for his continuous support during my PhD journey which commenced in 2006. His knowledge and personal guidance have been pivotal to the completion of this work. He was always very willing to discuss and offer advice whenever the need arose. Mostly, I appreciate the long discussions we had on several world events/conflicts and the complexity of power relations of groups of people around the world.

I am deeply grateful to Jarmo Houtsonen for his patience and continuous administrative support on the statistical part of the research. He was responsible for the expansion of my confidence in the use of the SPSS statistical package. I would also like to thank Professor Päivi Harinen for her eagerness to read and comment on my thesis during the final stages of the research. Her comments were truly invaluable. I remain grateful to the pre-examiners, Professor Spyro Spyrou from the European University of Cyprus and Professor Sari Hanafi from the American University of Beirut, who offered invaluable review statements. I would like to thank Jarmo Rompanen, Maria Venalainen and Jussi Virratvuori and Kaarina Huotilainen for helping me to overcome practical obstacles, and the editor of the study, Eija Fabritius.

I would like to thank the Greek and Turkish Cypriot professors that allowed me to distribute questionnaires during their lectures. I am grateful to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot University students who participated in the research by completing the survey and gave their own unique comments, during and after the survey. To Aila Määttänen I am grateful for helping me with English to Finnish translations. I am thankful to my friends, Salih Hassan and Christina Ashicalli, for their essential help during the distribution and gathering of the questionnaires. A big ‘thank you’ to my friends, Ritva, Miikka, Milla, Olli Aila and Risto, for their hospitality during my visits to Finland. I extend special thanks to my colleagues and friends, Fadi, Marta and Driss who gave me accurately help- ful comments on my work throughout, during the research seminars.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, Annita, Yiannis, Neophytos, Constantinos and Rafaella, who constantly supported and encouraged me to carry on. A special thanks to Angelos, Annita and Marios, without whose love, patience, understanding and support, this thesis would not have been completed.

Joensuu, March, 2014 Andri Neophytou

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1 Introduction

Cyprus is a small island of approximately one million people and is situated in the Mediterranean Sea at the juncture of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa.

Despite its size, Cyprus was quite often found in conflict situations throughout the centuries due to its geopolitical location as a meeting point between East and West (Appendix 1). It is a culturally diverse place and many questions arise on account of this diversity. Arguably, its main cultural individuality since 1500 A.C. has been a calling for co-existence between its Greek and Turkish Cypriot inhabitants. The two groups are culturally diverse in terms of language and religion, but they are also culturally similar primarily because of their extensive presence on the island.

Studying the attitude of Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students towards the ‘Other’ should be seen as part of a larger problem concerning the in- group and inter-group relations of the two communities throughout history. In this first chapter, I attempt to briefly introduce the historical background and the social, cultural, economic and political situation in Cyprus. Through this historical analysis, I aim to unfold the different repertoires related to the construction of the identities of the two groups and their interconnection with people’s beliefs, attitudes and actions in different moments. Furthermore, this first chapter is linked to the aims of the research as it shows how ‘us and them’ was historically constructed and how it developed throughout the centuries with the minimum or non-existence of bridging policies in the Cypriot context. Finally, towards the end of this chapter, I stress the importance of researching the attitudes of young Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students towards the ‘Other’ mainly because of the serious lack of research dealing with this specific group.

1.1 GREEk AND TURkISH CYPRIOTS IN HISTORY Indisputably, there are many different perspectives describing the history of Cyprus. Among the most dominant perceptions is that which suggests that there is no such thing as a ‘history of Cyprus’; however, in reality, there are many ‘his- tories of Cyprus’ (see Nevzat, 2005). These come from the perspective of the Greek Cypriot, the Turkish Cypriot, the Greek Cypriot centre, left or right, the Turkish Cypriot centre, left or right, the perspectives of foreign countries (e.g., the British perspective), the perspectives of the upper or lower social classes, and probably many others. In this study, I attempt to provide the dominant understandings and interpretations of Cyprus’ history and to provide the best possible realistic por- trait. It is not an easy task, considering that events regarding the history of Cyprus have been variably presented. The 1956 incident (when the British ruled the island) presented below shows the complexity of presenting the history of Cyprus.

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On the evening of 26 May 1956, an inter-communal conflict began between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots living in a mixed village called Aphanya. Below, I describe how the Greek and Turkish Cypriot media broadcast the news. A Greek Cypriot inhabitant¹ of a neighbouring village (Assia) gave the following description, which was broadcast through the Greek Cypriot media:

On the evening of 26 May 1956, a group of armed Turkish Cypriots started shooting at some Greek Cypriots sitting in a cafe in the mixed village of Aphania. Seven people were injured and transported to the Famagusta hospital, including the priest, Papa Nikolaos Georgiou. The bewildered inhabitants of Aphania were unable to react and went to Assia for reinforcements. The village church bell was rung to alert the inhabitants. Hundreds of Greek Cypriots from Assia went to Aphania by car and on foot car- rying knives, pickaxes, and shovels. They attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of the village, from where inhabitants escaped to the Turkish Cypriot village of Ayia Kebir.

Some Turkish Cypriots managed to escape to Nicosia where they informed Fazil Küçük, who, within 30-40 minutes, arrived in the area heading a convoy of British armoured vehicles. A Turkish Cypriot policeman, who was on his way to Ornithi to bring T.C.² reinforcements, was killed, and his fellow passenger escaped. British troops started shooting at Greek Cypriots, and Costas Florou was killed. Tens of Greek Cypriots were arrested. The remainder returned to Assia through the fields.” (Description of Afania clashes (1956) by Yiannis Nikas, Cyprus critical history archive, 2013)

However, the Turkish Cypriot newspaper,³ Kibris Türktür Partisi (Cyprus’

Turkish Party), wrote the following article on the same incident.

The events that occurred in Aphania have been explained: In the Greek coffeehouse on the main road, a quarrel began among Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots heard the noise of a gun or a bomb. Afterwards, a group of people from the Greek neighbourhood started marching towards the Turkish neighbourhood. Greek Cypriots from some other villages, such as Paşa, Timbu, and Makrasika, also participated in the attack. Turkish Cypriots with- drew to the Turkish village, Aya. Greek Cypriots set some empty houses ablaze, burning out one house completely. Ali Mustafa, the son-in-law of the former Mukhtar was killed by Greek Cypriot group. But the murder of this Greek Cypriot was not committed by Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots kept calm and refrained from fighting with Greek Cypriots. Dr.

Fazıl Küçük did not go to Aphania to secure a public order, as Cyprus Radio has claimed, but to inform anxious Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia about the event, as reported by the BBC.

(Statement by the Kibris Türktür Partisi (Cyprus’ Turkish Party) on the Aphania clashes, Cyprus critical history archive, 2013)

1 A.H. (2013) “Description of Afania clashes (1956) by Yiannis Nikas,” Cyprus critical history archive, accessed February 9, 2013, http://omeka.valicom.net/items/show/24. (Giannis Nikas, Recalling the struggle of 1955-59: Personal confessions, Nicosia: K. Epiphaniou Publishing, 2003).

2 TC stands for Turkish Cypriot, whereas GC stands for Greek Cypriot.

3 R.H., “Statement by the Kibris Türktür Partisi (Cyprus’ Turkish Party) on the Aphania clashes,”

Cyprus critical history archive, accessed February 9, 2013, http://omeka.valicom.net/items/show/26.

(“Afanya Hadisesi” in Halkın Sesi, May 29, 1956, pp. 1-2).

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Based on the first broadcast (Greek Cypriot), one could conclude that Turkish Cypriots began the conflict, while Greek Cypriots simply defended themselves.

Conversely, in the second article (Turkish Cypriot), the blame was squarely on Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots were presented as the victims of the conflict. There are probably more interpretations for this incident from other left and/or right leaning newspapers, however, access to them has not been possible.

Nonetheless, the disagreement seen in these two interpretations of the same incident is a widespread phenomenon in the history of Cyprus. The role of the media has been prominent in the inter-communal conflict. Consequently, Direnç (2010) suggests that there should be “…bilingual newspapers, TV channels and websites in order to overcome the negative effects of the hostile media exacerbated by the language issue” (Direnç 2010, p. 35).

Objectivity in presenting the history of Cyprus is an exceedingly difficult, though not impossible, task. Arguably, the choice of materials, sources and their critical analysis lay much on the researchers’ goals (see Akbar, 1988; Holborn, 1972; Stanford, 1976 and others). More specifically, Akbar (1988, p. 8) suggests that

“the role of the neutral social scientist is almost mythical”; as in most of the cases he/she is “both actor and observer”. Yet, conducting indigenous research is invaluable as the social scientist/researcher knows the context very well. Therefore, simultaneously being an actor and an observer is neither good nor bad, but the success of the research depends on the researcher’s aims as well as methods of keeping the balance between acting and observing (see Said, 1978). In this research, in order to tackle the roles of both actor and observer, and to explain the historical background as objectively as possible, I consider various sources written by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greek, Turkish and foreign researchers and historians who have examined the history of Cyprus from different perspectives. Moreover, in this study I use terms that might have political connotations in accordance with European and world decisions/regulations, which do not relate to my personal, political, national or other perceptions. Except for the critical rep- resentation of history, in this first chapter I aim to discuss several social, cultural, economic and political changes occurring at the time of research. These two di- mensions serve as a basis for setting the aims and developing the current thesis.

Cyprus has a long history dating 5,800 years. The first inhabitants probably came from the Balkans, Cilicia or Macedonia. Greeks settled on the island around 2000 B.C. The then Cypriot inhabitants adopted the Greek language, religion and customs.⁴ Despite the fact that throughout the centuries, there were different administrative arrangements and/or other situations (e.g., wars/attacks) whereby different peoples ruled the island (e.g., the Mycenaean, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Franco-English, Franks, Venetians and others), the population remained intrinsically Greek (Mallinson, 2005, p. 9). The ‘Greek-ness’ of the island is one of the main primordial arguments

4 History of Cyprus (a), 2010, p. 32. The Encyclopaedia History of Cyprus was written mainly by Greek and Greek Cypriot historians, and it is probably the newer encyclopaedia for the history of Cyprus written in Greek.

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in the Greek Cypriot/Greek nationalistic discourse which claims that Cyprus has its roots in ancient Greek history. The Turkish or Turkish Cypriot nationalistic discourse, on the other hand, maintains the ‘Turkish-ness’ of Cyprus and supports that in ancient years, Cyprus was part of Turkey, but that it was enveloped by the sea. Very vividly, Volkan (1979, p. 190) mentions: “I can still remember what we learned about Cyprus in elementary school: ‘Cyprus was once connected with Anatolia, but it sank into the sea. It rose only to sink again. For the third time after its third submersion, it was alas, no longer connected to Anatolia’.”

The Ottoman period began in 1571 and lasted until 1878. The British period followed from 1878 until 1960. In 1960, Cyprus became independent, but from then until 1974, it has been characterised as a period of “unrest, internal ethnic conflicts”

(Ozerk, 2001). From 1974 to the present, the Line⁵has divided the two communities (Turkish Cypriots in the North and Greek Cypriots in the South), and as a result, they have autonomous administrations. The Greek Cypriot government is internationally recognised, though not by Turkey, whereas the Turkish Cypriot administration⁶, the TRNC⁷, is recognised only by Turkey. The Cypriot question has remained unresolved since. A quick glance at the historical line raises many questions about the national identities of Cypriots, the subject of the following sub-section.

1.1.1 Ottoman period (1578–1878)

During the Ottoman period (1571–1878), the Ottomans conquered Cyprus, which was under Venetian rule. The Ottomans officially recognised the Greek Orthodox Church as autocephalous and applied the millet system, whereby the church was given the power to regulate social, educational and religious issues (Yilmaz, 2005).

Once the Ottomans conquered the island, they gave two choices to the Cypriots:

to become Muslims or pay a tax called ‘tzizie’, which was double the tax paid by Muslims, which was called ‘charatz’. The second choice gave the right to the conquered to live, but they were considered inferior compared to Muslim inhabitants.⁸ Historical sources referring to this period are rich, though quite often contra- dictory. For instance, in some cases it is presented as a period of prosperity, and in other cases, there are testimonies of massive poverty and arbitrariness.⁹ Greek and Turkish Cypriot discourses use sources in accordance with

5 The Line is also called the Green Line or cease-fire line, or border etc. As Hadjipavlou (2007) mentions: “The Line that splits the island into two is about 112 miles long. This Line carries different names according to one’s positioning in politics, ideology and history. It is referred to as the green line, as it was first called in 1963 after the first inter-ethnic violence, the ceasefire line, the dead zone, the demarcation line, the partitioning line, the Attila line, the no-man’s land or the border, designa- tions after the 1974 events.” In this study, I borrowed Hadjipavlou’s term ‘Line’, which, based on my considerations, sounds more neutral.

6 The word ‘administration’ is used instead of government because the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a non-recognised state. As Sepos (2008, p. 154) maintains, the main argument for ‘non- recognition’ of the TRNC, which has been proposed by the UN and subsequently by the EC/EU, is that under the principle of jus cogens in international law, an entity is not recognised if it is a result of an ‘illegal act’ or ‘aggression’ as the military intervention on the island was characterised by United Nations resolutions. For more on this issue, see Dugard, J. (1987), Recognition and the United Nations.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

7 TRNC stands for Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

8 History of Cyprus (b), p. 76.

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what each party aims to determine (e.g., the barbaric ‘Other’ or the enemy). The Ottomans began a mandatory settlement of Cyprus from 1572 to 1576 by transferring people from Asia Minor (Mikra Asia) to the island.¹⁰ The most obvious differences between Cypriots and Ottomans were language and religion. Language and religion are basic elements in the web of culture. As is later discussed in the analysis on nationalism (Chapter II Theoretical Framework), language and religion can serve to identify and classify individuals within a particular society and to divide peoples and nations of different tongues and beliefs (see Beer and James, 1985, Nielsen et al., 1983), as they are of the most ‘obvious’ characteristics of national identity. At that time (around 1572), both sides remained stuck to their religion, and religion played a significant role in people’s lives. Inhabitants of the island were divided under the names “Christians”

and “Muslims” (see also Constantinou, 2007). The Mosque was responsible for Ottoman Turks and the Church and monasteries were responsible for Greeks.

According to traditional Greek songs, stories and fairy tales, Greeks struggled to gain their freedom from “those of another creed” (Georgiadis, 1978). Religious identity was probably the most valuable part of their being. Additionally, constant conflicts between Greek Cypriots and the Ottoman authorities occurred because of high mandatory taxes. Despite Ozerk’s (2001) notion that at that time there were “no inter group relations”, there are sources¹¹ referring to common struggles between the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of Cyprus against the Ottoman authorities that imposed harsh laws, as was the case during the revolt of 1764. It is apparent that during this period, one could not even think about a

‘Cypriot identity’ as the main identities were Muslim and Christian. The Greek or Turkish identities were not so popular. Arguably, during the Ottoman period the conflict in Cyprus was not related to ethnicity; it developed as such in the following years (Sant Cassia, 1986).

1.1.2 British period (1878–1959)

The separation between the two groups has its roots in the nineteenth century when the Ottoman authorities conveyed Cyprus to the British. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were under the leadership of the British High Commissioner. Greek and Turkish Cypriots met each other in the streets, lived in mixed villages, worked together, but there were no official policies that brought them together (e.g., they studied in different schools). The attitude of the British politicians on the island at the time was based on their widespread colonial policy of “divide and rule”

(Ozerk, 2001), and the members of the two communities did not react to that particular British policy. This is because, at that time, the idea of ‘Cypriot-ness’

probably did not exist.

Not only did the British encourage the partition of Cyprus, they also attempt- ed to convince the world that co-existence between Turks and Greeks was un- realisable and unattainable (see Georgiadis, 1978; Pollis, 1998). According to the

11 For more details, see History of Cyprus (b), p. 143.

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same sources, British politicians spread dissension between the two groups. For example, they allowed the use of Greek school programmes (as they were used in Greece until 1931)¹²in Christian schools in Cyprus. On the other hand, the use of Ottoman educational programmes (used in Turkey) was encouraged in Muslim schools in Cyprus. Apparently, this arrangement offered feelings of security to the members of the two communities as they did not request common educational programmes. As a result, according to Pollis (1973, p. 590), young children learnt foreign languages quite different from their mother tongues. This led to the identification with the Greek or Turkish culture, respectively, something that encouraged the ‘us and them’ perceptions. Therefore, education was deliberately divisive during the British period as there were no common educational programmes, aims, or practices (see also Gregoriou, 2004). This divisive attitude was extended to other facets of the society. There was a constant attachment to the motherlands, Greece and Turkey. For example, Turkish Cypriots very easily and quickly adopted everything that came from Turkey, such as the change of the Turkish alphabet from Arabic to Latin, and the European dressing that Ataturk introduced in Turkey; they celebrated Turkish national holidays including those commemorating Turkey’s victories against Greece (see Yilmaz, 2005). At the same time, in Greece there was intense political activity that encouraged the ‘enosis’¹³ of Cyprus and Greece (the foundation of the Cyprus Central Committee, the Cypriot Students Brotherhood, the Society of Friends of Cyprus, and the Cyprus National Bureau (see Yilmaz, 2005)). The involvement of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus raised the level of nationalism in the two communities as they felt that a stronger country, with which they shared common cultural characteristics, was supportive of their struggle.

During this period, there were episodes, sometimes violent, from both sides that empowered the extreme nationalist rhetoric. For example, in 1907 when Winston Churchill visited the island there was a conflict between Christians and Muslims. The Christians (Greek) requested enosis, which Churchill rejected. Later on, the struggle for enosis became stronger. According to Papadakis, Peristianis and Weltz (2006, p. 2), “Greek Cypriots strove for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots initially expressed preference for the persistence of British rule and later demanded ‘taksim’, the partition of the island”. However, there are examples where Greek and Turkish Cypriots co-operated against specific British policies on Cyprus, especially in matters relating to high taxes, for example, in 1930 when faced with voting for the new economic plan proposed by Stors, the then governor of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots voted against, and Turkish Cypriots did not appear to have voted, thereby helping the Greek Cypriots’ attempt, and therefore, Stor’s plan was not accepted (Stylianou, 1984). Additionally, Papadakis (2001) maintains that up until the 1950s Greek and Turkish Cypriots co-operated in left-wing workers institutions.

12 After October, 1931, when Greek Cypriots demonstrated against British rule, the British did not allow anything ‘Greek’ in schools. Instead, the British language, schoolbooks and curricula were imposed on Greek Cypriots.

13 Enosis: Christians (Greek Cypriots) asked Cyprus to become part of Greece.

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Violent episodes followed in October of 1930 when a group of Greek Cypriots demonstrated and burned the government building (the place where the British governor was). Turkish Cypriots held a more neutral attitude and obeyed the British authorities with whom they kept more balanced relations. Contrarily, the attitude of the British became more negative and strict towards Greek Cypriots.

Persianis adduces that everything ‘Greek’ was prohibited, even writing with blue pen (‘blue’ was associated with the colour of the Greek flag). Similarly, Georgis (1999, pp. 164-165) describes how the Greek flag, Greek symbols and the Greek anthem were all prohibited. Katsonis (2002, pp. 50–52) describes the “British dic- tatorship” which began in 1931 and lasted more than ten years. He refers to the suppression of the legislative council, the imposition of censorship, the prohibition of meetings of more than five people, the prohibition of trade unions, the imprisonment of people and other strict measures.

In 1955, an ethnic struggle began for Greek Cypriots with the establishment of the EOKA A’.¹⁴EOKA A’ was a paramilitary nationalist organisation that aimed to put an end to British rule in Cyprus. Violent episodes followed between the EOKA supporters and the British authorities. The British authorities also consisted of the police, which mainly constituted Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵ As Walker (2005, p. 89) asserts, there were Turkish Cypriots like Rauf Dektash¹⁶ who struggled against EOKA A’ and for the condemnation of its supporters in cooperation with the British authorities. It is possible that not all Turkish Cypriots followed Denktash’s policy; however, these actions gave ground to Greek Cypriot nationalistic rhetoric, which contended that Turkish Cypriots were supporters of the ‘enemy’ (see Ozkirimli, 2005). Consequently, the message was that Turkish Cypriots should also be treated as enemies by Greek Cypriots. Arguably, the struggle by EOKA A’ led to the disturbance of relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and between Greek Cypriots. This was so because not all Greek Cypriots supported the EOKA A’ struggle. For instance, the communist party, AKEL,¹⁷ was against the use of violence as it recognised that this would dis- rupt relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.¹⁸ ‘Cypriotism’ failed during this period. As Loizides (2007, p. 178) notes “…Leftists suffered repression from both the British colonial authorities and the dominant ethnocentric Church”. Despite the facts that during this period, the most dominant identities were Greek and Turkish, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were not one voice, and undoubtedly, there were internal differences regarding their attitudes towards the ‘Other’.

14 EOKA A’: /Ethinki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston/ is the same as the National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle. The ‘Cypriot’ included only Greek Cypriots. Later on, in 1974 another EOKA was established, called EOKA B’, as is later explained.

15 Encyclopaedia History of Cyprus (c, p. 161) mentions that two-thirds of the police officers were Turkish Cypriots.

16 Rauf Denktash had a leading role in the foundation of TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) in 1957, and held the title of ‘Crown Prosecutor’. Additionally, he was one of the former leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. He was the elected leader of the Turkish Cypriots for 19 years.

17 AKEL: /Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou/ and is the same as the ‘Progressive Party of Working People’.

18 History of Cyprus, (c), p. 161.

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The establishment of EOKA was followed by that of TMT¹⁹in 1957. The Turkish Cypriot side argued that this action was a response to the EOKA struggle that caused fear among them (see Salih, 1968), but TMT actions in the years that followed showed that its members struggled for the partition of the island. After the EOKA struggle, and as world conditions became favourable (many British colonies became independent during this period), the island received its independence from the British in 1960.

1.1.3 Period of independence and ethnic conflict (1960–1974)

Cyprus was declared an independent state with the signing of the Zurich and London agreements in 1960. The constitution, among others, foresaw that Cyprus would become independent and that it would have three guarantor powers, Greece, Turkey and Britain. The constitution gave the guarantor powers the right to inter- fere in Cyprus’ internal affairs when they considered it necessary. Also, as part of the agreements, the British would keep ninety-nine square miles as British sovereign territory after independence. The British Sovereign territories remain on the island until today (Mallinson, 2005). The constitution soon proved inadequate to balance the two communities’ nationalisms and protect minorities (see Philippou, 2007). Yilmaz (2005) and Hadjipavlou (2006) express similar ideas. More specifically, Hadjipavlou (2006, p. 341) argues that “The imposed constitution in 1960 did not leave space for Cypriotness and integrative institutions to develop; instead the majority/minority model permeated every aspect of life creating mistrust and separation”. In 1960, the last inventory of the population took place, and it showed that 18.1% (103,822 people) were Turkish Cypriots and 78.2% (447,901 people) were Greek Cypriots. There are also three other minority (around 2% of the total population) members of the Greek Cypriot community, namely, the Armenian, Maronite and Latin minorities. Several researchers (see Constantinou, 2007; Drevet, 2000;

Mavratsas 2000, 2003; Varnava, 2010) reveal that the abovementioned minorities²⁰ suffer from internal exclusion.²¹ That is because they have been the victims of Greek and Turkish nationalism, which has kept them almost invisible.

After independence in 1960, Cypriots had the ‘opportunity’ to co-operate in many areas, politically, economically and otherwise. Some studies note that during the first three years, there was peace and prosperity on the island, as Turkish and Greek Cypriots had close relations (see History of Cyprus, 2010; Georgiadis, 1978). Conversely, the following years (1963-1974) were not so prosperous because of continuous conflict between the two groups, which finally led to the division of Cyprus.

Several researchers (e.g., Hatay & Bryant, 2008; Patrick 1976; Purcell 1969;

Volkan 1979) refer to the violent episodes that began during the Christmas

19 TMT stands for Turkish Resistance Organization. It was a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation that was formed by Rauf Denktash and the Turkish Military as a response to EOKA in 1957. It was very active until 1974.

20 The attitude of the state towards minorities could be discussed with reference to the global discus- sion on minority rights and minority protection.

21 The term is used in Varnava, 2010.

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of 1963 and lasted until 1967. More specifically, Papadakis (2006, p. 2) maintains that: “During this period, Turkish Cypriots, the weaker party, bore most of the costs in terms of casualties; around one-fifth of their people gradually were displaced in refugee camps. Fearful of Greek Cypriots and urged by their Partitionist leadership too, they set up enclaves scattered throughout the island”. Turkish Cypriot official documents indicate that 30,000 Turkish Cypriots permanently moved to other countries during the years 1963-1974. Hatay and Bryant (2008), who also describe the Turkish Cypriots as “enclaves” during this period, support that because of the difficulties they faced, they created a new collective identity. This collective identity was strengthened as co-operation was necessary for survival.

The events of 1963 were followed by those of 1974. In 1974, Junta, an extreme Greek nationalist group of politicians and military servants (also supported by Greek Cypriots), violently displaced the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios C’; Turkey then invaded Cyprus with the justification that the Turkish Army in- tended to protect Turkish Cypriot rights. In Turkish history books, the invasion is not referred to as such; it is seen as a friendly intervention or involvement²² and the Turkish Army is regarded as the saviour. There were many negative results of 1974. People were displaced from their homes, others died, while some others remain unaccounted. According to Papadakis (2006, p. 3): “This time, Greek Cypriots bore the heavier human cost of these events in terms of people killed, missing, and displaced; the number of displaced people amounted to almost one-third of all Greek Cypriots.” For Sant Cassia (2007, p. 176), Greek Cypriots losses did not only entail missing people, homes and property in the north, but also, their initial belief that they lost the opportunity to have an “original pre-lapsarian ideal state”. This idea could not be generalised to include all Greek Cypriots as there were people who differed and did not believe in the creation of an original pre-lapsarian ideal state. However, after 1974 the Line became more permanent, physically and mentally, for Cypriots. Any co-operation with the ‘enemy’ was prohibited by both sides.

During the period, 1963-1974, extreme nationalist movements from both sides – EOKA B’ for the Greek Cypriots and TMT for the Turkish Cypriots – attracted an increasing number of civilians in an effort to safeguard their national identity, to secure the ‘Greek-ness’ or the ‘Turkish-ness’ of Cyprus, to fight for language, religion and culture. Both organisations had support from nationalistic segments in Greece and Turkey, respectively. Moral and physical violence was posed on people from both sides. Groups of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, who did not abide by the extreme nationalist rhetoric of EOKA B’ and TMT, suffered violence from both conflicting factions simultaneously. For example, a Greek Cypriot who did

22 The word ‘invasion’ is adopted here as it was recognised by international regulations and decisions (see Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, UN Security Council Resolution 367/1975, and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, e.g., the case of Titina Loizidou vs. Turkey).

As stated by the European Commission of Human Rights, the Turkish invasion did not only aim to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority, it also seriously affected Greek Cypriot civilians who were not related to the oppression of Turkish Cypriots.

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not support EOKA B’ was both chased by the Turkish Cypriot TMT and by the Greek Cypriot EOKA B’. Turkish Cypriots were met with similar levels of violence (see also Loizides, 2007; Papadakis, 2001). Nationalism in Cyprus during this period has been variably called, such as ethnocentrism, nationalism or extreme nationalism and patriotism, depending on whom it came from and for what reason.

During these years, there was a huge effort to ‘preserve’ each group’s cultural characteristics (mostly religion, language and customs) through the use of arms, but also through poetry, media and school education (see Chapter III, Qualitative Analysis Results). Photographs, booklets and other informative material depict- ing the barbarism of the ‘Other’ have also circulated around the world. Media, as

“conveyors of information about issues and actors, according to their professional norms and values” (Lazarou, 2011, n.pag) presented images that could hardly be erased from Cypriot minds. According to Lazarou (2011), the conflict in Cyprus could have been solved a long time ago if hostile images, prejudices and national stereotypes were not presented by the mass media.

Additionally, extreme nationalist political rhetoric was presented in the media. Navaro-Yashin (2006) quotes Rauf Dektash (the former leader/president of the TRNC)²³:

I am a child of Anatolia. I am Turkish in every way and my roots go back to Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, and my whole being. I have a state as well as a motherland. The notions of “Cypriot culture”, “Turkish Cypriot”, “Greek Cypriot”,

“a shared Republic” are all nonsense. If they have their Greece and we have our Turkey, why should we live under the roof of the same Republic?...Some individuals are producing action about the existence of “Cypriots”, “Turkish Cypriots”, “Greek Cypriots”. There is no such thing as a “Turkish Cypriot”. Don’t dare to ask us whether we are “Cypriots”. We could take this as an insult. Why? Because there is only one thing that is “Cypriot” in Cyprus, and that is the Cypriot donkey. (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, p. 85-86)

Navaro-Yashin (2006) contends that until 2004,²⁴Denktash’s words about the national identity of Turkish Cypriots were the official policy of the TRNC. The above rhetoric was extended to specific policies adopted by Turkish Cypriots such as the avoidance of relations with the European Union. Beyatli (2011, p. 135) concurs that Denktash “…never considered building relations with the European Union or the international community in general. As he saw things, his country was under unjust embargoes and those imposing these embargoes on Turkish Cypriots were enemies not to be trusted.” Denktash’s rhetoric is in line with Ozkirimli’s (2005) description of nationalism. Referring to the social constructionist perspective, Ozkirimli (2005) concludes, among other things, that nationalist discourse di- vides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, as the world is perceived in terms of ‘friends’

and ‘enemies’. In Denktash’s thinking, Turkey and a few Arab countries were

23 TRNC is equal to Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

24 From 1985 until 2004, Denktash was the elected leader of Turkish Cypriots. There was a turnover of parliamentary power in December, 2003 and a referendum in April, 2004.

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friends, whereas Greek Cypriots, Greece, Europe and the rest of the world, that isolated the Turkish Cypriot community after 1974, were enemies.

Extreme nationalist rhetoric also appeared on the Greek Cypriot side, which shows that the discourse on nationalism (from a social constructionist perspective) ‘hegemonises’, as it is about power and domination (Ozkirimli, 2005, p.

33). For example, Glafkos Clerides (former president of the Republic) argued:

“We, the Greek Cypriots have full control of the government today. We do not have the vice-president and his vetoes, neither the three Turkish ministers. All ministers are Greek. Our government is the only one internationally recog- nized. Why bring in the Turks again?” (Kizilyurek, 1999, p. 43). Clerides’ words conceivably sought to justify the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot authority;

furthermore, these words aimed to ‘hegemonise’, to produce hierarchies among the actors, in this case, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In Clerides thinking,

‘us, the dominant group’ refers to Greek Cypriots and ‘them, the subordinate group’ to Turkish Cypriots.

Drawing on the social constructionist approach, in both abovementioned cases (Denktash and Clerides), we can recognise an attempt to ‘naturalise’

nationalism, where “National values are no longer seen as social values and appear as facts of nature – they become taken for granted, common sense and hegemonic” (Ozkirimli, 2005, p. 33). Arguably, political rhetoric²⁵ (see Direnç, 2010) played a major role in the formation of the different identities in Cyprus, the construction of ‘otherness’ and the perpetuation of ‘us and them’.

1.1.4 Lines, Annan Plan, referenda, European Union

From 1974 until April of 2003 when the lines opened only for short visits, the two groups had no communication. Greek Cypriots were forbidden from going to the north of the island, while Turkish Cypriots were barred from entering the south. The groups lived apart for 30 years. In both cases, an attachment to motherlands/fatherlands²⁶ was observed. Özkirimli and Sofos (2008) support that nationalism in Cyprus, was definitely connected to nationalism in Greece and Turkey. Similarly, Broome (2004, p. 191) explains that the conflict in Cyprus was driven originally by extreme nationalist rhetoric, intolerance of cultural differences, mistreatment of minorities and use of violence to subvert the political process (see also, Anastasiou, 2002).

Therefore, this long history, full of conflicts and challenges probably played a significant role in the formation of Cypriots’ national identity and attitude towards the ‘Other’ Cypriot. When some of the lines ‘opened’ in 2003, there were many reactions in support of Cypriots. Some people denied crossing the Line, some others went for short visits and some others frequently crossed. Despite their pain

25 I chose the rhetoric of the above two political figures in Cyprus (Denktash and Clerides) as they have been protagonists in Cypriot political life since 1955. Denktash was associated with the foundation of TMT and Clerides with the foundation of EOKA A’. Denktash was elected president of the TRNC in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 (for 19 years). Clerides was elected president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1993 and 1998 (for 10 years).

26 Greece for Greek Cypriots and Turkey for Turkish Cypriots.

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and frustration, people who visited their ‘lost’ houses recognised the friendliness of the ‘Other’ who invited them for coffee and had the opportunity to exchange stories and feelings (see also Hadjipavlou, 2007).

In the course of the divisive policies and practices, the nationalist rhetoric – from top to bottom (e.g., political indoctrinations, decisions, practices), and from bottom to top (e.g. informal discussions of people in coffee shops) – persisted after 1974. On 24 April 2004, Cypriots were given the option of two separate referenda:

to vote on whether or not they accepted the Annan Plan. The plan was proposed by Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the United Nations. There was a referendum on 24 April 2004 where the two sides were to vote in order to accept or reject the plan for the island’s re-unification. Greek Cypriots voted against the plan (75.38% against) for many reasons. The majority of Greek Cypriots was not convinced of the successful implementation of all the Annan Plan articles, since some basic ideas were not included, such as the dissolution of the Turkish Army. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots, who mainly voted for the Annan plan (64.91% in favour), considered that it was a unique opportunity for prosperity, democracy, peace and welfare. According to Hadjipavlou (2007), “Before the referenda, there occurred many changes in the Turkish Cypriot community, namely massive mobilization and public demonstrations led by the Left and the Center-left, the youth and NGOs, all supporting a change of leadership and of the status quo.” Turkey did not hold a negative attitude toward the Annan Plan, which was probably linked to the acknowledgment of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians that the unresolved Cyprus problem was a barrier to Turkey’s EU membership aspirations (see Eralp, 2010).

The atmosphere on the Greek Cypriot side was quite different as the president of Cyprus, Tasos Papadopoulos (supported by the centre and left political parties), encouraged Greek Cypriots not to vote for the plan as it “did not respond to the Greek Cypriots’ need for security and implementation of their full human rights” (Hadjipavlou, 2007). According to Turkish Cypriot youth ideas expressed in a bi-communal youth training group (Jumpstart²⁷ Conflict Resolution Training, Agros, 11-13 September, 2009), the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan as they believed that it was a great opportunity for democracy, and they also believed that coexistence was possible (see Christou, 2004). They also admitted that after the referendum, they developed very negative attitudes towards Greek Cypriots because they held them responsible for the rejection of the plan. They argued that the rejection of the plan meant a rejection of co-existence with Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, Turkish Cypriot participants accused Greek Cypriots of not wanting to ‘lose’ their current financial status. On the other hand, the majority of Greek Cypriot students expressed the belief that Turkish Cypriots only accepted the plan for their own financial interest. Moreover, Greek Cypriot participants tried to clarify that the

27 Jumpstart Conflict Resolution Training was a bi-communal meeting of young people aged 18-30, where issues about history and conflict resolution were discussed. It was held in the village of Agros in Cyprus between 11-13 September 2009. The author was one of the participants.

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plan did not guarantee security and stability. Conceivably, the results of the referenda had an impact on people’s lives and further influenced the ‘us and them’ perception, as is later discussed. Hadjipavlou (2007) also confirms that a period of frustration followed. Turkish Cypriots adopted the attitude that “the Greeks do not want us”, and Greek Cypriots believed that “the Turks do not understand us…”

Cyprus, not united,²⁸but divided after the results of the referenda, joined the European Union in May 2004. Several researchers (e.g., Diez, 2002; Eralp, 2010;

Philippou, 2005) have discussed the role of the EU as a ‘catalyst’ for the Cypriot problem. Eralp (2010), who discusses EU membership as a ‘catalyst’ for a solution, highlights the fact that there was “an imbalanced structure of incentives/

conditionality provided for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the one hand and Greek Cypriots on the other.” As he explains, there was a strong element of conditionality for the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side, as the accession of Turkey in the EU was linked to the solution of the Cypriot problem. This conditionality did not exist for the Greek Cypriot side. Related to this, Loizides and Keskiner (2004) explain that as Greek Cypriots were assured their accession to the EU, they did not have a “pressing need to demonstrate a cooperative attitude towards the plan” (Loizides & Keskiner, 2004, p. 159).

Joining the European Union was largely embraced by Greek Cypriots for many reasons. Firstly, they considered that inclusion in the European Union would lead to the solution of the Cypriot conflict (see Christou, 2004; Diez, 2002; Faustmann, 2011; Philippou, 2005). As Diez (2002, p. 139) puts it, there was a widespread belief that accession to the EU²⁹ would have a catalytic effect on the Cyprus issue. The idea was that with the support of ‘motherland’ Greece, Turkey – that also applied to join the European Union – would positively enhance its policies in relation to the Cypriot problem. There was a widespread notion among Greek Cypriots that Turkey would be ‘obliged’ to support democratic means of solving the Cypriot problem, thereby eschewing the use of armed force. As Philippou (2007) puts it, “The EU has been attentive to its ‘democratic deficit’” (Philippou, 2007, p. 69).

Moreover, joining the EU was seen culturally as a natural step for Greek Cypriots, as Cyprus, for Greek Cypriots, is closer to Greece and to Europe (see Diez, 2002; Gregoriou, 2004; Philippou, 2005). More precisely, Europe could be attractive to Greek Cypriots because of the way European citizenship is defined in EU centers like Maastricht and Amsterdam. As Philippou (2007, p. 70) asserts: “European citizenship (as defined in Maastricht and Amsterdam) only included economically active citizens and nationals of member-states, while it excluded immigrants (for example, Turks and Muslims), third country nationals, refugees, asylum-seekers, non-Europeans and ethnic-minority communities”.

President Papadopoulos³⁰ (2003) described the entrance of Cyprus in the EU as

28 Only the South has joined the EU, which is represented by the elected Greek Cypriots representatives.

29 EU stands for European Union.

30 Papadopoulos, T. (2003) Speech at the ceremony of the signing of the Treaty of Accession, Athens, 16 April. Available online at: www.pio.gov.cy.special issue141.htm In Philippou (2007).

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leading to an “economic, political and cultural bridge linking the two shores of the Mediterranean”, as well as “a necessary bridge of mutual understanding and cooperation between the various religions, cultures and ways of life” (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 244). Philippou (2007) argues that the concept of “Europe” could be used as a tool to “revisit ethnocentric constructions of national identity and citizenship in Greek Cypriot education” (Philippou, 2007, p. 76).

However, Turkish Cypriots did not share the jubilation experienced by the Greek Cypriot side following the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.

This arrangement would force them to remain in a subordinate position politically and economically until another was presented. For Turkish Cypriots, EU accession was seen as an opportunity to escape from existing economic restrictions and from the influence of Turkey (Vural & Rustemli, 2006). In addition, Beyatli (2011, p. 134) emphasises that despite the fact that “Turkish Cypriots hold a very high opinion of the capabilities of the Union… the European Union does not fully understand and appreciate the peculiarity of the situation Turkish Cypriots found themselves in after 1 May 2004”. Beyatli’s thinking is based on the idea that Turkish Cypriots had many expectations³¹ of the European Union as they considered that the EU was “capable of doing anything and everything should they wish” (Beyatli, 2011, p. 134). However, the European Union could not respond to these expectations. Turkish Cypriots did not join the European Union and they suffered the disappointment. Moreover, as Eralp (2010) points out, nowadays the Cyprus problem has become a major factor negatively affecting the Turkey-EU relationship.

Indisputably, these references to the past give useful hints on developing the current thesis. Issues concerning nationalism, majority/minority conflicts, ‘us and them construction’, otherness, contact with the other, the use of media/images, stereotyping and others are derived from the brief description of the history of Cyprus. While the historical context is invaluable, it is equally important to look at the different contextual aspects of society at the time of the research. What fol- lows is a brief description of important issues occurring at the time of the research in relation to Europe and the world.

1.1.5 The social, economic, cultural and political context at the time of the research

There has been an increasing recognition in the last few years that culture and diversity are vital elements to countries’ economies, competitiveness and international relations. According to Constant, Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009, p.

2), “In May 2007, the (European) Commission proposed three objectives: cul-

31 As Beyatli (2011) supports, the European Union dream of Turkish Cypriots began in 2001. “Change was started by a group of businesspeople who organised themselves in the Businessmen Association and took over the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (TCCoC) in April, 2001. In June, 2001, the Chamber announced its vision, pointing to a settlement and EU membership as the magical formula to solve all the problems the Turkish Cypriots were experiencing” (Beyatli, 2011, p. 137). Before 2001, Turkish policies, in agreement with Turkish Cypriot politicians, did not support any kind of contact with the European Union, as it was seen as co-operating with the enemy (see also Denktash’s policies later in this chapter).

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tural diversity and intercultural dialogue; culture as a catalyst for creativity;

and culture as a key component in international relations”. Referred to as the Lisbon Strategy (or Lisbon Agenda), this underlined the EU’s commitment to diversity and intercultural cooperation. Certain aims were set by the European Union such as equal opportunities for all, intercultural dialogue, creativity and innovation.

Following such calls at the time of the research, the political rhetoric in Cyprus was driven in a more positive direction, compared to previous years, and there appeared to be a strong political will to solve the ‘Cyprus problem’.³² The former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias (voted by the majority of the Greek Cypriots, supported by left and centre political parties), outlined his policy on the Cyprus issue in his address at the ceremony for his investiture at the special session of the House of Representatives on 28 February 2008 (Investiture speech, p. 2); in this speech, he said:

“A just, viable and functional solution that will terminate the occupation and colonization of our country; a solution that will restore the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and will exclude any rights for military intervention in the internal affairs of our country by foreign powers; a solution that will reunite the territory, the people, the institutions and the economy of our country in the framework of a bi-zonal, bi- communal federation…” In his investiture speech, the president addressed Turkish Cypriots and assured them that he had the best intentions for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

Another positive political action was the establishment of the working groups and the technical committees, composed of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The working groups’ aim was to engage in pre-work concerning government and power relations, European issues, security, property and financial issues that would help the peace negotiations among leaders. In addition, the technical committees aimed to deal with themes such as criminality, human relations, health, environ- ment and conflict resolution. This new idea of the bi-communal working groups and technical committees gave new hope for a sustainable solution to the Cypriot problem, and as the Special Representative of the United Nations in Cyprus, Elisabeth Spehar, mentioned “…the beginning of this work is a proof of commitment of both leaders and their constructive attitude…” (Spehar, 2008).

An initial attempt to demolish the Line of Ledras Street (in Greek) or Lokmaci Street (in Turkish) that divided Nicosia for almost half a century and lay in the heart of Nicosia, took place the night of 09 March 2007. The decision was taken by the then president of Cyprus, Tasos Papadopoulos. The line was demolished from the Greek Cypriot side, late and without warning. Even though the line did not open to the public, it was a sign of goodwill, however, this initiative generated many negative and positive reactions (see Cyprus Press and Information Office, 2007). The reactions by the youth varied and are worthy of mention. On the one hand, a group of young

32 With reference to the ‘Cyprus’ problem’, politicians and others refer exclusively to the political problem of the island between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Conceptions of "us" and "them" : the attitude of Greek and Turkish Cypriot university students towards the "other"