Craftsmanship is about developed expertise in a specific area of proficien-cy. It is acquired by experience. The knowledge concerning this expertise is refined intrinsically. The background of knowing may have connection with propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, the central part of the ca-pability is attached to its carrier – it is knowledge attained by its maker.
Gaining this kind of experience or knowledge is a process where the cre-ator makes expertise (knowledge) by exercise. In the beginning, it may demand some examples or theoretical knowledge. When getting more so-phisticated, one begins to adjust their performance by internal guidance.
Internal guidance does not mean anything supernatural. It is about a gut feeling. It is something you already know, or you can do. An experienced professional is able to perform complex operations without specific atten-tion. Being skilled is closely connected to this – being skilled in something enables one to focus attention on something more important: a craftsman doesn´t have to think about how to use tools and may focus on the frag-ile material he is working with; and the football player is able to concen-trate on the situation on the field because his ball control works like auto-mation (Breivik, 2014).
When discussing the maker’s knowledge or practical knowledge, we must remember the inseparable connection between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge on an individual level. While an individual’s under-standing about causal dependency evolves, his capabilities regarding prac-tical knowledge improve (Hintikka, 1974, 86). Theoreprac-tical reason, then, is free from the real world. Experienced world has a restraining essence when one is operating from his practical reasoning. Theoretical reasoning expands possibilities to exercise practical actions by reasoning the upcom-ing actions and their possible effects. The conceptual structure of cause and effect creates awareness of the possibilities to reach the intentionality behind the maker’s knowledge.
Functional explanation means that we are giving an explanation of some-thing by reference to its purpose or function. This kind of explanation dif-fers from the methods of natural sciences, which explain how things are without dividing them into the inner and outer environments. Birds and planes being able to fly can be explained by natural laws. There is no rea-son for a division between an inner and an outer environment. For exam-ple, why do animals in the Arctic have white fur? When explaining this we are shifting to an explanation by functionality: their white colour helps them to survive in that kind of environment. This is only a statement but when we support it with the notion of natural selection, we turn it into an explanation. (Simon, 1996, 7)
The dual nature of the artefact means that it has a connection to the world of causal connection where it works as a physical object and to the world of human beings where it works through intentional acts of human agents (Kroes, 2002). We are used to working with the former physical conceptu-alisation employed and developed by the physical sciences. The latter in-tentional conceptualisation of the world underlies most of the social sci-ences. The problem appears when these two give competing explanations for the same kind of phenomena.
The technological explanation bundles artefacts, physical structure, and functional explanation. Functionality, which is explained in an intention-al language, must be translated to the terminology of structure. The func-tionality of the artefact exploits natural laws, but the operating princi-ples are bound to the use of the artefact. Natural science is not able to ex-plain the functionality of the artefact before it exists. Technological ob-jects’ physical essence and their functionality can be explained with caus-al connections. For example, a piston moving up and down in a cylinder and the energy it produces can be described as a phenomenon with sever-al features. This description is not enough for deductive reasoning to in-vestigate the functionality of the artefact. This phenomenon can produce several outcomes in different uses. On the other hand, it is also impossi-ble to derive the structure of the artefact just by knowing the functional-ity. (Kroes, 1998)
A technological explanation, therefore, is not a deductive explana-tion; it connects structure and function on the basis of causal re-lations and pragmatic rules of actions based on these causal rela-tions. (Kroes, 1998)
The relation between cause and effect has been discussed through the ages without reaching consensus. In this context, it is sufficient to state: When an effect is caused by another effect, the first one must always be followed by the second, which is consequently caused by the first one. Understand-ing cause-effect relations enables predictions – after the first phenomenon, the effect it causes is predictable. Experiments in natural sciences are a
process of intentionally causing cause-effect conditions. With the notion of technology, we are signifying the knowledge we possess about applying cause and effect in practice. (von Wright, 1961, 177 – 178)
We consider a phenomenon explained when its causes have been discov-ered. Natural sciences constitute a system of causal laws. These laws ex-plain how the universe works – all things that happen have some cause.
When we turn our focus to the human and society, the notion of causation becomes much more difficult. Individual intentional and social action does not form a deterministic system like the natural sciences do. (von Wright, 1961, 178 – 179)
G. H. von Wright´s concept of technical norm defines factual statements about the relations between means and ends. When we have a causal law that ‘X causes A in situation B’ we can predict that if X happens in situa-tion B, it may cause A. If the X may be chosen by us (not by nature), the causal law can be converted to a technical norm: “if we want to achieve aim A, and the situation is type B, then we should bring about cause X”.
(Niiniluoto ,1993)
In the context of human sciences, causality is used to represent the cause-effect relationship with respect to human action. When focusing on human behaviour, the role of experience and the context where the agent is oper-ating must be emphasised. In comparison to computer software, humans are likely to act against the rules (Hughes, Kroes & Zwart, 2005). Human beings have the ability to reason, which makes their cause-effect relation-ship differ from the relationrelation-ship between the physical objects. Human rea-soning creates a possibility to make several different choices in similar sit-uations. Human cause-effect relationships can tell us why someone has done something, but it is never a guarantee that this will happen again.
Interaction between physical objects is purely causational, whereas hu-man behaviour bears in itself a significant amount of intentional deliber-ation (Kroes, 2002).
According to Aristotle, the deliberation related to practical knowledge – practical reasoning – focuses on the means, not on the ends. Because act-ing or craftact-ing are both focused on reachact-ing an objective, deliberatact-ing on the objective itself is not the issue in this context. The objective is based on a presumption like healing the patient or creating the desirable legisla-tion. Deliberation thereby focuses on the ways to reach the objective. Prac-tical reasoning is about choosing the best alternative via deliberation. This process is a linear way to achieve understanding about reaching the objec-tive. (Hintikka, 1974, 89 – 90)