Hume’s Scepticism and Realism
His Two Profound Arguments against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
U N I V E R S I T Y O F T A M P E R E ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of
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This study was carried out in the Finnish Doctoral Program in Philosophy, at the Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Philosophy, University of Tampere. It was accomplished as part of a project of the Academy of Finland, The Possibility of Metaphysics in Twentieth Century and Contemporary Philosophy. The dissertation was supported financially by the University of Tampere, the University of Tampere Foundation, and the Academy of Finland.
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to three people without whom what is best in this dissertation would not be what it is. My official supervisor and teacher, Professor Leila Haaparanta has provided invaluable support and advice over the years. Lecturer Lauri Mehtonen’s teaching and influence has been absolutely crucial. Starting from the first day of my studies at the university, he has guided me in my pursuit of the truth about Hume. He is sine qua non of this work. The same can be said of Dr Peter Millican (Hertford College, Oxford). In the Introduction, I will describe his substantial influence, but here it is appropriate to thank him warmly for many discussions on Hume and for arranging my stay at the University of Leeds, spring 2005.
I would also like to thank the official referees of the dissertation, Professors Donald L.M. Baxter (University of Connecticut) and Olli Koistinen (University of Turku), for reading, commenting, and assessing the manuscript. Virginia Mattila (M.A.) gave guidance on idiomatic English and I am grateful for that.
Many colleagues have influenced the work directly or indirectly. I can mention only a few of them here. Assistant Professor Eric Schliesser (Syracuse University) read and commented parts of the work. Dr Miira Tuominen (University of Helsinki) did the same for the section on ancient scepticism that did not end up in the book. With Erna Oesch (Lic. Phil.), Dr Martina Reuter, Dr Roomet Jakapi, Dr Juhana Lemetti, Ville Lähde (M.A.), Vili Lähteenmäki (M.S.S.), Ville Paukkonen (M.S.S.), assistant Arto Repo, Dr Markku Roinila, Dr Petri Räsänen, Mr Tuomas Tiainen, and Dr Valtteri Viljanen, I have enjoyed many discussions on Hume, British Empiricism, and early-modern philosophy. The “select” society gathered around Mehtonen - Dr Juha Koivisto, Dr Mikko Lahtinen, and Lecturer Markku Mäki - affected me profoundly as a young undergraduate, and the effect lasts. This harvested the seeds sown by my philosophy teacher in high school, Reijo Ylimys, who kindled my passion for philosophy. The last but not the least has been the passionate, vivid and lively bunch of my fellow students and colleagues at the department: Marika, Mirja, Jaana, Tintti, Vesa, Antti, Mika, Tomi, Timo Klemola, Petri Koikkalainen, Ilmari,
Even a philosopher needs intimates. It is not possible to describe the importance of my parents Raili and Rauli for everything. With my sister Riina, I could always refine my argumentative skills. More recently, she and my nieces Carmeline and Noela have taught me something that cannot be grasped without experiencing it (and Frank, thanks for being not so silent company). My uncle Mika set an example for me (good or bad) very early, which originates in the family of my grandmother Eva and late grandfather Hemmo. I have also had the priviledge to enjoy the fruits of the lake and forest with my parents-in-law, Riitta and Pentti. My sister-in-law Teija and her daughter Julia are almost the second family for me. I have also been fortunate to have “philosophical” friends to talk about everything and anything in human life:
Erkki, Tiina, Markus, Juha, Marc, and Janne.
In the end it is my beloved wife Tiina who made all possible. Otherwise I would not be writing this and the world would be “this world of none”.
Jani Hakkarainen
Tampere, November 2007
TwoProfound Arguments against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
Jani Hakkarainen
University of Tampere, Finland ABSTRACT
The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking.
A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment on Metaphysical Realism, whereas as a common man he firmly believes in the existence of mind-independent, external, and continuous entities. Therefore Hume does not have any one position; accordingly, a form of “no one Hume” interpretation (Richard Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter) is argued for in the book.
The key point in this distinction is the temporal difference between Hume’s philosophical and everyday views. It is introduced in order to avoid attributing a conscious contradiction to him (a problem which has not attracted enough attention in the literature). The method of the work is modelled on Peter Millican’s work on Hume and induction. The approach to the main problem is to study the two
“profound” arguments against the senses that Hume presents in the Section 12 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). These arguments are first reconstructed in detail resulting in Millican-type diagrams of them and then Hume’s endorsement of them is established on the basis of the diagrams. The first profound argument concludes that Metaphysical Realism and thus any Realistic theory of perception is unjustified as well as the existence of God and the soul. The second argument goes further having first conceptual conclusion: the very notions of Real entitity, material substance, and bodies are completely out of the reach of the faculty of understanding. Therefore they ought to be rejected according to Hume. This is a consequence of the consistent use of the Humean faculty of reason: idea-analysis and inductive inference. The second profound argument thus concludes that believing in Metaphysical Realism is inconsistent with the rational attitude that is to refrain from
The study is finished by arguing that this sceptical and Metaphysically Realistic interpretation concurs well with (1) Hume’s professed Academical philosophy and (2) project of the science of human nature. (1) According to Hume, Academical philosophy is in the first place diffidence, modesty, and uncertainty including suspension on certain issues. Secondly, it is restriction of the range of topics for which experience can provide a standard of truth. This kind of empiricist epistemological realism is coherent with the sceptical attitude on Metaphysical Realism because the latter does not rule out inter-subjective consensus on what we experience. (2) Suspension of judgment on Metaphysical Realism coheres with the mind-dependency of the objects of Hume’s science of human nature: the understanding, passions, morals, aesthetics, politics, and the human culture in all of its manifestations.
Although the study takes the first Enquiry to be Hume’s authorised word on the understanding, his juvenile work A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is argued to support this “no one Hume” interpretation. Hume’s other works are also discussed when needed.
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS OF REFERENCES ...IX 1 INTRODUCTION ...XI
1.1 OFDIFFERENTINTERPRETATIONS ON THEPROBLEM...XII
1.2 THESES...XXIII
1.3 REFERENCES...XXIV
1.4 OFMETHOD...XXVII
1.5 OVERVIEW...XXIX
2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS...31
2.1 HUME’SSENSIBILISM... 31
2.2 OFTERMINOLOGY... 32
2.3 STRUCTURE OFEHU 12 ... 34
2.4 HUME’SCONCEPTION ANDREFUTATION OFPYRRHONISM... 38
3 PROFOUND ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SENSES ... 43
3.1 OVERVIEW... 43
3.2 RECONSTRUCTIONMETHOD... 48
3.3 FIRSTPROFOUNDARGUMENT... 49
3.3.1 Structure ... 49
3.3.2 Primary Opinion... 52
3.3.3 Counter-Argument to the Primary Opinion... 60
3.3.4 Philosophical System ... 70
3.3.5 Counter-Argument to the Philosophical System ... 75
3.3.6 Diagram of the First Profound Argument... 92
3.4 SECONDPROFOUNDARGUMENT... 94
3.4.1 Structure ... 94
3.4.2 Distinction between Primary and Sensible Qualities ... 97
Of the History of the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities... 97
Starting Point of the Second Profound Argument...103
3.4.3 Argument against the Distinction between Primary and Sensible Qualities...106
3.4.4 Objection to the Counter-Argument...111
3.4.5 Objection to the Objection...120
3.4.6 Conclusion...123
Pre-1777 Conclusion...123
1777 Supplementary Conclusion...136
3.4.7 Diagram of the Second Profound Argument ...140
4 HUME’S ATTITUDE TO THE PROFOUND ARGUMENTS ...142
4.1 TEXTUALEVIDENCE...142
4.2 ARGUMENTBASED ONRECONSTRUCTIONS...146
4.2.1 First Profound Argument...147
Counter-Argument to the Primary Opinion ...147
Philosophical System ...158
Counter-Argument to the Philosophical System...159
Conclusion of the Argument...168
First Profound Argument and the Treatise...169
4.2.2 Second Profound Argument...177
Counter-Argument to the Distinction between Primary and Sensible Qualities...179
Objection to the Counter-Argument and the Objection to It...184
Pre-1777 Conclusion of the Argument ...188
1777 Supplementary Conclusion of the Argument ...227
5 CONCLUSION...262
5.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THEPROFOUNDARGUMENTS...263
5.1.1 Justification ...263
5.1.2 Intelligibility and Irrationality ...265
5.2 FURTHERTEXTUALEVIDENCE...270
5.2.1 Justification ...270
5.2.2 Irrationality...273
5.3 HUME’SATTITUDE TOMETAPHYSICALREALISM...282
5.4 HUME ON THETHEORIES OFPERCEPTION...293
5.5 HUME’S PROGRAMME...300
6 REFERENCES...307
6.1 PRIMARY REFERENCES...307
6.2 SECONDARY REFERENCES...309
ABBREVIATIONS OFREFERENCES
Abs. An Abstract of a Book lately published
App. The Appendix (to A Treatise of Human Nature)
Categ. Categories
CDP The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
CE A Companion to Epistemology
CSM The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
DHP Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
DNR Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
E Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary
EHU, first Enquiry An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding EPM, second Enquiry An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals
Essay An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
HL The Letters of David Hume
LO Lennon-Olscamp translation of The Search after Truth LS Liddell and Scott’s Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon Letter A Letter from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh
OED Oxford English Dictionary
PHK A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge
Princ. Principles of Philosophy
Search The Search after Truth
T, Treatise A Treatise of Human Nature
“Hume’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution.”
L.A. Selby-Bigge
“Those who study Hume’s philosophy with care inevitably come away impressed by the tension between the surface of his smoothly flowing style and the complex philosophical
structures that move beneath.”
Donald W. Livingston
Like all studies in history, every work on the history of philosophy reflects its own time. The work at hand exemplifies this general principle. Its main problem is to position Hume in one of the liveliest philosophical discussions of recent decades, that on realism and anti-realism (see Brock and Mares 2007). However, this controversy revolves around a question already discussed in slightly different terms in David Hume’s (1711-1776) times. Are there mind-independent entities that are also external to the mind and exist continuously? This ontological side of what is nowadays known as ‘the problem of the external world’ owes its first appearance on the agenda of philosophy to Descartes; for the ancients, it was little unknown and less important (Larmore 1998, 1146). Besides, Hume’s view of the existence of mind- independent, external, and continuous entities is among the oldest problems of his interpretation. As will shortly be shown, the debate on it began during Hume’s lifetime and has not so far vanished from the discussion of Hume’s relation to scepticism. The dissertation will also establish that it really is Hume’s problem. Our main question is not therefore only up to date; it is no way anachronistic.
Whether Hume is a Metaphysical Realist is a pivotal question for the interpretation of his thinking in general. Metaphysical Realism1 is the doctrine that there are Real, that is, mind-independent, external, and continuous entities.2 The work itself constitutes evidence for the importance of Metaphysical Realism, but it is initially possible to remark something. In the first place, it has epistemological, in Hume’s terms, logical (Abs.3), implications because it is connected to the problem of the standard of truth, for instance. If Hume does not believe in the existence of Real entities, it follows that he cannot hold the strong version epistemological realism according to which the standard of truth is in the nature of Real entities. Another epistemological point is that Hume’s view of the Realistic theories of perception depends on his attitude to Metaphysical Realism.
In the second place, it has implications for his metaphysical and ontological views.
Traditionally, notions like “substance”, “essence”, “property”, and “cause” referred to the realm of human being independent world. Hume’s attitude to and possible divergence from traditional ontology depends therefore on whether or not he is a Metaphysical Realist. In addition, in the case that Hume rejects these traditional meanings of the terms, it will also affect his constructive ontological positions.
1 Capitalised in order to distinguish it from the other senses of realism.
2 More accurate definition of the components of the definition of Real entities will be given in Chapter 3.2.
In this book, a novel answer to this old question will be rest on a firm interpretative foundation. However, before going into that, it is necessary to draw a map of the main interpretations proposed so far on the question.
1.1 Of Different Interpretations on the Problem
To the question of Hume’s position on the existence of Real entities, there are three principal, basic answers: (1) he believes in their existence, (2) he believes that they do not exist, and (3) he does not take any stance on the issue but suspends his judgement on it. If Hume endorses the first affirmative position, he can be called a positive dogmatic regarding the existence of Real entities, that is, a Metaphysical Realist. In the case that the second negative answer represents Hume’s view, he is an anti-Realist in the sense of a negative dogmatic concerning the existence of Real entities.3 The last position of suspension is what is arguably, following ancient Pyrrhonists, the only true sceptical attitude to the matter.4 It is also the other anti- Realist position. The main problem of the dissertation can be thus put in terms of whether Hume is a positive or negative dogmatic, or a sceptic regarding the existence of Real entities.
The situation, however, is not that simple. There is no logical obstacle to attributing to Hume different combinations of these positions (if indeed suspension can be called a position). We may claim, for example, that at one time Hume is a positive dogmatic on the issue and at another, a sceptic. This does not involve attributing any contradiction to him because of the difference in temporal dimension. Consequently, if we do not take the order of the positions into account (not ordered pairs), there are, in principle, four combinative interpretations of Hume’s stance: (4) a positive dogmatic and sceptic, (5) a positive and negative dogmatic, (6) a sceptic and negative dogmatic, and (7) a positive dogmatic, sceptic, and negative dogmatic. As these combinative interpretations can be represented by readings according to which Hume has more than one position, I will call these accounts “no one Hume interpretations”.
Most of these seven interpretative options have been defended in the history of Hume scholarship. To begin with the oldest, perhaps, it was once a prevalent view
3 Here the term dogmatic should not be assumed to be a pejorative description. This use of it merely follows origin in classical Greek dogma, opinion (LS, dogma). A dogmatic is a person who has a stance on some issue.
4 See the references to the contemporary discussion on the scope and nature of scepticism of the ancient Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus (c. 200 AD.).
that Hume denies the existence of Real entities - he is a negative dogmatic. This was part of the general interpretation that Hume is a destructive thinker who denies the existence of or even the possibility of knowledge concerning everything except his own mental occurrences, which he calls “perceptions”. According to this interpretation, extreme Subjectivist Idealism is the logical consequence of ‘British empiricism’, which Hume inherits mainly from John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753). This reading was created by Hume’s contemporary critics, his cousin Lord Kames (Henry Home, 1696-1782), and the so-called Scottish common- sense philosophers and Metaphysical Realists James Beattie (1735-1803) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Its status as the prevalent Hume interpretation was established later by T.H. Green (1835-1882), who was a ‘British Idealist’ following in Hegel’s (1770-1831) footsteps. Together with T.H. Grose, he edited Hume’s philosophical works published in 1874-5 and wrote the over 300-page interpretation to the edition, where he fervently argued for the totally negative dogmatic interpretation.5
After Norman Kemp Smith (1872-1952)6 trampled on this reading in his double article in Mind (Smith 1905) and especially in the indisputable classic The Philosophy of David Hume (Kemp Smith 2005/1941), it has almost completely gone out of fashion and for good reason.7 Even the more limited negative dogmatic reading denying only the existence of Real entities has suffered the same fate - with only a few exceptions.
In the positivistic atmosphere of the first part of the 20th century, the limited negative dogmatic reading was endorsed in the form of the phenomenalistic Hume interpretation by the Oxford philosopher H.H. Price (1899-1985), for example.
Although Price adheres to the negative dogmatic account in relation to the existence of Real entities, Hume’s overall intentions are not, according to him, destructive but constructive as leaning towards phenomenalism. Hume does not deny the possibility of conceiving of external objects; he merely reduces them to aggregates consisting of
“perceptions”. (Price 1940, 227)
In recent years, Louis Loeb has defended the negative dogmatic interpretation concerning Metaphysical Realism. First of all, Loeb makes the standard point, as we will see, that Hume thinks that we cannot sustain the rejection of the belief in the
5 A fine summary of this interpretation can be found in Reid (2002, 162). For other references, see Kemp Smith 2005/1941, 3-8, and chap. IV; Norton 1982, 3-5, 192, and 196-204.
6 Like Hume, Kemp Smith (before 1910 Smith) was a Scot, born in Dundee. He died in Edinburgh and was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh (1919-45), to the alumni of which Hume belonged. Kemp Smith was also a distinguished Descartes and Kant scholar and translator. For Kemp Smith’s life, see Garrett 2005.
7 It still survives in some late 20th century textbooks of the history of philosophy.
existence of Real entities. Yet his reading is that according to Hume, philosophical reflection leads inevitably to the position that there are no Real entities since Hume condemns every account of them that he discusses. None of them is satisfactory and one is even impossible (the modern notion of the matter with only primary qualities).
This entails that according to Hume, no belief, including the belief in Real entities, is epistemically justified.9 Reflection leads to an unstable position and Hume’s theory of justification claims that the criterion of epistemic justification is stability. Besides, Loeb explicitly dissociates himself from the positive dogmatic, that is, Metaphysically Realistic interpretation. (Loeb 2002, viii and 215-6)10 The general characteristic of Loeb’s reading is that under intense reflection Hume’s naturalistic theory of epistemic justification entails the denial of the possibility of any epistemically justified belief. (Loeb 2002, viii)
This way of making the main problem of the interpretation of Hume’s philosophy in general the relation between naturalism and scepticism was created by Kemp Smith, whose ground-breaking work founded the naturalistic reading of Hume (Garrett 2005, xxxiv). One part of this general interpretation is that Hume is a positive dogmatic with regard to the existence of Real entities – as also in many other questions. Kemp Smith’s own view is that Hume is a firm Metaphysical Realist.
According to him, the belief in the existence of Real entities is one of the “natural”
fundamental human beliefs, concerning which our will is impotent. It is therefore an involuntary belief for humans, an inevitable fact of the human condition. As a result, no sceptical argument can undermine it. (Kemp Smith 2005/1941, 124 and 126) Kemp Smith does not claim, however, that Hume is a positive dogmatic across the board, or even concerning every question revolving around the belief in Real entities;
he thinks that Hume denies the possibility of any rational epistemic justification for it. There can be no reason justifying its truth. This is what Hume’s sceptical arguments put beyond doubt. (Ibid. 116, and 118-9) Kemp Smith’s point, however, is that this negative conclusion is chiefly ground-clearing for Hume’s positive naturalistic thesis. The function of the sceptical arguments is to establish the negative conclusion that makes way for the positive that the origin of the belief in Real entities is in a natural instinct (instead of the epistemic justification and coherence seeking reason). It is not mere reason but natural instinct that inevitably makes us all
8 In this work, I use “to reject” and “rejection” in the sense of believing that not-p.
9 I take epistemic justification to concern truth in contrast to practical justification that may concern morally good, for example.
10 An interesting feature of Loeb’s interpretation is that he intends to amend Hume in the way that he can avoid this negative conclusion (chaps. VI.5, 6, and VII.2).
Metaphysical Realists. (Ibid. 116-121, 124-7, and 129-132) For Hume, sceptical arguments and their negative conclusions are therefore “an ally, but in due subordination, not as an equal” in relation to his naturalism (Ibid. 132). This is parallel to Kemp Smith’s famous ‘subordination thesis’ that in Hume’s philosophy reason is, and ought to be, only the slave of, subordinate to, natural beliefs, instincts, and sentiments. (Ibid. 11, 543, and 545)
Though Kemp Smith’s interpretation denies any rational epistemic justification for the belief in Real entities, and perhaps even any epistemic justification, there is an interesting undercurrent in his reading. That is what can be called providentialism. As the subordination thesis states, reason not only is but it also ought to be the slave of natural instincts. So Kemp Smith goes to claim that according to Hume, every impulse of “Nature” is “wholesome and beneficial” when it is duly proportioned and kept within its “natural conditions” (Ibid. 131). From the context of the claim, scepticism with regard to the senses, it is clear that he thinks that this also concerns the belief in Real entities as a “natural” belief. It is thus Kemp Smith’s view that Hume takes this belief to be practically justified, it has beneficial results.
Consequently, we not only must but also should entertain it - whatever our subordinate reason may tell us. Kemp Smith connects, then, Hume to the providentialism that was typical of his day (Ibid.). What Nature has implemented on us is good and beneficial for human well-being. We are led by the providence of Nature. (see also Garrett 2005, xxxiii-iv)
The basic tenets of Kemp Smith’s naturalistic interpretation of Hume’s attitude to the existence of Real entities are then the following. Hume holds the natural belief in their existence for the following reasons (positive dogmatic and Metaphysically Realist). (1) As a fundamental natural belief, it is involuntary at the end of the day (must). (2) Thus, the sceptical arguments challenging it are impotent. (3) It is practically justified because it has beneficial consequences (ought). Providential Nature has made us hold it for our own good. The negative side of Kemp Smith’s interpretation is that the belief in Real entities cannot have rational epistemic justification. This is what Hume’s sceptical arguments can establish. But his purpose in advancing the arguments and their negative conclusion is ultimately positive, to make way for his constructive naturalism. The aim subordinate to it is to show that mere reason as the faculty that seeks justification and consistency could not compel us to believe in the existence of Real entities.
Kemp Smith’s student, Charles W. Hendel, adheres to all these tenets of his master in Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume, which was originally published in 1925, before Kemp Smith got his book out (Hendel 1963, 194, 198-9, 217, 221-2, 363,
365-6, and 368). Among established philosophers and Hume scholars, Barry Stroud has more recently endorsed Kemp Smith’s theses except the practical justification.
This is manifest in his seminal Hume (Stroud 1977, 115-7), but it is his latest Hume article that explicitly celebrates Kemp Smith’s Metaphysically Realistic interpretation (Stroud 2006, 340-5). Two other commentators who endorse it are H.O. Mounce in his introductory book on Hume’s naturalism and Harold W. Noonan in a reading guide toA Treatise of Human Nature (Mounce 1999, 59; Noonan 1999, 186).
Perhaps the most distinguished current Hume scholar to align himself with the naturalistic interpretation is Don Garrett. In 1997, Garrett published his Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, which is one of the most important books on Hume ever, and has since defended and developed his reading in articles.12 Although Garrett sees differences between his and Kemp Smith’s interpretations, his position on the belief in Real entities comes very close to that advanced by Kemp Smith.
Hume is a Metaphysical Realist, he holds a positive dogmatic position on the existence of Real entities for two reasons (Garrett 1997, 208, and 234; 2004, 83, and 90; 2006, 167, and 171). First, suspension of belief produced by sceptical arguments suffers a psychological defeat after the philosopher moves from his study to common life. The belief in Real entities is an involuntary opinion that we cannot continuously suspend. (Garrett 2004, 83, and 90) Second, it is epistemically worthy of assent; there is a positive evaluation of its truth (Garrett 1997, 234; 2004, 88; 2006, 167). It is especially this second reason that distinguishes Garrett from other current naturalistic commentators like Stroud and makes him closer to Kemp Smith. Garrett has made it clearer and clearer that according to Hume, the belief in Real entities has indeed some epistemic merit (especially Ibid.). Even though it cannot have any rational epistemic justification (Garrett 2004, 83; 2006, 167 and 171). In Garrett’s view, then, Hume assigns naturalistic, non-rational, epistemic justification to the belief in Real entities.
This happens by means of what Garrett calls “the Title Principle” (Garrett 1997, 234;
2004, 88 and 90). Hume claims it in the Conclusion to the first Book of the Treatise. It affirms that when “lively” reason is united with “some propensity”, “it ought to be
11 Hendel made only one change to his main chapters in the 1963 second edition. He cut out the original fifth Chapter on space and time (T 1.4.2). (Hendel 1963, viii) He merely added a new preface, supplement, and revised the four appendices (Ibid. xiii).
12 One of Garrett’s followers in general is Noonan. David Owen also comes close to his interpretation (Owen 1999). Peter Millican has vigorously and insightfully attacked Garrett’s and Owen’s views of Hume on induction (Millican 2002c). In the exposition of Garrett’s reading, I will use mainly the articles since he is more explicit of his views in them.
assented to.” (T 1.4.7.11) Garrett reads this in the way that when the understanding serves our inclinations, needs, and desires, its products are worthy of (epistemic) assent (Garrett 1997, 241). The criteria for the justification of the understanding and its products are thus their practical consequences. In the case of the belief in Real entities, this means that it is justified to take it as a true belief since it serves human needs and desires. Thus, it can be said that according to Garrett, Hume considers the belief in Real entities as having consequentially naturalistic, epistemic justification and we ought to hold it. This point comes close to Kemp Smith’s claim that it has practical justification as having good consequences, the mechanism of which has been laid down by providential Nature. Yet there are two subtle differences between Garrett and Kemp Smith. In the first place, Garrett does not ground justification in providential Nature. Second, he sees justification as epistemic, concerning truth, whereas Kemp Smith does not but understands it in practical terms.
A further difference between these two prominent naturalistic commentators is the relation between the naturalistic and sceptical materials in Hume’s works, especially in the Treatise. As we have seen, for Kemp Smith, scepticism is largely ground- clearing for naturalism in Hume’s works; it shows that mere consistency and epistemic justification seeking reason cannot make us believe in fundamental natural beliefs. Garrett sees their relation as more complicated. The first phase of Hume’s argumentation for him is not sceptical but naturalistic (Garrett 2004, 89-90). It consists of the explanation of which natural operations of the human mind produce belief or movement of thought. It is true that this phase of cognitive psychology involves a negative part showing which natural operations are not responsible for belief and thinking. But the main intention is to establish the positive result. It is only in the second main phase that Hume starts to reflect on the negative, epistemological implications of the naturalistic phase: whether he is still allowed to continue using his intellectual faculties or not. This happens in the Conclusion of Treatise 1 and it leads Hume to answer “no”, that is, to the brink of “unmitigated practicing sceptical doubt”. Yet this verging on total suspension of belief suffers a psychological defeat, it is psychologically impossible to sustain it. The force of the sceptical arguments is overcome by natural impulses. But for Garrett, as for many naturalistic commentators, this is not the end of the story. We are led to adopt the Title Principle and to commit ourselves again to the workings of the understanding that allowed by this principle, that is, to those that serve our needs, desires, and inclinations. According to Garrett, then, Hume’s final position is naturalism combined with “mitigated, constant, general, prescriptive and epistemic merit scepticism”. We are justified in assenting moderately to certain cognitive operations and their results. (Ibid.)
Besides Kemp Smith, Robert J. Fogelin is Garrett’s acknowledged masters in Hume scholarship (Garrett 1997, Acknowledgements; 2004, 89). Fogelin has been particularly influential in studying scepticism and sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy, which is the topic of his Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (1985). In that book, and in a later article “Hume’s Scepticism” (1993), Fogelin wants to distinguish himself from Kemp Smith and one of the means for this is to claim, like Garrett, that the most radical scepticism is consequent to the naturalistic phase of Hume’s studies. Fogelin and Garrett think that in Kemp Smith’s interpretation, scepticism is merely ground-clearing for naturalism. As will be seen in Conclusion, it seems to me that they oversimplify Kemp Smith’s views. Here the relevant point is, however, that in these works Fogelin is actually quite close to the standard naturalistic reading regarding the belief in Real entities. He thinks that Hume takes it as rationally and epistemically unjustified but still as involuntary (Fogelin 1985, 6-7, 79, and 81; 1993, 91-2, 93, 111, and 112). Fogelin’s account repeats then the standard naturalistic point that the sceptical arguments against it are in time overcome by natural beliefs. For him, in these two works, Hume is a Metaphysical Realist (1985, 64, and 150; 1993, 94).13
David Fate Norton, who is an established Hume scholar, has sharply criticised Kemp Smith’s subordination thesis. Yet he practically agrees with what Kemp Smith has to say about Hume’s attitude to the existence of Real entities. Norton interprets Hume thinking that the belief in their existence is involuntary, Hume assents to it and is a Metaphysical Realist. Norton’s specific point is to maintain that Hume’s assent is moderate or mitigated in two senses. Epistemically, Hume both believes and challenges the existence of Real entities (Norton takes pains to prove this possibility).
Factually, Hume endorses mitigated naturalism as he claims that the belief in Real entities is instinctive, that is, it is caused rather than reasoned. From this, it does not follow, however, that it is true. (Norton 1982, 216, 221, 232-4, 237-8, 279, and 290-2) Despite of the somewhat uncertain truth of the belief in Real entities, Norton goes on to claim that Hume is an epistemological realist. For him, the criterion of truth is independent of human thought. (Ibid. 298, and 309)
13 Another Hume scholar who has both emphasised sceptical and even inconsistent elements in Hume’s thinking and still maintained that Hume is a Realist is John Passmore. He thinks that the rescue for the sceptical argument against the belief in Real entities that nature can offer is psychological. It is not psychologically possible to keep on rejecting the belief. Hume’s reply to those arguments is not another argument refuting them but a psychological fact. (Passmore 1952, 1-2, 87 142, 146-9, and 152-3).
Hence, the Metaphysically Realistic and especially its naturalistic version of Hume reading is currently the dominant interpretation. It seems to me that this state of affairs corroborates the dependency of the history of philosophy upon the more general philosophical currents. Another account of Hume’s thinking of which we can say the same thing is the causal Realist reading by the so-called New Humeans (a term coined by Kenneth Winkler in 1991). According to this interpretation, Hume is not, as the Old Humeans claim, a pure regularity theorist of causality; Hume adheres to the position that causation is more than mere regularity between the types of events or objects. Moreover, some of them go on to claim that Hume also believes in the existence of Real causes underlying and explaining the observed regularities – though their nature is beyond our conception. (Richman 2000, 1-2) The New Hume reading is accordingly also called the sceptical Realistic interpretation. The term was invented by John P. Wright who is one of the proponents of the strong New Hume interpretation (Wright 1983). In the dissertation, I will also take Galen Strawson and Stephen Buckle as examples of that reading – though focusing here on Wright and Strawson.14
As Wright and Strawson commit Hume to the existence of Real causes, they also need to defend the reading that he is a Metaphysical Realist in general. For this, they advance different strategies. Wright comes quite close to Kemp Smith in making the standard naturalistic point that the belief in Real entities is involuntary (Wright 1995/1986, 231, and 234; Wright 1983, 75-6). So Hume’s permanent position must be that there are indeed Real entities (Ibid. 223). His real contribution, however, is that Hume’s theory of ideas leaves room for “inconceivable suppositions”, by virtue of which we can believe in Real entities in the various common life and philosophical forms discussed by Hume. It is with the help of these that Wright interprets Hume holding a Representative Realism close to some readings of Locke. There are Real material entities with only the primary qualities of extension, solidity, figure, number, etc., which cause our sense-perceptions of them. We can suppose and believe this philosophical theory although strictly speaking we cannot conceive it. (Wright 1995/1986, 226-7, and 231-4; 1983, 107-112)
Strawson’s move is to attribute “relative ideas” to Hume’s theory of ideas. Although it is not possible to conceive of Real entities in terms of descriptively contentful perceptions, we can suppose their existence as distinguished from other entities through relative ideas. The relative idea of Real entities is of incomprehensible beings
14 I will discuss New Hume more extensively in Chapter 4.2.2. It has been especially influential in Britain and also defended by Janet Broughton (1987), Edward Craig (2000), Paul Stanistreet (2002), Peter Kail (2003), and Helen Beebee (2006).
causing our sense-perceptions. It is this relative idea that provides content for the belief in the existence of Real entities, despite the fact that it does not give any contentful insight into their properties and nature. (Strawson 2002, 239-42; Strawson 1989, 49-53)
A camp of the Metaphysically Realistic and positive dogmatic readings of Hume is formed by those commentators who maintain that Hume holds a Realistic theory of perception. Like Garrett and Wright, John Bricke and John Yolton are among those scholars who take Hume to be some kind of Representative (indirect) Realist (Bricke 1980, 21, and 23-4; Yolton 1984, 162-3; and 2000, 109-13). Recently, not only William Edward Morris but also Cass Weller has defended the interpretation that Hume is a Direct Realist (Morris 2000, 108-9; and Weller 2001).15
The readings of Hume by Donald Livingston, Annette Baier, and Morris claim that the sceptical arguments that he presents are not really his own.16 Hume does not endorse either their premises, argumentative links, or conclusions. His assent to some of them is contended. Therefore, the fact that Hume presents sceptical arguments against the belief in Real entities does not show that he rejects or suspends judgment on it. (Livingston 1984, 2-4, and 9ff.; Baier 1991, 21, and 107;
Morris 2000, 96-102, and 106) Conversely, all these commentators believe that Hume is a Metaphysical Realist. According to Livingston, Hume takes the everyday belief in Real entities as a transcendental presupposition of our experience and reasoning (Livingston 1984, 3, and 15). For Baier, Hume’s true philosophy is critical application and self-reflection of common life beliefs and reasonings including the belief in Real entities (Baier 1991, 20-7). Morris claims that Hume advocates going back to common life from the philosophical “problem space” of “modern philosophy”, which produces the hardest sceptical argument against the belief in Real entities. (Morris 2000, 108-9)
A distinguished scholar of the history of scepticism in early modern philosophy, Richard H. Popkin, laid the foundations for the contemporary combinative accounts of Hume’s attitude to the existence of Real entities. Above I have coined the term
“no one Hume interpretation” to cover these readings. In his classic article David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism, Popkin maintains that Hume is
“the only “consistent” Pyrrhonian” sceptic (Popkin 1980/1951, 103). In the case of our question, this means that at one time he suspends his judgement on the existence
15 For a description of these theories of perception, see Chapter 3.3.
16 To be precise, Morris does this only in relation to what I call “the second profound argument against the senses”, see Chapter 3.4.
of Real entities; at another, he firmly believes in it. According to Popkin, Hume is both a sceptic and a positive dogmatic on the issue. When he is in his rational
“mood”, by means of irrefutable sceptical arguments, he comes to the conclusion that we ought to suspend our belief in Real entities (Ibid. 132, 112, 114-5, 119-20, 126, and 130). That belief cannot have any rational basis and it involves insolvable paradoxes (Ibid. 112, 119-20).
Though the intellectual mood is also natural for certain people, philosophers (Ibid.
123, 131), it is yet in the strong natural mood that Hume is a Metaphysical Realist.
With this respect, Popkin repeats the basic naturalistic claim that natural instincts force us to believe in it notwithstanding the irrefutable sceptical arguments. (Ibid.
116, 119-20, 123-6) Hume is the only consistent Pyrrhonist because he does only what nature compels him to do. In their lives, the ancient Pyrrhonists followed nature in form of appearances, what seemed to them to be the case, but suspended judgement on the question of how things really were. Hume follows nature more consistently as he believes firmly when nature necessitates him to do so. Actually, Popkin goes so far as to claim that Hume believes only what nature makes him believe. (Ibid. 126-30 and 132)
Another circumstance with respect to which Hume is also a consistent Pyrrhonist is that since he suspends and believes in different periods of time, he is not subject to any inconsistency. Popkin does not make this explicit but it turns out to be so in the more recent “no one Hume” interpretations by Fogelin and Donald L.M. Baxter, to which I next briefly turn.
In his most recent Hume article, which is a comment on Garrett’s book, Fogelin defends a form of “no one Hume” interpretation. Actually, in his book, he already acknowledges his debt to Popkin and there are also hints at this kind of reading in it and the 1993 article (Fogelin 1985, xii, and 149-50; 1993, 113). However, it is only in the most recent paper that he explicitly maintains a “no one Hume” reading.
Fogelin’s latest view is that Hume is a radical perspectivalist: his writings exhibit inconsistent positions depending on the perspective from which things are considered. From one point of view, Hume is a Metaphysical Realist; from another, he is not. At this point, I shall not go into detail on Fogelin’s new interpretation.
Suffice it to note two things. First, Fogelin does not attribute any inconsistency to Hume’s philosophical positions. The inconsistent views are held from distinct perspectives and therefore they are not contradictory with each other. (Fogelin 1998, 164-8) Second, Fogelin also reads Hume as the first philosopher doing the “natural history of philosophy” (Fogelin 1998, 168). This means that especially with regard to Real entities and perceiving them with our senses, Hume’s account should be taken
as “a sequence of philosophical perspectives”, which unfold naturally when one is doing philosophy in “an unrestricted manner.” (Ibid.; for a detailed account, see Fogelin 1985, 80ff.)
Recently, Baxter has deliberately followed Popkin’s footsteps and defended the view that Hume is a Pyrrhonist regarding the existence of Real entities. Baxter’s interesting claim is that Hume’s various remarks on the issue are best accounted for by making a subtle distinction between two kinds of assents. Baxter thinks that in this regard, Hume models himself on Sextus Empiricus who, according to Popkin and Michael Frede (1997), distinguished between active endorsement and passive assent.
Applied to the case of Real entities, this means the following. On the one hand, Hume suspends his active assent to their existence since it is epistemically unjustified - there are no reasons to support its truth. Actually, Baxter takes Hume to be a complete Pyrrhonist in the sense of suspending active endorsement on every belief due to the absence of reasons. However, on the other hand, Hume assents passively to the existence of Real entities because it is involuntary, almost irresistible and instinctive. The passive endorsement is for Baxter then what the naturalistic interpretation takes as Humean, natural belief. His contribution, which is close to Popkin, is to distinguish this following of natural impulses from the upper case, philosophical endorsement. The relevant point here, as in Popkin and Fogelin’s latest interpretation, is that this is a way to avoid attributing an inconsistency to Hume.
(Baxter 2006, 114-7) As Baxter concisely puts it, “[i]n this sceptical way Hume takes for granted the existence of body.” (Ibid. 116)17
In light of this survey of Hume scholarship, it can be thus said that reading Hume as a Metaphysical Realist is practically the dominant interpretation of his thinking at this moment. The proponents of the naturalistic interpretation hold it without exception.
It is included in the influential New Hume reading. Writers on Hume’s theory of perception tend to think that he is some kind of Metaphysical Realist. Even among the commentators who like to emphasise the sceptical or negative dogmatic aspects of his writings still think that he is a Metaphysical Realist regarding the existence of Real entities - at some points, moments, or moods at least. Despite the fact that it was once widely held that Hume denies their existence among other things, nowadays it is quite hard to find any Hume scholar who seriously challenges this consensus. Loeb is a rare exception; yet he thinks that Hume rejects the existence of Real entities only under intense reflection.
17 In his most recent work, Baxter developes his interpretation into a direction, which is subtly but significantly different. See the note on the topic in Chapter 5.3.
Corresponding consensus prevails regarding Hume’s view of the rational epistemic justification of the belief in Real entities. As far as I know, only Baier and Livingston may contend that Hume does not deny its possibility – and it must be acknowledged that even this is dubious. There is therefore significant agreement among Hume scholars that he rejects the possibility to support the veracity of the existence of Real entities by any reasons whatsoever.
1.2 Theses
The interpretation advanced in this work differs from this widely held consensus of Hume being a Metaphysical Realist. Normally this issue is discussed in terms of Hume’s philosophical position. But I deem it important that we distinguish Hume’s philosophical view from his everyday opinion in this matter. My interpretation is thus founded in the first place on Hume’s distinction between common people and philosophers in its various forms. My intention is not to dispute the wide consensus in the case of Hume’s everyday opinion on things. However, I deny that Metaphysical Realism is Hume’s philosophical position. My main thesis in the dissertation is that Hume is both a sceptic and a positive dogmatic on the existence of Real entities along with the material substance18 and bodies (insofar as they are considered mind-independent).19 As a philosopher, Hume suspends his judgment on the existence of Real entities, the matter, and substantial bodies. Instead, Hume the common man firmly believes in their existence. In contemporary philosophical terms, Hume’s philosophical position is anti-Realistic and his everyday belief Metaphysical Realism. I thus endorse and defend a form of the combinative “no one Hume” interpretation.
The crucial point in the interpretation is that there is temporal difference between Hume’s philosophical and everyday views; one of my contributions is to substantiate that Hume thinks that there is a contradiction between the philosophical use of reason and everyday belief in the existence of Real entities, which arises under intense reflection. It is by virtue of the temporal distinction between Hume’s philosophical position and common life opinion that my “no one Hume”
interpretation is meant to avoid this inconsistency. I will show that in light of the different interpretations, this is a novel way of resolving this inconsistency puzzle.
Besides, it has not attracted enough attention in Hume scholarship.
18 When I mention matter as a substance in the sense of a perception-independent entity, I use the definitive form “the matter”.
19 This sense is either clear from the context or I refer to independent bodies by the term
“substantial bodies”.
Another reason for this interpretation is the sub-conclusion of the dissertation that Hume considers Real entities (the matter and substantial bodies) to be completely out of the reach of our faculty of understanding. We can have no intellectual access to them. I thus claim that Hume professes conceptual negative dogmatism concerning these entities and rejects their notions as inadequate. This does not mean, however, that Hume thinks that Real entities, the matter, and substantial bodies are non-existent or impossible entities. His suspensive, philosophical attitude to Real entities is manifest in this question, too, because he does not dogmatically deny their existence or possibility. There may be Real entities beyond our understanding; we just cannot comprehend them. I will also conclude that Hume does not take the term
“Real entity” as totally meaningless because it can have obscure and confused though not precise meaning. In the first place, we are able to deceive ourselves that we have the perception of Real entities. Secondly, it is possible to have an idea that is close to the idea of Real entity and to confuse these two ideas. These two perceptions may provide some meaning for “Real entity”, which is confused, however, instead of determinate.
Though my reading is opposite to the prevalent view in the case of Hume’s philosophical position on Metaphysical Realism, I do not dispute the wide consensus on Hume denying the possibility of any rational, epistemic justification for it. Rather, my intention is to put this finally beyond any reasonable doubt. I also go further and claim that any epistemic justification and Kemp Smith’s practical justification for Metaphysical Realism is rejected by Hume. This conclusion concerning Metaphysical Realism is also defended in the case of Hume’s view of the existence of God and the soul. I establish these claims concerning justification chiefly by means of showing that Hume renounces any rational, epistemic justification for Representative Realism.
Representative Realism is a theory of perception, according to which perceptions with the senses represent their Real objects (representation involves resemblance and/or causation). At the end of the dissertation, I give reasons for the interpretation that Hume’s philosophical position in the first Enquiry does not involve any theory of perception.
1.3 References
The method of this study may be approached from the direction of which works by Hume are considered to be the primary textual sources in it. Regarding this question, too, the work takes an untypical route, for it is Hume’s mature masterpiece on the faculty of the understanding, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, that is the primary reference. This diverges from the standard principle of Hume scholarship of recent decades to use Hume’s first work, A Treatise of Human Nature (3 volumes,
1739-40), as the text to which Hume scholars ought to refer in the first place when studying his theory of the understanding, passions, and morals.
The first Enquiry20 was published anonymously in 1748 under the title Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (Beauchamp 2000a, xlvi). For the 1758 edition, Hume changed the name to the existing (Ibid. l). The last edition under his supervision fell from the press posthumously in 1777. I have used Beauchamp’s critical edition, which is mainly based on the 1772 edition.
There are two reasons for this deviant approach. First, the first Enquiry has been too much ignored in Hume scholarship, especially when we compare it with its corresponding Book in the Treatise, the first (Millican 2002d). So far, only four book- length studies in English have been published on it, while there are dozens of works on the first Book of the Treatise (Flew 1961, Stern 1971, Buckle 2001, and Millican (ed.) 2002). The main reason is, nevertheless, that the firstEnquiry is Hume’s mature, authorised piece on the understanding, on what he calls logic (EHU, Advertisement).
Hume also edited the first Enquiry for almost 30 years, whereas the Treatise was written in a couple of years (E, MOL, xxxiv). There is therefore a clear message from Hume’s side for us that the first Enquiry contains his deliberated word on the understanding. The interpretative principle that follows from this is that we ought to treat it as the primary reference in Hume’s logic (theory of understanding, epistemology, philosophy of science, logic) whenever it is possible21 Commentators doubting this norm should reflect on a situation in which their work is studied and even judged on their juvenile work instead of well-honed, mature compositions.
It is a different question how we judge these two works philosophically, which is an issue that cannot be settled here. Many people find the Treatise more interesting and philosophically stimulating. Of course, if we want to study Hume’s philosophy as it is in the Treatise, his juvenile views, or thoughts that are omitted from the later works, taking it as the primary reference is not a problem. However, the readings of Hume that choose the Treatise as the primary reference of his authorised views are under the treat of conflating interpretation with assessment or juvenile views with mature positions in their very premises.
This does not mean that we should ignore the Treatise completely in this work.
According to good interpretative principles, no text can be properly understood out
20 The so-called second Enquiry was published in 1751 under the title An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
21 Philosophy of religion is a more problematic case because of theDialogues.
of context, and the author’s other works form the closest textual context for it. In this regard, Hume’s entire corpus bears potential textual evidence for any study that begins with the first Enquiry. In some questions, the evidence that the first Enquiry can provide is so scarce that we have to use all the potential evidence. Besides, we shall see that there are particular cases where it is possible to document that Hume still holds the view in his later works that he maintained in the Treatise. Thus, he must endorse it in the first Enquiry as well, although we do not have any textual evidence for it in that work. In this respect, the Dialogues, Hume’s essays The Sceptic (1741), Of the Standard of Taste (1757), and the posthumous Of the Immortality of the Soul are relevant.
It is therefore predictable that, among commentators, the Hume scholar who has worked most extensively on the first Enquiry has been the main influence on this work. Millican’s Introduction to his anthology especially, his chapter on the context and aims of EHU, and his master article on Hume on induction have provided the general point of view to approach the first Enquiry (Millican 2002a-c). Of the other books on the firstEnquiry, much can be learned about Hume as a philosopher of the Enlightenment from Buckle (2001).22 Flew’s and Stern’s pieces are, however, dated and they do not merit discussion.
Although other Hume literature focuses on the Treatise, no Hume scholar can deny that he or she is standing on the shoulders of the giants of the literature. Kemp Smith’s classic (2005/1941) is a self-evident instance of this. Excellent work by Stroud (1977), Norton (1982), Daniel Flage (2000), Garrett (1997, 2004, 2006), Baxter (1997, 2006), Owen (1999), Loeb (2002), and Falkenstein (2006), to name a few, are also indisputable classics of Hume scholarship. Amid the viable New Hume literature, Wright (1983, 1995/1986, 2000) and Winkler’s (2000/1991) works – though they disagree - are invaluable and Strawson’s thought provoking.23
As already mentioned, Hume is hard to understand without taking his context into account. Nowadays the body of literature on the so-called early modern philosophy is vast, but I have learned most from Yolton (1984) and Michael Ayers (1991,
22 As we recollect. Buckle endorses the New Hume interpretation. Consequently, it suffices to discuss Wright’s and Strawson’s accounts in its stead.
23 On Hume, there is also a master’s thesis in Finnish by Dr. Juha Koivisto (Filosofiaa ilman ‘takuita’
–David Humen ihmistiede (Philosophy without ‘guarantees’ – David Hume’s Science of Man).
University of Tampere 1991). Without this work, the general view of Hume as a philosopher who understands human nature as social, which is implicit in this dissertation, would not have been possible.
1998b). On Sextus Empiricus, Julia Annas (1985 and 2000 with Barnes) and Jonathan Barnes (1997) have been the most important resources.
1.4 Of Method
The discussion of my main question on Hume’s attitude to Metaphysical Realism is organised upon his view of the so-called two “profound” sceptical arguments against the senses. I will approach this sub-problem of what Hume thinks about the arguments by means of a careful, detailed reconstruction of them. The reason for this is that it is useful first to have as good an understanding of the arguments as possible before tackling the problem of Hume’s attitude to them.
Hume presents these arguments in Part 1 of the last Section of the first Enquiry, Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy.24 They take 10 paragraphs from EHU 12.1.7 to 16 - three to five pages depending on the edition. The first part of the book consists of the most detailed, close reading of these paragraphs, by means of which the two profound arguments are reconstructed step-by-step. In this approach, Millican’s and Garrett’s work on several Hume’s arguments have been influential. Garrett’s method of outlining them in Hume’s words is a useful and reliable way of initially organising the arguments. The reconstruction results in diagrams of the arguments similar to those of Millican in the case of Hume’s famous argument on induction in Section 4 of the firstEnquiry (Millican 2002c).
As such, this meticulous reconstruction work is valuable in two respects. First, it raises the accuracy of the interpretation of the arguments to a new level. The reconstructions themselves are thus a contribution to Hume scholarship. Although Bricke has analysed them briefly in some detail (1980, ch. 1), nobody has reconstructed the arguments resulting in the structure diagrams as Millican has done for EHU 4. It is in this respect that this book is intended to supplement and continue Millican’s work.25 Secondly, it is surprising how little Hume’s arguments in Of the modern philosophy of the Treatise (1.4.4), which corresponds to the second profound argument, have attracted attention. Instead, Of scepticism with regard to the senses (1.4.2), which is similar to the first argument, has been much studied. To this state of affairs, Wright, Garrett, Bricke, and Kemp Smith are notable exceptions.
24 The tables of the contents in the 1748-56 editions read “Of the sceptical or academical philosophy” (Beauchamp 2000a, xlvi).
25 Naturally, this does not mean that we agree on every point of interpretation. I am also aware that the chapters dealing with the reconstruction and diagrams are quite hard to understand in certain points but I take the end to justify the means.
Wright and Garrett have analysed T 1.4.4 in some detail, and Bricke and Kemp Smith are two of the few to realise the importance of its conclusion (Wright 1983, 107-12; Garrett 1997, 215-20, Bricke 1980, 9-10, 19ff., Kemp Smith 2005/1941, 127- 132, and 490-4).26
The second part of the work consists of the discussion of Hume’s view of these two profound arguments. In it, their impeccable reconstruction is rewarding. First of all, in this part, I establish that the two profound arguments against the senses are really Hume’s own arguments. For this, their Millican-type diagrams provide a useful framework. Hume’s endorsement of the arguments can namely be established by showing that he subscribes to their central premises. Thus, as I will substantiate that he endorses the links of the arguments, he must assent to their conclusions, too, if he is consistent.
In the third part of the dissertation, this leads to comparing the implications of Hume’s assent to the profound arguments with other, potential textual evidence on Metaphysical Realism. By virtue of this comparison, I justify my sceptical and positive dogmatic interpretation of Hume’s attitude to it and the sceptical reading of his view of the different theories of perception. The reconstructions of the arguments in the first part form thus a rock-solid basis, from which we can advance to address the main question of the dissertation in the second and especially in the third part.
In all these efforts, I have followed a case-specific method. The main reason for this is that studying texts calls for an approach that is sensitive to the characteristics of each part of the text. Three examples may be given how this is present in this work.
First, I apply slightly different points of view to the two profound arguments against the senses. As we shall see, the first of them does not require so much of a contextual approach as the second. In it, we do not need to be so historically sensitive. In the second place, I have used contemporary philosophical terms whenever appropriate, for the sake of making the text more accessible to the present-day readers. However, when the parlance of Hume or his times have been necessary, appropriate or illustrative, they have been employed. Thirdly, as the reader may observe, my method is a hybrid of so-called rational and historical reconstructions. On the one hand, I scrutinize EHU 12.7-16 and other Hume’s relevant texts following a rigorous textual approach, which is coupled with a somewhat detailed contextual study when needed. On the other, I aim at the
26 Accordingly, I will focus mainly on their interpretations. Bricke is not therefore on the wrong track when he claims that the problem has gone “unnoticed” before him (Bricke 1980, 19).
