According to Aristotle, practical and theoretical reasoning are parallel processes. Theoretical knowledge and practical action have an inaliena-ble connection. Knowledge has not only a connection to the character of the action but also to the reasons behind the action – to the intentional-ity of the action. A single event produces a single experience which is not yet exploitable. Several combined events are creating a picture about the effects of the causes, but they are not yet enough to tell why the effects are following the causes. Only causal knowledge explains why certain ef-fects come about and how they are connected to the causes. The aware-ness about causes and effects makes experiences evolve into knowledge.
(Mutanen, 2016)
Richard Sennett (2009, 9 – 12) describes traditional craftsman’s skill as an ongoing dialogue between head and arm: the synthesis of practice and de-liberation. On one hand, it is the capability to use tools and on the other it is knowledge about achieving the objective.
Knowledge about skill is often divided into knowing that and knowing how. The first one refers to theoretical knowledge and the latter to practi-cal knowledge. According to Ryle (2009, 18) one always uses a bit of both when one does something. The basic challenge is that theoretical knowl-edge does not provide a full perspective on how to do something. Vice ver-sa, it is not fully possible to describe “know-how” in a descriptive way – how could one, for example, describe the difference between a good and a bad joke? (Ryle, 2009, 18 – 19)
This division is complex because of the connection between knowing that and knowing how. In the recent discussions concerning “knowing how”
there is a clear disagreement about the grounds of knowing how: is the idea of “knowing how” based on propositional attitudes or on other abili-ties (Breivik, 2014). Is knowing how simply a form of knowing that?
The so-called “intellectualist explanation” of knowing how suggests that there is always theoretical knowledge behind the intentional action. Prac-tical and ethical implications of theorePrac-tical knowledge are diverse. What if an agent has false knowledge but is still able to carry out the desired action? Anti-intellectualism explains “knowing how” as an ability. This means that propositional knowledge alone is not sufficient for knowing how – one must be able. There could also be an important difference be-tween knowing how to do something and being able to do it. Becoming paralyzed may affect being able to walk, but one still knows how to walk.
(Breivik, 2014; Boesch, 2019)
The idea of tacit knowledge gives an important vantage point to the dis-cussion concerning knowing how. The idea about knowledge that one can-not express points out one important aspect of knowledge. There is a kind of knowledge that is connected to the person who carries it and is not able to make it explicit. The origin of this kind of knowledge is intrinsic. It is based on experience and bound to its subject. One important feature is that it is connected to expectations regarding the feeling of experiencing something: “Knowing how to execute involves knowing how it should feel, the bodily feeling and maybe also what the emotional involvement should be” (Breivik, 2014).
The idea of the maker´s knowledge covers both the theoretical and the practical knowledge. The main idea can be summarised as an idea that one can possess the kind of theoretical knowledge that one can bring forth (Hintikka 1974, 80). Maker’s knowledge includes knowing that and
knowing how: theoretical (knowing that) and practical (knowing how) knowledge are inalienable (Hintikka, 1974, 86 – 88).
Instead of building a wall between the natural science and the human sci-ences, they can both be approached through theories of a manmade, arti-ficial world through the concept of a maker´s knowledge. Maker´s knowl-edge has an important connection with practical reasoning. Hintikka (1974, 84) elaborates on the concept of maker´s knowledge regarding prac-tical or intentional knowledge, which are often understood as pracprac-tical reasoning.
Maker´s knowledge has a close connection to intentionality. By con-trast to speculative knowledge, which is derived from known objects, maker´s knowledge is connected to the reason of actual processing or doing. When the artisan is creating his or her artefact, we can observe all the phases of the work process, but we cannot tell why he or she is working that way. There is still a certain goal toward which he or she is aiming. There is a long causal chain and a true intention behind it.
The craftsman is an expert in his or her own area. The craftsman’s focus is directed towards a personal aim. The knowledge and experience a crafts-man possesses are bound to the artefact. He gains more experience every time he creates a new artefact, but the experience is limited to this certain subject (cf. Martini, 2019, 17–118). The craftsman’s competence is focused on solving a certain, known problem.
A craftsman´s skill or ability can be analysed from the viewpoint of habitu-al action (Pollard, 2006). When reaching the level of a highly experienced and skilful actor, the manufacturing of an artefact does not need ongoing attention. Repetition has then developed one´s skills to the self-acting lev-el (Pollard, 2006). The cycle of habituation and repetition improves the ac-tion to something that the agent does not have to think about. In a social setting, the apprentice is not only imitating his master but also improving and exercising his own skills. By intentional exercising and monitoring his own performance, one learns – or habituates – their action.
Breivik (2014) describes the skill acquisition of expert athletes in a broader way – it is not just habitual behaviour: “At high skill levels, the execution of know how is thus an all-embracing activeness involving a person´s cog-nitive, emotional and motor abilities and resources”. A craftsman would in this framework be called an expert when he achieves a high skill level in his area of expertise. This expertise should be evaluated in two differ-ent ways: as backward-looking experience and as forward-looking compe-tence. Experts then should have experience in their field of expertise and be competent in using their experience in solving new problems (Marti-ni, 2019, 117).
Craftsmanship is about developed expertise in a specific area of proficien-cy. It is acquired by experience. The knowledge concerning this expertise is refined intrinsically. The background of knowing may have connection with propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, the central part of the ca-pability is attached to its carrier – it is knowledge attained by its maker.
Gaining this kind of experience or knowledge is a process where the cre-ator makes expertise (knowledge) by exercise. In the beginning, it may demand some examples or theoretical knowledge. When getting more so-phisticated, one begins to adjust their performance by internal guidance.
Internal guidance does not mean anything supernatural. It is about a gut feeling. It is something you already know, or you can do. An experienced professional is able to perform complex operations without specific atten-tion. Being skilled is closely connected to this – being skilled in something enables one to focus attention on something more important: a craftsman doesn´t have to think about how to use tools and may focus on the frag-ile material he is working with; and the football player is able to concen-trate on the situation on the field because his ball control works like auto-mation (Breivik, 2014).
When discussing the maker’s knowledge or practical knowledge, we must remember the inseparable connection between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge on an individual level. While an individual’s under-standing about causal dependency evolves, his capabilities regarding prac-tical knowledge improve (Hintikka, 1974, 86). Theoreprac-tical reason, then, is free from the real world. Experienced world has a restraining essence when one is operating from his practical reasoning. Theoretical reasoning expands possibilities to exercise practical actions by reasoning the upcom-ing actions and their possible effects. The conceptual structure of cause and effect creates awareness of the possibilities to reach the intentionality behind the maker’s knowledge.