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PUBLICATIONS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN FINLAND Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
PUBLICATIONS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN FINLAND
The Polish-Russian border is an external border of the European Union that poses challenges
on multiple levels from state governance to everyday social encounters. Between the years
2012-2016 the visa free agreement known as
‘Small Border Traffic’ (SBT) tried to alleviate these challenges for both the individual and the state. This study answers the following questions:
Did the Polish-Russian SBT visa free regime function as designed? Did the regime achieve a balance between everyday border life and the
requirements of state sovereignty? This study investigates the subject from multiple angles:
economic, geopolitical and sociological.
STANISŁAW DOMANIEWSKI
DISSERTATIONS | STANISŁAW DOMANIEWSKI | A BORDER FOR ALL? DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON THE... | N
STANISŁAW DOMANIEWSKI
A BORDER FOR ALL? DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES
A BORDER FOR ALL?
DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLISH-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND
A DECONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL BORDER REGIME
Stanisław Domaniewski
A BORDER FOR ALL?
DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLISH-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND
A DECONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL BORDER REGIME
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
No 151
University of Eastern Finland Joensuu
2017
Grano Oy Jyväskylä, 2017
Editor in-chief: Kimmo Katajala Editor: Eija Fabritius
Sales: University of Eastern Finland Library ISBN:978-952-61-2560-2 (print)
ISBN:978-952-61-2561-9 (PDF) ISSNL:1798-5749
ISSN:1798-5749 ISSN:1798-5757 (PDF)
Stanisław, Domaniewski
A Border for all? Differing Perspectives on the Polish-Russian Borderland. A deconstruction of a European Union external border regime.
University of Eastern Finland, 2017, 80 pages Publication of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertation in Social Sciences and Business Studies; 151 ISBN: 978-952-61-2560-2 (print)
ISSNL: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5749
ISBN: 978-952-61-2561-9 (PDF) ISSN: 1798-5757 (PDF)
ABSTRACT
This study investigates different perspectives of the Polish-Russian borderland. The themes presented in this dissertation are part of the ongoing struggle at the border between structure and agency. Based on research, it argues that solely structuralist tendencies or overriding ideas of agency should not be allowed to outweigh each other. Although the Polish-Russian border may not cease to function if these two forces do not keep one another in check, it will certainly be less balanced. Allowing a single concept to dominate cedes power unevenly to forces that may currently be involved in what can be called the balancing act of the border. Instead, balance or equilibrium is more desirable.
Poland, Russia, Kaliningrad, Borders, European Union
Stanisław, Domaniewski
Raja kaikille? Erilaiset näkökulmat Puolan ja Venäjän väliseen rajaan.
Dekonstruktio Euroopan Unionin ulkorajaregiimeistä.
Itä-Suomen yliopisto, 2017, 80 sivua
Publication of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertation in Social Sciences and Business Studies; 151 ISBN: 978-952-61-2560-2 (print)
ISSNL: 1798-5749 ISSN: 1798-5749
ISBN: 978-952-61-2561-9 (PDF) ISSN: 1798-5757 (PDF)
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Puolan ja Venäjän välistä rajaa useista eri näkökulmista käsin. Väitöskirjan teemat ovat osa meneillään olevaa järjestelmän ja toiminnan välistä kamppailua rajalla. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, ettei järjestelmän taipumusten ja toiminnan pitäisi kamppailla toisiaan vastaan. Rajan toiminta ei kenties lakkaa jos nämä kaksi voimaa eivät kontrolloi toisiaan, mutta rajan toiminta olisi vähemmän tasapainoista. Mahdollistamalla toisen komponentin vallan dominoinnin epätasa-arvoisesti vaikutamme niihin tekijöihin, jotka mahdollisesti kulloinkin osallistuvat siihen, jota voidaan kutsua tasapainottavaksi rajatoiminnaksi. Balanssi on toivottavampaa.
Avainsanat: Puola, Venäjä, Kaliningrad, rajat, Euroopan Unioni
“…Barriers constitute isolation; isolation gives rise to hatred, hatred to war, and war to invasion.”
Frédéric Bastiat, 1845
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation is the culmination of six years’ academic work and inspiration. As I have focused on research I have been listening to the opinions of other academics.
These opinions have not only focused on what, how, and why research work can be done. Since the start of my academic career, I have had the advice of many esteemed professors and lay persons, who have attempted to help me answer these questions and offered their own opinions. I can acknowledge that much of the advice offered has been helpful. Although the journey towards this degree and its completion has been long and difficult, I regret none of the decisions I have had to make in its completion.
I would like to thank my supervisors Paul Fryer and James Scott. Both have been invaluable assets in this endeavor. Although we have not always agreed, we have retained a mutual respect for one another that goes far beyond the normal standards of decorum. I would like to thank the former and current heads of the Karelian Institute, Professor Pekka Suutari, Professor Heikki Eskelinen, Dr. Petri Kahila and Dr. Tuulikki Kurki. I would also like to thank the following at the KTL:
Dr. Joni Virkkunen, Dr. Minna Piipponen, Professor Ilkka Liikkanen, Dr. Tiina Soininen, Dr. Lina Klymenko, Dr. Anna Casaglia, and Ms. Natalia Taksami. I would like to thank Professor Markku Tyykyläinen and Dr. Ilkka Pyy of the Department of History and Geography, my supervisor during my Master’s thesis at the now former University of Joensuu. I would like to thank my co-authors, Ms. Dominika Studzińska, Dr. Markku Sippola, and Dr. Jussi Laine, who worked with me on various articles in this dissertation. I would like to thank Professor Norman Markowitz of Rutgers University in the United States, without whom I would never have started the journey towards this or any other degree. Thanks are also due to my esteemed opponents Associate Professor Alex Diener and Professor Thomas Lundén for their evaluation and critique of this work. Similarly, I would like to thank Mr. Rupert Moreton for his prowess in helping me edit and proof this work. To family, friends, and coworkers, I would like to say thank you for your support throughout the years. Especially I would like to thank my parents and Ms.
Alicja Fajfer. For the rest of you, there are just too many to mention, so please forgive me. Vaya con Dios.
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of Mary Elizabeth Tomchuk, lifelong friend and mother of my best friend Richard Tomchuk, who died in 2015. May her legacy as an educator of young minds serve all who knew her. Is ait an mac an saol.
Joensuu, 8 September 2017 Stanisław K. Domaniewski
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ... 5
TIIVISTELMÄ ... 6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... 8
1 INTRODUCTION ...11
1.1 Context and background ...11
1.2 Aims of the study and research question ...13
1.3 Methodology ...14
1.4 Geographical and historical background ...16
2 THEORY ...30
2.1 Theoretical & conceptual framework ...30
2.1.1 The border ...30
2.1.2 Borders as a resource ...32
2.1.3 Identity and the border ...34
2.1.4 Structure and agency ...36
2.1.5 Relating borders to structure and agency ...37
2.1.6 Theoretical limitations and alternative paths to research ...40
3 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES ...44
3.1 Article I ...45
3.2 Article II ...46
3.3 Article III ...48
3.4 Article IV ...48
3.5 Article V ...49
3.6 Summary ...51
4 CONCLUSION ...53
4.1 The SBT: Design, balance and unitended consequences ...53
4.2 Moving research forward ...54
SOURCES ...58
APPENDICES ...62
ARTICLES ...78
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Map of the Second Polish Republic, 1921 ...18
Figure 2. Historical map of the evolution of East Prussia/Kaliningrad Oblast ....19
Figure 3. Historical map of land area of Europe after 1920 and present day ....21
Figure 4. Extent of the ‘Small Border Traffic Area’ ...26
Figure 5. Border traffic at the Polish–Russian border, 2002–2016 ...28
Figure 6. Theory of Borderland Studies ...38
Figure 7. Structuration Theory ...42
Figure 8. A lens of Structuration Theory concerning borders...42
1 INTRODUCTION
“The cultural states of Europe definitely recognize each other as members of a circle in which exchange is necessary and where neighboring states have to work together, even if they are hostile to each other…”
-Friedrich Ratzel – Politische Geographie (1897)
1.1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
This dissertation discusses the Polish-Russian border. The border is unique in the European context in that, as Domaniewski and Laine state, it is “a nearly straight line division between Poland and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast (region)” (2015:81). It is beset, like all borders, by its own geopolitical and historical circumstances. This dissertation is set against one of these backdrops, namely the creation of a visa-free regime in 2012. Although this regime was abandoned in 2016, while it was functioning the Polish-Russian visa free system, referred to as the
“Small Border Traffic” (SBT) system, allowed those living on each side of the border to travel to the other side to shop and engage in tourism.
The dissertation’s research concerns itself with the Polish side of the SBT area. It was conducted from just before the opening of the SBT in 2012 to its closing in 2016.
The empirical body of this work is contained in the five peer reviewed articles at the end of this volume. These articles form a multilevel and multi-focused case study which investigates various aspects of the Russian-Polish border, chiefly in economics, security, and identity during this period. The primary areas investigated in the study were the Polish border town of Braniewo and the Tri-City area of Gdansk, Gdynia, and Sopot. This introduction and the subsequent chapters create the thread which links these articles and unifies the dissertation.
This dissertation’s theoretical concern is with the idea that there are two constantly opposing forces in society, namely structure and agency. The term
“structure” relates to the overarching super structures by which society is supported and molded (Blackburn 2008). “Agency” suggests that humans interact with and push the bounds of the place or space which they inhabit. This occurs independently of the structures which contain them. As Barker states, agency
“consists of acts that make a pragmatic difference” (2008:235). Humans are agents who act independently to make a difference. This occurs despite the structures that try to restrict them. However, this dissertation does not imply that each of these concepts are separable, even if they are categorically separate. Instead, although actions occur outside the structures they wish to impact, they are still causally linked and mutually dependent.
In relation to the above mentioned concepts, this dissertation investigates how these forces interact at the Polish-Russian border. This illustration may serve to relate structure and agency to borders in general: Structure seeks to keep the lid on a container, while agency seeks either to remove or even ignore it. The dissertation incorporates Brunet-Jailly’s (2005) theory of border studies. Brunet-Jailly states that borders are encompassed by structure and agency. They are specific constructions that depend on constraints and actions. Brunet-Jailly’s theory is a schema of how to investigate these factors and their interactions at both the macro- and micro-levels.
The specific manifestation of structure and agency investigated by this schema is of borders as a resource and the identity of the border. A detailed discussion of the theory and how it seeks to investigate structure and agency at the border is presented in Chapter two. Since each of these features prominently in the dissertation’s five articles, chapter three is a specific discussion of how they relate to the research question of this study.
For the sake of this dissertation, the border is defined as a duality from the perspective of the nation state and the individual. Firstly, it is a man-made demarcation that limits the sovereign power and systems of a country. One crosses this demarcation into another sovereign system that contains its own set of institutions, values, and laws (Cote-Boucher 2008). Likewise, the demarcation creates a divide between different groups and regions (Alvarez 1995:448). Although the divided structures and the systems they represent may resemble one another, they are not identical. The purpose of the demarcation is not to cause a hindrance to activities that have been deemed legitimate by those in power. However, borders need to offer enough of a deterrent to stop what are deemed negative incursions.
Thirdly, if the nation state is the container of power or national systems, then the border is the lid of that container (Paasi 1999). According to Paasi (2002), containment and demarcation do not mean complete separation. Eventually, containment is sometimes not enough, and spillover occurs.
As already stated, this dissertation is concerned with the Polish side of the border. However, it is also inspired by the continued importance of all borders, be they imposed at the supranational, state, local, or individual level, and the actors that use agency or structure to construct or deconstruct them. Each of these holds a level of importance equal to the actors and structures involved in their regulation and/or maintenance. In the broader context, we must understand that borders are more than just a cartographer’s line demarcating space. These markings, which may be perceived as arbitrary, create meaning and a certain type of order for those who live along the border. At the same time, the border population also has an impact on how borders are administered, regulated, or perceived.
The next section of this chapter will explain the aims of this dissertation. It will then state the research question to be investigated, and the layout of how this will be achieved.
1.2 AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION
All borders have multiple layers of bordering which occur at the same time, space, and place (Paasi 2005). Each area being bordered is weighed down by its own set of facts that govern how the border does or does not function. These characteristics are often different and contradictory to those of other borders. Borders by their very nature are in a state of flux. No two are the same. The rules, bureaucracies, cultural norms, etc. that allow a border to exist will not fit in any other time, space, or place.
As Paasi states: “…these elements are deeply contextual. Boundaries may be unique, but there are a number of social, cultural and political processes that need to be theorized contextually” (2005:668). In other words, borders have similarities with one another, and these similarities can be identified by investigating them.
This dissertation argues that what results from this multiplicity of borders is a balancing act between the forces of agency and structure. Based on research, a middle ground or balance between an open or closed border and agency and structures is the optimal default setting for the Polish northern border regime. The articles in this dissertation examine the following aspects of the Polish-Russian border: security; identity; resources; consumption; and the border as a source of meaning. This dissertation will provide an answer to the following research question and sub-question:
Did the Polish-Russian SBT visa free regime function as designed during the period 2012-2016? Did the regime achieve a balance between everyday border life and the requirements of state sovereignty?
The issue at stake for the Polish-Russian border is not only whether a workable balance of these two forces was achieved, but also how sustainable this balance was. One can equate it to a machine where all the gears, those that can be seen and those that are invisible, work to their full potential. All parts of the border apparatus are in balance and are acknowledged.
This dissertation is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction and background to this work. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual ideas of the dissertation. Chapter 3 is a brief summary of the articles on which this dissertation is based and how they relate to the ideas expressed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 presents conclusions, briefly discussing the past and present state of the Polish-Russian border, while making observations on its possible future.
In addition to these four chapters, this dissertation is comprised of five separate articles. The first article concerns itself with local identity on the Polish side of the border. The article was written before the SBT came into use, and can be treated as part of the historiography of the Polish border. The second is a comparative study of the Polish-Russian visa-free zone with its counterpart on the Norwegian-Russian border. The third is a discussion of the duality of security and openness at the Polish-Russian border. The fourth is a comparative analysis of the travelers using the Small Border Traffic Zone. The fifth is a comparative analysis of two Polish
towns, Braniewo and the Tri-City, which were part of the SBT regime, during 2014 and 2015.
The next section in this chapter will cover the methods used in this dissertation for data collection, analysis, and dissemination.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
The data and information presented in this introduction and in the five articles that follow were collected from multiple sources. This section not only catalogs and describes the sources used, but also discusses any conflicts that have arisen in researching the dissertation’s data. This section is also concerned with and discusses any limitations that were experienced in data collection and the creation of this dissertation.
Concerning qualitative methods in this dissertation, face-to-face interviews were initially conducted, based on two different groups of individuals. Firstly, interviews with local townspeople and local non-governmental actors were collected by use of the snowball method. Secondly, targeted interviews with politicians and town officials were conducted. These interviews were conducted in Poland’s Tri-City area and the border town of Braniewo between 2012 and 2015. Towards this direction an effort was made during field work to go beyond structured interviews and instead immerse myself in life at the border for months at a time. Chapter 3 discusses how these methods and are used in the study’s five papers.
For the most part, this dissertation uses contemporary sources concerning the Polish-Russian border and borders in general. Initially, a literature review is conducted on research into the topic in the social sciences. Contemporary sources are used because of the difficulty in obtaining scholarship dating to the period between the 1940s and 1980s, when the Polish-Russian border was essentially a closed military border, and academic scholarship on the subject in both countries was almost entirely repressed. Nevertheless, the review and later analysis of the contemporary sources is multidisciplinary, and largely includes the fields of human geography, border studies, sociology, and history. Throughout the dissertation, this type of meta-analysis is used. The literature used can be found throughout all the presented papers. Literature concerning Poland’s other borders is briefly mentioned in this volume. This is not to suggest that a comparative approach has been taken with these borders; my purpose here is to place the Polish-Russian border in the correct contextual frame where the countries’ other borders are concerned. My research considers academic literature concerning the Polish- German and the Polish-Ukrainian border, such as Teufel (2014), Asher (2008), Sagan (2011), Zhurzhenko (2011), etc. This is reflected both in the articles of this dissertation and this introduction.
Concerning an ethical code, the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity’s 2009 recommendations have been followed. This is in line with the University of Eastern Finland’s own guidelines concerning project research in the behavioral and social sciences1. Interview recommendations have been followed and all interview data have been anonymized at the participants’ request. Interviewees were not paid.
Several ethical issues came to light in researching this dissertation. Initially, the most specific and pressing was how to conduct fieldwork in the presence of illegal activity, specifically petty smuggling, on the Polish-Russian border. The interviews in the first article in particular use this information. Concerning illegal activities, it was observed that smuggling often occurred in what might be called the gray economic area. To use the ideas of both the legal and the illegal as referenced by Cheema et al., one can say this gray area was one where the legality of certain actions could be argued as legal or illegal depending on one’s own perspective (Cheema et al. 2016). It is easily understood that the establishment of a shadow economy or the exploitation of semi-legal gray areas can create doubt in the viability of regulatory frameworks and takes capital away from systems of governance (Fleming et al. 2000). These gray market forces have real world consequences for tax collection. It must be acknowledged that petty smuggling provided a form of subsistence for a great number of individuals on the Polish- Russian border. What cannot be said about this unreported and unregulated economy is that these semi-legal actions were undertaken unconsciously. Those who participated in them were aware that, although they were not breaking the law, they were very close to doing so. Reference to Richardson and Pisani (2012:26) suggests that their actions were semi-legal at best and risked becoming illegal. This dissertation leaves the question of the morality of such economic activity for others to judge. For my own part, I did not myself participate in breaking any laws or statutes of either the Russian Federation or the Republic of Poland; nor did I benefit monetarily from any such activities. However, it was concluded that this activity was important for many in the local community as a means of subsistence rather than as a criminal enterprise, and could not be ignored.
Positionality as defined by Foote and Bartell (2011) requires the following observations about the research presented in this dissertation. Firstly, I am a dual citizen (Poland and The United States) conducting research through a university in a third country (Finland). In conducting my research, I introduced myself as Polish to those being researched. Secondly, although I am of Polish descent and speak the language fluently, I do so with a slight, albeit noticeable, accent. This sometimes made research and interviews difficult, since it confused some participants about my own identity. At best, both facts made me a mild curiosity. At worst, I was looked upon with suspicion. It often seemed that an initial barrier was created because of my circumstances. Later interviews proved this barrier was negotiable.
1 source: http://www.tenk.fi/sites/tenk.fi/files/ethicalprinciples.pdf
However, it always seemed that this process started again when new research subjects were introduced. At the end of the study, it was felt that with some subjects this barrier was still present. The question of who those being studied were to me and who I was to them intrigued me. Although we spoke the same language, we were not the same. Our mannerisms and ways of being were different. I do not believe, however, that my positionality adversely affected the research in this volume.
The next section traces the historical background of the Polish-Russian border by identifying its significant origins. To understand the border’s significance, one needs to understand its context, since, as Cresswell states, “…local actions, including those of individual humans, always contain something of the far away and long ago within them” (2013:251). Similarly, borders should not be viewed ahistorically, but instead as a window in concert and in context in the progression of the nation state (O’Dowd 2010, Ferdoush 2017). This remains especially true for the Polish-Russian border. Although the border is essentially a product of the post- 1945 world, its predecessors need to be traced to the 13th century.
1.4 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As stated previously, the formal Polish-Russian border is an almost straight line running along the northeastern part of Poland. The border runs for approximately 232 km, and is currently the only shared border between the two countries. It separates the Kaliningrad Oblast (region) from the Warmia-Mazury Wojewod (region). The Polish region is currently home to 1.4 million people, while the Russian region is currently home to approximately 950 thousand people. The principal city of the Russian region is Kaliningrad, with more than 46% of the population of the area. The Polish region’s population is more dispersed. The largest city of the Warmia-Mazury region, Olsztyn (pop. 180,000), comprises only 12% of the population. Smaller but still notable population centers can be found in Elbląg (pop. 120,000) and Ełk (pop. 60,000). An area of the Pomeranian region can also be included as part of the Polish border region because of SBT border travel restrictions. This area is comprised of the Tri-City, a cooperative administrative unit between the towns of Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot, as well as smaller towns and villages in the region (total pop. approx. 1.1 million)2.
The Kaliningrad region also borders Lithuania to the northeast. This makes the region an exclave from the rest of the Russian Federation. This situation is further complicated by the fact that both Poland and Lithuania are now members of both the EU and NATO. Currently, the only way to access Kaliningrad by land from the
2 For statistics concerning these regions, see the following:
Kaliningrad: https://knoema.com/atlas/Russian-Federation/Kaliningrad-Region.
Warmia-Mazury: https://knoema.com/atlas/Poland/Warminsko-Mazurskie
rest of Russia is to travel through several foreign countries or to travel by sea from Saint Petersburg. Air transport is still limited to major Russian cities, namely Saint Petersburg and Moscow, as well as some capitals of the former Soviet republics (Minsk & Tashkent).
The present-day area of Kaliningrad was historically populated by ethnic Prussians. The group was of Baltic ethnic stock, like its neighbors in Lithuania and Latvia (Wolffsen & Sergounin 2004). The region was conquered and colonized by the Germanic Teutonic Order in the early 13th century (Diener 2013, Krickus 2002:16-20). The Order’s conquest left its members in charge of a monastic kingdom. The area later became a Polish fiefdom after their defeat by Polish and Lithuanian forces at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410. The knights continued to rule the area until the order was dissolved in 1525. The area continued as a Polish fiefdom until the partition of Poland in the late 18th century.
From the 13th century until the Second World War, the capital of the region was Königsberg (today’s Kaliningrad). Although the area, called East Prussia, underwent multiple political and alliance changes over the centuries, it remained relatively stable. Likewise, during this period, the area’s dynastic political rulers, the Prussian line of the House of Hohenzollern, ruled almost unchecked until Germany’s unification in 18713.
With the creation of the Second Polish Republic in 1918, the area became a de facto exclave from the rest of Germany after World War (Fig. 1). In 1920, a plebiscite was organized by Germany and Poland in disputed East Prussian areas to which both countries laid claim. Both sides offered historical, cultural, and linguistic evidence to convince voters that the territory should fall within their jurisdiction.
Figure 1 shows the area of Mazuria that ultimately voted to join Germany.
According to Minakowski, the vote was marred by violence and outright fraud by the German side (Minakowski 2010). This is not surprising, given that the Polish electoral commission boycotted any overseeing of both the actual vote and the vote counting before a single ballot had been cast. This was mainly due to concerns that the organizational structure of the vote was being tilted toward voting to join Germany.
Although the 1920s and 1930s were a peaceful time for the region, German antagonism concerning it was rife during this period. According to Karski, many in the Weimar government resented the fact that East Prussia had been cut off from the rest of Germany (Karski 2014). This was to escalate into a full trade war between 1925 and 1934. Both governments levied tariffs on the other’s raw material exports and finished products (steel, coal, and foodstuffs). While for Poland, the trade war was the result of a tit-for-tat or protectionist policy to defend its own markets, for Germany it hinged on German demands for border adjustments and Poland’s refusal to make any such changes. The German demands included the return of the
3 In 1871, the ruler of Prussia, Wilhelm I, was crowned Emperor of a unified German state after France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war.
entire Polish Corridor and the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk)4. The Polish government found these demands unreasonable, as they would deprive the country of access to the Baltic coast and the newly built port in the city of Gdynia.
The Polish-German customs war finally ended in 1934 with the signing of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact.
However, the issue of border modifications was not settled. According to Hehn, the leadership of the Polish government believed that the pact bought the country time to re-arm and prepare for possible future hostilities (Hehn 2005). The leadership believed that there was a need to industrialize and to modernize the armed forces against possible future German aggression. The Polish government believed that a struggle was inevitable and would be concentrated in the Polish Corridor and the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk).
Figure 1. Map of the Second Polish Republic, 1921 (Source http://irena.sikorska.free.fr/map1920.jpg)
4 Business leaders in East Prussia deplored the tariffs that were placed on goods being imported and exported from the region by road and rail via Poland. Many of these goods often had their origin or destination in Germany, but were nonetheless taxed.
The Polish government was proved correct. The rise of the Nazi government in the late 1930s brought about renewed calls for Poland to cede the areas to Germany.
The Nazi government was emboldened after multiple bloodless conquests in Europe, and turned its attention to regaining the lost territories of Pomerania, Gdańsk and the Polish Corridor. Snyder states that these territories were used by the government as nationalistic pretexts to declare war (Snyder 2003:88). Nazi Germany declared war on Poland on September 1st 1939 after its refusal to settle the land dispute diplomatically in late August of that year. The German government’s false flag operations afforded a further pretext5. German territorial claims would eventually become the catalyst for World War II. The war concluded with the defeat of Germany by the allied powers in 1945, when Poland and many other European nations regained their sovereignty.
Figure 2. Historical map of the evolution of East Prussia/Kaliningrad Oblast (Source: Diener
& Hagen, 2013: 569)
5 See Ailsby (2001) for a detailed description of the Gleiwitz Incident and Operation Himmler
The origins of the modern Polish nation with its current borders lie in two events.
The current Polish-Russian border is a product of the end of World War II in 1945 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1945, the Kaliningrad Oblast (region) and the Warmia-Mazury Wojowod (county) were part of the German Reich in the province of Ostpreußen or East Prussia (Fig. 2). In 1948, East Prussia ceased to exist when it was formally annexed to the Soviet Union and Poland as agreed at the 1943 Tehran conference. After the war, the USSR began a campaign of ethnic cleansing and deportations from the region (Merten 2012, Douglas 2012). The rest of the decade saw mass deportations of the remaining German population from conquered German lands and a resettling of individuals from other parts of the USSR6. Diener and Hagen state that the area was then repopulated by citizens who were deemed loyal to the communist authorities (Diener & Hagen 2011). This repopulation was mostly composed of ethnic Russians (80%), and Sovietized Ukrainians and Belarusians. The authorities hoped that this would create a homogenized and Soviet sensibility. Similarly, the area on the Polish side of the border was repopulated with and culturally appropriated by Poles and Ukrainians, who were resettled from territories annexed to the Soviet Union (Gorzelak 2006:198). The communist government’s propaganda claimed the former Prussian area was returning to Poland, and likewise deported local inhabitants (Douglas 2012:93-98).
The Soviet area was decreed a military zone by the government of the USSR in 1949. The final border was demarcated in 1951 and closed to all traffic7. The Soviet government decreed the area closed to foreigners (Palmowski 2010:75). Likewise, an internal Soviet border was created for the region, which also closed it to Soviet citizens without travel approval8. There were no meaningful restrictions in the Polish annexed areas beyond security areas demarcated at several military bases. In general, the Polish-Soviet border between the end of World War II and the end of communism saw very low levels of permeability and almost no cooperation because of its hard border regime (Komornicki 2010: 56).
6 This process was not unique to East Prussia or the USSR. Poland also annexed territories and deported individuals from Silesia and Pomerania only to settle Poles there from lost territories to the east. Czecho- slovakia similarly deported Germans from the Sudeten region and allowed its own citizens of Czech or Slovak ethnicity to settle in the area.
7 Exceptions were made on an official basis. One example of this was for the military traffic transiting Poland to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Wolfe (1970:470).
8 The reason for the creation of both internal and external borders was the Soviet view that the region was of military importance. This was the case because of both its Cold War proximity to Warsaw Pact allies and its ice free Baltic Sea port. The area became less militarily significant toward the end of the Cold War, and again more significant in the Post-Soviet period for Russia after the Baltic States regained independence. For more information, see Drezner (1999: 215-218).
Figure 3. Historical map of land area of Europe after 1920 and present day (Source: Diener &
Hagen, 2013:571)
After resettlement by the communist authorities, the Polish side of the border retained the area’s pre-war, largely agricultural, character. Although the area suffered major destruction in the war and was left with very little industry, it was better equipped, with higher standard German housing stock and road network than other parts of the country (Gorzelak 2006:198). This led to the government failing to invest large sums in new infrastructure and housing. The communist authorities did try to build up the area via heavy industrial projects and large scale agriculture, often with mixed results at best. Likewise, the Russian side of the border saw extensive heavy industrialization, but this was done via the creation of a vast military industrial complex and collectivized agriculture (Palmowski 2010:79-83).
The border was not reopened until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
There was an increase in both cross-border trade and individual interactions after the collapse of the USSR (Palmowski 2010:75-76). Poland began talks in the mid- 1990s to join organizations such as NATO and the EU. This complicated the border arrangement. As the talks were completed (1999 and 2004 respectively), a new arrangement was sought. Due to Poland’s new defense and economic alliances with NATO and the West, the border area assumed greater significance for both sides.
The Polish authorities were concerned that the future closing of the exclave would stoke tensions in an already militarized region (Diener & Hagan 2010).
Concerns that Russia might close Kaliningrad to Poles were generally resolved in 2003 with an agreement between the two countries that allowed Polish citizens to
apply for a preferential visa. Again, with the formal incorporation of Poland into the EU in 2004, travel from the Russian side of the border became more difficult.
From late 2004 until July 2012, according to bilateral EU agreements, Russian citizens could enter Poland without a visa if they resided within 30 km of the border and had completed the corresponding paperwork with the Polish border agency, a similar arrangement to those existing with non-EU neighbors Ukraine and Belarus (Radio Free Europe 2010). Since the late 1990s, the EU’s internal border security had been promoted through the building of closer economic ties, a break from traditional ideas of securitized military demarcation lines (Andreas 2003). It has been argued that this process also can occur on the union’s external borders, but seemingly in an uneven fashion as evident from the case of Kaliningrad and Ukraine (Sagan 2011). More recently, security fears and historical animosities have been fueling the push toward the Polish-Russian border becoming a more militarized and securitized demarcation.
In the EU, the 1990s saw looser border regulations and the creation of a border regime which hinged on the idea of creating a united political and economic space where laws could be applied uniformly, while maintaining nation states’ sovereign power (Scott 2011: 135-136). The ultimate goal of this consolidation was the creation of mobility via a borderless European single market within which members could trade without tariffs or duties on each other’s goods and services. Throughout the latter half of the decade and into the next, member states of the European Union that had signed the Schengen Agreement systematically transformed the status quo of European borders. As countries in the European Union made strides to integrate more closely into the common market, further aspects that concerned borders and sovereignty lessened. These included such diverse aspects as regulation, taxation, a common employment market, a single external border zone, etc. Whereas once these had been the purview of the nation state and its exclusive sovereignty, they were now determined by the EU collectively. Policy and the regulation of borders were agreed by member states9. Likewise, EU member states strengthened their external non-EU border areas in this period.
For many EU member states, the system of mobility provided open borders between signatories and ameliorated many difficulties that had been plaguing the continent as a whole by creating an interdependent community (Heinz & Ward- Warmedinger 2006). At a national level, member states benefited from the mobility
9 The exceptions to this should be noted: The United Kingdom and Ireland are member states but are not signatories to the Schengen Agreement. Each country maintains its own border regime, including border checks and unique bureaucracies. However, both have incorporated common market rules into their own border frameworks. Similar to this are the cases of Romania, Croatia, Cyprus, and Bulgaria. These countries are obliged to join the Schengen agreement when they have passed an assessment by the Eu- ropean Commission. Two of these countries, Bulgaria and Romania, have recently qualified. Three countries, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, are not EU member states but have signed and adhere to all the protocols of the Schengen Agreement. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we- do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm.
of their own and each other’s citizens. This allowed nation-states to be more flexible concerning large national questions such as structural demographic problems, the lack, as well as the overabundance, of both skilled and unskilled labor, under- population, etc. At the local level, access to the other side of the border allowed communities the use of facilities and resources that might not have been available on their own side. Examples of this were schools, hospitals, housing, etc. The open border dynamic highlighted disparities between member states10. Areas that had seen a population decline saw an influx of individuals from the other side of the divide11. Border trade often fostered an increase in traffic for one or both sides of the border.
During the two decades since its formation, certain challenges became apparent as the Schengen Agreement and the wider common market grew in size and scope.
Although a level playing field had been created between all signatories, countries which bordered non-EU neighbors saw formerly open or accessible borders becoming harder to cross (Mrinska 2006: 81-93). Places that once only demanded a simple passport for entry would instead require multiple layers of bureaucracy and proof. In some countries, the new common Schengen visa regime created barriers to travel where none had existed before.
In preparing to join the Schengen Agreement, Poland was mandated by the EU to tightly regulate its non-EU eastern and northern borders12. This blanket agreement replaced Polish visa regimes that had been loosely or specifically regulated for various reasons. Reasons for this loose regulation included sporting events occurring within Poland, minority ethnic groups on both sides of the border, trade networks, seasonal employment, etc. Whereas once a visa could be obtained at the border for very little or no money, the system created a barrier to crossing by charging a uniform fee13.
The introduction of the visa system saw a decrease in border traffic along all Poland’s non-EU borders (Studzińska & Domaniewski 2016)14. The reason for this lay not only with the Polish authorities or the introduction of their visa regime.
During this period, the Russian authorities also created a visa regime that required
10 Most commonly, these have included price differences in staple and non-staple goods such as food, alcohol, gasoline, household items, etc.
11 For an example of this phenomenon concerning Poland, see the cases Görlitz (DE) and Zgorzelec (PL), Frankfurt Oder (DE), and Słubice (PL) as described by Teufel (2014) and Asher (2008).
12 The country borders three non-EU nation states: Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
13 It should also be stated that the Schengen visa regime often requires multiple forms of proof to be submitted. These proofs can include bank statements going back six months, employment leave letters, a current employment contract, up-to-date income tax returns, and a formal invitation letter from an EU resident or business.
14 After the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 2003, Poland began to implement multiple layers of EU bureaucracy in its own visa system in preparation for entering the agreement in late 2007. On the Polish-Russian border, this resulted in a 67% drop in individual crossings of the Polish-Russian border between 2005 and 2009. This estimate is based on data provided by the Polish office of the Border Guards.
travelers to apply for and purchase a much more expensive visa than the one that had been previously available. Although it did not require the same level of bureaucracy as the Schengen visa, the fact that a mutual visa regime had been instituted created a barrier on both sides of the border. Likewise, the 2007 financial crisis hindered border traffic growth. Policymakers from all sides could agree on the need for the mobility of both goods and people between Russia and the EU.
These were seen as a way of alleviating not only disparities, but also heightened security tensions.
Specific to Poland and Lithuania was the creation of a solution to each country’s border issues with Russia. Both countries border the Russian region of Kaliningrad.
This border divide was further reinforced after both Poland and Lithuania, in addition to joining NATO and the EU, joined the Schengen Zone in 2007. Brokering an agreement with the Kaliningrad region seemed a logical first step toward a possible broader agreement between Russia and the rest of the EU. Initial recommendations were made to the EU by all three nation-states. An agreement on the transit of individuals from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia through Lithuania was solved by the use of facilitated transit documents (Acher & Eztold 2010). This solution was piecemeal at best, as it did not create a reciprocal transit regime that could be used to regularly cross the border to visit neighboring countries without having to purchase a standard EU Schengen visa.
The EU’s solution was a visa-free zone named the ‘Small Border Traffic Zone’, or the SBT (Rogoza et al. 2011). The plan called for a zone to extend 30 km from the borders of the Polish-Russian state. Residents of the region would be allowed to have visa-free access to the other side of the border if they met certain requirements. These included a minimum residency requirement, that they be in good standing concerning other visa programs, and that they did not constitute a security threat to a member state. Any penalties for breaking the regulation of the SBT fell to the country involved. The current visa regime was supplanted, and identification cards were issued to access the other side of the border. The EU plan immediately ran into opposition from the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian governments for various reasons. The EU’s provision calling for a 30 km zone on each side of the border was the largest sticking point for both Poland and Russia15. Such a zone would not have allowed the overwhelming majority of Kaliningrad residents access to the scheme, and would have completely omitted the region’s largest population concentration (the city of Kaliningrad) of over 500,000 people.
Similarly, only a sparse population on the Polish and Lithuanian side of the border would have been able to avail of the system, as it would have omitted every significant population center16.
15 The EU’s initial idea called for a 25 km area on each side of the border, but this was quickly changed to 30 km.
16 Elblag, a city of 120,000 approximately 45 km from the border, is the closest.
The Russian government, with the support of Poland, lobbied the EU to explore an expanded version of the system. The result was a scheme that saw the entire Kaliningrad region incorporated into the geographical area of the scheme on the Russian side of the border (Agreement on Visa-Free Travel Zone between Poland and Russia 2012). Likewise, Poland saw a large expansion of the scheme to not only the Warmia-Mazury region, but also west to the Tri-City region and other parts of the Pomorskie region17. Lithuania was not keen to join, believing that such a large scheme would make a visa-free zone of almost the entire country. Such a scheme had been negotiated in 2009 between the two countries, but they had failed to agree on the size of the area that could be traveled through (Dudzinska & Dyner 2013).
The functioning of the visa regime for Polish-Russian borderlanders changed in July 2012. A visa-free zone was created that encompassed the entire Kaliningrad Oblast, half of the Warmia-Mazury region, and the Tri-City area of Sopot, Gdańsk, and Gdynia, which comprised 10 percent of the Pomorskie region. Figure 3 shows the extent of the areas that Russians and Poles were allowed to travel to in each other’s territory (darker areas). Under the scheme, all those living in the affected area could travel to the other country for up to thirty days in a month or ninety days in a six-month period, provided that their primary residence had been in the Polish or Russian SBT Zone for the three previous years. Travel beyond these areas could result in one or all of a number of penalties: a variable fine of between €5 and
€125, the threat of deportation, the revocation of a currently-held Schengen visa, and a ban on the renewal of subsequent visa-free travel. These penalties who have standing against the individual for an undetermined period of time18. The law was based on an already functioning SBT visa-free scheme that had been established between Poland and Ukraine in 2009, which contained similar provisions (Skorupska 2013:1). The possession of an SBT travel permit did not allow individuals to work or trade on the territory of the other country. Likewise, taking pictures of guarded or sensitive objects was prohibited, although these objects were often inadequately or not at all marked (Agreement on Visa-Free Travel Zone between Poland and Russia 2012).
Similarly, Poles could avail of this travel system within an identical reciprocal regulatory framework (Dudzinska & Dyner 2013). However, the Polish authorities allowed certain provisions to be adjusted, or did not impose certain restrictions on their own citizens concerning three key areas. Firstly, Poles were issued a standardized card that allowed travel within the visa-free scheme, unlike Kaliningraders, who had to use a registered passport. Secondly, Poles were allowed to travel throughout almost the entire Kaliningrad region rather than just a portion
17 The scheme stretches as far south as the Warmia-Mazury regional seat of Olsztyn, 70 km south, and Debki, 120 km west, of the border. For a detailed map of the area, see Figure 4.
18 From the Polish Ministry of the Interior Website:
https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/informacje_konsularne/maly_ruch_graniczny/ accesed 15.06.15
of it19. Lastly, Poles involved in a governmental role, for example the fire, police, or military services, were not restricted from participating in the visa-free travel scheme20.
Figure 4. Extent of the ‘Small Border Traffic Area’ (Source: Domaniewski & Studzińska, 2016)
The scheme was instituted in July 2012, and saw a rise of almost 30% in the overall number of individual border crossings between 2012 and 2013 (Studzińska &
Domaniewski 2016). The SBT was highly successful after it first opened in mid- 2012. That year saw a growth of nearly 100% in the number of individual crossings against the previous year. VAT reimbursements also increased during the same period by approximately 110%21. The Polish border guards estimated that the
19 An exception exists for the actual border line itself. This is likewise also true for certain militairy areas near the border a section of the Nemen river basin as set down by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Dudzinska & Dyner (2013).
20 This last statement often causes some confusion, as there is no mention or declaration in the regula- tions of the visa-free regime that blocks either party from allowing any such individuals to participate.
The fact that Kaliningraders of the above stated occupations cannot participate is because of a decree imposed by the Russian Federation, not by the Republic of Poland.
21 For a full description of VAT reimbursement and border crossing statistics, see Domaniewski, S. &
Studzinska, D. (2016).
system would see a year-on-year rise to over 7 million individual crossings in both 2014 and 2015.
The SBT was extremely popular with residents on both sides of the border. Poles chose to cross the border to purchase cheaper gasoline, cigarettes, and alcohol.
Meanwhile, Kaliningraders crossed to purchase higher quality goods, for entertainment, and to exploit cheaper air travel to other countries in the EU, which depended on obtaining a Schengen visa. Since the start of the scheme, there was a year-on-year increase in individual crossings and VAT reimbursements until mid- 2014. During these years, there was even some discussion between Poland and Russia concerning the expansion of the area to municipalities further south of Olsztyn. Neighboring Belarus also expressed interest in such a scheme after the Polish-Russian SBT’s initial success22.
This changed after the annexation of Crimea, when the subsequent sanctions on and countersanctions by Russia caused the growth in travel to slow (Fig. 4).
Although the Polish border guards estimated in early 2014 that the system would see a year-on-year rise to over 7 million individual crossings during both 2014 and 2015, this did not materialize (Polish Border Guard Data 2014). Instead, the growth in individual crossings stagnated in 2015. VAT reimbursements and total individual crossings decreased in the second half of 2014 and barely increased in 2015 (Border Guards Statistic 2015). The reason for the stagnation in VAT reimbursements was not only the increase in geopolitical concerns, but also the decrease in the price of oil. Likewise, EU-Russian sanctions and counter-sanctions caused the exchange rates between the Russian ruble and other currencies to fluctuate wildly23. Talks concerning the enlargement of the area on the Polish side or the expansion of the program to neighboring Belarus have been largely canceled.
The military resurgence of the Russian Federation has caused a shift in how the Republic of Poland perceives its northern border with the Kaliningrad region. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, issues of a cooperative or lower level bureaucratic nature have been replaced by geopolitical concerns. Moreover, recent Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine and Syria have reinforced Poland’s and the EU’s wariness towards its northern neighbor. Security concerns have also escalated because of the recent modernization of Russia’s military. In early 2016, Poland began to build watchtowers and reinforce fencing along its 230 kilometer border with the Kaliningrad region24. The country has also become the host for a number of NATO exercise missions, a NATO strategic command center, and a future NATO/
American military base in the region. This is a far cry from the situation of early 2014.
22 See http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/803823,maly-ruch-graniczny-z-bialorusia-umowa.html.
23 For historical data on PLN-RUB exchange rate during the period, see http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from= PLN&to=RUB&view=2Y.
24 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/poland-to-build-watchtowers-at-russias- kaliningrad-border.
Figure 5. Border traffic at the Polish–Russian border, 2002–2016 (Source: estimate, based on data from the Border Guard, 2017)
Four years after it came into existence, the SBT was officially halted by the Polish government in July 2016. The Russian government reciprocated25. The forecast for total border crossings for the second half of 2016 shows a year-on-year decrease of 55% in total crossings (Border Guards Total 2016 Statistics). At the time of this dissertation’s submission, the SBT has not reopened. The suspension by the Polish and Russian governments has created doubt as to whether the scheme is still viable in the long-term or whether it can be restarted. Poland has cited security concerns for the cessation of the Polish-Russian SBT. Poland’s Ministry of the Interior stated that the SBT was suspended because of security concerns during the NATO summit which was being hosted in Warsaw during the first and second week of that month and the observance of the Krakow World Youth days at the beginning of August26. Currently, there is no timeline or mechanism available to either government to reverse this decision other than by a unilateral agreement to resume the SBT zone.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the decision to close down the project hurts Poland more than the Kaliningrad region27.
In the months following the closing of the SBT, the current Polish government tried to justify its closure as not only a cost saving measure, but also one that
25 The Polish government also reinstituted border controls at all EU borders and halted the Polish- Ukraine SBT zone. The government stated at the time that the halt of this scheme and the renewed bor- der controls were only temporary. Poland likewise stated that similar security concerns were the catalyst for instituting such actions. The government also stated that these decisions would most likely be re- versed in early August. This was the case for all the border regions involved, except the Polish-Russian border.
26 See https://mswia.gov.pl/en/news/925,Changes-at-the-Polish-borders-starting-with-the-4th-of-July.html.
27 Source http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/maly-ruch-graniczny-z-rosja-nie-wroci-rosyjska-prasa- komentuje/p2rprp This statement is not mere hyperbole. The majority of trade activity, be it the pur- chase of goods and services or tourism, occurs because of Russians on the Polish side of the border. For a detailed account, see Domaniewski & Studzińska (2016).
strengthened security28. The ruling party has stated on numerous occasions that the decision to suspend the visa-free zone is a financially sound one. The current government has gone so far as to state that statistics show that Poles spend more in Kaliningrad than Russians do in Poland29. Although this is true, it is only so because Polish border regions within the SBT have a larger population than the Kaliningrad region. The government’s statements are misleading at best.
The shift in Poland’s perception of the border has now extended to reversing previously existing border programs. While military concerns vis-à-vis the Russian Federation do exist, the project to facilitate the movement of goods and people between northern Poland and Kaliningrad should continue in earnest.
The following chapter reflects on the theoretical aspects of this dissertation and links it to the empirical research found in the articles which can be found at the end of this volume.
28 See Vice-Minister Jakub Skiba’s (Ministry of the Interior) comments on 23.08.2016, as recorded by Polskie Radio. http://www.polskieradio.pl/42/273/Artykul/1658878,Zawieszenie-malego-ruchu- granicznego-z-Rosja-oplaca-sie-budzetowi.
29See Vice Minister Sebastian Chwalek’s (Ministry of the Interior) comments to the Polish Sejm concerning the MRG on 14.09.2016. http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter8.nsf/0/F2B2B49A9F2CB6CAC125802E006EDA79 /%24File/25_b_ksiazka.pdf.
2 THEORY
“Borders? I’ve never seen one, but I’ve heard they exist in the mind of some people.”
-Thor Heyerdahl- Kon-Tiki (1948)
2.1 THEORETICAL & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework used in the dissertation, as well as its limitations. This section discusses the ideas of bordering and how they relate to theoretical writings and this dissertation as a whole.
Specifically, this section discusses the theories concerning structure and agency, and how these relate to the border. It argues that several factors must be considered concerning the border. These include ideas, perceptions, and cultural exchange, and can be used to understand how the border does or does not function. The goal of any nation state is to harness these factors to create a balance that not only allows for trade to flow, but also for stability to take hold. This cannot be done by providing a closed border regime. Such a scenario often breeds political infighting and tension, not only between locals, but also between different levels of governance. This tension itself stems largely from an inability to create interaction between the two sides of the border. Similarly, a fully open border regime limits the effectiveness of interaction because of the chance of instability taking hold (Newman 2006:18). Instead, a balance must be created between the forces of structure and agency which govern the border.
The following sections of this chapter present a brief discussion of borders and how they can be defined in today’s increasingly globalized world. Firstly, this chapter defines the border. Secondly, it discusses the identity of borders and borders as resources as they are used as theoretical constructs in this dissertation. It also discusses and contextualizes structure and agency as an approach, and its use in interpreting different aspects of the border. Lastly, it discusses the theory of Border Studies as presented by Brunet-Jailly (2005). As already noted, this theory should be seen as a schema or tool for the investigation of the different aspects of the border.
2.1.1 The border
This dissertation uses Alvarez’ definition of the border as a line which creates a separation between different groups, geographical regions, and societal norms (1995:448). Each side of the divide is stratified and conditioned, not only by events, but also by institutions and rules. This can cause them to adhere to contradictory
notions of space and place on either side of the border. Secondly, the separation is a man-made demarcation. Within it, the border creates limits to the sovereign power and systems of a country. One crosses this demarcation into another sovereign system that contains its own set of realities (Cote-Boucher 2008). However, Scott states that “… borders are not there only by tradition, wars, agreements and high politics but also made and maintained by other cultural, economic political and social activities. Everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ practices connive to create and recreate new social-cultural boundaries and divisions which are also spatial in nature” (Scott 2015:32).
The nation state is the container of sovereign power and national systems (Paasi 1999). The man-made demarcation that is the border creates a lid for the container.
Although the systems are separated, according to Paasi (2002), their containment and demarcation do not mean a complete separation between them. Instead, Paasi states that the “… modern state is a territory, which only partly remains within its territorial boundaries; the borders are actually sets of shifting discourses and social practices that mediate the links between inside and outside” (2002:192). These discourses and social practices can spill over the demarcation line, depending on the border’s permeability. Likewise, Newman states that “there is a correlation between closed borders, political tension and alienated borderlands on the one hand and open borders, political cooperation and integrated borderlands on the other” (2006:180). It is when the latter is the case that a correlation can also be found for increased permeability between the two sides of the border.
According to Celata & Coletti, border permeability can depend on whether hard or soft borders exist in a certain border area (Celata & Coletti 2015:11-12). The authors define a hard border as one that not only provides a barrier to armies and external politics, but that also relies on cultural exclusion as its first objective. By contrast, soft borders allow for the passage of not only goods and individuals in a mostly unimpeded fashion, but also for the exchange of ideas and culture between the two sides (2015:13-14). Each of these approaches seeks to secure the border and retain its integrity, but does so by different means and for different purposes.
According to Diener and Hagen, one should also remember that the border is a filter for both sovereign entities that govern the border regime (2012:65). This filtering and its resulting permeability occur variably and depend to a great extent on where a good, service, or individual fits in a social or economic hierarchy, and the importance one side or the other gives it. An example of this can be seen in the SBT border regime discussed in this dissertation’s articles – the restrictions that are placed on the individuals allowed to cross the border and how they vary according to which side of the border they are on. One can also see that the goods that are purchased on one side are regulated and allowed to cross differently to the other side.
Diener & Hagen conceptualize borders as variable or stratified filters, which fits well with Paasi’s idea that no single border rules and dominates all aspects of life or
